Letting Protectionist Nations Tax Themselves

22 Tuesday Apr 2025

Posted by in Comparative advantage, Protectionism, Tariffs

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First, a few more comments re: my speculative musings that Donald Trump’s tariff rampage could ultimately result in a regime with lower trade barriers, at least with a subset of trading partners. Arthur Laffer and Stephen Moore suggested last week that the White House should propose reciprocal free trade with zero barriers and zero subsidies for exports to any country that wishes to negotiate. A more cynical Ben Zycher scoffed at the very possibility, noting that Trump and his lieutenants view any trade deficit as evidence of cheating in one form or another. Zycher is convinced that Trump lacks a basic understanding of the (mostly) benign forces that drive trade imbalances.

I’ve said much the same. Trump’s crazy notions about trade could scuttle negotiations, or he might later accuse a trading partner of cheating on the pretext of a bilateral trade deficit (he’s done so already). And all this is to say nothing of the serious constitutional questions surrounding Trump’s tariff actions.

The mistaken focus on bilateral trade deficits also manifests in certain proposals made during trade negotiations: “Okay, but you’re gonna have to purchase vast quantities of our soybeans every year.” This sort of export promotion is a further drift into industrial planning, and it’s just too much for Trump’s trade negotiators to resist.

This might well turn out as an exercise in self-harm for Trump. However, I’ve also wondered whether his trade hokum is pure posturing, especially because he expressed support for a free trade regime in 2018. Let’s hope he meant it and that he’ll pursue that objective in trade talks. Please, just negotiate lower trade barriers on both sides without the mercantilist baggage.

Which brings me to the theme of this post: it would probably be simpler and more effective for the U.S. to simply drop all of its trade barriers unilaterally. There should be limited exceptions related to national security, but in general we should “turn the other cheek” and let recalcitrant trade partners engage in economic self-harm, if they must.

Okay, Wise Guy, What’s Your Plan?

I have a few friends who bemoan the lack of “fair play” against the U.S. in foreign trade. They have a point, but they also hold an unshakable belief that the U.S. can be just as efficient at producing anything as any other country. They are pretty much in denial that comparative advantages exist in the real world. They are seemingly oblivious to the critical role of specialization in unlocking gains from trade and lifting much of the world’s population out of penury over the past few centuries.

Furthermore, these friends believe that Trump is justified in “retaliating” against countries with whom the U.S. runs trade deficits. If tariffs are so bad, they ask, what would I do instead? Again, here’s my answer:

Eliminate (almost) all barriers to trade imposed by the U.S. Let protectionist nations choke themselves with tariffs/trade barriers.

Before getting into that, I’ll address one fact that is often denied by protectionists.

Yes, a Tariff Is a Tax!

Protectionists often claim that tariffs are not really taxes on U.S. buyers. However, tariffs are charged to buyers of imported goods (often businesses who sell imported goods to consumers or other businesses). In principle, tariffs operate just like a sales tax charged to retail buyers. Both raise government revenue, and they are both excise taxes.

In both cases, the buyer pays but generally bears less than the full burden of the tax. That’s because demand curves slope downward, so sellers (foreign exporters) try to avoid losing sales by moderating their prices in response to the tariff. In both cases, sellers end up shouldering part of the tax burden. How much depends on how buyers react to price: a steep (inelastic) demand curve implies that buyers bear the greater part of the burden of a tariff or sales tax.

People sometimes buy imports due to a lack of substitutes, which implies a steep demand curve. Consumer imports are often luxury items, and well-heeled buyers may be somewhat insensitive to price. Most imports, however, are inputs purchased by businesses, either capital goods or intermediate goods. In the face of higher tariffs, those businesses find it difficult and costly to arrange new suppliers, let alone domestic suppliers, who can deliver quickly and meet their specifications.

These considerations imply that the demand for imports is fairly inelastic (steeper), especially in the short run (when alternatives can’t easily be arranged). Thus, import buyers bear a large portion of the burden in the immediate aftermath of an increased tariff. By imposing tariffs we tax our own citizens and businesses, forcing them to incur higher costs. Correspondingly, if demand is inelastic, an importing country tends to gain more than its trading partners by unilaterally eliminating its own tariffs.

Tariffs on imports also trigger price hikes by import-competing producers. Sometimes this is opportunistic, but even these producers incur higher costs in attempting to meet new demand from buyers who formerly purchased imports. (See this post for an explanation of the costly transition, including a nice exposition of the waste of resources it entails.)

Other Forms of Blood Letting

Beyond tariffs, certain barriers to trade make it more difficult or impossible to purchase goods produced abroad. This includes import quotas and domestic content restrictions. These barriers are often as bad or worse than tariffs because they increase costs and encumber freedom of choice and consumer sovereignty.

Another kind of trade intervention, export subsidies, must be funded by taxpayers. Subsidies are too easily used to protect special interests who otherwise can’t compete. Currency manipulation can both subsidize exports and discourage imports, but it is often unsustainable. The common theme of these interventions is to undermine economic efficiency by shielding the domestic economy from real price signals.

Let Them Tax Themselves

Suppose the U.S. simply turns the other cheek, eliminating all of our own trade interventions with respect to country X despite X’s tariffs and other interventions.

To start with, the existence of barriers means that both countries are unable to exploit all of the benefits of specialization and mutually beneficial trade. Both countries must produce an excess of goods in which they lack a comparative advantage, and both countries produce too few goods in which they have a comparative advantage. Both incur extra costs and produce less output than they could in the absence of trade barriers.

Unilateral elimination of U.S. tariffs and other barriers would reduce high-cost domestic production of certain goods in favor of better substitutes from country X. But Country X gains as well, because it is now able to produce more goods and services for export in which it possesses a comparative advantage. Therefore, the unilateral move by the U.S. is beneficial to both countries.

On the other hand, U.S. export industries are still constrained by country X’s import tax or other restraints. These would-be exporters are no worse off than before, but they are worse off relative to a state in which buyers in country X could freely express their preferences in the marketplace.

What exactly does country X gain from tariffs and other trade burdens on its citizens? It denies them full access to what they deem to be superior goods and services at an acceptable price. It means that resources are misallocated, forcing abstention or the use of inferior or costlier domestic alternatives. Resources must be diverted to relatively inefficient firms. In short, the tariff makes country X less prosperous.

Empirical evidence shows that more open economies (with fewer trade barriers) enjoy greater income and productivity growth. This study found that “trade’s impact on real income [is] consistently positive and significant over time.” See this paper as well. Trade barriers tend to increase the income gap between rich and poor countries. The chart below (from this link) compares real GDP per capita from the top third and bottom third of the distribution of countries on a measure of trade “openness”. Converting logs to levels, the top third has more than twice the average real GDP per capita of the bottom third. And of course, the averaging process mutes differences between very open and very closed trade policies.

The chart also shows that countries more “open” to trade have more equal distributions of income, as measured by their Gini coefficients.

An important qualification is that domestic production of certain goods and services might be critical to national security. We must be willing to tolerate some inefficiencies in that case. It would be foolish to depend on a hostile nation for those supplies, despite any comparative advantage they might possess. It’s reasonable to expect such a list of critical goods and services to evolve with technological developments and changing security threats. However, merely acknowledging this justification leaves the door open for excessively broad interpretations of “critical goods”, especially in times of crisis.

Setting a Good Policy and Example

Here’s an attempt to summarize:

  • Tariffs are taxes, and non-tariff barriers inflict costs by distorting prices or diminishing choice
  • Trade barriers reduce economic efficiency and produce welfare losses
  • Trade barriers deny the citizens of a country the benefits of specialization
  • Both countries gain when one trading partner eliminates tariffs on imports from the other
  • The demand for imports is fairly inelastic, at least in the short run. Thus, the gain from eliminating a tariff will be skewed toward the domestic importers
  • Both countries gain when they agree to eliminate any and all trade barriers
  • Across countries, trade barriers are associated with lower incomes, lower income growth, and more unequal distributions of income

The U.S. has a large number of trading partners. Every liberalization we initiate means a welfare gain for us and one trading partner, who would do well to follow our example and reciprocate in full. Not doing so foregoes welfare gains and leads to incremental losses in income relative to more trade-friendly nations. Across all of our trading relationships, a unilateral end to U.S. trade barriers would almost certainly convince some countries to reciprocate. Those that refuse would suffer. Let them self-flagulate. Let them tax themselves.

The Tariff Games

08 Tuesday Apr 2025

Posted by in Protectionism, Tariffs

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Donald Trump’s imposition of higher tariffs — much higher tariffs — on our trading partners carries tremendous risk. See this article for a good summary of the tariffs Trump levied (and now paused for 90 days) on imported goods from different countries. The President believes he can win major concessions from other nations in terms of trade barriers as well as foreign policy objectives. But he would also have us believe that we’ll be better off even if those concessions fall short of his hopes.

Perhaps he’s posturing, but Trump seems to thinks tariffs are some kind of elixir. That is nonsense for a variety of reasons. I’ve discussed several of those previously and I’ll add more in a subsequent post. Here, I’ll attempt to give Trump his due. I’m highly skeptical, but I’ll be happy to eat crow if he is successful in achieving a trade regime with lower tariffs and other barriers across many of our trading partners.

Markets

The tariff announcements last week on “Liberation Day” spooked markets, prompting a continuation of the classic flight to safety we’ve witnessed since Trump began to rattle his trade saber. This has driven bond prices up and long-term interest rates down, though now we’re seeing a partial reversal (if it holds). Will lower interest rates help save the day for Trump? It will bring lower borrowing costs to many borrowers, including the federal government, and it should help to buttress stock values, softening the blow to some extent.

The tariffs, should they remain in place, are likely to boost inflation temporarily (a one-time increase in the price level) and could very well tip the U.S. economy into recession. Depending on the severity, those developments would undercut the GOP’s hopes of maintaining a congressional majority in the 2026 mid-term elections. Then, he’d truly have managed to cut off his nose to spite his face. Still, Trump thinks he knows something about tariffs that markets don’t.

Dominoes

Bill Ackman has expressed a view of how markets are reacting and how they might evolve under Trump’s trade policy. He thinks markets would be fine had the President set tariffs at levels matching our trading partners (doubtful at best), but Trump went bigger in order to jolt other nations into negotiating. Ackman thinks there might be a “tipping point” when countries line up at the negotiating table. And indeed, as of April 7, the administration said “up to” 70 countries had reached out to enter new trade negotiations with the U.S. That probably helped bring investors out of their doldrums, pending actual deals.

Elon Musk states a desire to see tariffs eliminated between the U.S. and the EU, and the EU has made a limited offer along those lines. This might be indicative of similar thinking by others in the administration. But Trump insists he’ll always revisit tariffs wherever he sees a bilateral trade deficit. Contrary to all economic logic, he is convinced that trade deficits are harmful, when in fact they mainly reflect our relative prosperity.

Hard-Nosed, High Stakes

Economists have been almost uniform in their condemnation of Trump’s approach trade. To some extent, that’s a visceral reaction to Trump’s pro-tariff rhetoric and revulsion to his opening moves. But is there an economic rationale for this type of aggressive attempt to bargain for lower trade barriers? Yes, and it’s not a terribly deep insight, and it carries great risks in the real world.

From a game-theoretic perspective, it’s possible that a dominant trading partner, in repeated rounds, can ultimately achieve lower bilateral trade barriers through the threat or imposition of higher barriers to imports from a trading partner. The key is the difference in costs that barriers impose on the two nations. One is in a position to leverage its dominant position, inflicting greater costs on the other nation as an inducement to gain concessions and achieve improved conditions for mutual trade.

The U.S. is almost uniformly the dominant partner in bilateral trade relationships. That’s because U.S. GDP is so large and U.S. trade with any given country is a comparatively small fraction of GDP. But dominance can mean different things: there are countries that supply critical goods to the U.S., like oil, semiconductors, or rare earths, which may give certain countries disproportionate leverage in trade negotiation. Those products along with many others are exempted from Trump’s tariffs.

Other Cards

Nevertheless, the U.S. has economic leverage over individual trading partners in the vast majority of cases, which Trump certainly is willing to exploit. And Trump has another powerful tool with which to negotiate with some trading partners: U.S. military protection. Using it might expose the U.S. to strategic disadvantages, but don’t put it past Trump to bring this up in negotiations!

Trump is doing his best to prove a readiness to escalate. That might build his credibility except for a couple of critical facts: first, his actions have already violated at least 15 existing treaties. Why should they trust him? Second, some groups of nations are likely to present a united front, putting them on a more equal footing with the U.S. This makes a trade war between the U.S. and the rest of the world more likely. One nation in particular stands ready to capitalize on severed relations between other nations and “Donald Trump’s” America: Xi Jinping’s China. Bilateral trade with China might just be the Super Bowl of these tariff games. Unfortunately, it could be a Super Bowl where everyone loses!

An additional complication: while the U.S. has dominance in most of its trade relationships, the barriers to U.S. goods erected by other nations are often supported by powerful special interests. Trump’s ability to strike deals will be complicated where governments are captive to these interests, which might be concentrated among powerful elites or of a more diffuse, nationalist/populist nature.

Deep In the Woods

There is optimism in some quarters that a few successful trade deals will lead to a “tipping point” in the willingness of other nations to negotiate with Trump. Despite the sudden clamor among our trade partners to negotiate, we’re a long way from getting solid agreements. Investors still assess a greater risk of a world trade war than vanishing barriers to trade.

I’ll close with a take on the situation by the reliably funny Iowahawk:

Choosing DOGE Over a Prodigal State Apparatus

03 Thursday Apr 2025

Posted by in Big Government, DOGE

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I prefer a government that is limited in size and scope, sticking closely to the provision of public goods without interfering in private markets. Therefore, I’m delighted with the mission of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), a rebranded version of the U.S. Digital Service created by Barack Obama in 2014 to clean up technical issues then plaguing the Obamacare web site. The “new” DOGE is fanning out across federal agencies to upgrade systems and eliminate waste and fraud.

A Strawman

For years, democrats such as Barack Obama and Joe Biden have advocated for eliminating waste in government. So did Bill Clinton, Al Gore, Bernie Sanders, Chuck Schumer, and Nancy Pelosi. Here’s Mark Cuban on the same point. Were these exhortations made in earnest? Or were they just lip service? Now that a real effort is underway to get it done, we’re told that only fascists would do such a thing.

I’m seeing scary posts about DOGE even on LinkedIn, such as the plight of Americans unable to get federal public health communications due to layoffs at HHS, while failing to mention the thousands of new HHS employees hired by Biden in recent years. As if HHS was particularly effective in dispensing good public health advice during the pandemic!

Those kinds of assertions are hard to take seriously. For reasons like these and still others, I tend to dismiss nearly all of the horror stories I hear about DOGE’s activities as nitwitted virtue signals or propaganda.

Many on the left claim that DOGE’s work is careless, and especially the force reductions they’ve spearheaded. For example, they claim that DOGE has failed to identify key employees critical to the functioning of the bureaucracy. The tone of this argument is that “this would not pass muster at a well-managed business”. A “sober” effort to achieve efficiencies within the federal bureaucracy, the argument goes, would involve much more consideration. In other words, given political realities, it would not get done, and they really don’t want it to get done.

The best rationale for the ostensible position of these critics might be situations like the dismissal of several thousand provisional employees at the FDA, a few of whom were later rehired to help manage the work load of reviewing and approving drugs. However, thus far, only a tiny percentage of the federal force reductions under consideration have involved immediate layoffs.

Of course, DOGE is not being tasked to review the practices of a well-managed business or a well-managed governmental organization. What we have here is a dysfunctional government. It is a bloated, low productivity Leviathan run by management and staff who, all too frequently, seem oblivious to the predicament. Large force reductions at all levels are probably necessary to make headway against entrenched interests that have operated as a fourth branch of government.

Thus, I see the leftist critique of Trump’s force reductions as something of a strawman, and it falls flat for several other reasons. First, the vast bulk of the prospective reduction in headcount will be voluntary, as the separating employees have been offered attractive severance packages. Second, force reductions in the private sector always feel chaotic, and they often are. And they are sometimes executed without regard to the qualifications of specific employees. Tough luck!

Duplicative functions, poor data systems, and a lack of control have led to massive misappropriations of funds. The dysfunction has been enabled by a metastasization of nests of administrative authority inside agencies with “incomprehensible” org charts, often having multiple departments with identical functions that do not communicate. These departments frequently use redundant but unconnected systems. A related problem is the inadequacy of documentation for outgoing payments. Needless to say, this is a hostile environment for effective spending controls.

It’s worth emphasizing, by the way, DOGE’s “open book” transparency. It’s not as if Elon Musk and DOGE are attempting to sabotage the deep state in the dark of night. Indeed, they are shouting from the rooftops!

Doing It Fast

Every day we have a new revelation from DOGE of incredible waste in the federal bureaucracy. Check out this story about a VA contact for web site maintenance. All too ironically, what we call government waste tends to have powerful, self-interested, and deeply corrupt constituencies. This makes speed an imperative for DOGE. In a highly politicized and litigious environment, the extent to which the Leviathan can be brought to heel is partly a function of how quickly the deconstruction takes place. One must pardon a few temporary dislocations that otherwise might be avoided in a world free of rent seeking behavior. Otherwise, the graft (no, NOT “grift”) will continue unabated.

The foregoing offers sufficient rationale not only for speedy force reductions, but also for system upgrades, dissolution of certain offices, and consolidation of core functions under single-agency umbrellas.

The Bloody Budget

It’s difficult to know when budget legislation will begin to reflect DOGE’s successes. The actual budget deficit might be affected in fiscal year 2025, but so far the savings touted by DOGE are chump change compared to the expected $2 trillion deficit, and only a fraction of those savings contribute to ongoing deficit reduction.

Uncontrolled spending is the root cause of the deficit, as opposed to insufficient tax revenue, as evidenced by a relatively stable ratio of taxes to GDP. The spending problem was exacerbated by the pandemic, but Congress and the Biden Administration never managed to scale outlays back to their previous trend once the economy recovered. Balancing the budget is made impossible when the prevailing psychology among legislators and the media is that reductions in the growth of spending represent spending cuts.

Federal spending is excessive on both the discretionary and mandatory sides of the budget. Ultimately, eliminating the budget deficit without allowing the 2017 Trump tax cuts to expire will require reform to mandatory entitlements like Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid, as well as reductions across an array of discretionary programs.

DOGE’s focus on fraud and waste extends to entitlements. At a minimum, the data and tracking systems in place at HHS and SSA are antiquated, sometimes inaccurate, and are highly susceptible to manipulation and fraud. Systems upgrades are likely to pay for themselves many times over.

But all indications are that it’s much worse than that. Social security numbers were issued to millions of illegal immigrants during the Biden Administration, and those enrollees were cleared for maximum benefits. There were a significant number of illegals enrolled in Medicaid and registered to vote. While some of these immigrants might be employed and contributing to the entitlement system, they should not be employed without legal status. Of course, one can defend these entitlement benefits on purely compassionate grounds, but the availability of benefits has served to attract a massive flow of illegal border crossings. This illustrates both the extent to which the entitlement system has been compromised as well as the breakdown of border security.

On the discretionary side of the budget, DOGE has identified an impressive array programs that were not just wasteful, but by turns ridiculous or politically motivated (for example, the bulk of USAID’s budget). Many of these funding initiatives belong on the chopping block, and components that might be worthwhile have been moved to agencies with related missions. In addition, authorized but unspent allocations have been identified that seem to have been held in reserve, and which now can be used to reduce the public debt.

Research Grants?

Of course, like the initial scale of the FDA layoffs, a few mistakes have and will be made by DOGE and agencies under DOGE’s guidance. Many believe another powerful argument against DOGE is the Trump Administration’s 15% limit on indirect costs as an add-on to NIH grants. Critics assert that this limit will hamstring U.S. scientific advancement. However, it won’t “kill” publicly funded research. As this article in Reason points out, historically public funding has not been critical to scientific advancement in the U.S. In fact, private funding accounts for the vast bulk of U.S. R&D, according to the Congressional Research Service. Moreover, it’s broadly acknowledged that indirect costs are subject to distortion, and that generous funding of those costs creates bad incentives and raises thorny questions about cross-subsidies across funders (15% is the rate at which charities typically fund indirect costs).

No doubt some elite research universities will suffer declines in grants, but their case is weakened politically by a combination of lax control over anti-Semitic protests on campus, the growing unpopularity of DEI initiatives in education, and public awareness of the huge endowments over which these universities preside. Nevertheless, I won’t be surprised to see the 15% limit on indirect research costs revised upward somewhat.

More DOGE Please

I’ve criticized the numbers posted on DOGE’s website elsewhere. They could do a much better job of categorizing and reporting the savings they’ve achieved, and they have far to go before meeting the goals stated by Elon Musk. Be that as it may, DOGE is making progress. Here is a report on a few of the latest cuts.

As I’ve emphasized on numerous occasions, the federal government is a strangling mass of tentacles, squeezing excessive resources out of the private sector and suffocating producers with an endless catalogue of burdensome rules. There are many examples of systemic waste taking place within the federal bureaucracy. For example, since its creation by Jimmy Carter, the Department of Education has managed to piss away trillions of dollars while student performance has declined. The Small Business Administration has doled out millions of dollars in subsidized loans to super-centenarians as well as children. The U.S. Postal Service keeps losing money and mail while deliveries slow to a crawl. Big projects become mired in endless iterations of reviews and revisions, such as Obama’s infrastructure plan and Joe Biden’s infrastructure and rural broadband initiative.

And again, regulatory agencies are often our worst enemies, imposing burdensome requirements with which only the largest industry players can afford to comply. Indeed, the savings achieved through the DOGE process might pale in comparison to the resources that could be liberated by rationalizing the tangle of regulations now choking private business.

A significant narrowing of the budget deficit would be a major accomplishment for DOGE. Even one-time savings to help pay down the public debt are worthwhile. In this latter regard, I hope DOGE’s work with the Department of Interior helps facilitate the sale of dormant federal assets. This includes land (not parks) and buildings worth literally trillions of dollars, and sometimes costing billions annually to maintain.

Medicaid Funding Scam Tolerated For Years

18 Tuesday Mar 2025

Posted by in Medicaid, rent seeking

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It’s been underway in various forms for a long time, at least since the early 1980s. It’s a basic variant of what the National Library of Medicine once called “creative financing” by some states “to get more federal dollars than they otherwise would qualify for” under Medicaid. It was even recognized as a scam by Joe Biden during Barack Obama’s presidency, and more recently by a number of legislators. Perhaps DOGE can do something to bring it under scrutiny, but ending it would probably take legislation.

Here’s the gist of it: increases in state Medicaid reimbursements qualify for a federal match at a rate known as the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAPs). First, increases in Medicaid reimbursements must be funded at the state level. To do this, states tax Medicaid providers, but then the revenue is kicked back to providers in higher reimbursements. The deluge of matching federal dollars follows, and states are free to use those dollars in their general budgets.

FMAPs vary based on state income level, so states with poorer residents have higher matching rates. The minimum FMAP is 50%, and it ranges up to 90% for marginal reimbursements falling under expanded Medicaid under Obamacare. The dollar value of the federal match is not capped.

The graphic at the top of this post highlights the circularity of this funding scheme. The graphic is taken from the Government Accountability Office’s “Medicaid Managed Care: Rapid Spending Growth In State Directed Payments Needs Enhanced Oversight and Transparency”. Here’s how Issues & Insights puts it:

“Let’s say, for example, a state imposes a provider tax on hospitals that raises $100 million. And then it returns that $100 million to the hospitals in the form of higher Medicaid reimbursement rates. There’s been no increase in benefits. Providers aren’t better off. But the state gets an extra $50 million from the federal government’s matching fund, money that it can use for anything it wants.“

However, whatever the increment to state coffers, and no matter what state programs are funded as a result, the increment is always expressed as a federal contribution to state Medicaid spending. That bit of shading helps cover for the convoluted and pernicious nature of the scheme. The lack of transparency is obvious, cloaking the circular nature of the flow of funds from providers to states and then back to providers. It’s possible that the arrangement inflates total annual Medicaid costs by as $50 – $65 billion a year, or by 6% – 8%.

Of course, this is also a blatant example of bureaucratic waste, and the allocation of “supplemental reimbursements” are a potential seedbed for cronyism and graft.

It would be better for the federal government to simply give states the money under block grants without the rigmarole. But of course that would change the character of the rent seeking already taking place, and the political daylight might not serve beneficiary states and providers well.

Putting aside the deception inherent in the funding mechanism, states vary tremendously in their reliance on federal matching revenue. States with large populations and high average incomes rely more heavily on the circular inflating of Medicaid reimbursements. California and New York lead the way in both Medicaid provider taxes and federal matching funds. Alaska, however, imposes no Medicaid provider taxes, and smaller states like Wyoming collect little in provider taxes.

High income states receive lower FMAPs, which seemingly encourages both higher Medicaid provider taxes and more “generous” provider reimbursements in order to harvest more federal matching funds. In addition, states have an incentive to participate in expanded Medicaid under the Affordable Care Act in order to receive higher matching rates.

The reciprocal nature of state-level Medicaid provider taxes and provider reimbursements implies a substantial but fictitious component of state Medicaid costs. The purpose is to qualify for federal matching dollars under Medicaid. The governments of 49 states have carried on with this escapade for years. Their misguided defenders insist that the federal contribution is necessary to protect benefits that states might otherwise have to cut. But even that stipulation would not justify the pairing of taxes on and reimbursements to Medicaid providers, which inflates the spending base upon which federal reimbursements are calculated. You have to wonder whether federal taxpayers should forgive the overstatement of costs and misallocation of funds.

DOGE Has Yet To Bite Into Treasury Yields

10 Monday Mar 2025

Posted by in Deficits, Trump Administration

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No sooner had I posted this piece on the bond market’s bemused reaction to DOGE’s cost-cutting potential than Treasury rates began to drop sharply. The 10-year Treasury note fell by about 30 basis points over the course of a week. It’s stabilized and up a little since then, but that drop had little to do with DOGE and everything to do with uncertainty about Trumpian policies and signs of a flagging economy.

Despite those probable causes, the excitement of falling rates prompted the author of this article to dive headlong into fantasy: “Interest Rates Are Falling Thanks to Cuts in Government Spending”. I hope he’s right that real cuts in government spending will be forthcoming, but that’s highly speculative at this point.

In fact, markets are grappling with massive uncertainties at the moment. Under these circumstances, a preference for safety among investors means a flight to low-risk assets like treasuries, forcing their prices up and yields down.

Tariff threats against long-time allies and adversaries alike are a huge source of uncertainty for markets, especially given Trump’s unpredictable thrusts and parries. The burden of U.S. tariffs falls largely on American buyers and tariffs are of limited revenue potential. They have already prompted announcements of retaliation, so the possibility of a trade war is real, which would create a major disruption in economic activity. This portent comes atop growing signs that a slowdown is already underway in the U.S. economy. As Eric Boehm notes, tariffs are all costs and no benefits, and their mere prospect adds significant risk to the economic and political outlook.

Budgetary developments have also been unsettling to markets. Despite promises of reduced federal spending, signs point to even larger deficits. The budget resolution passed by the House of Representatives in late February calls for various spending reductions, but it would extend the Trump tax cuts and increase defense and border control spending. On balance, deficits under the bill would be higher by $4 trillion over 10 years. That is not reassuring, and Trump still wants to eliminate taxes on tips, overtime, and Social Security benefits, which would require separate legislation. State and local tax deductions are also a hot topic. All this obviously undermines the notion that investors should take a rosy view of the outlook for reduced Treasury borrowing under Trump. Of course, higher deficits would be expected to push Treasury rates upward, but the point here is that on balance, DOGE and the Trump Administration have yet to provide a convincing case that rates should decline.

Every week the administration finds a way to demonstrate its lack of seriousness with respect to paying off the public debt. First we had the $5,000 “DOGE dividend” to all Americans. And last week a Strategic Bitcoin Reserve was authorized by Executive Order, to be funded by crypto asset forfeitures and civil penalties. While this type of funding technically qualifies as “budget neutral”, the better alternative would be to put those funds toward paying off debt. In any case, the whole idea makes about as much sense as a Hawk Tuah coin reserve.

The desire for safe assets is perhaps made more urgent by the bellicosity of Trump’s foreign policy initiatives. His multiple mentions of World War III simply can’t go over well with risk-averse investors. Rightly or wrongly, he’s thrown down the gauntlet with both Iran and Hamas, and he’s taken a fairly confrontational line with Greenland, Panama, Canada, Mexico, Venezuela, China, Russia, and especially (and unfairly) Ukraine. Ah, yes, all in the spirit of negotiating deals. We shall see.

As for DOGE, I’m a big fan of its mission to reduce waste and fraud in government, though its reporting of specific accomplishments thus far has been shrouded by inconsistencies and confusion. DOGE claims to have secured $105 billion in savings in the first six weeks of the Trump presidency, but that figure includes asset sales, which can pay down debt but aren’t deficit reduction. It’s also not clear how adverse court orders are reflected in the figure. For that matter, the reported savings are not given with any time dimension. The real savings thus far certainly don’t add up to $105 billion per year. And even at face value, those savings won’t get DOGE to its goal of $2 trillion in deficit reduction by July 2026 without some spectacular wins along the way. Medicaid fraud might be a big one, but that remains to be seen. This report on DEI initiatives by agency also offers some promising targets. (But now, apparently DOGE’s goal has been scaled back to $1 trillion in savings).

And there is one other hurdle: even after DOGE and the Administration identify and impound amounts already authorized, the savings will not be permanent without congressional action on budgetary recissions. That could be tough.

So the bond market is rightly skeptical of whether DOGE and the Administration can achieve major and permanent reductions in federal deficits. The recent drop in rates has much more to do with the economy and an array of uncertainties surrounding the values of risk assets.

Macro Policy As a Hindrance To Growth

03 Monday Mar 2025

Posted by in Growth, Stimulus

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Creative destruction takes place when inefficient producers are outcompeted by other firms, especially those brandishing new technologies. The concept, originally developed by Joseph Schumpeter in the 1940s, came to be accepted as a hallmark of market dynamics and capitalism. Successful market entrants rise to compete and eventually cripple incumbent producers who’ve grown stale in their offerings, inputs, or methods.

Creative destruction encourages long-term economic growth in several ways. First, it allows unproductive firms to fail, freeing resources to be absorbed by firms having solid growth opportunities. Second, creative destruction enables the diffusion of new technologies. Third, it motivates incumbents to improve their game, adapting to new realities in the marketplace. This is a continuous process. There are always firms that fail to keep pace with their competitors, whether old-line producers or failing risk-takers, but this is especially the case during periods of economic weakness.

Harmful Policy Menu

Attempting to prevent creative destruction via public policy is counter-productive, anti-competitive, and it impedes economic growth. Yet we constantly expend well-meaning energies to short circuit the process by attempting to promote uneconomic technologies, shield established firms from competition, and resuscitate dying firms. These efforts include industrial policies, barriers to foreign trade, excessive regulation of new technologies, selective taxation, certain bankruptcy reorganizations, and outright bailouts.

Creative destruction is a sign of flourishing competition, but it is subverted by industrial policies that subsidize politically-favored firms that otherwise would be uncompetitive. These policies create artificial advantages that waste public resources on what are often just bad ideas (see here and here).

Likewise, protectionism breeds weakness while shielding domestic producers from competition. And selective taxes, such as those on online sales, create an uneven playing field, blunting competitive forces.

Policies that encourage the survival of “zombie firms” also thwart creative destruction. These are companies with chronic losses that manage to hang on, sometimes for many years, with refinanced debt. Companies and their lenders can expend a great deal of internal effort forestalling bankruptcy. However, it’s not uncommon for zombie firms to languish for years but ultimately fail even after bankruptcy reorganizations, especially when the sole focus is on financial restructuring rather than business operations.

Government sometimes steps in to prolong the survival of struggling firms via subsidies, loan guarantees, and protracted efforts to keep interest rates low. Bailouts of various kinds have become all too common. Bailout activity creates perverse incentives with respect to risk. It also wastes resources by propping up inefficient operators, trapping resources in uses that return less to society than their opportunity costs.

Macro Maleficence

Ben Landau-Taylor makes a provocative but sensible claim in an article entitled “Industrial Greatness Requires Economic Depressions”. It’s about an unfortunate side effect of government policies intended to stabilize the economy: business failures occur with greater frequency during economic contractions, and that’s when policymakers are most apt to render aid via expansionary fiscal and monetary actions. No one likes economic downturns and unemployment, so “stimulative” policy is easy to sell politically, despite its all-too-typical failures in terms of timing and efficacy (see here and here). One intent is to support firms whose travails are revealed by a weak economy, including those relying on obsolete technologies. It might buy them survival time, but on the public dime. Ultimately, by forestalling creative destruction, these policies undermine economic growth.

Landau-Taylor emphasizes that creative destruction is not costless. Business failures and job losses are painful. And creative destruction brought on by dramatic advances can actually cause recessions or even depressions. Is that a rationale for delaying the inevitable failure of weak incumbents and impeding the broad adoption of new technologies? Our long-term well-being might dictate that we allow such transitions to take place by shunting aside interventionist temptations.

As a rationale for intervention, it’s sometimes said that we can’t regain the output lost during contractions. An appropriate riposte is that government efforts to counter recessionary forces are almost always futile. Furthermore, the lost output might be a pittance relative to the growth and permanent gains made possible by allowing creative destruction to run its course, liberating resources for better opportunities and growth.

On this point, Landau-Taylor says:

“If we want our descendants in 2125 to surpass our living standards the way we surpass our ancestors from 1925, then we will have to permit economic transformations at the scale that our ancestors did, including bankruptcies, job losses, and the cascading depressions that result. The individual pain of depressions does not have to be quite so severe as it once was. Because we are richer, we can and do spend vastly more on welfare, but this should be directed at individuals rather than at megacorporations. But there will always be some pain.“

Conclusion

Too often public policy creates obstacles to natural and healthy market processes, including creative destruction. This prevents the economy from reaching its true growth potential. Subsidies, bailouts, protectionism, and arguably macroeconomic stimulus, too often give safe harbor to struggling producers who manage to retain control over resources having more valued uses, including firms relying on obsolete and impractical technologies. Recessions typically expose firms with the weakest market prospects, but countercyclical fiscal and monetary policy may give them cover, forestalling their inevitable decline. Thus, we risk throwing good resources after bad, foregoing opportunities for growth and a more prosperous future.

Will DOGE Hunt? Bond Market Naturally Defers

21 Friday Feb 2025

Posted by in DOGE, Public debt

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Matt Yglesias tweeted on X that “the bond market does not appear to believe in DOGE”. He included a chart much like the updated one above to “prove” his point. Tyler Cowen posted a link to the tweet on Marginal Revolution, without comment … Cowen surely must know that any such conclusion is premature, especially based on the movement of Treasury yields over the past month (or more, since the market’s evaluation of the DOGE agenda preceded Trump’s inauguration).

Of course, there is a difference between “believing” in DOGE and being convinced that its efforts should have succeeded in reducing interest rates immediately amidst waves of background noise from budget and tax legislation, court challenges, Federal Reserve missteps (this time cutting rates too soon), and the direction of the economy in general.

In this case, perhaps a better way to define success for DOGE is a meaningfully negative impact on the future supply of Treasury debt. Even that would not guarantee a decline in Treasury rates, so the premise of Yglesias’ tweet is somewhat shaky to begin with. Still, all else equal, we’d expect to see some downward pressure on yields if DOGE succeeds in this sense. But we must go further by recognizing that DOGE savings could well be reallocated to other spending initiatives. Then, the savings would not translate into lower supplies of Treasury debt after all.

Certainly, the DOGE team has made progress in identifying wasteful expenditures, inefficiencies, and poor controls on spending. But even if the $55 billion of estimated savings to date is reliable, DOGE has a long way to go to reach Musk’s stated objective of $2 trillion. There are some juicy targets, but it will be tough to get there in 17 more months, when DOGE is to stand down. Still, it’s not unreasonable to think DOGE might succeed in accomplishing meaningful deficit reduction.

But if bond traders have doubts about DOGE, it’s partly because Donald Trump and Elon Musk themselves keep giving them reasons. In my view, Musk and Trump have made a major misstep in toying with the idea of using prospective DOGE savings to fund “dividend checks” of $5,000 for all Americans. These would be paid by taking 20% of the guesstimated $2 trillion of DOGE savings. Musk’s expression of interest in the idea was followed by a bit of clusterfuckery, as Musk walked back his proposal the next day even as Trump jumped on board. PLEASE Elon, don’t give the Donald any crowd-pleasing ideas! And don’t lose sight of the underlying objective to reduce the burden of government and the public debt.

Now, Trump proposes that 60% of the savings accomplished by DOGE be put toward paying for outlays in future years. Sure, that’s deficit reduction, but it may serve to dull the sense that shrinking the federal government is an imperative. The mechanics of this are unclear, but as a first pass, I’d say the gain from investing DOGE savings for a year in low-risk instruments is unlikely to outweigh the foregone savings in interest costs from paying off debt today! Of course, that also depends on the future direction of interest rates, but it’s not a good bet to make with public funds.

Nor can the bond market be comforted by uncertainty surrounding legislation that would not only extend the Trump tax cuts, but will probably include various spending provisions, both cuts and increases. As of now, the mix of provisions that might accompany a deal among GOP factions is very much up in the air.

There is also trepidation about Trump’s aggressive stance toward the Federal Reserve. He promises to replace Jerome Powell as Fed Chairman, but with God knows whom? And Trump jawbones aggressively for lower rates. The Fed’s ill-advised rate cuts in the fall might have been motivated in part by an attempt to capitulate to the then-President Elect.

Trump’s Executive Order to create a sovereign wealth fund (SWF), which I recently discussed here, is probably not the most welcome news to bond investors. All else equal, placing tax or tariff revenue into such a fund would reduce the potential for deficit reduction, to say nothing of the idiocy of additional borrowing to purchase assets.

Finally, Trump has proposed what might later prove to be massive foreign policy trial balloons. Some of these are bound up with the creation of the SWF. They might generate revenue for the government without borrowing (mineral rights in Ukraine? Or Greenland?), but at this point there’s also a chance they’ll create massive funding needs (Gaza development?). Again, Trump seems to be prodding or testing counterparties to various negotiations… prodding diplomacy. It’s unlikely that anything too drastic will come of it from a fiscal perspective, but it probably doesn’t leave bond traders feeling easy.

At this stage, it’s pretty rash to conclude that the bond market “doesn’t believe in DOGE”. In fact, there is no doubt that DOGE is making some progress in identifying potential fraud and inefficiencies. However, bond traders must weigh a wide range of considerations, and Donald Trump has a tendency to kick up dust. Indeed, the so-called DOGE dividend will undermine confidence in debt reduction and bond prices.

Cap Rates and You’ll Kill Low-Income Credit Cards

19 Wednesday Feb 2025

Posted by in Lending, Price Controls

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If you want to induce a shortage, a price ceiling is a reliable way to do it. Usury laws are no exception to this rule. Private credit can be supplied plentifully to borrowers only when lenders are able to charge rates commensurate with other uses of their funds. Importantly, the rate charged must include a premium for the perceived risk of nonpayment. That’s critical when extending credit to financially-challenged applicants, who are often deserving but may be less stable or unproven.

No doubt certain lenders will seek to exploit vulnerable borrowers, but those borrowers are made less vulnerable when formal, mainstream sources of credit are available. A legal ceiling on the price of credit short-circuits this mechanism by restricting the supply to low-income borrowers, many of whom rely on credit cards as a source of emergency funds.

A couple of odd bedfellows, Senators Josh Hawley (R-MO) and Bernie Sanders (D-CT), are cosponsoring a bill to impose a cap of 10% on credit card interest rates. Sanders is an economic illiterate, so his involvement is no surprise. Hawley is otherwise a small government conservative, but in this effort he reveals a deep ignorance. Unfortunately, President Trump would be happy to sign their bill into law if it gets through Congress, having made a similar promise last fall during the campaign. Unfortunately, this is a typically populist stance for Trump; as a businessman he should know better.

Many consumers in the low-income segment of the market for credit have thin credit reports, a few delinquencies, or even defaults. Most of these potential borrowers struggle with expenses but generally meet their obligations. But even a few with the best intentions and work ethic will be unable to pay their debts. The segment is risky for lenders.

Card issuers might be able to compensate along a variety of margins. These include high minimum payments, stiff fees for late payments, tight credit limits (on lines, individual purchases, or revolving balances), deep relationship requirements, and limits on rewards. However, the most straightforward option for covering the risk of default is to charge a higher interest rate on revolving balances.

The total return on assets of credit-card issuing banks in 2023 was 3.33%, more than twice the 1.35% earned at non-issuing banks, as reported by the Federal Reserve. But that difference in profitability is well aligned with the incremental risk of unsecured credit card lending. According to BBVA Research:

“… studies confirm that higher interest rates on credit cards are not related to limited market competition but to greater levels of risk relative to other banking activities backed or secured by collateral. … In fact, an investigation into the risk-adjusted returns of credit cards banks versus all commercial banks suggests that over the long term, credit cards banks do not enjoy a significant advantage. … the market is characterized by participants that operate a high-risk business that requires elevated risk premiums.”

So card issuers are not monopolists. They face competition from other banks, often on the basis of non-rate product features, as well as “down-market” lenders who “specialize” in serving high-risk borrowers. These include payday lenders, pawn shop operators, vehicle title lenders, refund anticipation lenders, and informal loan sharks, all of whom tend to demand stringent terms. People turn to these alternatives and other informal sources when they lack better options. Hawley, Sanders, and Trump would unwittingly throw more credit-challenged consumers into this tough corner of the credit market if the proposed legislation becomes law.

Much of this was discussed recently by J.D. Tuccille, who writes that many consumers:

“… find banks, credit card companies, and other mainstream institutions rigid, uninterested in their business, and too closely aligned with snoopy government officials. Often, the costs and requirements imposed by government regulations make doing business with higher-risk, lower-income customers unattractive to mainstream finance.

‘The regulators are causing the opposite of the desired effect by making it so dangerous now to serve a lower-income segment,’ JoAnn Barefoot, a former federal official, including a stint as deputy controller of the currency, told the book’s author. She emphasized red tape that makes serving many potential customers a legal minefield“

Tuccille offers a revealing quote attributed to a bank official from a 2015 article in the Albuquerque Journal:

“‘Banking regulations stemming from the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 and the Patriot Act of 2001 have created an almost adversarial credit environment for people whose finances are in cash.‘“

In other words, for some time the government has been doing its damnedest to choke off bank-supplied credit to low-income and risky borrowers, many of whom are deserving. It’s tempting to say this was well-intentioned, but the truth might be more sinister. Onerous regulation of lending practices at mainstream financial institutions, including caps on credit card interest rates, is political gold for politicians hoping to exploit populist sentiment. “Good” politics often hold sway over predictable but unintended consequences, which later can be blamed on the very same financial institutions.

Only a Statist Could Love a Sovereign Wealth Fund

12 Wednesday Feb 2025

Posted by in Central Planning, Public debt

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I want a federal government with a less pervasive presence in the private sphere. That’s why I oppose a U.S. sovereign wealth fund (SWF), but President Trump issued an executive order (EO) on February 3 setting in motion the creation of an SWF. It would hold various assets with the ostensible intent to earn a return benefiting American taxpayers.

Here are a few comments on the form an SWF might take:

1) How would the SWF be funded?

—Sales of federal assets like federal land, buildings, and the sale of extraction rights? These are probably the least offensive possibilities for funding an SWF, but the proceeds, if and when they materialize, should be used to pay off our massive federal debt, not to fund a governmental piggy bank.

—Taxes/Tariffs? Funding an SWF via taxes or tariffs would be contrary to the EO’s stated objective to “lessen the burden of taxes on American families and small businesses”. Moreover, it would be contrary to a pro-growth agenda, undermining any gains an SWF might produce.

—Borrowing? Another contradiction of a basic rationale for the SWF, which is “to promote fiscal sustainability”. It would mean more debt on top of a mountain of debt that is already growing at an unsustainable rate.

—“Deals” that might place assets under government ownership? Already, potential buyers of TikTok are singing the praises of a partnership with the SWF. Trump seems to think the government can acquire interests in certain enterprises in exchange for allowing them to operate in the U.S. He also believes that federal dollars can be used for development in order to acquire ownership capital. The federal government should not engage in the development of private resources. Business enterprises should remain private or be privatized, to the extent that their ownership has nothing to do with the provision of public goods.

2) What kinds of investments would be held in the SWF? Stocks and bonds? TikTok shares? Private equity? Crypto? The Gaza Riviera REIT?

These are all terrible ideas. Government ownership of the means of production, or socialism, virtually guarantees underperformance and subservience to political objectives. Federal acquisition of private businesses is not a legitimate function of the state.

There is no point in having the government hold a Bitcoin or crypto reserve. First, giving the U.S. government an interest in the private blockchain undermines the very purpose that most users feel gives the blockchain value. Second, the return on crypto depends only on price changes, and most forms of crypto are volatile. It is a stretch to believe that crypto assets have value in promoting “fiscal sustainability” or national security.

3) How would the SWF’s assets and earnings ultimately be used?

The EO plainly states that earnings in the SWF are to be used to promote fiscal sustainability and benefit taxpayers. In the presence of a large and growing national debt, the best path toward those objectives would be to use any and all spare funds to pay off debt and limit the explosive interest burden it imposes. This puts the funds back into hands of private investors, who will respond to market incentives by deploying the capital as they see fit. Does anyone truly think government planners know better how to put those funds to use?

SWF and Future Debt Service

Just to clarify matters, let’s quantify two alternatives: 1) pay off debt immediately; 2) create an SWF to invest funds and pay off debt later. Suppose the government stumbles upon a spare $100. It can immediately pay off $100 of debt and avoid a certain $3.50 in interest expense in year one. If instead an SWF invests the funds at an expected (but uncertain) return of 7%, then perhaps a greater reduction in the debt can be made a year later. How much? Not $107, but only $103.50 (assuming the 7% return is realized) because the $3.50 interest expense on the debt was not avoided in year one. The SWF must earn twice the interest cost on debt to break even on the proposition. That might be possible for an average return over many years, but the returns will vary and the government is likely to botch the job in any case.

An Itch For Intervention

The SWF is subject to dangers inherent in many government activities. One is that the funds held in reserve might be used as a tool of market intervention and/or political mischief, much as Joe Biden attempted to tamp down oil prices by releasing millions of barrels from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. An administration having available a large pool of financial assets might be tempted to use it to intervene in various markets to manipulate asset prices. And even if you happen to like the interventions of one administration, you might hate the interventions of another.

The Scratch That Corrupts

In testament to the inefficacy and corruption inherent in government intervention in private markets, Peter Earle offers a number of examples of government planning gone awry. It’s not difficult to understand the dysfunction:

“A sovereign wealth fund would not, whatever the intentions of its government administrators, be guided purely by market signals but rather by political interests. That virtually ensures poor investment choices, investments in politically favored industries, and/or wasteful subsidies tending to yield subpar returns. 

“Government officials will not have the same rigorous concern for opportunity costs that drives private investors and for-profit managers, as bureaucratic decision-making is often guided by political priorities and budget cycles rather than the disciplined allocation of capital to its most productive use. The Knowledge Problem is real — and ignoring it is expensive.“

Big money in government is an invitation to corruption, and an SWF is no exception. According to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace:

“…there are systemic governance issues and regulatory gaps that can enable SWFs to act as conduits of corruption, money laundering, and other illicit activities.“

Therefore, the management and operations of an SWF require great transparency as well as strong governance and oversight. This obviously adds a layer of cost as well.

Sound Planning

There is an economic rationale for holding funds in reserve for certain, earmarked purposes. For example, private businesses usually maintain reserves for the upkeep or replacement of physical capital. Shouldn’t the government do the same for public infrastructure such as highways or harbors? Public investments in physical capital should be planned such that the flow of tax revenue is adequate to replenish infrastructure from wear and tear. To the extent that the necessary expenditures are “lumpy”, however, a maintenance reserve fund is sound practice, as long as its management is transparent and accountable, and its holdings represent prudent risks.

Another example is the maintenance of a reserve fund for pension payments. This is a reasonable and even necessary practice under traditional defined benefit plans, but those plans have often fallen short of their obligations in practice. The private sector stayed ahead of this risk by shifting overwhelmingly to defined contribution plans. As part of this shift, the existing pension obligations of many private entities were converted to vested “cash value” balances. The public sector should do the same, putting employees in charge of their own retirement savings.

Countries with SWFs tend to be small and also tend to run budget surpluses. Very often, they are funded with revenue earned from abundant natural resources. But even those governments short-change their citizens by failing to reduce tax rates, which would promote growth.

Nonsensical Appeal to Nationalism

Why does the creation of an SWF sound so good to people who should know better? I think it has something to do with the nationalist urge to embrace symbols of patriotic strength. An SWF might evoke the emotive impact of phrases like “sound money” or “a strong dollar”. But in the presence of a large public debt and large, continuing budget deficits, the kind of SWF envisioned by Trump would be counterproductive. Future obligations to pay down the public debt are better addressed in the present, to the extent possible. The government has no business hoarding private financial assets as a means of outrunning debt. Sure, the return on equity usually exceeds the interest rate on public debt, but private investors are better at allocating capital than government, so government should not attempt to take on that role.