Joy-Politik: Taxing Unrealized Capital Gains

25 Wednesday Sep 2024

Tags

Alex Tabarrok, Billionaire Tax, Capital Flight, Jason Furman, Joe Biden, Kamala Harris, Michael Munger, Moore v. United States, Notional Equity Interest, Sam Altman, Tyler Cowen, ULTRA, Unrealized Capital Gains, Wealth Tax

Kamala Harris’ campaign platform lifts several tax provisions from Joe Biden’s ill-fated campaign. The most pernicious of these are lauded by observers on the Left for their “fairness”, but they dismiss some rather obvious economic damage these provisions would inflict. Here, I’ll cover Harris’ proposal to tax unrealized capital gains of the rich in two different ways:

A minimum 25% “billionaire tax” on the “incomes” of taxpayers with net worth exceeding $100 million. This definition of income would include unrealized capital gains.
A tax of 28% at the time of death on unrealized capital gains in excess of $5 million ($10 million for joint returns).

Why Bother?

To get a whiff of the complexity involved, take a look at the description on pp. 79 – 85 of this document, to which the Harris proposal seems to correspond. It’s not fully fleshed out, but it’s easy to imagine the lucrative opportunities this would create for tax attorneys and accountants, to say nothing of job openings at the IRS!

On the other hand, there’s little chance these proposals would be approved by Congress, no matter which party holds a majority. Harris knows that, or at least her advisors do. That taxation of unrealized gains is even part of the conversation in a presidential election year tells us how normalized the idea has become within the Democrat Party, which seems to have lost all regard for private property rights. These are classist proposals designed to garner the votes of the “tax-the-rich” crowd, who either aren’t aware or haven’t come to grips with the fact that the U.S. already has a very progressive income tax system. “The rich” already pay a disproportionately high share of taxes.

Taxable Income

These provisions would complicate and corrupt the income tax code by distorting the definition of income for tax purposes. The Internal Revenue Code has always been consistent in defining taxable income as realized income. One might use the expression “mark-to-market taxation” to characterize a tax on unrealized gains from tradable assets. It’s much more difficult to estimate unrealized gains on non-tradable or infrequently traded investments, for which there is no ready market value.

There is one type of income that some believe to be taxed as unrealized. A few weeks ago, in a post about Sam Altman’s infatuation with a wealth tax, I cited a recent Supreme Court decision that has been mistakenly interpreted as favoring income taxation of unrealized gains or a wealth tax. In fact, Moore v. United States involved the undistributed profits of a foreign pass-through entity (i.e., not a C corporation) for purposes of the mandatory repatriation tax. The foreign firm’s profits were realized, and its pass-through status meant that the U.S. owners had also, by definition, realized the profits. So this case did not set a precedent or create an exception to the rule that income taxation applies only to realized income.

Forced Sales

Tradable assets with easily recorded market values will often have unrealized gains in a given year. While tax payments might be spread over the current and future tax years, these taxes could necessitate asset sales to pay the taxes owed. If unrealized losses are treated symmetrically, they would require either future deductions or possibly credits for prior tax payments.

Estimates of unrealized gains on illiquid or private investments like closely-held business interests, artwork, or real estate are highly uncertain and subject to dispute. A large tax liability on such an asset could be especially burdensome. Cash must be raised, which might require a forced sale of other assets. And again, these valuations often come with great complexity and exorbitant administrative costs, not just for the IRS, but especially for taxpayers.

Economic Downsides

As I noted above, additional taxes on unrealized gains would create an obvious need for liquidity, if not immediately then at death. With or without careful planning, sales of assets by wealthy investors to pay the tax would undermine market values of equity (and other assets), producing a broader loss of wealth economy-wide.

Avoidance schemes would be heavily utilized. For example, a wealthy investor could borrow heavily against assets so as to offset unrealized gains with deductible debt-service costs.

Capital flight is likely to be intense if a Harris tax regime began to take shape in Congress. This might be the best avoidance scheme of all. The U.S. is likely to experience massive capital outflows. Furthermore, investment in new physical capital will decline, ultimately leading to lower productivity and real wages.

Entrepreneurial activity would also take a hit. In a critique of Jason Furman’s effort to justify Harris’ proposal, Tyler Cowen asks why we should be so eager to “whack” venture capital. He also quotes an email from Alex Tabarrok on the detrimental policy effects on rapidly growing start-ups:

“What’s really going on is that you are divorcing the entrepreneur from their capital at precisely the moment that the team is likely most productive. Separation of capital from entrepreneur could negatively impact the company’s growth or the entrepreneur’s ability to manage effectively. The entrepreneur could lose control, for example. If you wait until the entrepreneur realizes the gain that’s the time that the entrepreneur wants out and is ready to consume so it’s closer to taxing consumption and better timed in the entrepreneurial growth process.“

Or the entrepreneur might just decide that a startup would be more rewarding in a tax-friendly environment, perhaps somewhere overseas.

Interest Rates and Tax Receipts

Tabarrok notes in a separate post that much of the variation in stock prices is caused by changes in interest rates. Investors use market rates to determine discount rates at which a firm’s future cash flows can be valued. Thus, changes in rates engender changes in stock prices, capital gains, and capital losses.

A decline in interest rates can raise market valuations without any change in dividends. However, a long-term investor would see no change in pre-tax income or consumption, so the tax could force a series of premature sales. A change in a firm’s expected growth rate would also create an unrealized gain (or loss), but the tax would undermine U.S. equity values. Taxing an actual increase in the dividend is one thing, but taxing a change in expectations of future dividends is another. As Tabarrok puts it, “It’s taxing the chickens before the eggs have hatched.“

Dangerous Narrative, Dangerous Policy

A final objection to taxing unrealized capital gains is that it would cross the line into a form of wealth taxation. Assets come in many forms, but the only time realized values can be discerned are when they are traded. That goes for collectibles, homes, boats, and the full array of financial assets. A corollary is that a very large percentage of wealth is unrealized.

A tax on unrealized gains would be the proverbial camel’s nose under the tent and another incursion into the private realm. So often in the history of taxation we’ve seen narrow taxes expand into broad taxes. This is one more opportunity for the state to extend its dominance and control.

I’ve written in the past about the economic dangers of a wealth tax. First, every dollar of income used to purchase capital is already taxed once. In that sense, the cost basis of wealth would be double taxed under a wealth tax. Second, the supply of capital is highly elastic. This implies a high propensity for capital flight, shallowing of productive physical capital, and reduced productivity and real wages. Avoidance schemes would rapidly be put into play. Given these limitations, the revenue raising potential of a wealth tax is unlikely to live up to expectations. Finally, a wealth tax is unconstitutional, but that won’t stop the Left from pushing for one, especially if they first get a tax on unrealized gains. Even if they are unsuccessful now, the conversation tends to normalize the idea of a wealth tax among low-information voters, and that is a shame.

JoyPolitik: Greed, Gouging, and Gullability

18 Wednesday Sep 2024

Posted by Nuetzel in Inflation, Price Controls

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

Antitrust, Greed, Ham Sandwich Nation, Hoarding, Inflation, Interventionism, Kamala Harris, Mark-Ups, Market Concentration, Markets, Michael Munger, Monetary policy, Predatory Pricing, Price Fixing, Price Gouging, Price Rationing, Shortages, Supply Shocks

Economic ignorance and campaign politics seem to go hand-in-hand, especially when it comes to the rhetoric of avowed interventionists. They love “easy” answers. If they get their way, negative but predictable consequences are always “unintended” and/or someone else’s fault. Unfortunately, too many journalists and voters like “easy” answers, and they repeatedly fall for the ploy.

This post highlights one of many bad ideas coming out of the Kamala Harris campaign. I probably won’t have time to cover all of her bad ideas before the election. There are just too many! I hope to highlight a few from the Trump campaign as well. Unfortunately, the two candidates have more than one bad idea in common.

Price Gouging

Here I’ll focus on Harris’ destructive proposal for a federal ban on “price gouging”. Unfortunately, she has yet to define precisely what she means by that term. On its face, she’d apparently support legislation authorizing the DOJ to go after grocers, gas stations, or other sellers in visible industries charging prices deemed excessive by the federal bureaucracy. This is a form of price control and well in keeping with the interventionist mindset.

As Michael Munger has said, when you charge “too much” you are “gouging”; when you charge “too little” you are “predatory”; and when you charge the same price as competitors you’ve engaged in a price fixing conspiracy. The fact that Harris’ proposal is deliberately vague is an even more dangerous invitation to arbitrary caprice by federal enforcers. It might be hard to price a ham sandwich without breaking such a law.

The great advantage of the price system is its impersonal coordination of the actions of disparate agents, creating incentives for both buyers and sellers to direct resources toward their most valued uses. Price controls of any kind short circuit that coordination, inevitably leading to shortages (or surpluses), misallocations, and diminished well being.

Inflation As Aggregate Macro Gouging

Aside from vote buying, Harris has broader objectives than the usual “anti-gouging” sentiment that accompanies negative supply shocks. She’s faced mounting pressure to address prices that have soared during the Biden Administration. The inflation during and after the COVID pandemic was induced by supply shortfalls first and then a spending/money-printing binge by the federal government. The pandemic induced shortages in some key areas, but the Treasury and the Fed together engineered a gigantic cash dump to accommodate that shock. This stimulated demand and turned temporary dislocations into permanently higher prices.

There were howls from the Left that greed in the private sector was to blame, despite plentiful evidence to the contrary. Blaming “price gouging” for inflated prices dovetails with Harris’ proclivity to inveigh against “corporate greed”. It’s typical leftist blather intended to appeal to anyone harboring suspicions of private property and the profit motive.

The profit motive is a compelling force for social good, motivating the performance of large corporations and small businesses alike. Diatribes against “greed” coming from the likes of a career politician with no private sector experience are not only unconvincing. They reveal childlike misapprehensions regarding economic phenomena.

More substantively, some have noted that mark-ups rose during and after the pandemic, but these markups are explained by normal cyclical fluctuations and the growing dominance of services in the spending mix. High margins are difficult to sustain without persistently high levels of demand. The Fed’s shift toward monetary restraint has dissipated much of that excessive demand pressure, but certainly not enough to bring prices back to pre-pandemic levels, which would require a severe economic contraction.

Claims that concentration among sellers has risen in some markets are also cited as evidence that greedy, price-gouging corporations are fueling inflation. If that is a real concern, then we might expect Harris to lean more heavily on antitrust policy. She should be circumspect in that regard: antitrust enforcement is too often used for terrible reasons (and also see here). In any case, rising market concentration does not necessarily imply a reduction in competitive pressures. Indeed, it might reflect the successful efforts of a strong competitor to please customers, delivering better value via quality and price. Moreover, mergers and acquisitions often result in stronger challenges to dominant players, energizing innovation, improved quality, and price competition.

If Harris is serious about minimizing inflation she should advocate for fiscal and monetary restraint. We’ve heard nothing of that from her campaign, however. No credible plans other than vaguely-defined price controls and promises to tax and spend our way to a joyful “opportunity economy”.

Disaster Supply Gouging

There is already a federal law against hoarding “scarce items” in times of war or national crisis and reselling at more than the (undefined) “prevailing market price”. There are also laws in 34 states with varying “anti-gouging” provisions, mostly applicable during emergencies only. These laws are counterproductive as they tend to “gouge” the flow of supplies.

In the aftermath of terrible storms or earthquakes, there are almost always shortages of critical goods like food, water, and fuel, not to mention specialized manpower, machinery, and materials needed for cleanup and restoration. As I pointed out some time ago, retailers often fail to adjust their prices under these circumstances, even as shelves are rapidly emptied. They are sometimes prohibited from repricing aggressively. If not, they are conflicted by the predictable hoarding that empties shelves, the higher costs of replenishing inventory, and the knowledge that price rationing creates undeservedly bad public relations. So retailers typically act with restraint to avoid any hint of “gouging” during crises.

Disasters often disrupt production and create physical barriers that hinder the very movement of goods. When prices are flexible and can respond to scarcity on the ground, suppliers can be very creative in finding ways to deliver badly needed supplies, despite the high costs those are likely to entail. Private sellers can do all this more nimbly and with greater efficiency than government, but they need price incentives to cover the costs and various risks. Price controls prevent that from happening, prolonging shortages at the worst possible time.

The chief complaint of those who oppose this natural corrective mechanism is that higher prices are “unfair”. And it is true that some cannot afford to pay higher prices induced by severe scarcity. The answer here is that government can write checks or even distribute cash, much as the government did nationwide during the pandemic. That’s about the only thing at which the state excels. Then people can afford to pay prices that reflect true levels of scarcity. If done selectively and confined to a regional level, the broader inflationary consequences are easily neutralized.

Instead, the knee-jerk reaction is to short-circuit the price mechanism and insist that available supplies be rationed equally. That might be a fine way for retailers to respond in the short run. Share the misery and prevent hoarding. But supplies will run low. When the shelves are empty, the price is infinite! That’s why sellers must have flexibility, not prohibitions.

Blame Game

Harris is engaged in a facile blame game at both the macro and micro level. She claims that inflation could be controlled if only corporations weren’t so greedy. Forget that they must cover their own rising costs, including the costs of compensating risk-averse investors. For that matter, she probably hasn’t gathered that a return to capital is a legitimate cost. Like many others, Harris seems ignorant of the elevated costs of bringing goods to market following either unpredictable disasters or during a general inflation. She also lacks any understanding of the benefits of relying on unfettered markets to bridge short-term gaps in supply. But none of this is surprising. She follows in a long tradition of ignorant interventionism. Let’s hope we have enough voters who aren’t that gullible.

A, But Not-So-I: Altman’s Plan To Tax Wealth and Redistribute Capital

09 Tuesday Jul 2024

Posted by Nuetzel in Artificial Intelligence, Wealth Distribution, Wealth Taxes

≈ 2 Comments

Tags

Absolute Advantage, AGI, Alignment, American Equity Fund, Antitrust, ChatGPT, Chris Edwards, Comparative advantage, consumption tax, David Schizer, Defense Production Act, Direct Taxes, Inequality, Maxwell Tabarrok, Michael Munger, Michael Strain, Moore v. United States, Moore’s Law, Open AI, Patrick Hedger, Sam Altman, Scarcity, Scott Sumner, Sixteenth Amendment, Steven Calabresi, Tax Incidence, ULTRA Tax, Wealth Tax

In this case, the “A” stands for Altman. Now Sam Altman is no slouch, but he’s taken a few ill-considered positions on public policy. Altman, the CEO of Open AI, wrote a blog post back in 2021 entitled “Moore’s Law For Everything” in which he predicted that AI will feed an explosion of economic growth. He also said AI will put a great many people out of work and drive down the price of certain kinds of labor. Furthermore, he fears that the accessibility of AI will be heavily skewed against the lowest socioeconomic classes. In later interviews (see here and here), Altman is somewhat demure about those predictions, but the general outline is the same: despite exceptional growth of GDP and wealth, he envisions job losses, an underclass of AI-illiterates, and a greater degree of income and wealth inequality.

Not Quite Like That

We’ve yet to see an explosion of growth, but it’s still very early in the AI revolution. The next several years will be telling. AI holds the potential to vastly increase our production possibilities over the course of the next few decades. For that and other reasons, I don’t buy the more dismal aspects of Altman’s scenario, as my last two posts make clear (here and here).

There will be plenty of jobs for people because humans will have comparative advantages in various areas of production. AI agents might have absolute advantages across most or even all jobs, but a rational deployment would have AI agents specialize only where they have a comparative advantage.

Scarcity will not be the sort of anachronism envisioned by some AI futurists, Altman included, and scarcity of AI agents (and their inputs) will necessitate their specialization in certain tasks. The demand for AI agents will be quite high, and their energy and “compute” requirements will be massive. AI agents will face extremely high opportunity costs in other tasks, leaving many occupations open for human labor, to say nothing of abundant opportunities for human-AI collaboration.

However, I don’t dismiss the likelihood of disruptions in markets for certain kinds of labor if the AI revolution proceeds as rapidly as Altman thinks it will. Many workers would be displaced, and it would take time, training, and a willingness to adapt for them to find new opportunities. But new kinds of jobs for people will emerge with time as AI is embedded throughout the economy.

Altman’s Rx

Altman’s somewhat pessimistic outlook for human employment and inequality leads him to make a couple of recommendations:

1) Ownership of capital must be more broadly distributed.

2) Capital and land must be taxed, potentially replacing income taxes, but primarily to fund equity investments for all Americans.

Here I agree with the spirit of #1. Broad ownership of capital is desirable. It allows greater participation in the capitalist system, which fosters political and economic stability. And wider access to capital, whether owned or not, allows a greater release of entrepreneurial energy. It also diversifies incomes and reduces economic dependency.

Altman proposes the creation of an American Equity Fund (AEF) to hold the proceeds of taxes on land and corporate assets for the benefit of all Americans. I’ll get to the taxes in a moment, but in discussing the importance of educating the public on the benefits of compounding, Altman seems to imply that assets in AEF would be held in individual accounts, as opposed to a single “public” account controlled by the federal government. Individual accounts would be far preferable, but it’s not clear how much control Altman would grant individuals in managing their accounts.

To Kill a Golden Goose

Taxes on capital are problematic. Capital can only be accumulated over time by saving out of income. Thus, as Michael Munger points out, as a general proposition under an income tax, all capital has already been taxed once. And we tax the income from capital at both the corporate and individual level. So corporate income is already double taxed: corporate profits are taxed along with dividend payments to shareholders.

Altman proposed in his 2021 blog post to levy a tax of 2.5% on the market value of publicly-traded corporations each year. The tax would be payable in cash or in corporate shares to be placed into the AEF. The latter would establish a kind of UnLiquidated Tax Reserve Accounts (ULTRA), which Munger discusses in the article linked above (my bracketed x% in the quote here):

“Instead of taking [x%] of the liquidated value of the wealth, the state would simply take ownership of the wealth, in place. An ULTRA is a ‘notional equity interest.’ The government literally takes a portion of the value of the asset; that value will be paid to the state when the asset is sold. Now, it is only a ‘notional’ stake, in the sense that no shared right of control or voting rights exists. But for those who advocate for ULTRAs, in any situation where tax agencies are authorized to tax an asset today, but cannot because there is no evaluation event, the taxpayer could be made to pay with an ULTRA rather than with cash.”

This solves all sorts of administrative problems associated with wealth taxes, but it is draconian nevertheless. Munger quotes an example of a successful, privately-held business subject to a 2% wealth tax every year in the form of an ULTRA. After 20 years, the government owns more than a third of the company’s value. That represents a substantial penalty for success! However, the incidence of such a tax might fall more on workers and customers and less on business owners. And Altman would tax corporations more heavily than in Munger’s example.

A tax on wealth essentially penalizes thrift, reduces capital accumulation, and diminishes productivity and real wages. But another fundamental reason that taxes on capital should be low is that the supply of capital is elastic. A tax on capital discourages saving and encourages capital flight. The use of avoidance schemes will proliferate, and there will be intense pressure to carve out special exemptions.

A Regressive Dimension

Another drawback of a wealth tax is its regressivity with respect to returns on capital. To see this, we can convert a tax on wealth to an equivalent income tax on returns. Here is Chris Edwards on that point:

“Suppose a person received a pretax return of 6 percent on corporate equities. An annual wealth tax of 2 percent would effectively reduce that return to 4 percent, which would be like a 33 percent income tax—and that would be on top of the current federal individual income tax, which has a top rate of 37 percent.”

… The effect is to impose lower effective tax rates on higher‐yielding assets, and vice versa. If equities produced returns of 8 percent, a 2 percent wealth tax would be like a 25 percent income tax. But if equities produced returns of 4 percent, the wealth tax would be like a 50 percent income tax. People with the lowest returns would get hit with the highest tax rates, and even people losing money would have to pay the wealth tax.“

Edwards notes the extreme inefficiency of wealth taxes demonstrated by the experience of a number of OECD countries. There are better ways to increase revenue and the progressivity of taxes. The best alternative is a tax on consumption, which rewards saving and capital accumulation, promoting higher wages and economic growth. Edwards dedicates a lengthy section of his paper to the superiority of a consumption tax.

Is a Wealth Tax Constitutional?

The constitutionality of a wealth tax is questionable as well. Steven Calabresi and David Schizer (C&S) contend that a federal wealth tax would qualify as a direct tax subject to the rule of apportionment, which would also apply to a federal tax on land. That is, under the U.S. Constitution, these kinds of taxes would have to be the same amount per capita in every state. Thus, higher tax rates would be necessary in less wealthy states.

C&S also note a major distinction between taxes on the value of wealth relative to income, excise, import, and consumption taxes. The latter are all triggered by transactions entered into voluntarily. They are avoidable in that sense, but not wealth taxes. Moreover, C&S believe the founders’ intent was to rely on direct taxes only as a backstop during wartime.

The recent Supreme Court decision in Moore v. United States created doubt as to whether the Court had set a precedent in favor of a potential wealth tax. According to earlier precedent, the Constitution forbade the “laying of taxes” on “unrealized” income or changes in wealth. However, in Moore, the Court ruled that undistributed profits from an ownership interest in a foreign business are taxable under the mandatory repatriation tax, signed into law by President Trump in 2017 as part of his tax overhaul package. But Justice Kavanaugh, who wrote the majority opinion, stated that the ruling was based on the foreign company’s status as a pass-through entity. The Wall Street Journal says of the decision:

“Five Justices open the door to taxing unrealized gains in assets. Democrats will walk through it.”

In a brief post, Calabrisi laments Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson’s expansive view of the federal government’s taxing authority under the Sixteenth Amendment, which might well be shared by the Biden Administration. But the Wall Street Journal piece also describes Kavanaugh’s admonition regarding any expectation of a broader application of the Moore opinion:

“Justice Kavanaugh does issue a warning that ‘the Due Process Clause proscribes arbitrary attribution’ of undistributed income to shareholders. And he writes that his opinion should not ‘be read to authorize any hypothetical congressional effort to tax both an entity and its shareholders or partners on the same undistributed income realized by the entity.’”

Growth Is the Way, Not Taxes

AI growth will lead to rapid improvements in labor productivity and real wages in many occupations, despite a painful transition for some workers requiring occupational realignment and periods of unemployment and training. However, people will retain comparative advantages over AI agents in a number of existing occupations. Other workers will find that AI allows them to shift their efforts toward higher-value or even new aspects of their jobs. Along the same lines, there will be a huge variety of new occupations made possible by AI of which we’re only now catching the slightest glimpse. Michael Strain has emphasized this aspect of technological diffusion, noting that 60% of the jobs performed in 2018 did not exist in 1940. In fact, few of those “new” jobs could have been imagined in 1940.

AI entrepreneurs and AI investors will certainly capture a disproportionate share of gains from an AI revolution. Of course, they’ll have created a disproportionate share of that wealth. It might well skew the distribution of wealth in their favor, but that does not reflect negatively on the market process driving the outcome, especially because it will also give rise to widespread gains in living standards.

Altman goes wrong in proposing tax-funded redistribution of equity shares. Those taxes would slow AI development and deployment, reduce economic growth, and produce fewer new opportunities for workers. The surest way to effect a broader distribution of equity capital, and of equity in AI assets, is to encourage innovation, economic growth, and saving. Taxing capital more heavily is a very bad way to do that, whether from heavier taxes on income from capital, new taxes on unrealized gains, or (worst of all) from taxes on the value of capital, including ULTRA taxes.

Altman is right, however, to bemoan the narrow ownership of capital. As I mentioned above, he’s also on-target in saying that most people do not fully appreciate the benefits of thrift and the miracle of compounding. That represents both a failure of education and our calamitously high rate of time preference as a society. Perhaps the former can be fixed! However, thrift is a decision best left in private hands, especially to the extent that AI stimulates rapid income growth.

Killer Regulation

Altman also supports AI regulation, and I’ll cut him some slack by noting that his motives might not be of the usual rent-seeking variety. Maybe. Anyway, he’ll get some form of his wish, as legislators are scrambling to draft a “roadmap” for regulating AI. Some are calling for billions of federal outlays to “support” AI development, with a likely and ill-advised effort to “direct” that development as well. That is hardly necessary given the level of private investment AI is already attracting. Other “roadmap” proposals call for export controls on AI and protections for the film and recording industries.

These proposals are fueled by fears about AI, which run the gamut from widespread unemployment to existential risks to humanity. Considerable attention has been devoted to the alignment of AI agents with human interests and well being, but this has emerged largely within the AI development community itself. There are many alignment optimists, however, and still others who decry any race between tech giants to bring superhuman generative AI to market.

The Biden Administration stepped in last fall with an executive order on AI under emergency powers established by the Defense Production Act. The order ranges more broadly than national defense might necessitate, and it could have damaging consequences. Much of the order is redundant with respect to practices already followed by AI developers. It requires federal oversight over all so-called “foundation models” (e.g., ChatGPT), including safety tests and other “critical information”. These requirements are to be followed by the establishment of additional federal safety standards. This will almost certainly hamstring investment and development of AI, especially by smaller competitors.

Patrick Hedger discusses the destructive consequences of attempts to level the competitive AI playing field via regulation and antitrust actions. Traditionally, regulation tends to entrench large players who can best afford heavy compliance costs and influence regulatory decisions. Antitrust actions also impose huge costs on firms and can result in diminished value for investors in AI start-ups that might otherwise thrive as takeover targets.

Conclusion

Sam Altman’s vision of funding a redistribution of equity capital via taxes on wealth suffers from serious flaws. For one thing, it seems to view AI as a sort of exogenous boon to productivity, wholly independent of investment incentives. Taxing capital would inhibit investment in new capital (and in AI), diminish growth, and thwart the very goal of broad ownership Altman wishes to promote. Any effort to tax capital at a global level (which Altman supports) is probably doomed to failure, and that’s a good thing. The burden of taxes on capital at the corporate level would largely be shifted to workers and consumers, pushing real wages down and prices up relative to market outcomes.

Low taxes on income and especially on capital, together with light regulation, promote saving, capital investment, economic growth, higher real wages, and lower prices. For AI, like all capital investment, public policy should focus on encouraging “aligned” development and deployment of AI assets. A consumption tax would be far more efficient than wealth or capital taxes in that respect, and more effective in generating revenue. Policies that promote growth are the best prescription for broadening the distribution of capital ownership.

AntiSemitic Left Tests Limits of Free Speech

30 Tuesday Apr 2024

Posted by Nuetzel in anti-Semitism, Free Speech

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Tags

Agitators, Alex Tabarrok, Codes of Conduct, Eugene Volokh, Fighting Wirds, First Amendment, Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression, Free Speech, Freedom of Assembly, Hamas, Instapundit, Intifada, Israel, Michael Munger, P.J. O'Rourke, Terrorism

The current protests on college campuses across the nation bring into focus differing opinions on the limits of free speech and assembly. Particular questions seem to defy resolution. Nevertheless, there is some misunderstanding regarding the settled breadth of the First Amendment.

The protestors have acted as if they have constitutional carte blanche to gather anywhere to say anything in opposition to Israel and its war against Hamas terrorists; a subset thinks this encompasses “occupation” of any space for any duration; a still smaller subset believes this includes a right to condemn Jews, all Jews.

I strongly doubt, however, that many of the protestors truly believe their constitutional protections extend to intimidation and bullying of Jewish students attempting to go about their business on campus (scroll to a few of the articles here), destruction of property, or the use of “fighting words”, or physical attacks on Jews or other “oppressors”.

It’s well known that the Constitution does not protect “fighting words”, including threats. Furthermore, Eugene Volokh explains that there is no constitutional right to “occupy” a college campus, either public or private.

Of course, private schools are not legally bound to respect free speech or assembly rights. They can regulate activity on their private campuses in any way they see fit. Some explicitly abide the same rights as public universities, which seems reasonable for any institution dedicated to the free spirit of inquiry.

Volokh, however, cites Supreme Court precedents in which a majority held that government can prohibit camping in certain parks, for example, and that public colleges and universities can impose restrictions on campus activities:

“There is no First Amendment right to camp out in any university, public or private. Indeed, there is no First Amendment right to camp out even in public parks (see Clark v. CCNV (1984)), and the government’s power to limit the use of property used for a public university is even greater than its power as to parks (Widmar v. Vincent (1981)):

“‘A university differs in significant respects for public forums such as streets or parks or even municipal theaters. A university’s mission is education, and decisions of this Court have never denied a university’s authority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission upon the use of its campus and facilities. We have not held, for example, that a campus must make all of its facilities equally available to students and nonstudents alike, or that a university must grant free access to all of its grounds or buildings.’

“Likewise, if UC Berkeley had held a law student party in the law school building rather than at Dean Chemerinsky’s house, it could have stopped students from using the party as an occasion to orate to the audience (especially with their own sound amplification devices, which the student brought to Chemerinsky’s house). See Spears v. Arizona Bd. of Regents (D. Ariz. 2019)(upholding public university’s right to stop people from speaking with sound amplification at an on-campus book fair).“

Volokh also notes, however, that public universities cannot restrict mere “offensive” expression, which would include certain antisemitic statements or even swastikas (for example), as long as the expression falls short of “fighting words” or explicit threats. Do calls for the “extermination of Jews” qualify as fighting words? That deserves a resounding yes. It’s clearly hate speech, and it’s exactly the sort of expression that might be deemed so offensive to counterprotestors (for example) as to constitute an immediate threat to public order.

Does the meaning of “fighting words” include such chants as “From the river to the sea…”? Some say that depends on the speaker, but that can’t provide a sound basis of distinction. It is clearly associated with calls to eliminate the state of Israel. Some believe it also implies the genocide of Jews in Israel, and Jews can’t be blamed for finding it threatening. Okay, how about “Intifada”? I doubt all of the students involved in the current protests understand the genocidal implications of these words. The agitators understand them well enough.

This is a grey area in our understanding of the First Amendment. The “River to the Sea” chant, and Intifada, seem like fighting words to me, but they might not qualify as direct threats to anyone on campus. By comparison, the swastika is “just” a party emblem, whatever policies it stands for, and apparently the Court did not deem it a direct threat to anyone in Skokie, Illinois. The legal distinctions here feel inadequate. Still, we say the “mere” expression of offensive ideas or symbols is protected speech, provided that it does not directly threaten harm to any party.

Many libertarians, with whom I usually agree, urge tolerance of the protests and encampments, including at least cautious tolerance of the protests. The Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression (FIRE) has strenuously objected to the actions of police in Austin, Texas in dispersing demonstrators at the University of Texas. Alex Tabarrak has reposted a tweet or two apparently critical of the government’s response to protestors in Texas and at Emory University in Atlanta, though it should be noted that the economics professor who was taken down and handcuffed on video had actually hit a police officer. Michael Munger, in a variation of his “worst enemy test” of government power, says that giving campus authorities “the power to crush us, at their discretion” is probably a bad idea. But they have that power if they choose to exercise it, for better or worse. (By “us”, I don’t think Munger intended to take sides).

I’m highly skeptical of the motives and incentives of some of the “occupiers” of campus spaces, not to mention their status as students. More importantly, there is ample evidence that “fighting words” and threats against Jews have been used by many of the protesters. This violates the codes of conduct at many schools, and should not only be censured, but any student identified as guilty of this sort of hate speech should be expelled, not merely suspended. There should be severe consequences for professors choosing to participate in these protests as well.

This behavior should have long-term consequences, and that is happening at some schools. I saw the following quote from P.J. O’Rourke on Instapundit, which seems appropriate here:

“There’s only one basic human right, the right to do as you damn well please. And with it comes the only basic human duty, the duty to take the consequences.”

The kids are wearing masks for a reason, and it ain’t Covid! Now, the protestors’ demands include “amnesty” for their participation in the protests. That shouldn’t play well if you’re provably guilty of calling for the extermination of a race of people. But here’s the thing: certain institutions like Columbia University have allowed the aberrant behavior to go on with little challenge, showing that the real limits to free speech and assembly are whatever acquiescent campus administrators are willing to put up with.

Removing these encampments is more than justified on constitutional grounds at any school, public or private. The arrest of some of the more intransigent elements among the protesters may be well justified. Insulting hate speech is one thing, but eliminationist hate speech constitutes fighting words and should not be tolerated. Of course, forcibly removing the encampments is risky in terms of public safety because some of the protestors will physically challenge the police. Comparatively innocent (though naive) students might get caught up in a conflict with law enforcement, but ignorance is no defense. They should not be there. Those risks must be taken to end the “hate encampments”, which are a direct threat to the rights of others wishing only to go about their business.

Government Failure as a Root Cause of Market Failure

10 Monday Jul 2023

Posted by Nuetzel in Government Failure, Market Failure

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Capital Formation, central planning, Chevron Doctrine, Competitive Equilibrium, Corruption, crowding out, Declaration of Independence, Don Boudreaux, External Benefits, External Costs, Government Failure, Inflation, John Cochrane, Labor Supply, Market Failure, Michael Munger, monopoly power, Pareto Superiority, Peter Boettke, Price Controls, Protectionism, Redistribution, Regulatory Capture, rent seeking, Risk-Free Asset, Side Payments, Social Security, State Capacity, Tax Distortions, Thomas Jefferson, Treasury Debt, William R. Keech

We’re told again and again that government must take action to correct “market failures”. Economists are largely responsible for this widespread view. Our standard textbook treatments of external costs and benefits are constructed to demonstrate departures from the ideal of perfectly competitive market equilibria. This posits an absurdly unrealistic standard and diminishes the power and dramatic success of real-world markets in processing highly dispersed information, allocating resources based on voluntary behavior, and raising human living standards. It also takes for granted the underlying institutional foundations that lead to well-functioning markets and presumes that government possesses the knowledge and ability to rectify various departures from an ideal. Finally, “corrective” interventions are usually exposited in economics classes as if they are costless!

Failed Disgnoses

This brings into focus the worst presumption of all: that government solutions to social and economic problems never fail to achieve their intended aims. Of course that’s nonsense. If defined on an equivalent basis, government failure is vastly more endemic and destructive than market failure.

Related to this point, Don Boudreaux quotes from Peter Boettke’s Living Economics:

“According to ancient legend, a Roman emperor was asked to judge a singing contest between two participants. After hearing the first contestant, the emperor gave the prize to the second on the assumption that the second could be no worse than the first. Of course, this assumption could have been wrong; the second singer might have been worse. The theory of market failure committed the same mistake as the emperor. Demonstrating that the market economy failed to live up to the ideals of general competitive equilibrium was one thing, but to gleefully assert that public action could costlessly correct the failure was quite another matter. Unfortunately, much analytical work proceeded in such a manner. Many scholars burst the bubble of this romantic vision of the political sector during the 1960s. But it was [James] Buchanan and Gordon Tullock who deserve the credit for shifting scholarly focus.”

John Cochrane sums up the whole case succinctly in the “punchline” of a recent post:

“The case for free markets never was their perfection. The case for free markets always was centuries of experience with the failures of the only alternative, state control. Free markets are, as the saying goes, the worst system; except for all the others.”

Tracing Failures

We can view the relation between market failure and government failure in two ways. First, we can try to identify market failures and root causes. For example, external costs like pollution cause harm to innocent third parties. This failure might be solely attributable to transactions between private parties, but there are cases in which government engages as one of those parties, such as defense contracting. In other cases government effectively subsidizes toxic waste, like the eventual disposal of solar panels. Another kind of market failure occurs when firms wield monopoly power, but that is often abetted by costly regulations that deliver fatal blows to small competitors.

The second way to analyze the nexus between government and market failures is to first examine the taxonomy of government failure and identify the various damages inflicted upon the operation of private markets. That’s the course I’ll follow below, though by no means is the discussion here exhaustive.

Failures In and Out of Scope

An extensive treatment of government failure was offered eight years ago by William R. Keech and Michael Munger. To start, they point out what everyone knows: governments occasionally perpetrate monstrous acts like genocide and the instigation of war. That helps illustrate a basic dichotomy in government failures:

“… government may fail to do things it should do, or government may do things it should not do.’

Both parts of that statement have numerous dimensions. Failures at what government should do run the gamut from poor service at the DMV, to failure to enforce rights, to corrupt bureaucrats and politicians skimming off the public purse in the execution of their duties. These failures of government are all too common.

What government should and should not do, however, is usually a matter of political opinion. Thomas Jefferson’s axioms appear in a single sentence at the beginning of the Declaration of Independence; they are a tremendous guide to the first principles of a benevolent state. However, those axioms don’t go far in determining the range of specific legal protections and services that should and shouldn’t be provided by government.

Pareto Superiority

Keech and Munger engage in an analytical exercise in which the “should and shouldn’t” question is determined under the standard of Pareto superiority. A state of the world is Pareto superior if at least one person prefers it to the current state (and no one else is averse to it). Coincidentally, voluntary trades in private markets always exploit Pareto superior opportunities, absent legitimate external costs and benefits.

The set of Pareto superior states available to government can be expanded by allowing for side payments or compensation to those who would have preferred the current state. Still, those side payments are limited by the magnitude of the gains flowing to those who prefer the alternative (and if those gains can be redistributed monetarily).

Keech and Munger define government failure as the unexploited existence of Pareto superior states. Of course, by this definition, only a benevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent dictator could hope to avoid government failure. But this is no more unrealistic than the assumptions underlying perfectly competitive market equilibrium from which departure are deemed “market failures” that government should correct. Thus, Keech and Munger say:

“The concept of government failure has been trapped in the cocoon of the theory of perfect markets. … Government failure in the contemporary context means failing to resolve a classic market failure.”

But markets must operate within a setting defined by culture and institutions. The establishment of a social order under which individuals have enforceable rights must come prior to well-functioning markets, and that requires a certain level of state capacity. Keech and Munger are correct that market failure is often a manifestation of government failure in setting and/or enforcing these “rules of the game”.

“The real question is … how the rules of the game should be structured in terms of incentives, property rights, and constraints.”

The Regulatory State and Market Failures

Government can do too little in defining and enforcing rights, and that’s undoubtedly a cause of failure in markets in even the most advanced economies. At the same time there is an undeniable tendency for mission creep: governments often try to do too much. Overregulation in the U.S. and other developed nations creates a variety of market failures. This includes the waste inherent in compliance costs that far exceed benefits; welfare losses from price controls, licensing, and quotas; diversion of otherwise productive resources into rent seeking activity, anti-competitive effects from “regulatory capture”; Chevron-like distortions endemic to the administrative judicial process; unnecessary interference in almost any aspect of private business; and outright corruption and bribe-taking.

Central Planning and Market Failures

Another category of government attempting to “do too much” is the misallocation of resources that inevitably accompanies efforts to pick “winners and losers”. The massive subsidies flowing to investors in various technologies are often misdirected. Many of these expenditures end up as losses for taxpayers, and this is not the only form in which failed industrial planning takes place. A related evil occurs when steps are taken to penalize and destroy industries in political disfavor with thin economic justification.

Other clear examples of government “planning” failure are protectionist laws. These are a net drain on our wealth as a society, denying consumers of free choice and saddling the country with the necessity to produce restricted products at high cost relative to erstwhile trading partners.

There are, of course, failures lurking within many other large government spending programs in areas such as national defense, transportation, education, and agriculture. Many of these programs can be characterized as centrally planning. Not only are some of these expenditures ineffectual, but massive procurement spending seems to invite waste and graft. After all, it’s somebody else’s money.

Redistribution and Market Failures

One might regard redistribution programs as vehicles for the kinds of side payments described by Keech and Munger. Some might even say these are the side payments necessary to overcome resistance from those unable to thrive in a market economy. That reverses the historical sequence of events, however, since the dominant economic role of markets preceded the advent of massive redistribution schemes. Unfortunately, redistribution programs have been plagued by poor design, such as the actuarial nightmare inherent in Social Security and the destructive work incentives embedded in other parts of the social safety net. These are rightly viewed as government failures, and their distortionary effects spill variously into capital markets, labor markets and ultimately product markets.

Taxation and Market Failures

All these public initiatives under which government failures precipitate assorted market failures must be paid for by taxpayers. Therefore, we must also consider the additional effects of taxation on markets and market failures. The income tax system is rife with economic distortions. Not only does it inflict huge compliance costs, but it alters incentives in ways that inhibit capital formation and labor supply. That hampers the ability of input markets to efficiently meet the needs of producers, inhibiting the economy’s productive capacity. In turn, these effects spill into output market failures, with consequent losses in .social welfare. Distortionary taxes are a form of government failure that leads to broad market failures.

Deficits and Market Failure

More often than not, of course, tax revenue is inadequate to fund the entire government budget. Deficit spending and borrowing can make sense when public outlays truly produce long-term benefits. In fact, the mere existence of “risk-free” assets (Treasury debt) across the maturity spectrum might enhance social welfare if it enables improvements in portfolio diversification that outweigh the cost of the government’s interest obligations. (Treasury securities do bear interest-rate risk and, if unindexed, they bear inflation risk.)

Nevertheless, borrowing can reflect and magnify deleterious government efforts to “do too much”, ultimately leading to market failures. Government borrowing may “crowd out” private capital formation, harming economy-wide productivity. It might also inhibit the ability of households to borrow at affordable rates. Interest costs of the public debt may become explosive as they rise relative to GDP, limiting the ability of the public sector to perform tasks that it should *actually* do, with negative implications for market performance.

Inflation and Market Failure

Deficit spending promotes inflation as well. This is more readily enabled when government debt is monetized, but absent fiscal discipline, the escalation of goods prices is the only remaining force capable of controlling the real value of the debt. This is essentially the inflation tax.

Inflation is a destructive force. It distorts the meaning of prices, causes the market to misallocate resources due to uncertainty, and inflicts costs on those with fixed incomes or whose incomes cannot keep up with inflation. Sadly, the latter are usually in lower socioeconomic strata. These are symptoms of market failure prompted by government failure to control spending and maintain a stable medium of exchange.

Conclusion

Markets may fail, but when they do it’s very often rooted in one form of government failure or another. Sometimes it’s an inadequacy in the establishment or enforcement of property rights. It could be a case of overzealous regulation. Or government may encroach on, impede, or distort decisions regarding the provision of goods or services best left to the market. More broadly, redistribution and taxation, including the inflation tax, distort labor and capital markets. The variety of distortions created when government fails at what it should do, or does what it shouldn’t do, is truly daunting. Yet it’s difficult to find leaders willing to face up to all this. Statism has a powerful allure, and too many elites are in thrall to the technocratic scientism of government solutions to social problems and central planning in the allocation of resources.

The Impotence of AI for the Socialist Calculation Debate

05 Monday Jun 2023

Posted by Nuetzel in Artificial Intelligence, Central Planning, Markets

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Allocative efficiency, CATO Institute, central planning, Don Boudreaux, F.A. Hayek, incentives, Industrial Policy, Invisible Hand, Jason Kuznicki, Jesús Fernández-Villaverde, Knowledge Problem, Libertarianism.org, Machine Learning, Michael Munger, Opportunity cost, Protectionism, Robert Lucas, Socialist Calculation Debate

Recent advances in artificial intelligence (AI) are giving hope to advocates of central economic planning. Perhaps, they think, the so-called “knowledge problem” (KP) can be overcome, making society’s reliance on decentralized market forces “unnecessary”. The KP is the barrier faced by planners in collecting and using information to direct resources to their most valued uses. KP is at the heart of the so-called “socialist calculation debate”, but it applies also to the failures of right-wing industrial policies and protectionism.

Apart from raw political motives, run-of-the-mill government incompetence, and poor incentives, the KP is an insurmountable obstacle to successful state planning, as emphasized by Friedrich Hayek and many others. In contrast, market forces are capable of spontaneously harnessing all sources of information on preferences, incentives, resources, as well as existing and emergent technologies in allocating resources efficiently. In addition, the positive sum nature of mutually beneficial exchange makes the market by far the greatest force for voluntary social cooperation known to mankind.

Nevertheless, the hope kindled by AI is that planners would be on an equal footing with markets and allow them to intervene in ways that would be “optimal” for society. This technocratic dream has been astir for years along with advances in computer technology and machine learning. I guess it’s nice that at least a few students of central planning understood the dilemma all along, but as explained below, their hopes for AI are terribly misplaced. AI will never allow planners to allocate resources in ways that exceed or even approximate the efficiency of the market mechanism’s “invisible hand”.

Michael Munger recently described the basic misunderstanding about the information or “data” that markets use to solve the KP. Markets do not rely on a given set of prices, quantities, and production relationships. They do not take any of those as givens with respect to the evolution of transactions, consumption, production, investment, or search activity. Instead, markets generate this data based on unobservable and co-evolving factors such as the shape of preferences across goods, services, and time; perceptions of risk and its cost; the full breadth of technologies; shifting resource availabilities; expectations; locations; perceived transaction costs; and entrepreneurial energy. Most of these factors are “tacit knowledge” that no central database will ever contain.

At each moment, dispersed forces are applied by individual actions in the marketplace. The market essentially solves for the optimal set of transactions subject to all of those factors. These continuously derived solutions are embodied in data on prices, quantities, and production relationships. Opportunity costs and incentives are both an outcome of market processes as well as driving forces, so that they shape the transactional footprint. And then those trades are complete. Attempts to impose the same set of data upon new transactions in some repeated fashion, freezing the observable components of incentives and other requirements, would prevent the market from responding to changing conditions.

Thus, the KP facing planners isn’t really about “calculating” anything. Rather, it’s the impossibility of matching or replicating the market’s capacity to generate these data and solutions. There will never be an AI with sufficient power to match the efficiency of the market mechanism because it’s not a matter of mere “calculation”. The necessary inputs are never fully unobservable and, in any case, are unknown until transactions actually take place such that prices and quantities can be recorded.

In my 2020 post “Central Planning With AI Will Still Suck”, I reviewed a paper by Jesús Fernández-Villaverde (JFV), who was skeptical of AI’s powers to achieve better outcomes via planning than under market forces. His critique of the “planner position” anticipated the distinction highlighted by Munger between “market data” and the market’s continuous generation of transactions and their observable footprints.

JFV emphasized three reasons for the ultimate failure of AI-enabled planning: impossible data requirements; the endogeneity of expectations and behavior; and the knowledge problem. Again, the discovery and collection of “data” is a major obstacle to effective planning. If that were the only difficulty, then planners would have a mere “calculation” problem. This shouldn’t be conflated with the broader KP. That is, observable “data” is a narrow category relative the arrays of unobservables and the simultaneous generation of inputs and outcomes that takes place in markets. And these solutions are found by market processes subject to an array of largely unobservable constraints.

An interesting obstacle to AI planning cited by JFV is the endogeneity of expectations. It too can be considered part of the KP. From my 2020 post:

“Policy Change Often Makes the Past Irrelevant: Planning algorithms are subject to the so-called Lucas Critique, a well known principle in macroeconomics named after Nobel Prize winner Robert Lucas. The idea is that policy decisions based on observed behavior will change expectations, prompting responses that differ from the earlier observations under the former policy regime. … If [machine learning] is used to “plan” certain outcomes desired by some authority, based on past relationships and transactions, the Lucas Critique implies that things are unlikely to go as planned.”

Again, note that central planning and attempts at “calculation” are not solely in the province of socialist governance. They are also required by protectionist or industrial policies supported at times by either end of the political spectrum. Don Boudreaux offers this wisdom on the point:

“People on the political right typically assume that support for socialist interventions comes uniquely from people on the political left, but this assumption is mistaken. While conservative interventionists don’t call themselves “socialists,” many of their proposed interventions – for example, industrial policy – are indeed socialist interventions. These interventions are socialist because, in their attempts to improve the overall performance of the economy, proponents of these interventions advocate that market-directed allocations of resources be replaced with allocations carried out by government diktat.”

The hope that non-market planning can be made highly efficient via AI is a fantasy. In addition to substituting the arbitrary preferences of planners and politicians for those of private agents, the multiplicity of forces bearing on individual decisions will always be inaccessible to AIs. Many of these factors are deeply embedded within individual minds, and often in varying ways. That is why the knowledge problem emphasized by Hayek is much deeper than any sort of “calculation problem” fit for exploitation via computer power.

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Note: The image at the top of this post is attributed by Bing to the CATO Institute-sponsored website Libertarianism.org and an article that appeared there in 2013, though that piece, by Jason Kuznicki, no longer seems to feature that image.

Broken Windows: Destroying Wealth To Create Green Jobs

25 Saturday Feb 2023

Posted by Nuetzel in Industrial Policy, Renewable Energy

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Broken Windows Fallacy, Consumer Surplus, Dispatchable Power, Fossil fuels, Frederic Bastiat, Green Energy, Green Jobs, Job Creation, Keynesians, London’s Great Fire, Market Intervention, Michael Munger, Milton Friedman, Planned Obsolescence, Renewable Power, Societal Wealth

Investments in “green energy” create jobs, just like any other form of investment in physical assets. We’re told, however, that the transition to renewable energy sources will create a veritable jobs bonanza! Apparently, this is believed to be a great selling point for everyone to get behind. Sure, promoting job creation is always popular with politicians, and it is very popular with private actors seeking to win public funding of one kind or another.

The heavy emphasis on jobs creation brings to mind an old Milton Friedman story about a visit to China during which dignitaries brought him to a construction site, no doubt thinking he’d be impressed with their progressive investments in infrastructure. At the site, Friedman noticed workers digging a large trench or arroyo with shovels. When he asked why bulldozers or backhoes weren’t used, he was told that the jobs were too valuable. His response was something like, “Then have them use spoons!” The lesson, of course, is that merely creating jobs is not a prescription for building wealth and prosperity. But there is more at stake here than the low productivity of construction workers who lack the best tools.

There are some bad rationales for heavy investment in renewable energy sources, and I’ve addressed those at length previously. The appeal to job creation, however, is awful on simple economic grounds. It emphasizes a thing that is easily counted while ignoring massive costs that are generally untallied.

In the U.S. we have a huge base of productive capital that meets our energy needs, the bulk of which is built to utilize fossil fuels. That plant constitutes wealth to society, and not just to those with an ownership interest. Dispatchable power is available to the public at a rate below that at which they value the power. That ability to deliver consumer surplus on demand is a major aspect qualifying power capacity as societal wealth. The push for renewables, if wholly successful, would make the existing base of generating capacity redundant. There is no doubt that the ultimate goal of renewable energy advocates is to destroy existing capacity reliant on fossil fuels. They simply have not come to grips with the reality that it meets energy needs far more efficiently than intermittent renewables like wind and solar power. In spirit, the effort bears a strong similarity to destroying bulldozers to replace them with shovels, or spoons!

Recently, Michael Munger discussed the mistaken notion that renewable investments are justified based on job creation. He noted that with a coincident dismantling of the existing base of power generation, it amounts to exactly what Frederic Bastiat called the broken window fallacy, which insists that breaking windows is a great way to keep glaziers fully employed. There are many examples and variations on this idea, including so-called “planned obsolescence”.

Bastiat poked fun at an elite French government official who had marveled at the economic gains reaped in England with the rebuilding of London following the “Great Fire” of 1666. Bastiat engaged in some satire by suggesting that France could greatly benefit from burning Paris to the ground. But his point was serious: we often hear that reconstruction provides a silver lining for workers following hurricanes or other disasters. Fair enough: rebuild we must. The Keynesians among us would say it works out well for workers who are otherwise unemployed. Disasters destroy wealth, however, and often lives, not to mention opportunities for incremental wealth creation that are lost forever. The reconstruction jobs are not “good news”!

Unfortunately, people get carried away with broken windows arguments, using them to justify their own pet projects. The addition of new competing products and technologies is unquestionably healthy, but not when one side enlists the state as a partner in destroying viable incumbents and existing public or private wealth. For that matter, the state and its allies seem intent on destroying invested physical capital even before it’s services can come on line… if it’s viewed as the “wrong” kind of capital.

The costs of a transition to renewables is massive. The “big ask” for green energy involves not just taxpayer support for the build and usage, with all the inefficiencies endemic to taxation and market interventions. So-called green energy also entails huge environmental costs, and it calls for the wholesale destruction of an embedded industry. That means decommissioning invested assets having many years of useful life. And that goes for physical plant all the way from the wellhead to final use, including the destruction of stoves, cars, and other machines too numerous to mention. Those machines, by the way, still account for roughly 80% of our power use.

I leave you with part of Munger’s closing:

“Once you are duped into believing destruction is productive, almost everything that a rational public policy would label as a cost becomes, by some judo move of seraphic intuition, a benefit. … The problem is that jobs are not wealth. Wealth is access to the goods, products, and services that make our lives better. It is true that ‘studies show’ that wiping out all our productive wealth based on fossil fuels … would create jobs. Those ‘studies’ are among the best arguments against doing anything of the sort.”

The Twitter Files and Political Exploitation of Social Media

07 Wednesday Dec 2022

Posted by Nuetzel in Censorship, Regulation, Social Media

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Bari Weiss, Censorship, Common Carrier, Communications Decency Act, Content Moderation, Disinformation Governance Board, Elon Musk, Eugene Volokh, Fighting Words, First Amendment, Hunter Biden, In-Kind Campaign Contribution, James Baker, Mark Zuckerberg, Matt Taibbi, Michael Munger, Munger Test, Public Accompdation, Public Square, Section 230 Immunity, Social Media, Telecommunications Act, Trump-Russia Investigation, Twitter Files, Your Worst Enemy Test

I’ve been cheering for Elon Musk in his effort to remake Twitter into the kind of “public square” it always held the promise to be. He’s standing up for free expression, against one-party control of speech on social media, and especially against government efforts to control speech. That’s a great and significant thing, yet as Duke economist Michael Munger notes, we hear calls from the Biden Administration and congressional Democrats to “keep an eye on Twitter”, a not-so-veiled threat of future investigative actions or worse.

Your Worst Enemy Test, Public or Private

As a disclaimer, I submit that I’m not an unadulterated fan of Musk’s business ventures. His business models too often leverage wrong-headed government policy for profitability. It reeks of rent seeking behavior, whatever Musk’s ideals, and the availability of those rents, primarily subsidies, violates the test for good governance I discussed in my last post. That’s the Munger Test (the “Your Worst Enemy” Test), formally:

“You can only give the State power that you favor giving to your worst enemy.”

On the other hand, Musk’s release of the “Twitter Files” last weekend, with more to come, is certainly a refreshing development. Censorship at the behest of political organizations, foreign governments, or our own government are all controversial and possibly illegal. While we’d ordinarily hope to transact privately at arms length with free exchange being strictly an economic proposition, one might even apply the Munger Test to the perspective of a user of a social media platform: would you trust your worst enemy to exercise censorship on that platform on the basis of politics? Like Donald Trump? Or Chuck Schumer? If not, then you probably won’t be happy there! Now, add to that your worst enemy’s immunity to prosecution for any content they deem favorable!

Cloaked Government Censorship?

Censorship runs afoul of the First Amendment if government actors are involved. In an interesting twist in the case of the Twitter Files, the two independent journalists working with the files, Matt Taibbi and Bari Weiss, learned that some of the information had been redacted by one James Baker, Twitter’s Deputy General Counsel. Perhaps not coincidentally, Baker was also formerly General Counsel of the FBI and a key figure in the Trump-Russia investigation. Musk promptly fired Baker from Twitter over the weekend. We might see, very soon, just how coincidental Baker’s redactions were.

Mark Zuckerberg himself recently admitted that Facebook was pressured by the FBI to censor the Hunter Biden laptop story, which is a key part of the controversy underlying the Twitter Files. The Biden Administration had ambitious plans for working alongside social media on content moderation, but the Orwellian-sounding “Disinformation Governance Board” has been shelved, at least for now. Furthermore, activity performed for a political campaign may represent an impermissible in-kind campaign donation, and Twitter falsely denied to the FEC that it had worked with the Biden campaign.

Solutions?

What remedies exist for potential social media abuses of constitutionally-protected rights, or even politically-driven censorship? Elon Musk’s remaking of Twitter is a big win, of course, and market solutions now seem more realistic. Court challenges to social media firms are also possible, but there are statutory obstacles. Court challenges to the federal government are more likely to succeed (if its involvement can be proven).

The big social media firms have all adopted a fairly definitive political stance and have acted on it ruthlessly, contrary to their professed role in the provision of an open “public square”. For that reason, I have in the past supported eliminating social media’s immunity from prosecution for content posted on their networks. A cryptic jest by Musk might just refer to that very prospect:

“Anything anyone says will be used against me in a court of law.”

Or maybe not … even with the sort of immunity granted to social media platforms, the Twitter Files might implicate his own company in potential violations of law, and he seems to be okay with that.

Immunity was granted to social media platforms under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (DCA). It was something many thought “the state should do” in the 1990s in order to foster growth in the internet. And it would seem that a platform’s immunity for content shared broadly should be consistent with promoting free speech. So the issue of revoking immunity is thorny for free speech advocates.

Section 230 And Content Moderation

There have always been legal restrictions on speech related to libel and “fighting words”. In addition, the CDA, which is a part of the Telecommunications Act, restricts “obscene” or “offensive” speech and content in various ways. The problem is that social media firms seem to have used the CDA as a pretext for censoring content more generally. It’s also possible they felt as if immunity from liability made them legally impervious to objections of any sort, including aggressive political censorship and user bans on behalf of government.

The social value of granting immunity depends on the context. There are two different kinds of immunity under Section 230: subsection (c)(1) grants immunity to so-called common carriers (e.g. telephone companies) for the content of private messages or calls on their networks; subsection (c)(2) grants immunity to social media companies for content posted on their platforms as long as those companies engage in content moderation consistent with the provisions of the CDA.

Common carrier immunity is comparatively noncontroversial, but with respect to 230(c)(2), I go back to the question: would I want my worst enemy to have the power to grant this kind of immunity? Not if it meant the power to forgive political manipulation of social media content with the heavy involvement of one political party! The right to ban users is completely unlike the “must serve” legal treatment of “public accommodations” provided by most private businesses. And immunity is inconsistent with other policies. For example, if social media acts to systematically host and to amplify some viewpoints and suppress others, it suggests that they are behaving more like publishers, who are liable for material they might publish, whether produced on their own or by third-party contributors.

Still, social media firms are private companies and their user agreements generally allow them to take down content for any reason. And if content moderation decisions are colored by input from one side of the political aisle, that is within the rights of a private firm (unless its actions are held to be illegal in-kind contributions to a political campaign). Likewise, it is every consumer’s right not to join such a platform, and today there are a number of alternatives to Twitter and Facebook.

Again, political censorship exercised privately is not the worst of it. There are indications that government actors have been complicit in censorship decisions made by social media. That would be a clear violation of the First Amendment for which immunity should be out of the question. I’d probably cut a platform considerable slack, however, if they acted under threat of retaliation by government actors, if that could be proven.

Volokh’s Quid Pro Quo

Rather than simply stripping away Section 230 protection for social media firms, another solution has been suggested by Eugene Volokh in “Common Carrier Status as Quid Pro Quo for § 230(c)(1) Immunity”. He proposes the following choice for these companies:

“(1) Be common carriers like phone companies, immune from liability but also required to host all viewpoints, or

(2) be distributors like bookstores, free to pick and choose what to host but subject to liability (at least on a notice-and-takedown basis).”

Option 2 is the very solution discussed in the last section (revoke immunity). Option 1, however, would impinge on a private company’s right to moderate content in exchange for continued immunity. Said differently, the quid pro quo offers continued rents created by immunity in exchange for status as a public utility of sorts, along with limits on the private right to moderate content. Common carriers often face other regulatory rules that bear on pricing and profits, but since basic service on social media is usually free, this is probably not at issue for the time being.

Does Volokh’s quid pro quo pass the Munger Test? Well, at least it’s a choice! For social media firms to host all viewpoints isn’t nearly as draconian as the universal service obligation imposed on local phone companies and other utilities, because the marginal cost of hosting an extra social media user is negligible.

Would I give my worst enemy the power to impose this choice? The CDA would still obligate social media firms selecting Option 1 to censor obscene or offensive content. Option 2 carries greater legal risks to firms, who might respond by exercising more aggressive content moderation. The coexistence of common carriers and more content-selective hosts might create competitive pressures for restrained content moderation (within the limits of the CDA) and a better balance for users. Therefore, Volokh’s quid pro quo option seems reasonable. The only downside is whether government might interfere with social media common carriers’ future profitability or plans to price user services. Then again, if a firm could reverse its choice at some point, that might address the concern. The CDA itself might not have passed the “Worst Enemy” Munger Test, but at least within the context of established law, I think Volokh’s quid pro quo probably does.

We’ll Know More Soon

More will be revealed as new “episodes” of the Twitter Files are released. We may well hear direct evidence of government involvement in censorship decisions. If so, it will be interesting to see the fallout in terms of legal actions against government censorship, and whether support coalesces around changes in the social media regulatory environment.

Government Action and the “Your Worst Enemy” Test

03 Saturday Dec 2022

Posted by Nuetzel in Big Government, Censorship

≈ 3 Comments

Tags

Big government, Censorship, Donald Trump, Elon Musk, Michael Munger, Munger Test, Nancy Pelosi, regulation, Social Media, Twitter, Unicorn Governance, Your Worst Enemy Test

A couple of weeks back I posted an admittedly partial list of the disadvantages, dysfunctions, and dangers of the Big Government Mess seemingly wished upon us by so many otherwise reasonable people. A wise addition to that line of thinking is the so-called Munger Test articulated by Michael Munger of Duke University. Here, he applies the test to government involvement in social media content regulation:

“If someone says “The STATE should do X” (in this case, decide what is true and what can be published in a privately-owned space), they need to make a substitution.

Instead of “The STATE” substitute “Donald Trump,” and see if you still belief it. (Or “Nancy Pelosi”, if you want).”

If approached honestly, Munger’s test is sure to make a partisan think twice about having government “do something”, or do anything! In a another tweet, Munger elaborates on the case of Twitter, which is highly topical at the moment:

“In fact, the reporters and media moguls who are calling for the state to hammer Twitter, and censor all those other ‘liars’, naively believe that they have a 1000 Year Reich.

You don’t. 𝙔𝙤𝙪 𝙘𝙖𝙣 𝙤𝙣𝙡𝙮 𝙜𝙞𝙫𝙚 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙎𝙩𝙖𝙩𝙚 𝙥𝙤𝙬𝙚𝙧𝙨 𝙩𝙝𝙖𝙩 𝙮𝙤𝙪 𝙛𝙖𝙫𝙤𝙧 𝙜𝙞𝙫𝙞𝙣𝙜 𝙩𝙤 𝙮𝙤𝙪𝙧 𝙬𝙤𝙧𝙨𝙩 𝙚𝙣𝙚𝙢𝙮. Deal with it.”

The second sentence in that last paragraph is an even more concise statement of the general principle behind the Munger Test, which we might dub the “Worst Enemy Test” with no disrespect to Munger. He proposed the test (immodestly named, he admits) in his 2014 article, “Unicorn Governance”, in which he offered a few other examples of its application. The article is subtitled:

“Ever argued public policy with people whose State is in fantasyland?”

The answer for me is yes, almost every time I talk to anyone about public policy! And as Munger says, that’s because:

“Everybody imagines that ‘The STATE’ is smart people who agree with them. Once MY team controls the state, order will be restored to the Force.”

So go ahead! Munger-test all your friends’ favorite policy positions the next time you talk!

But what about the case of “regulating” Twitter or somehow interfering with its approach to content moderation? More on that in my next post.

Feel the Nutzenfreude: Joy In Success of Others

06 Sunday Feb 2022

Posted by Nuetzel in Free markets, Human Welfare

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David Sedaris, Duke University, Economic Efficiency, Exploitation, Free Markets, Freundschaftsbeziehungen, Gleichschaltung, Mark Twain, Marxism, Michael Munger, Nutzenfreude, Nutzenschmerz, Paretian, Pareto Improvements, Pareto Optimality, Privilege, Property Rights, Schadenfreude, Scottish Enlightenment, Social Justice, Tradenfreude, Tradenschmerz

Michael Munger is a professor of economics at Duke University who has coined a term for the distaste we observe, in some quarters, for the success of others. He calls it Nutzenschmerz, a conjunction of the German words “nutzen” (benefit) and “schmerz” (pain).

According to Munger, nutzenschmertz is an impulse of “indignant outrage over someone getting” … “an undeserved benefit”. Of course, “undeserved” is a key word here. I suspect those inflicted with nutzenschmerz apply definitions as flexible and arbitrary as the envy from which they suffer. Nutzenschmerz is a special kind of envy, however, because it doesn’t necessarily imply a personal want of the benefit. It’s simply a condemnation of another’s good fortune. Munger applies an additional twist to the definition, which I discuss below. As a mnemonic device, it might be helpful to think of nutzenschmerz as a hatred for anyone who “gets their nut”!

People of good spirit believe success in others is something to admire, at least if it doesn’t come at someone else’s expense. Perhaps success is more admirable as the fruit of hard work and talent, as opposed to dumb luck. But good luck is nothing to be ashamed of, and it’s often said we make our own luck. Well, maybe only lucky people say that! “Luck” doesn’t necessarily come at the expense of others, however, and no one “loses” things they have no right to expect.

Furthermore, one’s success, lucky or otherwise, often inures to the benefit of others in the form of better products, new jobs, and higher income. For example, if I were to find a deposit of some rare earth mineral on my property while digging a well, I’d consider myself quite lucky. I would then hire people to mine it. The new supplies of the mineral would be used in industry, bringing more plentiful supplies of certain products to consumers. New jobs! Cheaper products!

Economists have a particular framework for discussing “successes” of this kind. If a change occurs from which everyone benefits and no one loses, economists say the change is a Pareto improvement. If only only a few benefit and no one is made worse off, it is a weak Pareto improvement. When all such opportunities have been exhausted, we have reached a state of Pareto optimality. Free markets generally move society toward that state, externalities aside. This is an aspect of what’s meant when we say markets promote economic efficiency. And when technology, tastes, or resource availability change, as they do constantly, new opportunities arise for Pareto improvements.

The Left is selectively intolerant of success and even Pareto improvements from luck or effort. The attitude is usually couched in terms of undeserved “privilege” or some form of “exploitation”. They exempt their own gains, of course, especially when they find themselves in a position to pick winners (and that enterprise almost always involves picking losers as well). In fact, they are probably inclined to celebrate success that owes to subsidies for politically favored activities, which clearly come at the expense of others and are not Paretian in any sense. Social justice warriors demand a free pass on coveting what belongs to others, and they are often just as contemptible of successful effort as they are of dumb luck. Whatever it is you have, or have achieved, don’t expect them to respect it … or your right to have it.

The word Nutzenschmerz amuses me partly because the original German form of my name begins with the letters “Nütz“. Also, like Munger, I’ve always been charmed by the German linguistic practice of stringing words together, like the more familiar Schadenfreude, which means to take pleasure in the misfortunes of others. Or Freundschaftsbeziehungen (friendship demonstrations). Mark Twain said some German words are so long they have perspective! David Sedalis once commented that he heard lots of long words in Germany, but one of the few that stuck was Lebensabschnittspartner:

“This doesn’t translate to ‘lover’ or ‘life partner’ but, rather, to ‘the person I am with today,’ the implication being that things change, and you are keeping yourself open.”

Then, of course, take Gleichschaltung (the standardization of political, economic, and social institutions in authoritarian states). Er … no, please, not that!

In addition to nutzenschmirz, Munger has coined the term Tradenfreude, meaning “joy … at observing the ‘well-contrived machine’ of commercial society, with everyone trading with everyone else for conveniences and necessities.” By extension, he adds Tradenschmerz, meaning the hatred reserved for free markets by many leftists.

Nutzenschmerz is an emotive force that shapes the Marxist psyche. It could be dismissed as incidental to a shallow grasp of the mutually beneficial nature of voluntary trade. However, it also demonstrates a fundamental disrespect for property rights. It’s a rejection of the very things that motivate human action, and which enable cooperation on a scale unprecedented over nearly all of human history preceding the Scottish Enlightenment.

I propose that we should all practice a philosophy of Nutzenfreude, by which I mean taking pleasure in the Paretian successes of others. It might be vicarious, or it might signal the genesis of new opportunities for the rest of us! The thing is, those successes all represent human progress to one degree or another, from which we all derive incremental benefits. That doesn’t mean we shouldn’t be watchful for harms or externalities, but neither should we regard every success with suspicion, or worse, nutzenschmerz!

Do as Munger says: fight nutzenschmerz! And revel in nutzenfreude!

Sacred Cow Chips

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