Tag Archives: Public goods

State Aesthetics: Taxes for Art and Dogma

07 Tuesday Jan 2025

Posted by in Art & Politics, Subsidies

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In a post a few years ago entitled “The National Endowment for Rich Farts”, I discussed a point that should be rather obvious: federal funding of the arts too often subsidizes the upper class, catering to their artistic tastes and underwriting a means through which they conduct social and professional networking. The topic is back in the news, with reports that the incoming Trump Administration, at the recommendation of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), will attempt to eliminate funding for the Corporation for Public Broadcasting.

Great Big Stuff and Crowding Out

To opponents of federal arts funding, public radio is probably the bête noire of arts organizations due to its left-wing political orientation and the general affluence of its subscriber base. However, public arts funding goes way beyond subsidies for public radio.

Large nonprofits receive the bulk of government arts funding. Despite claims to the contrary, these organizations won’t go broke without the gravy provided by public funding. The federal government contributes about 3% of the revenue taken in by non-profit arts organizations, according to Americans For the Arts. These organizations are already heavily subsidized: their surpluses are tax exempt and private contributions are tax deductible. Tax deductions are worth more to those in high income-tax brackets, and involvement in such visible organizations is highly prized by elites.

Furthermore, there is no evidence that additional government funding “multiplies” private giving. If anything, increases in public funding reduce private giving (and see here).

Public Funds for Private Gain

It’s often argued that government should subsidize the arts because art has the qualities of a public good, but that’s a false premise. A good can be classified as “public” only when its consumption is non-exclusive and non-rivalrous. Can individuals be excluded from enjoying music? Of course. Can they be excluded from viewing a theatrical performance, a film, or any other piece of visual art? Generally yes, and art exhibitions and artistic performances are nearly always subject to paid and limited attendance.

In some contexts art is, or can be made, less excludable. Architecture can be admired (or detested) by anyone on the street. So can public monuments and street art. A concert or play can be performed free of charge, perhaps at a large, outdoor venue. Amplification and large video monitors can make a big difference in terms of non-exclusion. Museums can offer admission to the general public at no charge. And we can broaden the definition of a work to include copies or reproductions that might be available via public display or broadcast (on NPR!).

All these steps will help increase exposure to the arts. But you can’t make it mandatory. People will always self-exclude because they can. So, in which cases should taxpayers bear the costs of art, and of making it less exclusive? On the spectrum of legitimate functions of government, it’s hard to rank this sort of activity highly.

A claim less absurd than the public goods argument is that art has some positive spillover effects, or externalities. It should therefore be subsidized or underwritten with public funds lest it be underprovided. Unfortunately, the spillover effects of a piece of art (where relevant) are not always positive. After all, tastes vary considerably. One man’s art can be another man’s annoyance or provocation. This undermines the case for public funding, at least for art that is controversial in nature.

Perhaps a better interpretation of art externalities is that exposure to the arts has positive spillover effects. Thus, additional art confers benefits to society above and beyond the edification of those exposed to it. Perhaps it makes us nicer and more interesting, but that’s a highly speculative rationale for public funding.

Less questionably, more art and more exposure to the arts does enrich society in ways that have nothing to do with external benefits. Culture and arts are by-products of normal social interactions between private individuals. The benefits of art exposure (and art education) are largely accrued privately. When artistic knowledge is shared to nourish or broaden one’s network, the benefits flow from private social interactions that arise naturally, rather than as a consequence of phantom external benefits.

Public Funding and Agitprop

The selection of recipients and projects for government grants or subsidies is especially prone to influence by entrenched political interests. That is indeed the case when it comes to federal agencies that offer grants for the arts.

The same danger looms when government provides a venue or manages aspects of a presentation of art, including curation of content. It’s an avenue through which art can become politicized. The problem, however, is not so much that a particular work might have political implications. As Samuel Andreyev, a Canadian composer says:

“Like any other subject, it is possible for political subjects to be handled sensitively by an artist, provided there is a strong enough element of abstraction and symbolism so that the work does not become merely journalistic.”

Andreyev makes a good point, but government funding and direction can create incentives to politicize art, encouraging more blatant expressions of political viewpoints at the expense of taxpayers.

I’ve certainly admired art despite subtle political implications with which I differed. One can hardly imagine a treatment of the human condition that would not invite tangential political commentary. Still, politicization of art should always be left as a private exercise, not one over which the government of a free society wields influence.

Do Markets Undervalue Art?

What about the artists themselves? The premise that artists deserve subsidies relies on the questionable presumption that the value of their work exceeds its commercial or market value. Thus, taxpayers are asked to pay handsomely for art that is not valued as highly by private buyers.

Artists who benefit from government arts funding are often well established professionally. Less fortunate artists scrape by, finding what market they can while working side gigs. In fact, many less celebrated artists work at their craft on a part-time basis while earning most of their income from day jobs. Should the government support these artists, or artists having few opportunities to promote their work?

It’s not clear that public funding should override the private market’s basis of valuation for established or unestablished artists. However, some government funding finds its way into less celebrated corners of the art world. This report uses data at the census tract level to show that arts organizations located in low income tracts, while receiving less, still get a disproportionate share of federal grant dollars relative to their share of the population. This finding should be viewed cautiously, as data at this level of aggregation has limitations. The findings do not imply that “starving artists” receive a disproportionate share of those dollars. Nor do they prove that federal grants benefit low-income individuals disproportionately via improved access to the arts. Again, the findings are based on the location of organizations. And again, large organizations receive the bulk of these grants.

Drawing the Line

So where do we draw the line on taxpayer subsidies for the arts? The standard, public-goods justification is false. While externalities may exist, they are not always positive, and it is hardly the state’s proper role to fund art that “challenges” notions about good and bad art. In that vein, just as law tends to be ineffective when it lacks consensus, public arts funding breeds dissent when the art is controversial.

The legitimacy of public arts funding ultimately depends on whether the art itself has a true public purpose. To varying degrees, this might include the architecture and interior design of public buildings, landscaping of parks, as well as certain monuments and statuary. Even within these disciplines, the selection of form, content, and the artists who will execute the work can be controversial. That might be unavoidable, though controversy will be minimized when the content of publicly-funded art remains within cultural norms.

Beyond those limited purposes, funding art at the federal level is difficult to justify. That role simply does not fall within the constitutionally-enumerated powers of the federal government. The tenuous rationale for subsidies implies that art is undervalued, despite the existence of a vibrant private ecosystem for art, including private support foundations and markets. To the extent that public subsidies line the pockets of elites or support art that would otherwise fail a market test, they represent a wasteful misallocation of resources.

Funding art might seem less troublesome at lower levels of government, where elected representatives and policymakers are in more intimate contact with voters and taxpayers. Still, the same economic reservations apply. At local levels, institutions like community orchestras and concerts series might be broadly supported. Publicly-funded museums, theatrical venues, and other facilities might be accepted by voters as well. If parents have educational choices and expect schools to teach art, it should be funded at public schools, so long as the content stays within cultural norms and is age-appropriate. Of course, all of these matters are up to local voters.

The greatest danger of public funding for the arts is that it tends to be utilized as a tool of political propaganda. Having the state select winners and losers in the arts invites politicization, undermining freedom and our system of government. On that point, Thomas Jefferson once made this observation:

“To compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagations of opinions which he disbelieves and abhors, is sinful and tyrannical.“

Lords of the Planetary Commons Insist We Banish Sovereignty, Growth

29 Thursday Feb 2024

Posted by in Central Planning, Environmental Fascism, Global Warming, Liberty

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We all share Planet Earth as our home, so there’s a strong sense in which it qualifies as a “commons”. That’s one sensible premise of a new paper entitled “The planetary commons: A new paradigm for safeguarding Earth-regulating systems in the Anthropocene”. The title is a long way of saying that the authors desire broad-based environmental regulation, and that’s what ultimately comes across.

First, a preliminary issue: many resources qualify as commons in the very broadest sense, yet free societies have learned over time that many resources are used much more productively when property rights are assigned to individuals. For example, modern agriculture owes much to defining exclusive property rights to land so that conflicting interests don’t have to compete (e.g,, the farmer and the cowman). Federal land is treated as a commons, however. There is a rich history on the establishment of property rights, but within limits, the legal framework in place can define whether a resource is treated as a commons, a club good, or private property. The point here is that there are substantial economic advantages to preserving strong property rights, rather than treating all resources as communal.

The authors of the planetary commons (PC) paper present a rough sketch for governance over use of the planet’s resources, given their belief that a planetary crisis is unfolding before our eyes. The paper has two main thrusts as I see it. One is to broadly redefine virtually all physical resources as common pool interests because their use, in the authors’ view, may entail some degree of external cost involving degradation of the biosphere. The second is to propose centralized, “planetary” rule-making over the amounts and ways in which those resources are used.

It’s an Opinion Piece

The PC paper is billed as the work product of a “collaborative team of 22 leading international researchers”. This group includes four attorneys (one of whom was a lead author) and one philosopher. Climate impact researchers are represented, who undoubtedly helped shape assumptions about climate change and its causes that drive the PC’s theses. (More on those assumptions in a section below.) There are a few social scientists of various stripes among the credited authors, one meteorologist, and a few “sustainability”, “resilience”, and health researchers. It’s quite a collection of signees, er… “research collaborators”.

Grabby Interventionists

The reasoning underlying a “planetary commons” (PC) is that the planet’s biosphere qualifies as a commons. The biosphere must include virtually any public good like air and sunshine, any common good like waterways, or any private good or club good. After all, any object can play host to tiny microbes regardless of ownership status. So the PC authors characterization of the planet’s biosphere as a commons is quite broad in terms of conventional notions of resource attributes.

We usually think of spillover or external costs as arising from some use of a private resource that imposes costs on others, such as air or water pollution. However, mere survival requires that mankind exploit both public and non-public resources, acts that can always be said to impact the biosphere in some way. Efforts to secure shelter, food, and water all impinge on the earth’s resources. To some extent, mankind must use and shape the biosphere to succeed, and it’s our natural prerogative to do so, just like any other creature in the food chain.

Even if we are to accept the PC paper’s premise that the entire biosphere should be treated is a commons, most spillovers are de minimus. From a public policy perspective, it makes little sense to attempt to govern over such minor externalities. Monitoring behavior would be costly, if not impossible, at such an atomistic level. Instead, free and civil societies rely on a high degree of self-governance and informal enforcement of ethical standards to keep small harms to a minimum.

Unfortunately, the identification and quantification of meaningful spillover costs is not always clear-cut. This has led to an increasingly complex regulatory environment, an increasingly litigious business environment, and efforts by policymakers to manage the detailed inputs and outputs of the industrial economy.

All of that is costly in its own right, especially because the activities giving rise to those spillovers often enable large welfare enhancements. Regulators and planners face great difficulties in estimating the costs and benefits of various “correctives”. The very undertaking creates risk that often exceeds the cost of the original spillover. Nevertheless, the PC paper expands on the murkiest aspects of spillover governance by including “… all critical biophysical Earth-regulating systems and their functions, irrespective of where they are located…” as part of a commons requiring “… additional governance arrangements….”

Adoption of the PC framework would authorize global interventions (and ultimately local interventions, including surveillance) on a massive scale based on guesswork by bureaucrats regarding the evolution of the biosphere.

Ostrom Upside Down

Not only would the PC framework represent an expansion of the grounds for intervention by public authorities, it seeks to establish international authority for intervention into public and private affairs within sovereign states. The authors attempt to rationalize such far-reaching intrusions in a rather curious way:

“Drawing on the legacy of Elinor Ostrom’s foundational research, which validated the need for and effectiveness of polycentric approaches to commons governance (e.g., ref. 35, p. 528, ref. 36, p. 1910), we propose that a nested Earth system governance approach be followed, which will entail the creation of additional governance arrangements for those planetary commons that are not yet adequately governed.”

Anyone having a passing familiarity with Elinor Ostrom’s work knows that she focused on the identification of collaborative solutions to common goods problems. She studied voluntary and often strictly private efforts among groups or communities to conserve common pool resources, as opposed to state-imposed solutions. Ostrom accepted assigned rights and pricing solutions to managing common resources, but she counseled against sole reliance on market-based tools.

Surely the PC authors know they aren’t exactly channeling Ostrom:

“An earth system governance approach will require an overarching global institution that is responsible for the entire Earth system, built around high-level principles and broad oversight and reporting provisions. This institution would serve as a universal point of aggregation for the governance of individual planetary commons, where oversight and monitoring of all commons come together, including annual reporting on the state of the planetary commons.”

Polycentricity was used by Ostrom to describe the involvement of different, overlapping “centers of authority”, such as individual consumers and producers, cooperatives formed among consumers and producers, other community organizations, local jurisdictions, and even state or federal regulators. Some of these centers of authority supersede others in various ways. For example, solutions developed by cooperatives or lower centers of authority must align with the legal framework within various government jurisdictions. However, as David Henderson has noted, Ostrom observed that management of pooled resources at lower levels of authority was generally superior to centralized control. Henderson quotes Ostrom and a co-author on this point:

“When users are genuinely engaged in decisions regarding rules affecting their use, the likelihood of them following the rules and monitoring others is much greater than when an authority simply imposes rules.”

The authors of the PC have something else in mind, and they bastardize the spirit of Ostrom’s legacy in the process. For example, the next sentence is critical for understanding the authors’ intent:

“If excessive emissions and harmful activities in some countries affect planetary commons in other areas—for example, the melting of polar ice—strong political and legal restrictions for such localized activities would be needed.”

Of course, there are obvious difficulties in measuring impacts of various actions on polar ice, assigning responsibility, and determining the appropriate “restrictions”. But in essence, the PC paper advocates for a top-down model of governance. Polycentrism is thus reduced to “you do as we say”, which is not in the spirit of Ostrom’s research.

Planetary Governance

Transcending national sovereignty on questions of the biosphere is key to the authors’ ambitions. At a bare minimum, the authors desire legally-binding commitments to international agreements on environmental governance, unlike the unenforceable promises made for the Paris Climate Accords:

“At present, the United Nations General Assembly, or a more specialized body mandated by the Assembly, could be the starting point for such an overarching body, even though the General Assembly, with its state-based approach that grants equal voting rights to both large countries and micronations, represents outdated traditions of an old European political order.”

But the votes of various “micronations” count for zilch when it comes to real “claims” on the resources of other sovereign nations! Otherwise, there is nothing “voluntary” about the regime proposed in the PC paper.

“A challenge for such regimes is to duly adapt and adjust notions of state sovereignty and self-determination, and to define obligations and reciprocal support and compensation schemes to ensure protection of the Earth system, while including comprehensive stewardship obligations and mandates aimed at protecting Earth-regulating systems in a just and inclusive way.”

So there! The way forward is to adopt the broadest possible definition of market failure and global regulation of any and all private activity touching on nature in any way. And note here a similarity to the Paris Accords: achieving commitments would fall to national governments whose elites often demonstrate a preference for top-down solutions.

Ah Yes, Redistribution

It should be apparent by now that the PC paper follows a now well-established tradition in multi-national climate “negotiations” to serve as subterfuge for redistribution (which, incidentally, includes the achievement of interspecies justice):

“For instance, a more equal sharing of the burdens of climate stabilization would require significant multilateral financial and technology transfers in order not to harm the poorest globally (116).”

The authors insist that participation in this governance would be “voluntary”, but the following sentence seems inconsistent with that assurance:

“… considering that any move to strengthen planetary commons governance would likely be voluntarily entered into, the burdens of conservation must be shared fairly (115).”

Wait, what? “Voluntary” at what level? Who defines “fairness”? The authors approvingly offer this paraphrase of the words of Brazilian President Lula da Silva,

“… who affirmed the Amazon rainforest as a collective responsibility which Brazil is committed to protect on behalf of all citizens around the world, and that deserves and justifies compensation from other nations (117).”

Let Them Eat Cake

Furthermore, PC would require de-growth and so-called “sufficiency” for thee (i.e., be happy with less), if not for those who’ll design and administer the regime.

“… new principles that align with novel Anthropocene dynamics and that could reverse the path-dependent course of current governance. These new principles are captured under a new legal paradigm designed for the Anthropocene called earth system law and include, among others, the principles of differentiated degrowth and sufficiency, the principle of interconnectivity, and a new planetary ethic (e.g., principle of ecological sustainability) (134).”

If we’re to take the PC super-regulators at their word, the regulatory regime would impinge on fertility decisions as well. Just who might we trust to govern humanity thusly? If we’re wise enough to apply the Munger Test, we wouldn’t grant that kind of power to our worst enemy!

Global Warmism

The underlying premise of the PC proposal is that a global crisis is now unfolding before our eyes: anthropomorphic global warming (AGW). The authors maintain that emissions of carbon dioxide are the cause of rising temperatures, rapidly rising sea levels, more violent weather, and other imminent disasters.

“It is now well established that human actions have pushed the Earth outside of the window of favorable environmental conditions experienced during the Holocene…”

“Earth system science now shows that there are biophysical limits to what existing organized human political, economic, and other social systems can appropriate from the planet.”

For a variety of reasons, both of these claims are more dubious than one might suppose based on popular narratives. As for the second of these, mankind’s limitless capacity for innovation is a more powerful force for sustainability than the authors would seem to allow. On the first claim, it’s important to note that the PC paper’s forebodings are primarily based on modeled, prospective outcomes, not historical data. The models are drastically oversimplified representations of the earth’s climate dynamics driven by exogenous carbon forcing assumptions. Their outputs have proven to be highly unreliable, overestimating warming trends almost without exception. These models exaggerate climate sensitivity to carbon forcings, and they largely ignore powerful natural forcings such as variations in solar irradiance, geological heating, and even geological carbon forcings. The models are also notorious for their inadequate treatment of feedback effects from cloud cover. Their predictions of key variables like water vapor are wildly in error.

The measurement of the so-called “global temperature” is itself subject to tremendous uncertainty. Weather stations come and go. They are distributed very unevenly across land masses, and measurement at sea is even sketchier. Averaging all these temperatures would be problematic even if there were no other issues… but there are. Individual stations are often sited poorly, including distortions from heat island effects. Aging of equipment creates a systematic upward bias, but correcting for that bias (via so-called homogenization) causes a “cooling the past” bias. It’s also instructive to note that the increase in global temperature from pre-industrial times actually began about 80 years prior to the onset of more intense carbon emissions in the 20th century.

Climate alarmists often speak in terms of temperature anomalies, rather than temperature levels. In other words, to what extent do temperatures differ from long-term averages? The magnitude of these anomalies, using the past several decades as a base, tend to be anywhere from zero degrees to well above one degree Celsius, depending on the year. Relative to temperature levels, the anomalies are a small fraction. Given the uncertainty in temperature levels, the anomalies themselves are dwarfed by the noise in the original series!

Pick Your Own Tipping Point

It seems that “tipping point” scares are heavily in vogue at the moment, and the PC proposal asks us to quaff deeply of these narratives. Everything is said to be at a tipping point into irrecoverable disaster that can be forestalled only by reforms to mankind’s unsustainable ways. To speak of the possibility of other causal forces would be a sacrilege. There are supposed tipping points for the global climate itself as well as tipping points for the polar ice sheets, the world’s forests, sea levels and coastal environments, severe weather, and wildlife populations. But none of this is based on objective science.

For example, the 1.5 degree limit on global warming is a wholly arbitrary figure invented by the IPCC for the Paris Climate Accords, yet the authors of the PC proposal would have us believe that it was some sort of scientific determination. And it does not represent a tipping point. Cliff Mass explains that climate models do not behave as if irreversible tipping points exist.

Consider also that there has been absolutely no increase in the frequency or intensity of severe weather.

Likewise, the rise of sea levels has not accelerated from prior trends, so it has nothing to do with carbon forcing.

One thing carbon forcings have accomplished is a significant greening of the planet, which if anything bodes well for the biosphere

What about the disappearance of the polar ice sheets? On this point, Cliff Mass quotes Chapter 3 of the IPCC’s Special Report on the implications of 1.5C or more warming:

“there is little evidence for a tipping point in the transition from perennial to seasonal ice cover. No evidence has been found for irreversibility or tipping points, suggesting that year-round sea ice will return given a suitable climate.”

The PC paper also attempts to connect global warming to increases in forest fires, but that’s incorrect: there has been no increasing trend in forest fires or annual burned acreage. If anything, trends in measures of forest fire activity have been negative over the past 80 years.

Concluding Thoughts

The alarmist propaganda contained in the PC proposal is intended to convince opinion leaders and the public that they’d better get on board with draconian and coercive steps to curtail economic activity. They appeal to the sense of virtue that must always accompany consent to authoritarian action, and that means vouching for sacrifice in the interests of environmental and climate equity. All the while, the authors hide behind a misleading version of Elinor Ostrom’s insights into the voluntary and cooperative husbandry of common pool resources.

One day we’ll be able to produce enough carbon-free energy to accommodate high standards of living worldwide and growth beyond that point. In fact, we already possess the technological know-how to substantially reduce our reliance on fossil fuels, but we lack the political will to avail ourselves of nuclear energy. With any luck, that will soften with installations of modular nuclear units.

Ultimately, we’ll see advances in fusion technology, beamed non-intermittent solar power from orbital collection platforms, advances in geothermal power, and effective carbon capture. Developing these technologies and implementing them at global scales will require massive investments that can be made possible only through economic growth, even if that means additional carbon emissions in the interim. We must unleash the private sector to conduct research and development without the meddling and clumsy efforts at top-down planning that typify governmental efforts (including an end to mandates, subsidies, and taxes). We must also reject ill-advised attempts at geoengineered cooling that are seemingly flying under the regulatory radar. Meanwhile, let’s save ourselves a lot of trouble by dismissing the interventionists in the planetary commons crowd.

That Word “Liberal” … I Don’t Think That Means What You Think It Means

03 Wednesday Jan 2024

Posted by in Conservatism, Liberalism, Socialism

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Leftism has taken on new dimensions amid its preoccupation with identity politics, victimhood, and “wokeness”. Traditional socialists are still among us, of course, but “wokeists” and “identitarians” have been on the progressive vanguard of late, rooting for the deranged human butchers of Hamas and the dismantling of liberal institutions. This didn’t happen overnight, of course, and traditional socialists are mostly fine with it.

An older story is the rebranding of leftism that took place in the U.S. during the first half of the 20th century, when the word “liberal” was co-opted by leftists. Before that, a liberal orientation was understood to be antithetical to the collectivist mindset long associated with the Left. Note also that liberalism retains its original meaning even today in much of Europe. Often we hear the term “classical liberal” to denote the “original” meaning of liberalism, but the modifier should be wholly unnecessary.

Liberalism Is Not “In-Betweenism”

In this vein, Nate Silver presents a basic taxonomy of political orientation in a recent Substack post. It includes the diagram above, which distinguishes between socialism, conservatism, and liberalism. Silver draws on a classic essay written by Friedrich Hayek in 1945, “Why I am Not a Conservative”, in which Hayek discussed the meaning of the word “liberal” (and see here). Liberalism’s true emphasis is a tolerance for individual rights and freedoms, subject to varying articulations of the “nonaggression principle”. That is, “do as you like, but do no harm to others”.

We often see a linear representation distinguishing between so-called progressives on the left and conservatives on the right. Of course, a major hallmark of leftist thinking is extreme interventionism. Leftists or progressives are always keen to detect the slightest whiff of an externality or the slightest departure from the perfectly competitive market ideal. They seem eager to find a role for government in virtually every area of life. While it’s not a limiting case, we can substitute socialism or statism for progressivism on the far left, as Silver does, whereby the state takes primacy in economic and social affairs.

Conservatism, on the other hand, is a deep resistance to change, whether institutional, social, and sometimes economic. Conservatives too often demonstrate a willingness to use the coercive power of the state to prevent change. Hayek noted the willingness of both socialists and conservatives to invoke state power for their own ends.

Similarly, religious conservatives often demand state support beyond that afforded by the freedom to worship in the faith of one’s choice. They might strongly reject certain freedoms held to be fundamental by liberals. Meanwhile, socialists often view mere religious freedom as a threat to the power of the state, or at least they act like it (e.g. see here for an example).

Like conservatives, dedicated statists would doubtless resist change if it meant a loss of their own power. That is, they’d wish to preserve socialist institutions. On this point, witness the vitriol from the Left over what it perceives as threats to the public school monopoly. Witness also the fierce resistance among public employees to reducing the scale of the administrative state, and how advocates of entitlements fiercely resist decreases in the growth rate of those expenditures.

Silver, like Hayek, objects to the traditional, linear framework in which liberals are thought to occupy a range along a line between socialism and conservatism. He objects to that because real liberals value individual liberty as a natural human right, a viewpoint typically abhored by both socialists and conservatives. There is nothing “in between” about it! And of course, conservatives and progressives are equally guilty in their mistaken use of the word “liberal”.

Mapping Political Preferences

Liberty, statism, and conservatism are not exactly orthogonal political dimensions. Larger government almost always means less economic liberty. At a minimum, state dominance implies a social burden associated with public monopoly and monopsony power, as well as tax and welfare-state incentive problems. These features compromise or corrupt the exercise of basic rights. On the other hand, capitalism and its concomitant reliance on consumer sovereignty, individual initiative, free exchange and secure property rights is most in harmony with true liberalism.

For conservatives, resistance to change in support of a traditionally free market economy might offer something of a contradiction. In one sense, it corresponds to upholding market institutions. However, free markets allow new competitors and new technologies to undermine incumbents, who conservatives sometimes wish to defend through regulatory or protectionist measures. And conservatives are almost always too happy to join in the chorus of “price gouging” in response to the healthy operation of the free market in bringing forth supplies.

All that is to say that preferences involving liberty, statism, and traditionalism are not independent of one another. They cannot simply be mapped onto a three-dimensional space. At least the triangular representation gets liberalism out of the middle, but it’s difficult to visualize other ideological positions there. For example, “state religionism” could lie anywhere along the horizontal line at the top or even below it if certain basic liberties are preserved. Facism combines elements of socialism and a deformed version of capitalism that is properly called corporatism, but where would it fall within the triangle?

Big Government Liberalism?

Silver says he leans heavily toward a “big government” version of liberalism, but big government is hard to square with broad liberties. Granted, any well-functioning society must possess a certain level of “state capacity” to defend against private or public violations of individual rights, adjudicate disputes, and provide true public goods. It’s not clear whether Silver’s preferences lie within the bounds of those ambitions. Still, he deserves credit for his recognition that liberalism is wholly different from the progressive, socialist vision. It is the opposite.

The “New” Triangle

Silver attempts to gives the triangular framework a more contemporary spin by replacing conservatism with “MAGA Conservatism” and socialism with “Social Justice Leftism” (SJL), or “wokeism”. Here, I’m treating MAGA as a “brand”. Nothing below is intended to imply that America should not be a great nation.

The MAGA variant of conservatism emphasizes nationalism, though traditional conservatives have never been short on love of nation. For that matter, as a liberal American, it’s easier to forgive nationalist sentiments than it is the “Death to America” refrain we now hear from some SJLs.

The MAGA brand is also centered around a single individual, Donald Trump, whose rhetoric strikes many as nativistic. And Trump is a populist whose policy proposals are often nakedly political and counterproductive.

SJL shares with socialism an emphasis on various forms of redistribution and social engineering, but with a new focus on victimhood based on classes of identity. Of SJL, Silver says:

“Proponents of SJL usually dislike variations on the term ‘woke’, but the problem is that they dislike almost every other term as well. And we need some term for this ideology, because it encompasses quite a few distinctive features that differentiate it both from liberalism and from traditional, socialist-inflected leftism. In particular, SJL is much less concerned with the material condition of the working class, or with class in general. Instead, it is concerned with identity — especially identity categories involving race, gender and sexuality, but sometimes also many others as part of a sort of intersectional kaleidoscope.”

The gulf between liberals and SJLs couldn’t be wider on issues like free speech and “equity”, and equality of opportunity. MAGAns, on the other hand, have some views on individual rights and responsibility that are largely consistent with liberals, but reflexive populism often leads them to advocate policies protecting rents, corporate welfare, and protectionism.

Divided Liberalism

Liberalism emphasizes limited government, individual autonomy, and free exchange. However, there are issues upon which true liberals are of divided opinion. For example, one such area of controversy is the conflict between a woman’s right to choose and the fetal right to life. Many true liberals disagree over whether the rights of a fetus outweigh its mother’s right to choose, but most would concede that the balance shifts to the fetus at some point well short of birth (putting aside potential dangers to the mother’s life). Open borders is another area that can divide true liberals. On one side, the right to unrestricted mobility is thought to supersede any public interest in enforcing borders and limiting the flow of immigrants. On the other side, questions of national sovereignty, national security, as well as social and state capacity to absorb immigrants take primacy.

Don’t Call Lefties “Liberal”… They’re Not!

True liberalism (including most strains of libertarianism) recognizes various roles that a well-functioning state should play, but it also recognizes the primacy of the individual and individual rights as a social underpinning. As Hayek noted, true liberals are not resistant to change per se, unlike conservatives. But modern progressives demand changes of the worst kind: that the state should intervene to pursue their favored objectives, laying claim to an ever-greater share of private resources. This requires government coercion on a massive scale, the antithesis of liberalism. It’s time to recognize that “progressives” aren’t liberals in any sense of the word. For that matter, they don’t even stand for progress.

I’ll close with a quote from Adam Smith that I cribbed from Scott Sumner. Unfortunately, Sumner does not give the full reference, but I’ll take his word that Smith wrote this 20 years before the publication of The Wealth of Nations:

“Little else is requisite to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism, but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice; all the rest being brought about by the natural course of things. All governments which thwart this natural course, which force things into another channel, or which endeavour to arrest the progress of society at a particular point, are unnatural, and to support themselves are obliged to be oppressive and tyrannical.”

It’s a Big Government Mess

22 Tuesday Nov 2022

Posted by in Big Government, Uncategorized

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I’m really grateful to have the midterm elections behind us. Well, except for the runoff Senate race in Georgia, the cockeyed ranked-choice Senate race in Alaska, and a few stray House races that remain unsettled after almost two weeks. I’m tired of campaign ads, including the junk mail and pestering “unknown” callers — undoubtedly campaign reps or polling organizations.

It’s astonishing how much money is donated and spent by political campaigns. This year’s elections saw total campaign spending (all levels) hit $16.7 billion, a record for a mid-term. The recent growth in campaign spending for federal offices has been dramatic, as the chart below shows:

Do you think spending of a few hundred million dollars on a Senate campaign is crazy? Me too, though I don’t advocate for legal limits on campaign spending because, for better or worse, that issue is entangled with free speech rights. Campaigns are zero-sum events, but presumably a big donor thinks a success carries some asymmetric reward…. A success rate of better than 50% across several campaigns probably buys much more…. And donors can throw money at sure political bets that are probably worth a great deal…. Many donors spread their largess across both parties, perhaps as a form of “protection”. But it all seems so distasteful, and it’s surely a source of waste in the aggregate.

My reservations about profligate campaign spending include the fact that it is a symptom of big government. Donors obviously believe they are buying something that government, in one way or another, makes possible for them. The greater the scope of government activity, the more numerous are opportunities for rent seeking — private gains through manipulation of public actors. This is the playground of fascists!

There are people who believe that placing things in the hands of government is an obvious solution to the excesses of “greed”. However, politicians and government employees are every bit as self-interested and “greedy” as actors in the private sector. And they can do much more damage: government actors legally exercise coercive power, they are not subject in any way to external market discipline, and they often lack any form of accountability. They are not compelled to respect consumer sovereignty, and they make correspondingly little contribution to the nation’s productivity and welfare.

Actors in the private sector, on the other hand, face strong incentives to engage in optimizing behavior: they must please customers and strive to improve performance to stay ahead of their competition. That is, unless they are seduced by what power they might have to seek rents through public sector activism.

A people who grant a wide scope of government will always suffer consequences they should expect, but they often proceed in abject ignorance. So here is my rant, a brief rundown on some of the things naive statists should expect to get for their votes. Of course, this is a short list — it could be much longer:

  • Opportunities for graft as bureaucrats administer the spending of others’ money and manipulate economic activity via central planning.
  • A ballooning and increasingly complex tax code seemingly designed to benefit attorneys, the accounting profession, and certainly some taxpayers, but at the expense of most taxpayers.
  • Subsidies granted to producers and technologies that are often either unnecessary or uneconomic (and see here), leading to malinvestment of capital. This is often a consequence of the rent seeking and cronyism that goes hand-in-hand with government dominance and ham-handed central planning.
  • Redistribution of existing wealth, a zero- or even negative-sum activity from an economic perspective, is prioritized over growth.
  • Redistribution beyond a reasonable safety net for those unable to work and without resources is a prescription for unnecessary dependency, and it very often constitutes a surreptitious political buy-off.
  • Budgetary language under which “budget cuts” mean reductions in the growth of spending.
  • Large categories of spending, known in the U.S. as non-discretionary entitlements, that are essentially off limits to lawmakers within the normal budget appropriations process.
  • “Fiscal illusion” is exploited by politicians and statists to hide the cost of government expansion.
  • The strained refrain that too many private activities impose external costs is stretched to the point at which government authorities externalize internalities via coercive taxes, regulation, or legal actions.
  • Massive growth in regulation (see chart at top) extending to puddles classified as wetlands (EPA), the ”disparate impacts” of private hiring practices (EEOC), carbon footprints of your company and its suppliers (EPA, Fed, SEC), outrageous energy efficiency standards (DOE), and a multiplicity of other intrusions.
  • Growth in the costs of regulatory compliance.
  • A nearly complete lack of responsiveness to market prices, leading to misallocation of resources — waste.
  • Lack of value metrics for government activities to gauge the public’s “willingness to pay”.
  • Monopoly encouraged by regulatory capture and legal / compliance cost barriers to competition. Again, cronyism.
  • Monopoly granted by other mechanisms such as import restrictions and licensure requirements. Again, cronyism.
  • Ruination of key industries as government control takes it’s grip.
  • Shortages induced by price controls.
  • Inflation and diminished buying power stoked by monetized deficits, which is a long tradition in financing excessive government.
  • Malinvestment of private capital created by monetary excess and surplus liquidity.
  • That malinvestment of private capital creates macroeconomic instability. The poorly deployed capital must be written off and/or reallocated to productive uses at great cost.
  • Funding for bizarre activities folded into larger budget appropriations, like holograms of dead comedians, hamster fighting experiments, and an IHOP for a DC neighborhood.
  • A gigantic public sector workforce in whose interest is a large and growing government sector, and who believe that government shutdowns are the end of the world.
  • Attempts to achieve central control of information available to the public, and the quashing of dissent, even in a world with advanced private information technology. See the story of Hunter Biden’s laptop. This extends to control of scientific narratives to ensure support for certain government programs.
  • Central funding brings central pursestrings and control. This phenomenon is evident today in local governance, education, and science. This is another way in which big government fosters dependency.
  • Mission creep as increasing areas of economic activity are redefined as “public” in nature.
  • Law and tax enforcement, security, and investigative agencies pressed into service to defend established government interests and to compromise opposition.

I’ve barely scratched the surface! Many of the items above occur under big government precisely because various factions of the public demand responses to perceived problems or “injustices”, despite the broader harms interventions may bring. The press is partly responsible for this tendency, being largely ignorant and lacking the patience for private solutions and market processes. And obviously, those kinds of demands are a reason government gets big to begin with. In the past, I’ve referred to these knee-jerk demands as “do somethingism”, and politicians are usually too eager to play along. The squeaky wheel gets the oil.

I mentioned cronyism several times in the list. The very existence of broad public administration and spending invites the clamoring of obsequious cronies. They come forward to offer their services, do large and small “favors”, make policy suggestions, contribute to lawmakers, and to offer handsomely remunerative post-government employment opportunities. Of course, certaIn private parties also recognize the potential opportunities for market dominance when regulators come calling. We have here a perversion of the healthy economic incentives normally faced by private actors, and these are dynamics that gives rise to a fascist state.

It’s true, of course, that there are areas in which government action is justified, if not necessary. These include pure public goods such as national defense, as well as public safety, law enforcement, and a legal system for prosecuting crimes and adjudicating disputes. So a certain level of state capacity is a good thing. Nevertheless, as the list suggests, even these traditional roles for government are ripe for unhealthy mission creep and ultimately abuse by cronies.

The overriding issue motivating my voting patterns is the belief in limited government. Both major political parties in the U.S. violate this criterion, or at least carve out exceptions when it suits them. I usually identify the Democrat Party with statism, and there is no question that democrats rely far too heavily on government solutions and intervention in private markets. The GOP, on the other hand, often fails to recognize the statism inherent in it’s own public boondoggles, cronyism, and legislated morality. In the end, the best guide for voting would be a political candidate’s adherence to the constitutional principles of limited government and individual liberty, and whether they seem to understand those principles. Unfortunately, that is often too difficult to discern.

When Government Externalizes Internalities

02 Sunday Feb 2020

Posted by in Government Failure

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The headline describes a kind of government failure. In an ideal private transaction, costs and benefits are fully internalized by the buyer and seller. Both reap private gains, or surplus, from mutually beneficial transactions. On the other hand, there are cases in which external costs are inflicted on otherwise unrelated third parties, as when production emits pollutants. Or, there might be external benefits that inure to third parties, as when a homeowner pays to beautify their property and the whole neighborhood gains. These “externalities” are commonly citied as rationale for government interference in private markets. A good government, it is said, would seek to “internalize the externalities”, in one way or another, to prevent too much trade in a good imposing external costs, or too little trade where there are external benefits. Imposing taxes, granting subsidies, intervening with price controls, quotas, or various regulations are all ways in which corrective action might be attempted by public authorities.

The problem is that government often chooses badly, both misidentifying externalities, poorly estimating their magnitude, or in choosing how best to address them. When mistakes of this nature occur, the internal gains from trade are not just compromised or even destroyed. They are often externalized — revoked and redistributed to non-participants. The formerly private and internal gains may be extracted in the form of taxes, ultimately flowing to unconnected third parties. They are externalized internalizes, if I may coin a phrase. In other cases, in order to subsidize favored industries, individuals might be taxed on their income. Yet the favored industry is likely  unconnected or external to the taxed individual’s source of income. While the gains that might accrue in the favored industry are internalized there, their source is an externalized internality.

Putting the troubling issue of takings or confiscation aside, these mistaken interventions distort relative prices and production decisions, with false signals propagating into other markets — which again are external effects. This, in turn, distorts the allocation of resources across various uses. These cases are clear-cut examples of externalized internalities.

I will confine this discussion to economic matters. By “internalities“, I mean all things within the economic realm that are private and/or reserved to the individual by natural rights. That includes private property and the individual’s freedom to trade and contract with others.

Wrongly taxing presumed “bads” or wrongly subsidizing presumed “goods” are absolute cases of externalizing internalities. And taxing a “bad” excessively (at more than its true social cost) or subsidizing a “good” excessively (at more than its true social benefit) are cases of externalizing internalities. The political temptation to subsidize might be the greater danger, as it is all too easy for public officials and politicians to identify and sell “deserving” causes, especially if they intimate that others will pay.

For example, subsidized education, which primarily benefits private individuals, is billed to the taxpaying public. It over-allocates resources to education, including students with greater value as human resources in other pursuits. Subsidized energy pays the seller of a power source more than its value to buyers, courtesy of taxpayers, and over allocates resources to those energy sources relative to non-subsidized energy and other goods.

Even if an industry is taxed in exact accordance with its true social cost, there is still the question of how the proceeds of the tax are to be distributed. Ideally, unless the social costs are borne equally by all, the distribution should bear some proportionality to the damages borne by individuals, yet that is seldom considered outside of certain kinds of litigation. The true victims will almost certainly be shorted. Benefits will accrue to many who are free of any burden inflicted by the undesired activity. The corrective action thus fails to properly address the externality, and it bestows an incidental external benefit on wholly unconnected parties.

Likewise, subsidies paid to an industry in exact accordance with its true social benefits require taxes that may burden individuals who do not stand to benefit from the subsidized activity in any way. That is true unless the industry in question produces a pure public good. Indeed, if the taxed individuals had a choice in the matter, they would often use the funds for something they value more highly. Thus, suboptimal distribution of the tax proceeds for funding a less-than-pure “social good” involves the extraction of an internality.

Other forms of government action have similar externalization of internal costs or benefits. With the imposition of a wage floor, or minimum wage, the least-skilled workers are likely to lose their jobs. Consumers are likely to pay higher prices as well. The job losers become more dependent on public aid, which must be funded via taxes on others. The wage floor will also degrade working conditions for those lucky enough to keep their jobs. All of these effects of market intervention demonstrate the public piercing of internal gains from private, voluntary trade. Some of what is excised gets spilt, and some gets siphoned off to external parties. Thus internalities are externalized.

Regulation of private industry often results in regulatory capture, whereby regulators impose rules with compliance costs too high for small competitors and potential entrants to afford. This obviously strengthens the market power of larger incumbents, who may in turn increase prices or skimp on quality. Taxpayers pay the regulators, consumers pay the inflated prices, smaller firms shut down, and resources are under-allocated to the product or service in question. These distortions spill into other markets as well. All these effects are part of the despoilment of internal gains from trade. To the extent that trades are prevented at competitive prices, the external winners are those who capture trades at higher prices, along with the regulators themselves and anyone else standing to benefit from graft as part of the arrangement. And again, the wrongful gains to the winners can be described as externalized internalities.

There are many other examples of government failure that fit the description of externalized internalities. In fact, extracting internalities is the very essence of taxation, though we readily accept its use for expenditures on goods that are of a truly public nature, which by definition confer benefits that are non-exclusive. The classic case, of course, is national defense. The differences in the cases of government failure cited above, however, are that the internalities extracted via taxation or other forms of intervention are externalized for private gain by other parties, no matter how widely distributed and diffuse. This is an extremely pernicious kind of government failure, as it ultimately leads to a cannibalization of private activity via our role as public actors. Beware politicians bearing gifts, and beware them just as much when they demonize private trade.

Who Are the Zero-Sum Winners?

09 Monday Sep 2019

Posted by in Big Government, rent seeking

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Productive effort seldom goes unrewarded, but all too often rewards are directed to nonproductive activities and secured in ways that are outright takings of resources and rights from others. These are zero-sum propositions at best, as the rewards come only at equivalent or greater costs to others. Gains from zero-sum activities are often purely consumptive in nature and tend to foster more destructive behavior. A clear-cut example is outright thievery, but there are many cases in which, by matters of degree, the perpetrators are not even dimly aware that their gains bring harm to others.

Sadly, our society has undergone a transition to a state in which everyone collects ongoing streams of zero-sum rewards, which are, by definition, at someone else’s (and often our own) expense. The turbulence caused by this unnecessary and avoidable mix of costs and rewards is all too real for consumers and businesses, but again, they don’t always fully grasp its dysfunctional nature.

The Way To Positive Sums

Of course, there are winners and losers in almost any area of economic life. Even when two individuals engage in mutually beneficial exchange, an otherwise win-win situation, other traders might regret missing out on the deal. Pleasing buyers more effectively than one’s competitors might force those rivals to turn to other pursuits. That’s all for the best from a social point of view, unless they can come up with an even better idea to win back customers. In this way, things can keep getting better and better for everyone, even for the one-time losers who are free to compete in trades to which they are better suited. Winners, then, are defined by their success in creating value for others. These are the productive winners. But again, material success doesn’t always come so honorably.

Bobbing For Booty?

Purely “consumptive” or zero-sum winners might be simple crooks who are able to avoid apprehension, or perhaps they are dishonest business-people who sell goods with hidden defects or inferior workmanship. There are many degrees here: a talented salesperson with shoddy merchandise might compromise on price. A clever product manager might reduce the size of a package slightly without reducing price.

A simple gamble is zero-sum in a purely monetary sense, but both gamblers do it for enjoyment, so there are psychic gains involved. A successful gambler might be a zero-sum winner in a monetary sense, but luck usually runs out on honest players. A cheater qualifies as a zero-sum winner. Conversely, it’s not correct to say that casinos are strictly zero-sum winners, though the odds are always stacked in favor of the house and everyone knows it. Casino patrons enjoy the experience, including other amusements available in casinos, so they are often happy customers despite their losses. They are engaging in mutually beneficial exchange.

Private Affairs Made Public

A short-hand description encompassing much of our zero-sum havoc is “the public trough”. Many zero-sum rewards have arisen out of legislative battles, court cases, and regulatory actions restricting private decision-making and encroaching on private property rights. The unremitting tendency is for expansion of these kinds of actions. Where there are zero-sum winners at the public trough, or an opportunity to expand the trough itself, there are always more covetous seekers of zero-sum winnings, otherwise known as rent seekers. They are reliable promoters of “do-something-ism” relative to the outrage du jour through more legislation, lawsuits, and regulatory filings. The tragic thing about rent seeking is that the process itself consumes resources and undermines private incentives, thereby transforming zero-sum outcomes into wasteful, negative-sum outcomes.

Winners At the Trough

There are many kinds of zero-sum winners at the public trough. The winning and losing often occur separately and asynchronously, connected only by an enabling authority who sets rules and funds winners from proceeds taken from losers. For this reason, it is easy for citizens to lose track of the “zero-sumness” of the many benefits they receive. After all, the government can deliver things for “free”, right? And the connection between one’s obligations, losses, and the gains reaped by others is not always obvious.

All of the following involve some degree of zero-sum activity, and all attract rent seekers:

  • Public aid in exchange for no contribution to output, funded by zero-sum losing taxpayers.
  • Subsidies for politically-favored technologies that are otherwise uneconomic, funded by zero-sum losing taxpayers.
  • Farm subsidies when too much is produced and the output is not highly valued, leading to an overallocation of resources to agricultural activity and rents for farmers funded by zero-sum losing taxpayers.
  • Complex regulatory and tax rules generate income for compliance advisors such as attorneys, accountants, and consultants. Those are rents, pure and simple, paid for by parties who must comply under penalty of law.
  • Regulatory advantage conferred upon firms sufficiently large or dominant to afford compliance. That penalizes smaller competitors and undermines their market position. The additional profit large firms may earn as a consequence is a rent, funded by zero-sum losing consumers and weaker competitors.
  • The award of government contracts is often as much political as it is economic. Such a process is not subject to the market discipline imposed on private contracts, so there is ample opportunity for rents via cost-padding and graft, again funded by zero-sum losing taxpayers.
  • More generally, government purchases of any kind are subject to weak market discipline, like any buyer spending someone else’s money. Thus, government has a tendency to pay prices not supported by economic value, offering rents to suppliers, funded by zero-sum losing taxpayers.
  • The tax deduction afforded to employer-provided health care is a targeted subsidy that leads employees to over-insure. More fundamentally, these employees and their employers are zero-sum winners. It also creates profits for health insurers and drives up health care costs. The zero-sum spoils are to the detriment of other taxpayers and participants in the individual insurance market.
  • Drug prohibition drives up black market profits, creating zero-sum winnings at the expense and safety of users.
  • Social Security creates zero-sum winnings for those who will not or cannot save. But this is a mixed bag to the extent that some people are unable to save privately: their ability to do so is largely usurped via payroll taxes, both on them and on their employer. The many zero-sum losers would otherwise have no difficulty earning better returns on private investments.

There are many other examples. And almost everyone ends up on one side or the other of many different zero-sum outcomes. Show me a government action and I’ll show you zero-sum winners and losers. This is not to say there are no welfare gains associated with government action. Public aid, for example, is intended as social insurance and surely has some value in mitigating the risks of personal economic calamity. Nonetheless, the overextension and poor incentives of aid programs create a significant zero-sum component. Likewise, government spending on public goods creates social benefits, but government is insufficiently incented to economize, creating a zero-sum win for contractors and losses for taxpayers.

Not Zero Sum

While zero-sum winners collect economic rents, the existence of economic rents does not imply a zero-sum winning. For example, members of the so-called rentier class collect passive investment income. Those investments represent a supply of current resources to other parties hoping to transform them into a greater supply of future resources. That’s productive, and so the gains enjoyed by rentiers are not zero-sum winnings, but payments for the use of transformational capital.

Economic profits are those exceeding the owner’s opportunity cost, and they too are called rents. They should not necessarily be classified as zero-sum gains, however. Only sometimes. Successful innovators and first movers often earn economic profits as a reward for their efforts, as do alert entrepreneurs deploying their resources where they are most demanded. This “positive-sumness” applies to monopolists with a hot product just as surely as it applies to a firm facing nascent competition. But economic profits gained through political connections, outright graft, and government-enabled monopoly are zero-sum, enabled by non-market, authoritarian forces. Members of the political class tend to share in these zero-sum gains, and there are many losers.

Zero-Sum Psyche

Unfortunately, zero-sum thinking is deeply ingrained in the human psyche, despite our transition to a higher plane of social cooperation via markets. Even in those markets, certain outcomes might seem zero-sum in the moment. Witness the widespread denigration of the profit motive, which produces efficient outcomes in the long-run. As noted above, over time, the biggest winners tend to be those capable of creating the most value.

If you ask school children today how to get rich, many will say “win the lottery” without hesitation. I know, I know, government-sponsored lotteries are a relatively new phenomenon, and some of the lottery proceeds may benefit schools or other public programs, but the idea that a game of chance is so indelibly ingrained in the minds of children is a manifestation of the psychology of zero-sum success.

The Tangled Mess

So we have the zero-sum winners: successful gamblers, thieves, and rent seekers. The latter root deeply for gains made possible by government intervention in private affairs, actions that always leave room for enduring rents. They always lobby fiercely for new public interventions that might confer private advantages. And then we have the hapless public, stumbling through a series of zero-sum gains and losses made possible by the Leviathan they know and obey. They should look in the mirror, because every law and every program they have allowed their political leaders to hatch, reliably sold as good and just, creates more zero-sum activity to the detriment of long-term economic welfare. Roll it back!

New Socialists Fail Socialism 101

02 Sunday Sep 2018

Posted by in Big Government, Socialism

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Not many self-styled socialists can actually provide a proper definition of socialism these days. That includes the celebrated Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, the New York congressional candidate who has proven herself to be an incredible stumble-bum in numerous media appearances since her primary victory over incumbent democrat Joe Crowley. Maine Wire‘s Matthew Gagnon calls her “belligerently ignorant” as she tweets what she believes to be examples of democratic socialism. Gagnon dissects some of her flakey assertions. The sad truth is that Ocasio-Cortez is fairly typical of her generation, despite her dual college majors in economics and political science.

Gagnon notes that socialism is public ownership of the means of production. But socialism is somehow regarded as a “soft” version of communism: less authoritarian, perhaps. That premise deserves closer examination. There is only one way that the public sector can take possession of private property: by force. A new, authoritarian regime might simply commandeer property, nationalize it, and revoke prior ownership claims at the point of a gun or a club. The government would ultimately impose new rules under which management of formerly private enterprises must operate, and it would engage in centralized decision-making and planning to a large extent. This is essentially communism. Some personal freedoms might be preserved, but they are likely to be severely curtailed; dissidence is not likely to be tolerated.

There is another mechanism by which society can declare public ownership of productive resources that is nominally less authoritarian: democracy. Citizens or their elected representatives simply vote for the state to acquire particular resources and enterprises, in whole or in part. Enabling legislation might authorize administrative agencies to determine how the former private owners of these enterprises are to be compensated. To one extent or another, this involves takings of private property and rights, and it boils down to a very real tyranny of the majority: we will vote to take possession of your business; we will vote to create a bureau that will determine its worth and your compensation; we will vote that henceforth you may not operate this business on your own behalf, but only in the service of the people; and we will vote on what rights you possess. This is the ugly tyranny of democratic socialism, and it still requires force.

Self-proclaimed socialists are fond of proclaiming that we already have socialism in many sectors of the economy. They cite public parks, roads, bridges, K-12 education, and other goods and services sometimes provided by the public sector. There is a key distinction, however, that separates many of these examples from actual socialism: whether a good is actually a “public good”, meaning that its benefits are non-exclusive, as opposed to a private good that yields exclusive benefits. A more precise definition of socialism, in my view, is public ownership of the means of producing private goods.

The typical example of a public good is national defense: the benefits I receive do not reduce the benefits you receive, so those benefits are non-exclusive. I have little personal incentive to pay for national defense if anyone else is willing to pay for it, as I’ll receive the benefits anyway. But who will pay if everyone tries to free-ride on others? That’s why the provision of public goods is an appropriate function of government, and it is not generally what is meant by socialism. Gagnon is correct that government involvement in an activity is not the same as socialism, and he correctly ridicules some examples of governmental activities (and non-governmental activities like cooperatives) that Ocasio-Cortez believes to be socialism.

In contrast to public goods, private goods are exclusive in their benefits. The development of a private market can be counted upon to fulfill demands for such goods because private individuals are willing to pay. However, when government grants itself an advantaged position as a provider in such a market, such as a monopoly franchise, we can safely describe it as socialism. Many goods are not purely private, having some degree of non-exclusivity in their benefits. This is commonly asserted to be the case for K-12 education, but the matter is not as clear-cut as the public education establishment would have you believe. The bulk of the benefits to education accrue privately. Therefore, it is fair to describe public K-12 education in the U.S. as socialism. And it is largely a disaster.

Is a social safety net rightly described as socialism? Gagnon thinks not and, strictly speaking, the welfare state does not require public ownership of the means of production, only a means of redistribution. It requires funding, so private resources will be extracted via taxes, and the same is true of public goods. Taxes do not make it “socialism”. Let’s stipulate for the moment that there is a true safety net supporting only those unable to support themselves, either on a temporary or a permanent basis. This may yield non-exclusive benefits to the extent that such a “lifeline” reduces crime, begging, and our personal discomfort with the possibility that other individuals might starve. However, on an ex ante basis, some of these benefits represent a form of risk reduction that, in principle, could be arranged privately. To the extent that we vote to provide these potentially private benefits, those parts of the safety net can be construed as democratic socialism. In practice, our “safety net” covers a large number of able-bodied individuals. Unfortunately, it does a poor job of encouraging self-sufficiency. Like most public benefit programs, it is expansive, poorly designed, and has pernicious effects on the private economy that act to the long-term detriment of its intended beneficiaries.

Leftists fancy that socialism is “compassionate” and righteous, despite its predictably harsh outcomes. The misleading conceit that universal alms-giving by the state is always empowering to individual recipients, and potential voters, is an extremely corrosive element of democratic socialism. William Voegeli, Senior Editor of The Claremont Review of Books, writing in Imprimis makes “The Case Against Liberal Compassion“. (I dislike his misuse of the word “liberal” — too many conservatives are willing to cede that label to the Left.) Voegeli notes the “never enough” mentality of welfare statists, who refuse to acknowledge that the expansive growth of the welfare state over the past five decades has failed to reduce rates of poverty. The programs are rife with fraud, waste and bad incentives. If leftists are truly compassionate, Voegeli insists, they ought to take more interest in fixing problems that leave less for the truly needy and create dependencies rather than simply increasing the flow of funding.

Many well-meaning individuals are careless about affiliating with socialist causes because they do not understand what it actually means, and they often lack any historical and theoretical perspective on the implications of socialism. The flirtation is dangerous, and we can only attempt to educate and reason with them. Some will grow into greater wisdom. Some, like Bernie Sanders, will never come around. While we educate, let’s keep their hands away from the reins of power.

Open Borders and Club Goods

13 Saturday Jan 2018

Posted by in Immigration, Liberty

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The question of open borders divides libertarians as much as any. The arguments for open borders made by the likes of Bryan Caplan, Alex Tabarrok, Don Boudreaux and Sheldon Richman are in many ways quite appealing. Fewer borders means greater opportunities for gainful trade among individuals. For the U.S., the economic gains from in-migration have been unquestionable. From a pure libertarian perspective, governments should never interfere with the non-violent actions of free individuals, including freedom of movement. These great economists contend, in effect, that there is no real moral distinction between government actions that confine individuals within borders and those that keep people out, though our conciences are less burdened by the latter because the world abroad seems so large.

There is a gnawing contradiction in this viewpoint, however. It relates to the appropriate scope of “ownership”. At the link above, Caplan says:

“The only principled libertarian objection to this is that the citizens of each country are its rightful owners, so they’re entitled to regulate migration as they see fit. … But if you believe this, there is no principled libertarian objection to any act of government. Fortunately, the belief that citizens are countries’ rightful owners is crazy. The social contract is an utter myth. Contracts require unanimous consent, and no country has ever had unanimous consent.“

The Character of a Good

I contest Caplan’s assertion that any one act of government is like all others. Yes, there is always a danger of a majoritarian tyranny in any democracy. But there is also the question of sovereignty, for which borders of some kind are necessary. If policies governing those borders are established legislatively, they should be subject to checks and balances: executive consent as well as judicial review of disputes.

I also contest Caplan’s statement that ownership implies unanimous consent. In fact, there are many forms of property over which decisions do not imply unanimous consent of joint owners. One such form is the subject of what follows, and I believe that form of “ownership” is applicable to one’s citizenship or residency status.

To keep things simple, I’ll frame this discussion only in terms of citizenship. I therefore abstract from issues like green cards, visiting worker programs, and the presence of resident aliens in general. For a nation, the essence of barriers to immigration can be addressed by considering the simpler case of citizens versus non-resident non-citizens. For purposes of this discussion, if you are allowed to arrive on a nation’s shores, you will be a citizen.

If a country’s citizenship can be considered a good worth acquiring, what is its real character? It is privately possessed and not tradable, but not all goods are tradable. An important taxonomy of goods in the public finance literature is based on two dimensions: exclusivity and rivalrousness. The former is the degree to which other parties can be excluded from enjoyment or use of the good or resource.

Most goods have at least some degree of exclusivity: you can be denied admission to a concert, the use of an appliance or furniture, and even parks and port facilities. Pure public goods like national defense and the air we breath are completely non-exclusive, however. Broadcast television is non-exclusive as well, as long as you have the equipment to watch it.

Rivalrousness is the degree to which the use or enjoyment of a good precludes another’s use or enjoyment. My friend can’t eat the steak if I eat the steak. That’s rivalrous. But my friend and I can both enjoy the concert. That’s non-rivalrous. A private good is both exclusionary and rivalrous. A public good is neither.

Citizenship as a Good

Citizenship can be viewed as a bundle of attributes much as any good, but it is an extremely complex bundle: it includes the individual rights enshrined in a nation’s constitution (if any), the personal and economic opportunities available by virtue of access to in-country markets and resources, the culture(s), and any personal risk reduction provided collectively, i.e., a safety net via public support. How, then, would one classify citizenship, or its component attributes, in terms of exclusivity and rivalrousness?

First, the entire citizenship bundle has a high degree of exclusivity. A nation can decide on closed borders, or partially open borders, if it chooses to do so, just as a theme park limits its gate. That is the political decision at hand. The degree of exclusivity of individual components of the bundle matters little if the bundle itself is highly exclusive.

At a high level, citizenship itself is non-rivalrous. My citizenship does not preclude citizenship for anyone else. Therefore, at the level of the bundle, citizenship is exclusive but non-rivalrous, so it has the character of what economists call a “club good“. Citizens are already part of the club; to that extent they are joint “owners”. Like many clubs, decisions about new membership need not be unanimous.

Classification of citizenship attributes as goods is trickier. The exclusivity of citizenship makes the non-rivalrous public goods available to citizens into club goods. Once admitted, for example, you are free to engage in speech, practice a religion of your choice, own a weapon, and receive due process and habeas corpus without interfering with any other citizen’s ability to exercise the same rights. You get national defense and a judicial system. You have equality of opportunity to the extent that your pursuit of economic gain does not interfere directly with anyone else’s opportunities. On the other hand, the freedom of assembly is rivalrous to at least some extent, as we learned last year from events in Charlottesville, VA. In fact, there may be congestion limits to some of the other freedoms mentioned above. 

Access to a nation’s markets permits mutually beneficial trade to take place. An individual’s participation usually does not rule out participation by others, so it is essentially non-rivalrous. (In some markets the entry of new sellers may be limited and exclusionary.) Of course, a nation’s resources are scarce; exploiting them for gain or enjoyment necessarily prevents others from using the same resources. From the point of view of existing citizens, these resources are non-exclusive and rivalrous, and are therefore classified as “common resources”, subject to congestion effects, but they are still exclusive to those citizens. The key here is not whether there are gains from trade, but that there is some rivalrousness embedded in this citizenship attribute.

In addition to the basic rights mentioned earlier, the entire legal structure, regulatory apparatus, and the political process are complex attributes of citizenship. These bear on the limits of legal conduct: Can you buy or sell liquor on Sundays? Do businesses require licensure? Is abortion legal? And on and on. In a democracy, the ability to participate in the political process is non-rivalrous: it does not prevent others from participating. However, the range of possible outcomes of the process can also be viewed as an attribute, and these outcomes, as they are promulgated, are certainly rivalrous. If the “other” side gets extra votes, then the power of my vote is diminished. So the limits of legal conduct are exposed to political rivalry. In the case of open borders, a large number of citizens may not favor existing rules, regulations, and the allocation of public spending.

So the attributes of citizenship are mixed in terms of rivalrousness: Some are rivalrous but many are not. The citizenship bundle, at a more detailed level, is therefore a mix of club goods (exclusive but non-rvalrous) and some goods that are rivalrous. This is important, because under the classical description club goods are public goods provided privately; they are therefore under-provided from the perspective of social welfare and the Pareto criterion that a new citizens can be made better off without making any existing citizen worse off. That might not be the case in the presence of congestion effects.

Should a Club Good Be Unrestricted?

Citizenship has value at the margin to both existing citizens, who should be regarded as established club members, and non-citizens. The foregoing establishes that there are some private (exclusive and rivalrous) attributes attached to citizenship. Sometimes this is due to the impact of congestion on the provision of public goods. Patrick McNutt, in his survey of literature on “Public Goods and Club Goods“, summarizes some basic conditions under which public goods are provided by clubs:

“The public good is not a pure public good, but rather there is an element of congestion as individuals consume the good up to its capacity constraint. What arises then is some exclusion mechanism in order to charge consumers a price for the provision and use of the good. Brown and Jackson (1990, p. 80) had commented that the purpose of a club ‘is to exploit economies of scale, to share the costs of providing an indivisible commodity, to satisfy a taste for association with other individuals who have similar preference orderings’. For Buchanan and Ng the main club characteristic is membership or numbers of consumers and it is this variable that has to be optimised.“

Citizenship (or residency) is generally not price rationed, though there are certainly costs to the immigrant. I make no pretense here as to the determination of an optimal membership from a club or larger social perspective. My point is that rationing membership is a rational choice by club members, or citizens in this case.

Okay, I Like My Club

Tribal affiliations, and ultimately nation states, were a natural outgrowth of early competition for resources, especially when identifying threats from outsiders was a constant preoccupation. Territorialism was a byproduct, and with the establishment of agriculture, the peoples of these early societies probably identified strongly with their homelands.

Modern nation-states have evolved from those early patterns, and nations continue to differ in terms of language, culture, and governance. Successful nations are undoubtedly more liberal (in the classical sense) and open to trade and cross-border movement. Maybe one day all nations will be united under the principles of libertarianism… don’t count on it! For now, to one degree or another, a nation’s inhabitants have an interest in minimizing economic and political risks and retaining access to resources within their borders. I don’t believe that desire is irrational or immoral. If the inhabitants of a nation have a moral obligation to share their rights, wealth, and political process with all comers, then they must accept the possibility that their rights will be compromised, and possibly even complete upheaval. They suffer a loss of sovereignty and a loss in the expected value of their citizenship.

There is obviously no limiting principle to the open borders policy, as Tyler Cowen says. Existing citizens would be obligated to accommodate all those who land upon their shores, granting them the full rights and opportunities accorded to all other residents. Perhaps there would be economic gains in the short or long run, as most libertarians would predict. But perhaps there would be some losses along the way. Perhaps there would be political stability after a large influx of new residents, but perhaps not. And ultimately, perhaps changes in the political climate would feed back to the detriment of economic performance. One simply cannot say, a priori, how things would go. There are risks to the existing citizenry, and if they are obliged to accept those risks, those might well include having to feed, clothe and house new residents. There should be no absolute obligation to accept those risks. If the debate is about individual liberty, then surely imposing those risks via open borders would  abrogate the rights of existing citizens.

Addendum: A Note on the Goods Taxonomy

Given the two dimensions of goods discussed above, exclusivity and rivalrousness, goods are classified as follows:

  • Private goods: exclusive and rivalrous;
  • Public goods: non-exclusive and non-rivalrous;
  • Club goods: exclusive but non-rivalrous: e.g., a concert;
  • Common resources: non-exclusive but rivalrous: the air we breath; an aquifer;

Another category is sometimes defined: contestable goods, which have the character of public goods or even club goods when under light use, and are common resources when under heavy use. There is a difference between an empty park and a crowded park; or an empty road and a crowded road.

See ThoughtCo. for a good exposition on the taxonomy.

Private Incentives and Infrastructure

10 Tuesday Jan 2017

Posted by in infrastructure, Markets

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Material infrastructure is fixed plant and equipment providing services considered basic to the functioning of society. That definition leaves plenty of room for interpretation, however. For example, it does not limit the meaning of “infrastructure” to facilities necessary for the provision of “public goods”, for which benefits are non-exclusive. And it encompasses facilities used by firms in certain competitive markets, such as some forms of telecommunication. The character of infrastructure tends to change over time, as new technologies lead to changes in our way of life (e.g., the cellular network). That’s even more evident when infrastructure is defined more broadly, as Walter Buhr does in “What Is Infrastructure?” His definition of material infrastructure encompasses all facilities enabling “the activation or mobilization of the economic agents’ potentialities.”

Infrastructure ≠ Government

There is a popular fallacy that infrastructure is the exclusive province of government. Infrastructure often does provide some public, non-exclusive benefits, but the willingness of users to pay is the key test of private benefits. As it happens, most infrastructure needs can be met privately and partly, if not fully, supported by user fees. That follows from the high degree of exclusivity of benefits yielded by the infrastructure. Today, privately-owned infrastructure includes communication networks, power generation and distribution, some water and sewer systems, toll roads, ports, and landfills. The presumed monopolistic nature of some infrastructural services probably encourages the notion that infrastructure must be public, but that view is largely unjustified: the services may be “monopolized” only to the extent that the relevant market is defined narrowly, such as road travel, rather than transportation. Indeed, certain kinds of infrastructure functions in markets that are fairly competitive (e.g., wireless networks).

The great thing about most private infrastructure is that owner-operators have an incentive to put it up and keep it up. So it kind of takes care of itself. I say “kind of” because there is always a degree of public involvement, from land use and environmental approval to construction permits, to licensing, to spectrum auctions, to rate regulation, and many other varieties of oversight. Aside from those considerations, if there is a need for infrastructure that is commercially-viable, the project is likely to be proposed by private interests. The funds necessary to pay for construction can be raised from private investors, rather than taxpayers. It’s not at all strange to say that private infrastructure is highly advantageous from a public finance perspective.

There are risks to private infrastructure developers, but those risks are too often borne publicly. A new facility, be it a water treatment plant or a road, might not prove to be profitable once a new revenue stream or reduction in operating costs is realized. Given those circumstances, private interests might seek additional incentives from public authorities to ensure profitbility. To the extent that the shortfall is due to an error in pricing administered by a public regulatory authority, it might be reasonable to make adjustments in the owner-operator’s favor. However, to the extent that demand falls short of the owner-operator’s expectations, it might be better to let the firm fail. That would allow the assets to be sold at a discount to a new operator who can make the cheaper investment profitable. No bailouts!

Trumpian Infrastructure Incentives

The coming Trump Administration is known to have certain steps in mind for encouraging infrastructure development. While the tax plan that has been discussed has a few questionable features, any policy that reduces corporate tax rates would increase the return to existing and prospective private infrastructure, and the profitability of private operation of public infrastructure. In addition, a proposal mentioned explicitly by Trump is a corporate tax credit for infrastructure development.

Here is where a more precise definition of infrastructure would be helpful. Would traditional categories of infrastructure investment by power, telecommunication, and water treatment companies qualify automatically? Moreover, the long timelines required in the planning and installation of most infrastructure might make it difficult to distinguish between new plans and those already in the works. Will the administration establish a bright line between infrastructure investment and run-of-the-mill corporate spending on new plant and equipment? Perhaps any form of corporate investment will qualify. These are questions that remain unanswered as we await Trump’s inauguration.

There is another public-finance dimension of the Trump infrastructure credit. Public infrastructure projects, such as roads, are frequently difficult for governments to fund because they face limits on the debt they can issue. This is emphasized by Randall O’Toole in a recent piece on the Trump credit. Instead of issuing its own debt, a government can take advantage of a large private road builder’s ability to raise funds in the capital market, agreeing to compensate the contractor over time. Thus, taxpayers will be obligated to pay-off the contractor’s debt. The term “Public-Private Partnership” has been invoked in this connection.

Private Incentives Or Central Planning?

I am never averse to reduced tax rates to the extent that taxation always distorts economic incentives. However, selective targeting of tax benefits at certain industries, specific forms of business organization (like corporations), or specific activities like capital investment is overt central planning. Overriding market incentives in this way is not desirable. (Neither are proposals to subsidize exporters and penalize importers. Tyler Cowen at the Marginal Revolution provides some salient quotes from Lawrence Summers on this point.) At this stage, Trump’s tax plan looks like central planning gone berserk.

Ideally, private investment and private infrastructure should be judged on its real merits, not on the prejudices of a central authority. To that end, I believe the Trump Administration’s intent to roll back regulatory distortions is commendable. A case in point is nuclear power generation. Despite the constant outcry against the burning of fossil fuels, there has been little emphasis on encouraging investment in new nuclear capacity. The lengthy approval process and costly regulatory requirements discourage this zero-carbon form of energy production relative to other forms of energy investment.

Users Are the Cost-Causers

I should note that O’Toole speaks favorably of “targeting” certain kinds of public infrastructure, but I think his point is that private operation of infrastructure, if not ownership, will allow markets to do the targeting more efficiently than government ever could. In particular, he notes that politicians tend to prefer new projects to the maintenance and repair of existing infrastructure, independent of the actual merit. Would relying on private operation and user fees encourage better maintenance?

“Unlike infrastructure paid for out of tax dollars, user-fee-funded projects tend to be well maintained because the agencies that manage them know they have to keep them in good shape to continue earning revenues.“

The cartoon above satirizes the consequences of providing free access to a costly facility. User fees encourage more rational patterns of use. For example, it is folly to think that projects like light rail can be financially viable when free alternatives exist. Specific highway routes under high demand must be priced in order for commuters to make rational decisions about the alternatives available to them, and for providers of transportation facilities, whether public or private, to rationally balance the resources dedicated to supporting various modes of travel.

Lower tax and regulatory burdens under the Trump infrastructure plan offer some encouragement for private development and operation of infrastructure projects. As a by-product, the plan might encourage greater reliance on user fees as a method of defraying the costs of infrastructure and promoting a more efficient allocation of resources toward infrastructure needs. However, there are unanswered questions about the details of the plan, and some of its heavy-handy features should be dispensed with.

Rainfall, Individualism and Income

23 Friday Sep 2016

Posted by in Capitalism, Collectivism

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Highly variable rainfall in a country is associated with less individualistic attitudes, according to a provocative paper by economist Lewis Davis (HT: Marginal Revolution). He leverages this relationship to estimate a positive impact of individual responsibility on economic development. Both results are potentially important, if somewhat controversial. Davis admits that he confronted a number of measurement issues and methodological complexities.

Davis notes that the variability of rainfall creates agricultural risk. He posits that countries having to deal with such recurrent, exogenous risks tend to develop institutions that might allow risk to be shared more broadly. In other words, such uncontrollable events as droughts, destructive flooding and uneven agricultural output lead to a social tendency toward collectivism, which is also reflected in the attitudes of individual citizens. He first builds a mathematical economic model with that implication:

“… the model predicts the equilibrium level of collective responsibility will be greater where nature is more capricious.“

Davis finds that the relationship holds up empirically using cross-country data on rainfall and surveys of social attitudes. His real interest, however, is to exploit that relationship to obtain estimates of the impact of individual responsibility on economic development. The complication he grapples with is that more favorable survey ratings of individual responsibility are themselves a function of economic development, so causation runs both ways. To tackle this problem, he uses rainfall variability to create an empirical “instrument” based on survey measures of individual responsibility, and in turn uses the exogenous variation in the instrument to explain differences in per capita income. Controls are used in the fitted equations for other social and economic factors. Again, he finds that his instrument for individual responsibility is positively related to income.

Another way to summarize Davis’ results is that natural risks are associated with greater acceptance of collectivism, but collectivist attitudes are associated with lower income levels. The empirical finding of a preference for heavy reliance on the state to insure against common risks is fascinating and it comports with the theory that the government has a legitimate role in the provision of public goods, social risk mitigation being among them. One should not place too much faith in the state as a reliable problem solver, however, or as an engine of economic growth. After all, there is a good reason for the second result: an economy dominated by the public sector is doomed to long-term decline. Individual initiative and capitalism, on the other hand, are more reliable in producing long-term economic gains and ending poverty, even when the rain is spotty. General prosperity might be more difficult to achieve when the weather is fickle, but prosperity is a much better cushion against risk than government.