Beware of Government Health Care Yet To Come

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Ongoing increases in the resources dedicated to health care in the U.S., and their prices, are driven primarily by the abandonment of market forces. We have largely eliminated the incentives that markets create for all buyers and sellers of health care services as well as insurers. Consumers bear little responsibility for the cost of health care decisions when third parties like insurers and government are the payers. A range of government interventions have pushed health care spending upward, including regulation of insurers, consumer subsidies, perverse incentives for consolidation among health care providers, and a mechanism by which pharmaceutical companies negotiate side payments to insurers willing to cover their drugs.

It’s not yet clear whether the Trump Administration and its “Make America Healthy Again” agenda will serve to liberate market forces in any way. Skeptics can be forgiven for worrying that MAHA will be no more than a cover for even more centrally-planned health care, price controls, and regulation of the pharmaceutical and food industries, not to mention consumer choices. Robert F. Kennedy Jr., who is likely to be confirmed by the Senate as Donald Trump’s Secretary of Health and Human Services, has strong and sometimes defensible opinions about nutrition and public health policies. He is, however, an inveterate left-winger and is not an advocate for market solutions. Trump himself has offered only vague assurances on the order of “You won’t lose your coverage”.

Government Control

The updraft in health care inflation coincided with government dominance of the sector. Steven Hayward points out that the cost pressure began at about the same time as Medicare came into existence in 1965. This significantly pre-dates the trend toward aging of the population, which will surely exacerbate cost pressures as greater concentrations of baby boomers approach or exceed life expectancy over the next decade.

Government now controls or impinges on about 84% of health care spending in the U.S., as noted by Michael F. Cannon. The tax deductibility of employer-provided health insurance is a massive example of federal manipulation and one that is highly distortionary. It reinforces the prevalence of third-party payments, which takes decision-making out of consumers’ hands. Equalizing the tax treatment of employer-provided health coverage would obviously promote tax equity. Just as importantly, however, tax-subsidized premiums create demand for inflated coverage levels, which raise prices and quantities. And today, the federal government requires coverages for routine care, going beyond the basic function of insurance and driving the cost of care and insurance upward.

The traditional non-portability of employer-provided coverage causes workers with uninsurable pre-existing conditions to lose coverage when they leave a job. Thus, Cannon states that the tax exclusion for employer coverage penalizes workers who instead might have chosen portable individual coverage in a market setting without tax distortions. Cannon proposes a reform whereby employer coverage would be replaced with deposits into tax-free Universal Health Accounts owned by workers, who could then purchase their own insurance.

In 2024, federal subsidies for health insurance coverage were about $2 trillion, according to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). Those subsidies are projected to grow to $3.5 trillion by 2034 (8.5% of GDP). Joel Zinberg and Liam Sigaud emphasize the wasteful nature of premium subsidies for exchange plans mandated by the Affordable Care Act (ACA), better known as Obamacare. Subsidies were temporarily expanded in 2021, but only until 2026. They should be allowed to expire. These subsidies increase the demand for health care, but they are costly to taxpayers and are offered to individuals far above the poverty line. Furthermore, as Zinberg and Sigaud discuss, subsidized coverage for the previously uninsured does very little to improve health outcomes. That’s because almost all of the health care needs of the formerly uninsured were met via uncompensated care at emergency rooms, clinics, medical schools, and physician offices.

Proportionate Consumption

Perhaps surprisingly, and contrary to popular narratives, health care spending in the U.S. is not really out-of-line with other developed countries relative to personal income and consumption expenditures (as opposed to GDP). We spend more on health care because we earn and consume more of everything. This shouldn’t allay concern over health care spending because our economic success has not been matched by health outcomes, which have lagged or deteriorated relative to peer nations. Better health might well have allowed us to spend proportionately less on health care, but this has not been the case. There are explanations based on obesity levels and diet, but important parts of the explanation can be found elsewhere.

It should also be noted that a significant share of our decades-long increases in health care spending can be attributed to quantities, not just prices, as explained at the last link above.

Health Consequences

The ACA did nothing to slow the rise in the cost of health care coverage. In fact, if anything, the ACA cemented government dominance in a variety of ways, reinforcing tendencies for cost escalation. Even worse, the ACA had negative consequences for patient care. David Chavous posted a good X thread in December on some of the health consequences of Obamacare:

1) The ACA imposed penalties on certain hospital readmissions, which literally abandoned people at death’s door.

2) It encouraged consolidation among providers in an attempt to streamline care and reduce prices. This reduced competitive pressures, however, which had the “unforeseen” consequence of raising prices and discouraging second opinions. The former goes against all economic logic while the latter goes against sound medical decision-making.

3) The ACA forced insurers to offer fewer options, increasing the cost of insurance by encouraging patients to wait until they had a pre-existing condition to buy coverage. Care was almost certainly deferred as well. Ultimately, that drove up premiums for healthy people and worsened outcomes for those falling ill.

4) It forced drug companies to negotiate with Pharmacy Benefit Managers (PBMs) to get their products into formularies. The PBMs have acted as classic middlemen, accomplishing little more than driving up drug prices and too often forcing patients to skimp on their prescribed dosage, or worse yet, increasing their vulnerability to lower-priced quackery.

The Insurers

So the ACA drastically increased the insured population (including the new burden of covering pre-existing conditions). It also forced insurers to meet draconian cost-control thresholds. Little wonder that claim rejection increased, a phenomenon often at the root of public animosity toward health insurers. Peter Earle cites several reasons for the increase in denial rates while noting that claim rejection has made little difference in insurer profit margins.

Matt Margolis points out that under the ACA, we’ve managed to worsen coverage in exchange for higher premiums and deductibles. All while profits have been capped. Claim denials or delays due to pre-authorization rules (which delay care) have become routine following the implementation of Obamacare.

Perhaps the biggest mistake was forcing insurers to cover pre-existing conditions without allowing them to price for risk. Rather than forcing healthy individuals to pay for risks they don’t face, it would be more economically sensible to directly subsidize coverage for those in high-risk pools.

Noah Smith also defends the health insurers. For example, while UnitedHealth Group has the largest market share in the industry, its net profit margin of 6.1% is only about half of the average for the S&P 500. Other major insurers earn even less by this metric. Profits just don’t explain why American health care spending is so high. Ultimately, the services delivered and charges assessed by providers explain high U.S. health care spending, not insurer profits or administrative costs.

Under the ACA, insurance premiums pay the bulk of the cost of health care delivery, including the cost of services more reasonably categorized as routine health maintenance. The latter is like buying insurance for oil changes. Furthermore, there are no options to decline any of the ten so-called “essential benefits” under the ACA, thus increasing the cost of coverage.

Medical Records

Arnold Kling argues that the ACA’s emphasis on uniform, digitized medical records is not a productive avenue for achieving efficiencies in health care delivery. Moreover, it’s been a key factor driving the increasing concentration in the health care industry. Here is Kling:

My point is that you cannot do this until you tighten up the health care delivery process, making it more rigid and uniform. And I would not try to do that. Health care does not necessarily lend itself to being commoditized. You risk making health care in America less open to innovation and less responsive to the needs of people.

So far, all that has been accomplished by the electronic medical records drive has been to put small physician practices out of business. They have not been able to absorb the overhead involved in implementing these systems, so that they have been forced to lose their independence, primarily to hospital-owned conglomerates.”

Separating Health and State

The problem of rising health care costs in the U.S. is capsulized by Bryan Caplan in his call for the separation of health and state. The many policy-driven failures discussed above offer more than adequate rationale for reform. The alternative suggested by Caplan is to “pull the plug” on government involvement in health care, relying instead on the free market.

Caplan debunks a few popular notions regarding the appropriate role for markets in health care and health insurance. In particular, it’s often alleged that moral hazard and adverse selection would encourage unhealthy behaviors and encourage the worst risks to over-insure, causing insurance markets to fail. But these problems arise only when risk is not priced efficiently, precisely what the government has accomplished by attempting to equalizing rates.

Pulling the plug on government interference in health care would also mean deregulating both insurance offerings and pricing, encouraging the adoption of portable coverage, expediting drug approvals based on peer-country approvals, reforming pharmacy benefit management, ending deadly Medicare drug price controls, and encouraging competition among health care providers.

Value Vs. Volume

There are a host of other reforms that could bring more sanity to our health care system. Many of these are covered here by Sebastian Caliri, with some emphasis on the potential role of AI in improving health care. Some of these are at odds with Kling’s skepticism regarding digitized health records.

Perhaps the most fundamental reforms entertained by Caliri have to do with health care payments. One is to make payments dependent on outcomes rather than diagnostic codes established and priced by the American Medical Association. To paraphrase Caliri, it would be far better for Americans to pay for value rather than volume.

Another payment reform discussed by Caliri is expanding direct payments to providers such as capitation fees, whereby patients pay to subscribe to a bundle of services for a fixed fee. Finally, Caliri discusses the importance of achieving “site-neutral payments”, eliminating rules that allow health systems to charge a higher premium relative to independent providers for identical services.

For what it’s worth, Arnold Kling disagrees that changing payment metrics would be of much help because participants will learn to game a new system. Instead, he emphasizes the importance of reducing consumer incentives for costly treatments having little benefit. No dispute there!

Avoid the Single-Payer Calamity

I’ll close this jeremiad with a quote from Caliri’s piece in which he contrasts the knee-jerk, leftist solution to our nation’s health care dilemma with a more rational, market-oriented approach:

Single payer solutions and government control favored by the left are no solutions at all. Moving to a monopsonist system like Canada is a recipe for strangling innovation and rationing access. Just ask our neighbors to the north who have to wait a year for orthopedic surgery. The UK’s National Health Service (NHS) is teetering on the brink of collapse. We need to sort out some other way forward.

Other parts of the economy provide inspiration for what may actually work. In the realm of information technology, for example, fifty years has taken us from expensive four operation calculators to ubiquitous, free, artificial intelligence capable of passing the Turing Test. We can argue about the precise details but most of this miracle came from profit-seeking enterprises competing in a free market to deliver the best value for the buyer’s dollar.

State Aesthetics: Taxes for Art and Dogma

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In a post a few years ago entitled “The National Endowment for Rich Farts”, I discussed a point that should be rather obvious: federal funding of the arts too often subsidizes the upper class, catering to their artistic tastes and underwriting a means through which they conduct social and professional networking. The topic is back in the news, with reports that the incoming Trump Administration, at the recommendation of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), will attempt to eliminate funding for the Corporation for Public Broadcasting.

Great Big Stuff and Crowding Out

To opponents of federal arts funding, public radio is probably the bête noire of arts organizations due to its left-wing political orientation and the general affluence of its subscriber base. However, public arts funding goes way beyond subsidies for public radio.

Large nonprofits receive the bulk of government arts funding. Despite claims to the contrary, these organizations won’t go broke without the gravy provided by public funding. The federal government contributes about 3% of the revenue taken in by non-profit arts organizations, according to Americans For the Arts. These organizations are already heavily subsidized: their surpluses are tax exempt and private contributions are tax deductible. Tax deductions are worth more to those in high income-tax brackets, and involvement in such visible organizations is highly prized by elites.

Furthermore, there is no evidence that additional government funding “multiplies” private giving. If anything, increases in public funding reduce private giving (and see here).

Public Funds for Private Gain

It’s often argued that government should subsidize the arts because art has the qualities of a public good, but that’s a false premise. A good can be classified as “public” only when its consumption is non-exclusive and non-rivalrous. Can individuals be excluded from enjoying music? Of course. Can they be excluded from viewing a theatrical performance, a film, or any other piece of visual art? Generally yes, and art exhibitions and artistic performances are nearly always subject to paid and limited attendance.

In some contexts art is, or can be made, less excludable. Architecture can be admired (or detested) by anyone on the street. So can public monuments and street art. A concert or play can be performed free of charge, perhaps at a large, outdoor venue. Amplification and large video monitors can make a big difference in terms of non-exclusion. Museums can offer admission to the general public at no charge. And we can broaden the definition of a work to include copies or reproductions that might be available via public display or broadcast (on NPR!).

All these steps will help increase exposure to the arts. But you can’t make it mandatory. People will always self-exclude because they can. So, in which cases should taxpayers bear the costs of art, and of making it less exclusive? On the spectrum of legitimate functions of government, it’s hard to rank this sort of activity highly.

A claim less absurd than the public goods argument is that art has some positive spillover effects, or externalities. It should therefore be subsidized or underwritten with public funds lest it be underprovided. Unfortunately, the spillover effects of a piece of art (where relevant) are not always positive. After all, tastes vary considerably. One man’s art can be another man’s annoyance or provocation. This undermines the case for public funding, at least for art that is controversial in nature.

Perhaps a better interpretation of art externalities is that exposure to the arts has positive spillover effects. Thus, additional art confers benefits to society above and beyond the edification of those exposed to it. Perhaps it makes us nicer and more interesting, but that’s a highly speculative rationale for public funding.

Less questionably, more art and more exposure to the arts does enrich society in ways that have nothing to do with external benefits. Culture and arts are by-products of normal social interactions between private individuals. The benefits of art exposure (and art education) are largely accrued privately. When artistic knowledge is shared to nourish or broaden one’s network, the benefits flow from private social interactions that arise naturally, rather than as a consequence of phantom external benefits.

Public Funding and Agitprop

The selection of recipients and projects for government grants or subsidies is especially prone to influence by entrenched political interests. That is indeed the case when it comes to federal agencies that offer grants for the arts.

The same danger looms when government provides a venue or manages aspects of a presentation of art, including curation of content. It’s an avenue through which art can become politicized. The problem, however, is not so much that a particular work might have political implications. As Samuel Andreyev, a Canadian composer says:

Like any other subject, it is possible for political subjects to be handled sensitively by an artist, provided there is a strong enough element of abstraction and symbolism so that the work does not become merely journalistic.”

Andreyev makes a good point, but government funding and direction can create incentives to politicize art, encouraging more blatant expressions of political viewpoints at the expense of taxpayers.

I’ve certainly admired art despite subtle political implications with which I differed. One can hardly imagine a treatment of the human condition that would not invite tangential political commentary. Still, politicization of art should always be left as a private exercise, not one over which the government of a free society wields influence.

Do Markets Undervalue Art?

What about the artists themselves? The premise that artists deserve subsidies relies on the questionable presumption that the value of their work exceeds its commercial or market value. Thus, taxpayers are asked to pay handsomely for art that is not valued as highly by private buyers.

Artists who benefit from government arts funding are often well established professionally. Less fortunate artists scrape by, finding what market they can while working side gigs. In fact, many less celebrated artists work at their craft on a part-time basis while earning most of their income from day jobs. Should the government support these artists, or artists having few opportunities to promote their work?

It’s not clear that public funding should override the private market’s basis of valuation for established or unestablished artists. However, some government funding finds its way into less celebrated corners of the art world. This report uses data at the census tract level to show that arts organizations located in low income tracts, while receiving less, still get a disproportionate share of federal grant dollars relative to their share of the population. This finding should be viewed cautiously, as data at this level of aggregation has limitations. The findings do not imply that “starving artists” receive a disproportionate share of those dollars. Nor do they prove that federal grants benefit low-income individuals disproportionately via improved access to the arts. Again, the findings are based on the location of organizations. And again, large organizations receive the bulk of these grants.

Drawing the Line

So where do we draw the line on taxpayer subsidies for the arts? The standard, public-goods justification is false. While externalities may exist, they are not always positive, and it is hardly the state’s proper role to fund art that “challenges” notions about good and bad art. In that vein, just as law tends to be ineffective when it lacks consensus, public arts funding breeds dissent when the art is controversial.

The legitimacy of public arts funding ultimately depends on whether the art itself has a true public purpose. To varying degrees, this might include the architecture and interior design of public buildings, landscaping of parks, as well as certain monuments and statuary. Even within these disciplines, the selection of form, content, and the artists who will execute the work can be controversial. That might be unavoidable, though controversy will be minimized when the content of publicly-funded art remains within cultural norms.

Beyond those limited purposes, funding art at the federal level is difficult to justify. That role simply does not fall within the constitutionally-enumerated powers of the federal government. The tenuous rationale for subsidies implies that art is undervalued, despite the existence of a vibrant private ecosystem for art, including private support foundations and markets. To the extent that public subsidies line the pockets of elites or support art that would otherwise fail a market test, they represent a wasteful misallocation of resources.

Funding art might seem less troublesome at lower levels of government, where elected representatives and policymakers are in more intimate contact with voters and taxpayers. Still, the same economic reservations apply. At local levels, institutions like community orchestras and concerts series might be broadly supported. Publicly-funded museums, theatrical venues, and other facilities might be accepted by voters as well. If parents have educational choices and expect schools to teach art, it should be funded at public schools, so long as the content stays within cultural norms and is age-appropriate. Of course, all of these matters are up to local voters.

The greatest danger of public funding for the arts is that it tends to be utilized as a tool of political propaganda. Having the state select winners and losers in the arts invites politicization, undermining freedom and our system of government. On that point, Thomas Jefferson once made this observation:

To compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagations of opinions which he disbelieves and abhors, is sinful and tyrannical.

A Social Security “Private Option” and Federal Debt

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Social Security wasn’t designed as a true saving vehicle for workers. Instead, SS has always been a pay-as-you-go system under which current benefits are funded by the payroll taxes levied on the current employed population. In fact, many Americans earn lousy effective returns on their tax “contributions” (also see here), though low-income individuals do much better than those near or above the median income. Worst of all, under pay-as-you-go, the system can collapse like a Ponzi scheme when the number of workers shrinks drastically relative to the retired population, leading to the kind of situation we face today.

Unfunded Obligations

Payroll tax revenue is no longer adequate to pay for current Social Security and Medicare benefits, and the problem is huge: according to the Penn-Wharton Budget Model, the unfunded obligations of Social Security (including old age, survivorship and disability) through 2095 have a present value of $18.1 trillion in constant 2024 dollars (using a discount rate of 4.4%). The comparable figure for Medicare Part A is $18.6 trillion. Together these amount to more than the current national debt.

Barring earlier reform, the Social Security Trust Fund is expected to be exhausted in 2033 (excluding the disability fund). At that point, a 20% reduction in benefits will be required by law. (More on the trust fund below.)

What To Do?

The most prominent reform proposals involve reduced benefits for wealthy beneficiaries, increased payroll taxes on high earners, and an increase in the retirement age. However, President-Elect Donald Trump shows no inclination to make any changes on his watch. This is unfortunate because the sooner the system’s insolvency is addressed, the less draconian the necessary reforms will be.

A neglected reform idea is for SS to be privatized. Many observers agree in principle that current workers could earn better returns over the long-term by investing funds in a conservative mix of equities and bonds. The transition to private accounts could be made voluntary, so that no one is forced to give up the benefits to which they’re “entitled”.

Takers would receive an initial deposit from the government in a tax-deferred account. For participating pre-retirees, ongoing FICA contributions (in whole or in part) would be deposited into their private accounts. They could purchase a private annuity with the balance at retirement if they choose. The income tax treatment of annuity payments or distributions could mimic the current tax treatment of SS benefits.

Given that the balance remaining at death would be heritable, some individuals might be willing to accept an initial deposit less than the actuarial PV of the future SS benefits they’ve accumulated to-date (discounted at an internal rate of return equating future benefits “earned” to-date and contributions to-date). I also believe many individuals would willingly accept a lower initial deposit because they would gain some control over investment direction. Such voluntarily-accepted reductions in initial deposits to personal accounts would mean the government’s issue of new debt would be smaller than the decrease in future benefit obligations.

Nevertheless, funding the accounts at the time of transition would necessitate a huge and immediate increase in federal debt. Market participants and political interests are likely to fear an impossible strain on the credit market. Perhaps the transition could be staged over time to make it less “shocking”, but that would complicate matters. In any case, heavy debt issuance is the rub that dissuades most observers from supporting privatization.

Fiscal Theory of Price Level

The fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) implies that such a privatization might not be an insurmountable challenge after all, at least in terms of comparative dynamics. Much background on FTPL can be found at John Cochrane’s Grumpy Economist Substack.

FTPL asserts that fiscal policy can influence the price level due to a constraint on the market value of government debt. This market value must be in balance with the expected stream of future government primary surpluses. This is known as the government budget constraint.

The primary surplus excludes the government’s interest expense, a budget component that must be paid out of the primary surplus or else borrowed. Of course, the market value of government debt incorporates the discounted value of future interest payments.

This budget constraint must be true in an expectational sense. That is, the market must be convinced that future surpluses will be adequate to pay all future obligations associated with the debt. Otherwise, the value of the debt must change.

Should a spending initiative require the government to issue new debt with no credible offset in terms of future surpluses, the market value of the debt must decline. That means interest rates and/or the price level must rise. If interest rates are fixed by the monetary authority (the Fed) then only prices will rise.

A SS Private Option Under FTPL

But what about FTPL in the context of entitlement reform, specifically a privatization of Social Security? Suppose the government issues debt and then deposits the proceeds into personal accounts to fund future benefits. Future government surpluses (deficits) would increase (decrease) by the reduction in future SS benefit payments.

This improved budgetary position should be highly credible to financial markets, despite the fact that benefits are not and never have been guaranteed. If it is credible to markets, the new debt would not raise prices, nor would it be valued differently than existing debt. There need not be any change in interest rates.

But Thin Ice

There are risks, of course. It might be too much to hope that other federal spending can be restrained. That kind of failure would subvert the rationale for any budgetary reform. A variety of other crises and economic shocks are also possible. Those could disrupt markets and jeopardize budget discipline as well. Given a severe shock, interest expense could more readily explode given the massive debt issuance required by the reform discussed here. So there are big risks, but one might ask whether they could turn out to be more disastrous in the absence of reform.

Other Details

The private account “offers” extended to workers or beneficiaries relative to the actuarial PVs of their future benefits would be controversial. Different offer percentages (discounts) could be tested to guage uptake.

Another issue: provisions would have to be made for individuals in “unbanked” households, estimated by the FDIC to be about 4.2% of all U.S. households in 2023. Voluntary uptake of the “offer” is likely to be lower among the unbanked and among those having less confidence in their ability to make financial decisions. However, even a simplified set of choices might be superior to the returns under today’s SS, even for low-income workers, not to mention the very real threat of future reductions in benefits. Furthermore, financial institutions might compete for new accounts in part by offering some level of financial education for new clients.

A similar reform could be applied to Medicare, which like SS is also technically insolvent. Participating beneficiaries could receive some proportion of expected future benefits in a private account, which they could use to pay for private or public health insurance coverage or medical expenses. From a budget perspective, the increase in federal debt would be balanced against the reduction in future Medicare benefits, which would constitute a credible increase (decrease) in future surpluses (deficits).

Credibility

But again, how credible would markets find the decrease in benefit obligations? Direct reductions in future entitlements should be convincing, though politicians are likely to find plenty of other ways to use the savings.

On the other hand, markets already give some weight to the possibility of future benefit cuts (or other policies that would reduce SS shortfalls). So it’s likely that markets will give the reform’s favorable budget implications significant but only “incremental credit”.

Another possible complication is that the market, prior to execution of the reform, might discount the uptake by workers and current retirees. This would necessitate better offers to improve uptake and more debt issuance for a given reduction in future obligations. Skepticism along these lines might worsen implications for the price level and interest rates.

The Trust Fund

Finally, what about the SS Trust Fund? Can it play in role in the reform discussed above? The answer depends on how the trust fund fits into the federal government’s budgetary position.

The trust fund holds as assets only non-marketable Treasury securities acquired in the past when SS contributions exceeded benefit payments. The excess payroll tax revenue was placed in the trust fund, which in turn lent the funds to the federal government to help meet other budgetary needs. Hence the bond holdings.

In terms of the government’s fiscal position, the money has already been pissed away, as it were. The bonds in the trust fund do not represent a pot of money. As noted above, with our age demographics now reversed, payroll taxes no longer meet benefits. Thus, bonds in the trust fund must be redeemed to pay all SS obligations. The Treasury must pay off the bonds via general revenue or by borrowing additional amounts from the public.

Post-reform, if continuing deficits are the order of the day, redeeming bonds in the trust fund would do nothing to improve the government’s fiscal position. If the trust fund “cashes them in” to help meet benefit payments, the federal government must borrow to raise that cash. In other words, the bonds in the trust fund would be more or less superfluous.

But what if the federal budget swings into a surplus position post-reform? In that case, federal tax revenue would cover the redemption of at least some of the bonds held by the trust fund. SS beneficiaries would then have a meaningful claim on federal taxpayers through the trust fund and the government’s surplus position, which would reduce the new federal debt required by the reform.

Conclusion

The Social Security and Medicare systems are in desperate need reform, but there is little momentum for any such undertaking. Meanwhile, exhaustion of the SS and Medicare trust funds creeps ever closer, along with required benefit cuts. All of the reform options would be painful in one way or another. A voluntary privatization would require a huge makeover, but it might be the least painful option of all. Current workers and beneficiaries would not be compelled to make choices they found inferior. Moreover, the new debt necessary to pay for the reforms would be matched by a reduction in future government obligations. The fiscal theory of the price level implies that the reform would not be inflationary and need not depress the value of Treasury bonds, provided the reform is accompanied by long-term budget discipline.

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Note: the chart at the top of this post was produced by the Congressional Budget Office and appears in this publication.

Free Trade or Tariffs: Sow Wealth or Lay Waste

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The table above is from Eric Boehm at Reason.com. It shows a variety of negative economic projections based on the likely imposition of tariffs by the incoming Trump Administration. Donald Trump’s protectionist agenda is motivated in large part by the notion that imports of foreign goods and services harm the U.S. economy. This misapprehension is common on both the populist left and the nationalist right, but it is also fueled by special interests averse to competition. Especially puzzling are those who extol the virtues of capitalism and free markets while claiming that free markets across borders are inimical to our nation’s economic interests.

Imports and Domestic Spending

Many assume that imports directly reduce GDP. In fact, on this point, some might be led astray by a superficial exposure to macroeconomics. As Noah Smith has noted, they might think back to the simple spending definition of GDP they learned as college freshmen:

GDP = C + I + G + (X – M),

where C is consumer spending on final goods and services, I is investment spending, G is government spending, X is foreign spending on U.S. exports, and M is U.S. spending on imports from abroad. So imports are subtracted! Doesn’t that mean imports directly reduce GDP?

The key here is to recognize that C, I, and G already include spending on imported goods. Therefore, imports must be subtracted from the spending totals to find the value spent on domestically-produced final goods and services. No, imports are not a direct, net subtraction from GDP.

Your Loathsome Foreign Car

Of course the domestic impact of imports goes deeper than this simple accounting framework. If someone decides to purchase an imported good instead of a close substitute produced domestically, what happens to GDP? If the decision has an immediate impact on production, then U.S. GDP declines. Otherwise, the domestic good is new inventory investment (part of I above), and there is no change. But if the import decision is repeated, the result is permanently lower U.S. GDP relative to the alternative, as producers won’t want to add to inventories indefinitely. The same is true if a domestic producer decides to purchase a component or raw material produced overseas rather than one produced at home.

The import decision causes a domestic producer to lose a sale along with the profit that sale would have earned. That puts pressure on the firm’s workers and wages as well. The firm still has the value of the unit in inventory, but if the import decision is repeated there will be more substantial follow-on effects on production, employment, spending, and saving.

Not So Fast

There is still more to the story, of course. By purchasing the foreign good,,which in the buyer’s estimation delivers greater value at that point in time, there is a gain in consumer surplus that is very real. To the buyer, that gain is perhaps equivalent to dollars in the bank. Their real wealth has increased relative to the surplus value of the foregone domestic purchase. This, too, will likely have follow-on effects in terms of spending and saving, but positive effects.

Therefore, to a first approximation, the immediate effects of an import purchase on total domestic welfare are ambiguous. Consumers of imports gain value; producers of import-competing goods lose value.

As to the loss of the domestic sale, competition is tough, but it greatly contributes to the efficiency of the free market system and to the well being of consumers. Let’s face it: ultimately, the whole point of economic activity is to enable consumption. Production has no other purpose. So producers must react to competition and strive to improve value for buyers along any margins they can. That, in turn, is unequivocally positive for potential buyers both here and abroad.

It’s also true that the purchase of foreign goods means that dollars must be sold in exchange for foreign currency. That weakens the dollar, but those “excess dollars” are generally used to purchase U.S. assets, including physical capital. That direct investment promotes economic growth.

Open Economy, Open Mind

No matter what you believe about the net benefits or costs of a single import transaction like the one described above, it is misleading to draw conclusions about the benefits of foreign trade based on a single transaction, or even a series of repeated transactions.

First, consumer sovereignty is based on freedom of choice, including the freedom to purchase from any seller, domestic or foreign. Consumers greatly benefit from that broad freedom. Add to that the benefit of producers who are free to purchase inputs from any source they believe to offer the greatest value (a benefit that ultimately flows through to consumers). These freedoms ultimately enhance productivity and well being.

Trade across borders leverages the same economic advantages as trade within borders. People tend to accept the latter as truth without giving it a thought, yet the former is often rejected reflexively. The question is inappropriately bound up in issues like patriotism and, over time, an excessive focus on high-visibility job losses in traditional industries.

Trade allows people and their countries to specialize in producing things at which they are comparatively efficient, i.e., in which they are lower-cost producers. This is at the very heart of mutually beneficial exchange: no party to a voluntary transaction expects to suffer a loss. And in trade, when an external, domestic party sustains a lost sale, for example, they have the opportunity to improve or reallocate their resources to endeavors to which they are better suited. So there are direct gains from trade and there are indirect gains via the discipline of competition, including the benefits of reallocating scarce resources from inefficient to efficient uses.

Tariff Gains

Now we shift gears to tariffs: interventions having benefits that are more concentrated than costs, and which tend to be more ephemeral:

— Domestic producers who compete with imports gain through the grant of additional market power, given the tax on foreign goods and services. These producers now have more pricing flexibility, and what is often more pertinent, survivability.

— Workers at domestic firms will benefit to the extent that their employers face reduced foreign competition. Some combination of employment, hours, and wages may rise.

— Some firms have mixed gains and losses, with more pricing power over final product but elevated costs due to the use of taxed foreign components.

Tariff Losses

Who pays when government succumbs to irrational protectionist pressure and attempts to restrict imports via tariffs?

— Domestic consumers suffer a loss of freedom and bear a large part of the burden of the tariff tax.

— Higher prices for imports lead to higher prices for competing domestic goods, causing consumers to experience a loss of purchasing power.

— Domestic businesses suffer a loss of control over input decisions. Those already utilizing foreign inputs (and their buyers downstream) bear some of the burden of the tariff tax. For example, tariffs could be quite damaging to the U.S. AI industry, a result that would run strongly contrary to Trump’s promise to promote American AI.

— The U.S. suffers a loss of foreign investment, which could engender higher interest rates, lower productivity growth, and lower real wages.

As Tyler Cowen puts it in a review of this paper, “… lobbying, logrolling and political horse-trading were essential features of the shift toward higher US tariffs. A lot of the tariffs of the time [1870 -1909] depended on which party controlled Congress, rather than economic rationality.

— Tariffs tend to reduce economic growth due to diminished productivity in tariff-protected industries, which also erodes real wages. Less productive firms capture a significant share of the benefits of tariffs, so that economic growth falls due to a compositional effect. Higher prices for imports and import-competing goods undermine the real gains of import-protected workers.

— Finally, tariffs invariably beget retaliatory tariffs by erstwhile friendly trading partners. Export industries and their employees take a direct hit. This retaliation damages the prospects of the most productive exporters, while weaker exporting firms might be forced to close shop unnecessarily.

One other note: the discussion of gains and losses above is essentially the same for policies that reward the use of American labor via tax breaks. This not only penalizes imports of final and intermediate foreign goods, it subsidizes high-cost domestic labor. Obviously, the upshot is a less competitive U.S. economy.

Tariff-Threat Policy

To be fair, Donald Trump has said he’d use the threat of tariffs strategically to achieve a variety of objectives, not all of which are directly related to trade. We can hope that many of those threats won’t be acted upon. On one hand, that’s more appealing than general tariffs, with potential foreign policy gains and less in the way of general damage to the economy. On the other hand, the discretionary application of tariffs could invite political favoritism and foster a corrupt rent-seeking environment.

Conclusion

Trade protectionism protects weak and strong producers alike. The weak should not be given artificial incentives to produce goods inefficiently. That’s simply a waste of resources. Protecting the strong is unnecessary and discourages the drive for efficiency as well as real value creation. It lends market power to already powerful firms, leading to higher prices and penalizing domestic consumers.

One last aside: tariffs cannot raise anywhere close to the revenue necessary to replace the income tax, an absurd claim made by Trump on the campaign trail.

Only free trade is consistent with the values of a free society. It enhances choice, makes markets more competitive, creates incentives for efficiency, and cultivates opportunities for economic growth, That would serve Trump and the nation much better than the fixation on tariffs.

Promises and Policies: Grading the Candidates

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Wow! We’re less than a week from Election Day! I’d hoped to write a few more detailed posts about the platforms and policies of Kamala Harris and Donald Trump, but I was waylaid by Hurricane Milton. It sent us scrambling into prep mode, then we evacuated to the Florida Panhandle. The drive there and back took much longer than expected due to the mass exodus. On our return we found the house was fine, but there was significant damage to an exterior structure and a mess in the yard. We also had to “de-prep” the house, and we’ve been dealing with contractors ever since. It was an exhausting episode, but we feel like we were very lucky.

Now, with less than a week left till the election, I’ll limit myself to a summary of the positions of the candidates in a number of areas, mostly but not all directly related to policy. I assign “grades” in each area and calculate an equally-weighted “GPA” for each candidate. My summaries (and “grades”) are pretty off-the-cuff and not adequate treatments on their own. Some of these areas are more general than others, and I readily admit that a GPA taken from my grade assignments is subject to a bit of double counting. Oh well!

Role of Government: Kamala Harris is a statist through and through. No mystery there. Trump is more selective in his statist tendencies. He’ll often favor government action if it’s politically advantageous. However, in general I think he is amenable to a smaller role for the public than the private sector. Harris: F; Trump: C

Regulation: There is no question that Trump stands for badly needed federal regulatory reform. This spans a wide range of areas, and it extends to a light approach to crypto and AI regulation. Trump plans to appoint Elon Musk as his “Secretary of Cost Cutting”. Harris, on the other hand, seems to favor a continuation of the Biden Administration’s heavy regulatory oversight. This encourages a bloated federal bureaucracy, inflicts high compliance costs on the private sector, stifles innovation, and tends to concentrate industrial power. Harris: F; Trump: A

Border Policy: Trump wants to close the borders (complete the wall) and deport illegal immigrants. Both are easier said than done. Except for criminal elements, the latter will be especially controversial. I’d feel better about Trump’s position if it were accompanied by a commitment to expanded legal immigration. We need more legal immigrants, especially the highly skilled. For her part, Harris would offer mass amnesty to illegals. She’d continue an open border policy, though she claims to want certain limits on illegal border crossings going forward. She also claims to favor more funds for border control. However, it is not clear how well this would translate into thorough vetting of illegal entrants, drug interdiction at the border, or sex trafficking. Harris: D; Trump: B-

Antitrust: Accusations of price gouging by American businesses? Harris! Forty three corporations in the S&P 500 under investigation by the DOJ? The Biden-Harris Administration. This reflects an aggressively hostile and manipulative attitude toward the business community. Trump, meanwhile, might wheedle corporations to act on behalf of certain of his agendas, but he is unlikely to take such a broadly punitive approach. Harris: F; Trump: B-

Foreign Policy: Harris is likely to continue the Biden Administration’s conciliatory approach to dealing with America’s adversaries. The other side of that coin is an often tepid commitment to longtime allies like Israel. Trump believes that dealing from a position of strength is imperative, and he’s willing to challenge enemies with an array of economic and political sticks and carrots. He had success during his first term in office promoting peace in the Middle East. A renewed version of the Abraham Accords that strengthened economic ties across the region would do just that. Ideally, he would like to restore the strength of America’s military, about which Harris has less interest. Trump has also shown a willingness to challenge our NATO partners in order to get them to “pay their fair share” toward the alliance’s shared defense. My major qualification here has to do with the candidates’ positions with respect to supporting Ukraine in its war against Putin’s mad aggression. Harris seems more likely than Trump to continue America’s support for Ukraine. Harris: D+; Trump: B-

Trade: Nations who trade with one another tend to be more prosperous and at peace. Unfortunately, neither candidate has much recognition of these facts. Harris is willing to extend the tariffs enforced during the Biden Administration. Trump, however, is under the delusion that tariffs can solve almost anything that ails the country. Of course, tariffs are a destructive tax on American consumers and businesses. Part of this owes to the direct effects of the tax. Part owes to the pricing power tariffs grant to domestic producers. Tariffs harm incentives for efficiency and the competitiveness of American industry. Retaliatory action by foreign governments is a likely response, which magnifies the harm.

To be fair, Trump believes he can use tariffs as a negotiating tool in nearly all international matters, whether economic, political, or military. This might work to achieve some objectives, but at the cost of damaging relations more broadly and undermining the U.S. economy. Trump is an advocate for not just selective, punitive tariffs, but for broad application of tariffs. Someone needs to disabuse him of the notion that tariffs have great revenue-raising potential. They don’t. And Trump is seemingly unaware of another basic fact: the trade deficit is mirrored by foreign investment in the U.S. economy, which spurs domestic economic growth. Quashing imports via tariffs will also quash that source of growth. I’ll add one other qualification below in the section on taxes, but I’m not sure it has a meaningful chance.

Harris: C-; Trump: F

Inflation: This is a tough one to grade. The President has no direct control over inflation. Harris wants to challenge “price gougers”, which has little to do with actual inflation. I expect both candidates to tolerate large deficits in order to fulfill campaign promises and other objectives. That will put pressure on credit markets and is likely to be inflationary if bond investors are surprised by the higher trajectory of permanent government indebtedness, or if the Federal Reserve monetizes increasing amounts of federal debt. Deficits are likely to be larger under Trump than Harris due in large part to differences in their tax plans, but I’m skeptical that Harris will hold spending in check. Trump’s policies are more growth oriented, and these along with his energy policies and deregulatory actions could limit the inflationary consequences of his spending and tax policies. Higher tariffs will not be of much help in funding larger deficits, and in fact they will be inflationary. Harris: C; Trump: C

Federal Reserve Independence: Harris would undoubtedly like to have the Fed partner closely with the Treasury in funding federal spending. Her appointments to the Board would almost certainly lead to a more activist Fed with a willingness to tolerate rapid monetary expansion and inflation. Trump might be even worse. He has signaled disdain for the Fed’s independence, and he would be happy to lean on the Fed to ease his efforts to fulfill promises to special interests. Harris: D; Trump: F

Entitlement Reform: Social Security and Medicare are both insolvent and benefits will be cut in 2035 without reforms. Harris would certainly be willing to tax the benefits of higher-income retirees more heavily, and she would likely be willing to impose FICA and Medicare taxes on incomes above current earning limits. These are not my favorite reform proposals. Trump has been silent on the issue except to promise no cuts in benefits. Harris: C-; Trump: F

Health Care: Harris is an Obamacare supporter and an advocate of expanded Medicaid. She favors policies that would short-circuit consumer discipline for health care spending and hasten the depletion of the already insolvent Medicare and Medicaid trust funds. These include a $2,000 cap on health care spending for Americans on Medicare, having Medicare cover in-home care, and extending tax credits for health insurance premia. She supports funding to address presumed health care disparities faced by black men. She also promises efforts to discipline or supplant pharmacy benefit managers. Trump, for his part, has said little about his plans for health care policy. He is not a fan of Obamacare and he has promised to take on Big Pharma, whatever that might mean. I fear that both candidates would happily place additional controls of the pricing of pharmaceuticals, a sure prescription for curtailed research and development and higher mortality. Harris: F; Trump: D+

Abortion: The Supreme Court’s 2022 decision in Dobbs v. Jackson essentially relegated abortion law to individual states. That’s consistent with federalist principles, leaving the controversial balancing of abortion vs. the unborn child’s rights up to state voters. Geographic differences of opinion on this question are dramatic, and Dobbs respects those differences. Trump is content with it. Meanwhile, Harris advocates for the establishment of expanded abortion rights at the federal level, including authorization of third trimester abortions by “care providers”. And Harris does not believe there should be religious exemptions for providers who do not wish to offer abortion services. No doubt she also approves of federally funded abortions. Harris: F; Trump: A

Housing: The nation faces an acute housing shortage owing to excessive regulation that limits construction of new or revitalized housing. These excessive rules are primarily imposed at the state and local level. While the federal government has little direct control over many of these decisions, it has abetted this regulatory onslaught in a variety of ways, especially in the environmental arena. Harris is offering stimulus to the demand side through a $25,000 housing tax credit for first-time home buyers. This will succeed in raising the cost of housing. She has also called for heavier subsidies for developers of low-income housing. If past is prologue, this might do more to line the pockets of developers than add meaningfully to the stock of affordable housing. Harris also favors rent controls, a sure prescription for deterioration in the housing stock, and she would prohibit software allowing landlords to determine competitive neighborhood rents. Trump has called for deregulation generally and would not favor rent controls. Harris: F; Trump B

Taxes: Harris has broached several wildly destructive tax proposals. Perhaps the worst of these is to tax unrealized capital gains, and while she promises it would apply only to extremely wealthy taxpayers, it would constitute a wealth tax. Once that line is crossed, the threat of widening the base becomes a very slippery slope. It would also be a strong detriment to domestic capital investment and economic growth. Harris would increase the top marginal personal tax rate and the corporate tax rate, which would discourage investment and undermine real wage growth. She’d also increase estate tax rates. As discussed above, she unwisely calls for a $25,000 tax credit for first-time homebuyers. She also wants to expand the child care tax credit to $6,000 for families with newborns. A proposed $50,000 small business tax credit would allow the federal government to subsidize and encourage risky entrepreneurial activity at taxpayers’ expense. I’m all for small business, but this style of industrial planning is bonkers. She would sunset the Trump (TCJA) tax cuts in 2026.

Finally, Harris has mimicked Trump in calling for no taxes on tips. Treating certain forms of income more favorably than others is a recipe for distortions in economic activity. Employers of tip-earning workers will find ways to shift employees’ income to tips that are mandatory for patrons. It will also skew labor supply decisions toward occupations that would otherwise have less economic value. But Trump managed to find an idea so politically seductive that Harris couldn’t resist.

Trump’s tax plans are a mixed bag of good and bad ideas. They include extending his earlier tax cuts (TCJA) and restoring the SALT deduction. The latter is an alluring campaign tidbit for voters in high-tax states. He would reduce the corporate tax rate, which I strongly favor. Corporate income is double-taxed, which is a detriment to growth as well as a weight on real wages. He would eliminate taxes on overtime income, another example of favoring a particular form of income over others. Wage earners would gain at the expense of salaried employees, so one could expect a transition in the form employees are paid over time. Otherwise, the classification of hours as “overtime” would have to be standardized. One could expect existing employees to work longer hours, but at the expense of new jobs. Finally, Trump says Social Security benefits should not be taxed, another kind of special treatment by form of income. This might encourage early retirement and become an additional drain on the Social Security Trust Fund.

The higher tariffs promised by Trump would collect some revenue. I’d be more supportive of this plank if the tariffs were part of a larger transition from income taxes to consumption taxes. However, Trump would still like to see large differentials between tariffs and taxes imposed on the consumption of domestically-produced goods and services.

Harris: F; Trump C+

Climate Policy: This topic has undergone a steep decline in relative importance to voters. Harris favors more drastic climate interventions than Trump, including steep renewable subsidies, EV mandates, and a panoply of other initiatives, many of which would carry over from the Biden Administration. Harris: F; Trump: B

Energy: Low-cost energy encourages economic growth. Just ask the Germans! Consistent with the climate change narrative, Harris wishes to discourage the use of fossil fuels, their domestic production, and even their export. She has been very dodgy with respect to restrictions on fracking. Her apparent stance on energy policy would be an obvious detriment to growth and price stability (or I should say a continuing detriment). Trump wishes to encourage fossil fuel production. Harris: F; Trump: A

Constitutional Integrity: Harris has supported the idea of packing the Supreme Court, which would lead to an escalating competition to appoint more and more justices with every shift in political power. She’s also disparaged the Electoral College, without which many states would never have agreed to join the Union. Under the questionable pretense of “protecting voting rights”, she has opposed steps to improve election integrity, such voter ID laws. And operatives within her party have done everything possible to register non-citizens as voters. Harris: F; Trump: A

First Amendment Rights: Harris has called for regulation and oversight of social media content and moderation. A more descriptive word for this is censorship. Trump is generally a free speech advocate. Harris: F; Trump A-

Second Amendment Rights: Harris would like to ban so-called “assault weapons” and high-capacity magazines, and she backs universal background checks for gun purchases. Trump has not called for any new restrictions on gun rights. Harris: F; Trump: A

DEI: Harris is strongly supportive of diversity and equity initiatives, which have undermined social cohesion and the economy. That necessarily makes her an enemy of merit-based rewards. Trump has no such confusion. Harris: F; Trump: A

Hysteria: The Harris campaign has embraced a strategy of demonizing Donald Trump. Of course, that’s not a new approach among Democrats, who have fabricated bizarre stories about Trump escapades in Russia, Trump as a pawn of Vladimir Putin, and Russian manipulation of the 2016 Trump campaign. Congressional democrats spent nearly all of Trump’s first term in office trying to find grounds for impeachment. Concurrently, there were a number of other crazy and false stories about Trump. The current variation on “Orange Man Bad” is that Trump is a fascist and a Nazi, and that all of his supporters are Nazis. And that Trump will use the military against his domestic political opponents, the so-called “enemy within”. And that Trump will send half the country’s populace to labor camps. The nonsense never ends, but could anything more powerfully ignite the passions of violent extremists than this sort of hateful rhetoric? Would it not be surprising if at least a few leftists weren’t interested in assassinating “Hitler” himself. This is hysteria, and one has to wonder if that is not, in fact, the intent.

Can any of these people actually define the term fascist? Most fundamentally, a fascist desires the use of government coercion for private gain (of wealth or power) for oneself and/or one’s circle of allies. By that definition, we could probably categorize a great many American politicians as fascists, including Barack Obama, Joe Biden, Donald Trump, and a majority of both houses of Congress. That only demonstrates that corporatism is fundamental to fascist politics. Less-informed definitions of fascism conflate it with everything from racism (certainly can play a part) and homophobia (certainly can play a part) to mere capitalism. But take a look at the demographics of Trump’s supporters and you can see that most of these definitions are inapt.

Is the Trump campaign suffering from any form of hysteria? It’s shown great talent at poking fun at the left. Of course, Trump’s reactions to illegal immigration, crime, and third-trimester abortions are construed by leftists to be hysterical. I mean, why would anyone get upset about those kinds of things?

Harris: F; Trump: A

“Grade Point Average”

I’m sure I forgot an area or two I should have covered. Anyway, the following are four-point “GPAs” calculated over 20 categories. I’m deducting a quarter point for a “minus” grade and adding a quarter point for a “plus” grade. Here’s what I get:

Harris: 0.44; Trump: 2.68

Hmmm

Joy-Politik Weird Trick: Anti-Business, Anti-Labor

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Workers nationwide are assured that great joy will prevail if Kamala Harris retains her grip on the reins of power next year. Finally, greedy employers and rich people generally will have to “pay their fair share”. While slower job growth and stagnating real wages might dampen the enthusiasm, Harris offers vague assurances that “metrics” will demonstrate how her policies pay for themselves, achieving positive returns on investment (ROI). That creates an attractive buzz and it takes a lot of chutzpah, but she probably wouldn’t know an ROI if it bit her in the ass.

Tax “Big Greed”

This installment of my “Joy-Politik” series covers another federal tax proposal put forward by Harris. In my last post, I discussed her plan to tax unrealized capital gains, which is inimical to investment incentives, a healthy capital base, and economic growth. Here I discuss her proposal: to increase the corporate income tax rate from 21 percent to 28 percent (and increase the alternative minimum tax rate for corporations from 15% to 21%).

The chart at the top of this post shows that corporate statutory tax rates have trended down quite a bit over the past 40+ years. That’s a strong indicator of competition for corporate investment capital. It’s intense because governments know capital investment produces jobs, higher wages, and economic growth. U.S. corporate taxes today are competitive within the distribution, and they are below the international average. A hike to 28% would push the U.S. to a much less competitive level.

But here’s Harris’ rhetorical move: insist that the income of corporations must be taxed heavily, even punitively, for the benefit of the masses! While you’re at it, deride these greedy companies for causing inflation. The thinking is that a corporation’s shareholders will have to pay the tax. That’s who they’re after, and they can’t resist the left-populist optics!

Tax Incidence

Let’s put aside the “class struggle” premise and the political joy of bashing the rich; let’s also put aside the mistaken attribution of inflation to corporate greed. Beyond all that, Harris (and many others) makes a fundamental error in thinking that shareholders will bear the full burden of the tax. Anyone with a passing familiarity with tax incidence knows that the burden of the tax will be shared by the firm’s workers, customers, and shareholders. That’s because firms attempt to pass the tax along to consumers in higher prices and employees in lower wages.

Corporations cannot avoid tax incidence entirely. All parties (the firms, their consumers, workers, and shareholders) respond with some degree of elasticity. Ultimately, the interplay between their responses will yield a behavioral compromise whereby each of the three groups shoulders a portion of the burden.

Workers have limited mobility, but the supply of capital to a country is fairly elastic. Capital will deploy to locales where the returns net of taxes are most favorable. So capital tends to flee from jurisdictions in which it is more heavily penalized. This reduces the amount of capital available to each worker (tools, machinery, information/computing resources), ultimately leading to reduced productivity and wages.

As of 2021, even the federal government’s tax studies assumed that workers bore 20% – 25% of the burden of a corporate tax increase. However, the true labor share is likely to be higher. An abundance of research (for example, see here, here, and here) supports this conclusion. The full range of estimates runs from 15% – 100%. A number of studies suggest a range of 50% – 100%, with 70% seen as a reasonable midpoint. That means wages can be expected to decline in the wake of a corporate tax hike, and labor ultimately bears more than two-thirds of the increased corporate rate hike. With this in mind, no one should mistake Harris’ anti-corporate policy stance as labor-friendly. Quite the contrary!

Broad Economic Effects

The macroeconomic effects of the corporate tax hike are unfavorable, according to a Tax Foundation report:

Raising the corporate income tax rate to 28 percent is the largest driver of the negative effects, reducing long-run GDP by 0.6 percent, the capital stock by 1.1 percent, wages by 0.5 percent, and full-time equivalent jobs by 125,000.

The report’s estimates of losses for the entire Harris tax package through 2034 exclude a few provisions such as the new minimum tax on unrealized gains of high income earners. Therefore, the negative impacts are likely larger. But even without that, the losses in the report are a 2% decline in GDP, a 1.2% loss of wages, a 3% decline in the capital stock, and 786,000 fewer jobs.

Conclusion

Kamala Harris makes a great show of her desire to stick it to the rich for their “fair share.” In this case, the motives of corporations are demonized and presented as a natural vehicle through which the rich can be targeted. That effort would be worse than futile. The bulk of the incidence of the change in the corporate income tax rate would fall on workers. Even worse, the impact on jobs, the capital stock, and GDP are all likely to be negative. Rewarding workers by punishing their employers is a negative sum proposition, not a joyous thing.

Joy-Politik: Taxing Unrealized Capital Gains

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Kamala Harris’ campaign platform lifts several tax provisions from Joe Biden’s ill-fated campaign. The most pernicious of these are lauded by observers on the Left for their “fairness”, but they dismiss some rather obvious economic damage these provisions would inflict. Here, I’ll cover Harris’ proposal to tax unrealized capital gains of the rich in two different ways:

  1. A minimum 25% “billionaire tax” on the “incomes” of taxpayers with net worth exceeding $100 million. This definition of income would include unrealized capital gains.
  2. A tax of 28% at the time of death on unrealized capital gains in excess of $5 million ($10 million for joint returns).

Why Bother?

To get a whiff of the complexity involved, take a look at the description on pp. 79 – 85 of this document, to which the Harris proposal seems to correspond. It’s not fully fleshed out, but it’s easy to imagine the lucrative opportunities this would create for tax attorneys and accountants, to say nothing of job openings at the IRS!

On the other hand, there’s little chance these proposals would be approved by Congress, no matter which party holds a majority. Harris knows that, or at least her advisors do. That taxation of unrealized gains is even part of the conversation in a presidential election year tells us how normalized the idea has become within the Democrat Party, which seems to have lost all regard for private property rights. These are classist proposals designed to garner the votes of the “tax-the-rich” crowd, who either aren’t aware or haven’t come to grips with the fact that the U.S. already has a very progressive income tax system. “The rich” already pay a disproportionately high share of taxes.

Taxable Income

These provisions would complicate and corrupt the income tax code by distorting the definition of income for tax purposes. The Internal Revenue Code has always been consistent in defining taxable income as realized income. One might use the expression “mark-to-market taxation” to characterize a tax on unrealized gains from tradable assets. It’s much more difficult to estimate unrealized gains on non-tradable or infrequently traded investments, for which there is no ready market value.

There is one type of income that some believe to be taxed as unrealized. A few weeks ago, in a post about Sam Altman’s infatuation with a wealth tax, I cited a recent Supreme Court decision that has been mistakenly interpreted as favoring income taxation of unrealized gains or a wealth tax. In fact, Moore v. United States involved the undistributed profits of a foreign pass-through entity (i.e., not a C corporation) for purposes of the mandatory repatriation tax. The foreign firm’s profits were realized, and its pass-through status meant that the U.S. owners had also, by definition, realized the profits. So this case did not set a precedent or create an exception to the rule that income taxation applies only to realized income.

Forced Sales

Tradable assets with easily recorded market values will often have unrealized gains in a given year. While tax payments might be spread over the current and future tax years, these taxes could necessitate asset sales to pay the taxes owed. If unrealized losses are treated symmetrically, they would require either future deductions or possibly credits for prior tax payments.

Estimates of unrealized gains on illiquid or private investments like closely-held business interests, artwork, or real estate are highly uncertain and subject to dispute. A large tax liability on such an asset could be especially burdensome. Cash must be raised, which might require a forced sale of other assets. And again, these valuations often come with great complexity and exorbitant administrative costs, not just for the IRS, but especially for taxpayers.

Economic Downsides

As I noted above, additional taxes on unrealized gains would create an obvious need for liquidity, if not immediately then at death. With or without careful planning, sales of assets by wealthy investors to pay the tax would undermine market values of equity (and other assets), producing a broader loss of wealth economy-wide.

Avoidance schemes would be heavily utilized. For example, a wealthy investor could borrow heavily against assets so as to offset unrealized gains with deductible debt-service costs.

Capital flight is likely to be intense if a Harris tax regime began to take shape in Congress. This might be the best avoidance scheme of all. The U.S. is likely to experience massive capital outflows. Furthermore, investment in new physical capital will decline, ultimately leading to lower productivity and real wages.

Entrepreneurial activity would also take a hit. In a critique of Jason Furman’s effort to justify Harris’ proposal, Tyler Cowen asks why we should be so eager to “whack” venture capital. He also quotes an email from Alex Tabarrok on the detrimental policy effects on rapidly growing start-ups:

What’s really going on is that you are divorcing the entrepreneur from their capital at precisely the moment that the team is likely most productive. Separation of capital from entrepreneur could negatively impact the company’s growth or the entrepreneur’s ability to manage effectively. The entrepreneur could lose control, for example. If you wait until the entrepreneur realizes the gain that’s the time that the entrepreneur wants out and is ready to consume so it’s closer to taxing consumption and better timed in the entrepreneurial growth process.

Or the entrepreneur might just decide that a startup would be more rewarding in a tax-friendly environment, perhaps somewhere overseas.

Interest Rates and Tax Receipts

Tabarrok notes in a separate post that much of the variation in stock prices is caused by changes in interest rates. Investors use market rates to determine discount rates at which a firm’s future cash flows can be valued. Thus, changes in rates engender changes in stock prices, capital gains, and capital losses.

A decline in interest rates can raise market valuations without any change in dividends. However, a long-term investor would see no change in pre-tax income or consumption, so the tax could force a series of premature sales. A change in a firm’s expected growth rate would also create an unrealized gain (or loss), but the tax would undermine U.S. equity values. Taxing an actual increase in the dividend is one thing, but taxing a change in expectations of future dividends is another. As Tabarrok puts it, “It’s taxing the chickens before the eggs have hatched.

Dangerous Narrative, Dangerous Policy

A final objection to taxing unrealized capital gains is that it would cross the line into a form of wealth taxation. Assets come in many forms, but the only time realized values can be discerned are when they are traded. That goes for collectibles, homes, boats, and the full array of financial assets. A corollary is that a very large percentage of wealth is unrealized.

A tax on unrealized gains would be the proverbial camel’s nose under the tent and another incursion into the private realm. So often in the history of taxation we’ve seen narrow taxes expand into broad taxes. This is one more opportunity for the state to extend its dominance and control.

I’ve written in the past about the economic dangers of a wealth tax. First, every dollar of income used to purchase capital is already taxed once. In that sense, the cost basis of wealth would be double taxed under a wealth tax. Second, the supply of capital is highly elastic. This implies a high propensity for capital flight, shallowing of productive physical capital, and reduced productivity and real wages. Avoidance schemes would rapidly be put into play. Given these limitations, the revenue raising potential of a wealth tax is unlikely to live up to expectations. Finally, a wealth tax is unconstitutional, but that won’t stop the Left from pushing for one, especially if they first get a tax on unrealized gains. Even if they are unsuccessful now, the conversation tends to normalize the idea of a wealth tax among low-information voters, and that is a shame.

JoyPolitik: Greed, Gouging, and Gullability

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Economic ignorance and campaign politics seem to go hand-in-hand, especially when it comes to the rhetoric of avowed interventionists. They love “easy” answers. If they get their way, negative but predictable consequences are always “unintended” and/or someone else’s fault. Unfortunately, too many journalists and voters like “easy” answers, and they repeatedly fall for the ploy.

This post highlights one of many bad ideas coming out of the Kamala Harris campaign. I probably won’t have time to cover all of her bad ideas before the election. There are just too many! I hope to highlight a few from the Trump campaign as well. Unfortunately, the two candidates have more than one bad idea in common.

Price Gouging

Here I’ll focus on Harris’ destructive proposal for a federal ban on “price gouging”. Unfortunately, she has yet to define precisely what she means by that term. On its face, she’d apparently support legislation authorizing the DOJ to go after grocers, gas stations, or other sellers in visible industries charging prices deemed excessive by the federal bureaucracy. This is a form of price control and well in keeping with the interventionist mindset.

As Michael Munger has said, when you charge “too much” you are “gouging”; when you charge “too little” you are “predatory”; and when you charge the same price as competitors you’ve engaged in a price fixing conspiracy. The fact that Harris’ proposal is deliberately vague is an even more dangerous invitation to arbitrary caprice by federal enforcers. It might be hard to price a ham sandwich without breaking such a law.

The great advantage of the price system is its impersonal coordination of the actions of disparate agents, creating incentives for both buyers and sellers to direct resources toward their most valued uses. Price controls of any kind short circuit that coordination, inevitably leading to shortages (or surpluses), misallocations, and diminished well being.

Inflation As Aggregate Macro Gouging

Aside from vote buying, Harris has broader objectives than the usual “anti-gouging” sentiment that accompanies negative supply shocks. She’s faced mounting pressure to address prices that have soared during the Biden Administration. The inflation during and after the COVID pandemic was induced by supply shortfalls first and then a spending/money-printing binge by the federal government. The pandemic induced shortages in some key areas, but the Treasury and the Fed together engineered a gigantic cash dump to accommodate that shock. This stimulated demand and turned temporary dislocations into permanently higher prices.

There were howls from the Left that greed in the private sector was to blame, despite plentiful evidence to the contrary. Blaming “price gouging” for inflated prices dovetails with Harris’ proclivity to inveigh against “corporate greed”. It’s typical leftist blather intended to appeal to anyone harboring suspicions of private property and the profit motive.

The profit motive is a compelling force for social good, motivating the performance of large corporations and small businesses alike. Diatribes against “greed” coming from the likes of a career politician with no private sector experience are not only unconvincing. They reveal childlike misapprehensions regarding economic phenomena.

More substantively, some have noted that mark-ups rose during and after the pandemic, but these markups are explained by normal cyclical fluctuations and the growing dominance of services in the spending mix. High margins are difficult to sustain without persistently high levels of demand. The Fed’s shift toward monetary restraint has dissipated much of that excessive demand pressure, but certainly not enough to bring prices back to pre-pandemic levels, which would require a severe economic contraction.

Claims that concentration among sellers has risen in some markets are also cited as evidence that greedy, price-gouging corporations are fueling inflation. If that is a real concern, then we might expect Harris to lean more heavily on antitrust policy. She should be circumspect in that regard: antitrust enforcement is too often used for terrible reasons (and also see here). In any case, rising market concentration does not necessarily imply a reduction in competitive pressures. Indeed, it might reflect the successful efforts of a strong competitor to please customers, delivering better value via quality and price. Moreover, mergers and acquisitions often result in stronger challenges to dominant players, energizing innovation, improved quality, and price competition.

If Harris is serious about minimizing inflation she should advocate for fiscal and monetary restraint. We’ve heard nothing of that from her campaign, however. No credible plans other than vaguely-defined price controls and promises to tax and spend our way to a joyful “opportunity economy”.

Disaster Supply Gouging

There is already a federal law against hoarding “scarce items” in times of war or national crisis and reselling at more than the (undefined) “prevailing market price”. There are also laws in 34 states with varying “anti-gouging” provisions, mostly applicable during emergencies only. These laws are counterproductive as they tend to “gouge” the flow of supplies.

In the aftermath of terrible storms or earthquakes, there are almost always shortages of critical goods like food, water, and fuel, not to mention specialized manpower, machinery, and materials needed for cleanup and restoration. As I pointed out some time ago, retailers often fail to adjust their prices under these circumstances, even as shelves are rapidly emptied. They are sometimes prohibited from repricing aggressively. If not, they are conflicted by the predictable hoarding that empties shelves, the higher costs of replenishing inventory, and the knowledge that price rationing creates undeservedly bad public relations. So retailers typically act with restraint to avoid any hint of “gouging” during crises.

Disasters often disrupt production and create physical barriers that hinder the very movement of goods. When prices are flexible and can respond to scarcity on the ground, suppliers can be very creative in finding ways to deliver badly needed supplies, despite the high costs those are likely to entail. Private sellers can do all this more nimbly and with greater efficiency than government, but they need price incentives to cover the costs and various risks. Price controls prevent that from happening, prolonging shortages at the worst possible time.

The chief complaint of those who oppose this natural corrective mechanism is that higher prices are “unfair”. And it is true that some cannot afford to pay higher prices induced by severe scarcity. The answer here is that government can write checks or even distribute cash, much as the government did nationwide during the pandemic. That’s about the only thing at which the state excels. Then people can afford to pay prices that reflect true levels of scarcity. If done selectively and confined to a regional level, the broader inflationary consequences are easily neutralized.

Instead, the knee-jerk reaction is to short-circuit the price mechanism and insist that available supplies be rationed equally. That might be a fine way for retailers to respond in the short run. Share the misery and prevent hoarding. But supplies will run low. When the shelves are empty, the price is infinite! That’s why sellers must have flexibility, not prohibitions.

Blame Game

Harris is engaged in a facile blame game at both the macro and micro level. She claims that inflation could be controlled if only corporations weren’t so greedy. Forget that they must cover their own rising costs, including the costs of compensating risk-averse investors. For that matter, she probably hasn’t gathered that a return to capital is a legitimate cost. Like many others, Harris seems ignorant of the elevated costs of bringing goods to market following either unpredictable disasters or during a general inflation. She also lacks any understanding of the benefits of relying on unfettered markets to bridge short-term gaps in supply. But none of this is surprising. She follows in a long tradition of ignorant interventionism. Let’s hope we have enough voters who aren’t that gullible.

The Fed Tiptoes Through Lags and an Endless Fiscal Thicket

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The late, great Milton Friedman said monetary policy has “long and variable lags” in its effect on the economy. Easy money might not spark an inflation in goods prices for two years or more, though the typical lag is thought to be more like 15-20 months. Tight money seems to have similar lags in its effects. Debates surround the division and timing of these effects between inflation and real GDP, and too many remain convinced that a reliable tradeoff exists between inflation and unemployment.

With that preface, where do we stand today? The Fed executed a veritable helicopter drop of cash during the pandemic, in concert with support payments by the Treasury, with predictable inflationary results. It was also, in part, an accommodation to supply-side pressures. Then the tightening of policy began in the spring of 2022. How will the timing and strength of these shifting policies ultimately play out, as well as the impact of expectations regarding future policy moves?

Help On the Way?

Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell and the Fed’s Open Market Committee (FOMC) are now poised to ease policy after three-plus years of a tighter policy stance. The FOMC is widely expected to cut its short-term interest rate target by a quarter point at the next FOMC on September 17-18. There is an outside chance that the Fed will cut the target by a half point, depending on the strength of new data to be released over the next couple of weeks. In particular, this Friday’s employment report looms large.

What sometimes goes unacknowledged is that the Fed will be following market rates downward, not leading them. The chart below shows the steep drop in the one-year Treasury yield over the past couple of months. Other rates have declined as well. Granted, longer rates are determined in large part by expectations of future short-term rates over which the Fed has more control.

And yet the softening of market rates may well be a signal of weaker economic activity. There is certainly concern among investors that a failure by the Fed to ease policy might jeopardize the much hoped-for “soft landing”. The lagged effects of the Fed’s tighter policy stance may drag on, with damage to the real economy and the labor market. Indeed, some assert that a recession remains a strong possibility (and see here), and the manufacturing sector has been in a state of contraction for five months.

On the other hand, the Fed has fallen short of its 2% inflation goal. The core PCE deflator, the Fed’s preferred inflation gauge, was up 2.6% for the year ending in July. Some observers fear that easing policy prematurely will lead to a new acceleration of inflation.

Powell Gives the Nod

Nevertheless, markets were relieved when Jerome Powell, in his recent speech in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, indicated his determination that a shift in policy was appropriate. From Bloomberg:

Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell said ‘the time has come’ for the central bank to start cutting interest rates.

Powell’s comments cemented expectations for a rate cut at the central bank’s next gathering in September. The Fed chief said the cooling of the labor market is ‘unmistakable,’ adding, ‘We do not seek or welcome further cooling in labor market conditions.’ Powell also said his confidence has grown that inflation is on a ‘sustainable path’ back to the Fed’s goal of 2%.

The “sustainable path back to … 2%” might imply a view inside Fed that policy will remain somewhat restrictive even after a quarter or half-point rate cut in September. Or perhaps the “sustainable path” has to do with the aforementioned lags, which might continue to be operative regardless of any immediate change in policy. The feasibility of a “soft landing” depends on whether policy is indeed still restrictive or on how benign those lagged effects turn out to be. But if we take the lags seriously, an easing of policy wouldn’t have real economic force for perhaps 15 months. Still, the market puts great hope in the salutary effects of a move by the Fed to ease policy.

Big Balance Sheet

It can be argued that the Fed already took a step toward easing policy in May when it reduced the rate at which it was allowing runoff in its portfolio of Treasury and mortgage-backed securities. Prior to that, it had been redeeming $95 billion of maturing securities a month. The new runoff amount is $60 billion per month. Unless neutralized in other ways, the runoff has a contractionary effect on bank reserves and the money supply. It is known as “quantitative tightening” (QT). but then the May announcement was a de facto easing in the degree of QT.

Thus far, the total reduction in the Fed’s portfolio has amounted to only $1.7 trillion from the original high-water mark of $8.9 trillion. Here is a chart showing the recent evolution in the size of the Fed’s securities holdings.

The Fed’s current balance sheet of $7.2 trillion is gigantic by historical standards. It’s reasonable to ask why the Fed considers what we have now to be a more “normalized” portfolio, and whether its size (and correspondingly, the money supply) represents potential “dry tinder” for future inflation. It remains to be seen whether the Fed will further pare the rate of portfolio runoff in the months ahead.

Money growth had been running negative for roughly a year and a half, but it edged closer to zero in late 2023 before accelerating to a slow, positive rate a few months into 2024. The timing didn’t exactly correspond to the Fed’s slowing of portfolio runoff. Nevertheless, the Fed’s strong preference is to supply the banking system with “ample reserves”, and reserves drive money growth. Thus, the Fed’s reaction to conditions in the market for reserves was a factor allowing money growth to accelerate.

A Cut Too Soon?

A rate cut later this month will make reserves still more ample and support additional money growth. And again, this will be an effort to mediate the negative impact of earlier policy tightness, but the effect of this move on the economy will be subject to similar lags.

A danger is that the Fed might be easing too soon, so that inflation will fail to taper to the 2% goal and possibly accelerate again. And perhaps policy was not quite as tight as it needed to be to achieve the 2% goal. Now, new supply bottlenecks are cropping up, including a near shutdown of shipping through the Suez Canal and a potential strike by east coast dockworkers.

Fiscal Incontinence

An even greater threat now, and in the years ahead, is the massive pressure placed on the economy and the Fed by excessive federal spending and Treasury borrowing. The growth of federal debt over the 12 months ending in July was almost 10%. Total federal debt stands at about $35 trillion. According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projections, federal debt held by the public will be almost $28 trillion by the end of 2024 (the rest the public debt is held by the Fed or federal agencies). The CBO also projects that the federal budget deficit will average almost $1.7 trillion annually through 2027 before rising to $2.6 trillion by 2034. That would bring federal debt held by the public to more than $48 trillion.

Inflation is receding ever so slowly for now, but it’s unclear that investors will remain comfortable that growth in the public debt can be paid down by future surpluses. If not, the only way its real value can be reduced is through higher prices. Most observers believe such an inflation requires that the Fed monetize federal debt (buy it from the public with printed money). Tighter credit markets will increase pressure on the Fed to do so, but the growing debt burden is likely to exert upward pressure on the prices of goods with or without accommodation by the Fed.

Hard, Soft, Or Aborted Landing?

Some economists are convinced that the Fed has successfully engineered a “soft landing”. I might have to eat some crow…. I felt that a “hard landing” was inevitable from the start of this tightening phase. Even now I would not discount the possibility of a recession late this year or in early 2025. And perhaps we’ll get no “landing” at all. The Fed’s expected policy shift together with the fiscal outlook could presage not just a failure to get inflation down to the Fed’s 2% target, but a subsequent resurgence in price inflation.

Tampons For Men From a Strapped Public Purse

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I had to laugh when I saw this tweet on X the other day:

I actually think she was fishing for sympathetic comments from … anyone. Or it was intended as a rhetorical question, as the poster seems to regard many cis-men as the meanies in this affair. But let’s give her the benefit of the doubt. Maybe she really wanted to engage with men who object to tampon dispensers in men’s public restrooms.

Before getting started, I want to be clear that I’m using the term “public restroom” to mean a restroom available to the general public and furnished by the public sector. I distinguish these from restrooms in commercial establishments intended for use by customers only.

Tampon Dispensing Is Not Cost-Free

So I have a question: who will be asked to pay for the dispensers in men’s public restrooms, their installation, servicing, and the tampons themselves? Will the tampons be dispensed at no charge, as some advocates would like? That’s the case in some public schools, so there might be a tendency to think tampons should be free in other men’s public restrooms. Of course, another possibility is to install pay vending machines for tampons, and I will address that in later sections. Here I note that I’d have no objection if they paid for themselves.

Free tampons in men’s public restrooms, or even priced tampons that don’t cover their costs, would represent a use of public resources. Taxpayers would be on the hook. Alternatively, some other public expenditure might be reduced to make room in government budgets for the new amenity. Public budgets are notoriously strapped, and foregoing other budget needs would carry an opportunity cost. Public resources should be put to the most urgent public needs, which might run the gamut from critical services like law enforcement, sanitation, and street repair to the staffing of mental health facilities.

If this strikes you as economic small-ball, remember that demands for public funds are seemingly without end. Whether taxes are increased or the budget is reallocated, “my life” is affected to a degree by every new demand that is met. To pay for tampon dispensers in men’s public restrooms, resources must be diverted from some other valued use.

Beneficiaries

Surely Ms. Fachner believes that tampons in men’s restrooms confer social benefits. Might those benefits exceed the opportunity cost of the necessary resources?

Well, biological males don’t have ovaries, they can’t get pregnant, and they don’t have periods, so we can scratch them off the list of potential beneficiaries. This is about trans- or intersex men who menstruate or perhaps suffer bleeding from hysterectomies. As I’ll discuss below, this is a small minority of users of men’s public restrooms.

But wait, here’s one advocate:

Our culture does not really acknowledge the diversity of menstruating individuals.

Statements like that lend absolutely no clarity. In fact, it’s a gross obfuscation made in an effort to redefine reality and exaggerate the prevalence of menstruating males.

Estimates of the Trans-Male Population

The transgender population was estimated at about 0.5% – 0.6% of the total U.S. population in 2022, based on two studies. That’s about one in every 200 individuals. However, male-to-female (MTF) transitions are 2 – 4 times more common than female to male (FTM) transitions. Combining these estimates yields one FTM in every 400 – 800 men. Of course, not all FTMs menstruate (and they don’t menstruate over the entirety of a given month). So men who might need a tampon in a public restroom are a small minority.

Nonbinaries?

Some would insist that any such estimate should account for the nonbinary population of individuals who menstruate. Part of this group is the intersex (hermaphrodite) population who identify as males. A number of these individuals have had gender-affirming care and would already have been counted as FTMs in the studies linked above (and I will continue to use “FTM” as inclusive of this group). However, I’m skeptical of the non-binary classification on surveys because some otherwise “straight” individuals use it to signal their participation in the avant guarde of gender identification, perceiving it as something fashionable or even virtuous.

Nevertheless, one 2022 poll found that the trans plus nonbinary population was about 1.6% of all adults. Combining this with the MTF/FTM estimates above, an implied upper bound on the male tampon “market” would be about 3 out of every 400 distinct visitors to a men’s restroom, or less than one out of every hundred. If the nonbinary classification is taken at face value, it’s still a small minority and probably far less than 1/100.

Woe Is We

A great many of us suffer inconveniences in life, some of them terrible, but it would be extremely costly and irrational for the state to attempt to neutralize every one of them. For example, people with overactive bladders are far more common than the trans population. Should the state accommodate them by doubling the number of public restrooms? At some point it’s worth recognizing that claims on public resources can become preposterous.

The economic argument against outfitting all men’s public restrooms with tampon dispensers falls into a broader category of common-sense resistance to eliminating (or compensating) for every tiny cross borne by anyone: every minor strife, inconvenience, or “micro-aggression” individuals might experience. The cumulative effect of this cavalcade of demands on society and on each other, which cannot all be met, is to breed discontent while stifling social and economic progress. We live in the real world where scarcity matters. We must therefore be sensible about where and how we expend our energy and resources.

Costs

I haven’t yet explored the specific costs associated with adding tampon dispensers to men’s public restrooms. Not surprisingly, it’s difficult to pin them down completely, but a few notes are helpful.

The cost of a free-tampon dispenser ranges from about $90 to $140. A pay tampon vending machine ranges from about $300 – $500. Then the dispensers have to be installed, stocked, and serviced, and there is a potentially greater cost of sanitation within each restroom. This article includes cost data from 2017-2019 for a public school district in Massachusetts. It’s ambiguous as to whether installations of free dispensers occurred in women’s restrooms only or all restrooms, but much of the article is written as if it applies to women and girls. To be clear, I don’t take issue with providing free tampon dispensers in school restrooms for females.

The dispensers and receptacles for the school district totaled $33,000, which presumably included the labor cost of installation. The annual cost of keeping the dispensers stocked was just $2.48 per student annually, but it’s not clear whether that average includes labor, or whether the divisor is the female student population or all students. Certainly all of these costs would be greater today.

Don’t Putsch It

The FTM minority is likely to grow, especially in parts of the country where advocates for the gender dysphoric have won legislative battles over gender-affirming care for youths. This is a huge mistake. It’s highly unethical to encourage unalterable, life-changing medical interventions for what often amount to youthful anxieties that usually pass with age. But these initiatives go hand-in-hand with bills requiring free menstrual products in all school restrooms and in all public restrooms. It would be more reasonable to suggest to any biological female considering a gender transition, who must weigh many considerations, that they’ll sometimes be inconvenienced by the need to pack a precautionary tampon.

Crazy Counter-Arguments

There were some interesting comments on Ms. Fachner’s tweet. One contended that men should have tampons available in the event that a female companion happens to need one. Well, it’s so nice to know that chivalry still has a place among the woke! But if a woman needs a tampon while she’s out, and if she has any sense, she’ll try the womens’ restroom herself before asking a male companion to check the men’s room.

Another commenter felt that the availability of tampons in men’s restrooms is the equivalent of condom dispensers in womens’ restrooms. Not quite! A woman out with a male companion might wish to have protection available if she expects to have intercourse. I’m not sure how many public women’s restrooms have condom dispensers, but you might find paid dispensers at truck stops, dance clubs, or other private venues where the sexes meet and greet. In any event, interest in condoms in women’s restrooms might well be a more common phenomenon than FTMs unprepared for the onset of a period.

Market Test

The mere existence of vending machines for condoms and other products in the restrooms of private establishments proves that these offerings satisfy a sort of market test. The charges for those products, including tampons, pads, and condoms in women’s restrooms, might or might not cover all of the associated costs. However, even if they don’t, the machines are provided as a courtesy to customers and/or because competitors provide them. Either way, as a market proposition, the establishments find the machines to be advantageous.

Would private establishments find it profitable to offer tampons and pads in vending machines in men’s restrooms? It’s possible, and businesses catering to non-traditional lifestyles are more likely to offer menstrual products in men’s restrooms, if only as a courtesy to FTM customers. However, it’s uncommon at best among mainstream businesses. Again, the economic logic is dependent on the volume of menstrual products likely to be dispensed. If they add value, the market is likely to provide them. This might be more plausible for machines that vend multiple products.

Successful pricing of tampons in men’s public restrooms would be easier if the probable volume was greater, but it will be quite low relative to women’s restrooms. Thus, the up-front fixed costs are difficult to justify. In any case, vending machines of any type are less common in public restrooms. Perhaps that’s because the items sold would not cover all of the associated costs. Or perhaps it’s because public administrators lack the incentives that motivate actions in the private sector. Enter the activists!

Market Failure?

One might argue that passing the market test is irrelevant because public facilities are intended to offer a range of services which the market can’t be relied upon to provide. That’s not clear cut in the case of restrooms themselves, and I’ve advocated for more pay toilets in the past. However, tampons are very much a private good. A trans-male with an unmet need for a tampon is in a bad spot, and he might generate external costs. However, I maintain that the situation is fairly uncommon, and those hypothetical external costs are fairly easy to internalize. This is not a true market failure nor a public priority.

Finally, I note again that Ms. Fachner addresses her question only to cis-men. I have news for her: like any other form of common sense, the rudimentary economic logic of costs and benefits is inclusive and available to all, regardless of sexual preference and gender identification.