Pros and Cons of the “Big Beautiful Bill”

16 Monday Jun 2025

Posted by Nuetzel in Federal Budget, Fiscal policy

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Big Beautiful Bill, Budget Baseline, Budget Reconciliation, Congressional Budget Office, Deficit Reduction, DOGE, Dominic Pino, Donald Trump, Elon Musk, EV Subsidies, filibuster, Homeland Security, Mandatory Spending, Medicaid, No Tax On Overtime, No Tax On Tips, Rand Paul, SALT Deduction, Senior Deduction, Social Security, Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program, Tax Cuts and Jobs Act

The GOP’s “Big Beautiful Bill” (BBB) has generated its share of controversy, not least between President Trump and his erstwhile ally Elon Musk. It is a budget reconciliation bill that was passed by a single vote in the House of Representatives. It’s now up to the Senate, which is sure to alter some of the bill’s provisions. That will require another vote in the House before it can head to Trump’s desk for a signature.

Slim But “Reconciled” Majority

As a reconciliation bill, the BBB is not subject to filibuster in the Senate, and only a simple majority is required for approval, not a 60% supermajority. Obviously, that’s why the GOP used the reconciliation process.

I hate big bills, primarily because they tend to provide cover for all sorts of legislative mischief and pork. However, the reconciliation process imposes limits on what kinds of budgetary changes can be included in a bill. A reconciliation bill can alter only mandatory spending programs like Medicaid and other entitlements, but not discretionary or non-mandatory spending. Social Security is an entitlement, but it would be off limits in a typical reconciliation bill (owing to an arcane rule). Reconciliation bills can also address changes in revenue and the debt limit.

The BBB includes provisions to reduce Medicaid outlays such as work requirements, denial of benefits to illegal aliens, and controls on fraud. These are projected to cut spending by nearly $700 billion. Of course, this is a controversial area, but efforts to impose better controls on entitlements are laudable.

Elon Musk criticized the bill’s failure to aggressively rein-in deficit spending, prompting what was probably his first public feud with Trump. At the time, it wasn’t clear whether Musk really understood the limits of reconciliation. If he had, he might at least have been mollified by the effort to tackle Medicaid waste and fraud. Entitlement programs like Medicaid are, after all, at the very root of our fiscal imbalances.

Extending Trump’s Tax Cuts

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) says that BBB will reduce tax revenue by $3.8 trillion over the next ten years. The Trump tariffs are not addressed in the BBB, but those won’t come close to offsetting this projected revenue loss.

The CBO’s score compares spending and tax revenue to “current law”. Thus, the baseline assumes that the 2017 tax cuts under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) expire in 2026. With spending cuts under the BBB, primary federal deficits (non-interest) are projected to rise $2.4 billion over that time. With interest costs on the higher federal debt, the increase in deficits rises to about $3 trillion. I’ll briefly address some of the major provisions below, including their budget impacts.

Spending Cuts

In addition to Medicaid, other significant cuts in spending in the BBB include reductions in benefits under the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (food stamps, -$267b). This includes tighter work requirements, eligibility rules, and higher matching requirements for states. Also included in BBB are more stringent student loan repayment rules and changes in other education funding programs (-$350b).

Other spending categories would increase. The bill would authorize an additional $144 billion for Armed Services and $79 billion for Homeland Security, including $50 billion for the border wall. Senator Rand Paul has called the border security provisions excessive, though many of those favoring greater fiscal discipline also believe defense is underfunded, so they probably don’t oppose these particular items.

~~Voting~~ Tax Incentives

In terms of revenue, the BBB would extend the provisions of the TCJA. The deduction for state and local taxes (SALT) would be extended and increased to $40,000 at incomes less than $500,000. This would have a combined revenue impact of -$787 billion. No wonder deficit hawks are upset! A larger SALT deduction creates an even greater subsidy for states imposing high tax burdens on their residents. There’s an expectation, however, that this provision will be dialed back to some extent in the Senate version of the BBB.

There are also provisions to eliminate taxes on overtime (-$124b) and tip income (-$40b), and to increase the standard deduction for seniors (-$66b). As I’ve written before, these are all terribly distortionary policies. They would treat different kinds of income differently, create incentives to reclassify income, and impose a highly complex administrative burden on the IRS. The senior deduction creates an incremental revenue hole as a function of Social Security benefit payments. This is the wrong way to address the needs of a system that is insolvent. These policies were selected primarily with vote buying in mind.

The timing of some of these provisions differs. Some would expire after 2028, while others would be permanent. Apparently, the Senate version of the bill is likely to include immediate and permanent expensing of business investment, which would encourage economic growth.

Another notable change would eliminate subsidies and tax credits for EVs (+$191b). Some claim this was at the heart of Musk’s diatribes against the BBB. However, Musk has supported elimination of both EV subsidies and mandates for many years. He stated as much to legislators on Capital Hill last December, so this theory regarding Musk’s opposition to BBB doesn’t wash.

Defining a Baseline

Advocates of extending the TCJA say the CBO’s baseline case is inappropriate, and that the proper baseline should incorporate the continued tax provisions of the TCJA. Again, the extension increases the ten-year deficit by $3.8 trillion, but that total includes the revenue effects of other provisions. Perhaps $3 trillion might be a more accurate upward adjustment to baseline deficits. In that case, the BBB would actually reduce ten-year deficits by $0.2 trillion.

Another criticism is that the CBO does not attempt to estimate dynamic changes in revenue induced by policy. Those in support of extending the TCJA believe that this static treatment unfairly discounts the revenue potential of pro-growth policies.

I don’t have a problem with the alternative baseline, but the fact is that deficits will still be problematic. Over the 2025-2034 time frame, a baseline incorporating an extension of TCJA would yield deficits in excess of $20 trillion. That includes mounting interest costs, which might overwhelm serious efforts at fiscal discipline in the unlucky event of an updraft in interest rates. Of course, these large, ongoing deficits raise the likelihood of inflationary pressure. The recent downgrade in the credit rating assigned to U.S. Treasuries by Moody’s is an acknowledgement that bondholder wealth could well be undermined by future attempts to “inflate away” the real value of the debt.

Debt Ceiling

In addition to its direct budgetary effects, the BBB calls for a $5 trillion increase of the federal debt limit. I admit to mixed feelings about this large increase in borrowing authority. Frequent debt limit negotiations tend to create lots of political theater and chew up scarce legislative time. Moreover, it’s easy to conclude that they usually accomplish little in terms of restraining deficit spending. Dominic Pino argues otherwise, citing historical examples in which the debt limit “was paired with” reforms and spending restraint. In other words, despite its apparent impotence, Pino asserts that deficits would have been much higher without it. I’m still skeptical, however, that frequent showdowns over the debt ceiling have much value given entitlements that are seemingly beyond legislative control. In the end, elected representatives must respect the judgement of credit markets and face consequences at the ballot box.

Final Thoughts on BBB

Superficially, the Big Beautiful Bill looks like an abomination to deficit hawks. The GOP decided to structure it as a reconciliation bill to strengthen its odds of passage. That decision sharply limited its potential for spending restraint. Other legislation will be required to make the kinds of rescissions necessary to eliminate wasteful spending identified by DOGE.

As for the bill itself, the effort to extend the 2017 Trump tax cuts was widely expected. That, in and of itself, is neutral with respect to a more reasonable baseline assumption. Elimination of EV tax subsidies is a big plus, as are the permanent incentives for business investment. Unfortunately, Trump and his congressional supporters also propose to create the additional fiscal burdens of no taxes on tips and overtime pay, as well as an increased standard deduction for seniors. The ill-advised increase in the SALT deduction was a compromise to ensure the support of certain blue-state republicans, but with any luck it will be curtailed by the Senate.

On the spending side, the big item is Medicaid. Reforms are long past due for a system so riddled with waste. In addition, there are new rules in the BBB that would reduce SNAP outlays and increase student loan repayments. Outlays for defense, Homeland Security, and border security would increase, but these were known to be Trump priorities. Too bad they’ve been paired with several wasteful tax policies.

But even with those flaws, the BBB would reduce deficits marginally relative to a baseline that incorporates extension of the TCJA. Yes, excessive ongoing deficits still have to be dealt with, but spending reductions on the discretionary side of the budget were out of the question this time due to reconciliation rules. They will have to come later, but that sort of legislation will face tough political headwinds, as will Social Security and Medicare reform. arever introduced.

Big Spending, Explosive Debt, and the Inflation Tax

07 Tuesday May 2024

Posted by Nuetzel in Deficits, Fiscal policy, Inflation

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American Rescue Plan, CBO, Child Tax Credit, CHIPS Act, Debt to GDP, Discretionary Spending, Donald Trump, Emergency Spending, entitlements, Eric Boehm, Inflation Premium, Inflation tax, Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Joe Biden, John Cochrane, Medicare, OMB, Promise to Address Comprehensive Toxics Act, Social Security, Soft Default, Student Loan Forgiveness, Supreme Court, Treasury Debt

The chart above makes a convincing case that we have a spending problem at the federal level. Really, we’ve had a spending problem for a long time. But at least tax revenue today remains reasonably well-aligned with its 50-year historical average as a share of GDP. Not spending. Even larger deficits opened up during the pandemic and they haven’t returned to pre-pandemic levels.

We’ve seen Joe Biden break spending records. His initiatives, often with questionable merit, have included the $1.8 trillion American Rescue Plan and the nearly $0.8 trillion Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, along with several other significant spending initiatives such as the Promise to Address Comprehensive Toxics Act and the subsidy-laden CHIPS Act. Meanwhile, emergency spending has become a regular occurrence on Biden’s watch. More recently, he’s made repeated efforts to forgive massive amounts of student loans despite the Supreme Court’s clear ruling that such gifts are unconstitutional.

Indeed, while Biden keeps pretty busy spinning tales of his days driving an 18-wheeler, cannibals devouring his Uncle Bosie Finnegan, his upbringing in black churches, synagogues, or in the Puerto Rican community, he still finds time to dream up ways for the government to spend money it doesn’t have. Or his kindly puppeteers do.

Biden’s New Budget

Eric Boehm expressed wonderment at Biden’s fiscal 2025 budget not long after its release in March. He was also mystified by the gall it took to produce a “fact sheet” in which the White House congratulated itself on fiscal responsibility. That’s how this Administration characterizes deficits projected at $16 trillion over the next ten years. No joke!

Furthermore, the Administration says the record spending will be “paid for”. Well, yes, with tax increases and lots of borrowing! There are a great many fabulist claims made by the White House about the budget. This link from the Office of Management and Budget includes a handy list of propaganda sheets they’ve managed to produce on the virtues of their proposal.

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects ten-year deficits under current law that are $3 trillion higher than Biden’s proposed budget. That’s the basis of the White House’s boast of fiscal restraint. But the difference is basically paid for with a couple of accounting tricks (see below). More charitably, one could say it’s paid for with higher taxes, aided by the assumption of slightly faster economic growth. The latter will be a good trick while undercutting incentives and wages with a big boost to the corporate tax rate.

The revenue projected by the While House from those taxes does not come anywhere close to eliminating the gap shown in the CBO’s chart above. Federal spending under Biden’s budget grows at about 4% annually, just a bit slower than nominal GDP. Thus, the federal share of GDP remains roughly constant and only slightly higher than the CBO’s current projection for 2034. Nevertheless, spending relative to GDP would continue at an historically high rate. Over the next decade, it would average more than 3% higher than its 50-year average. That would be about $1.3 trillion in 2034!

Meanwhile, the ratio of tax revenue to GDP under Biden’s proposal, as they project it, would average slightly higher than its 50-year average, reaching a full percentage point above by 2034 (and higher than the CBO baseline). That’s probably optimistic.

There is little real effort in this budget to reduce federal deficits, with Treasury borrowing rates now near 15-year highs. Interest expense has grown to an alarming share of spending. In fact, it’s expected to exceed spending on defense in 2024! Perhaps not coincidentally, the White House assumes a greater decline in interest rates than CBO over the next 10 years.

Treats or Tricks?

The situation is likely worse than the White House depicts, given that its budget incorporates assumptions that look generous to their claim of fiscal restraint. First, they frontload nondefense discretionary spending, allowing Biden to make extravagant promises for the near-term while pushing off steep declines in budget commitments to the out-years. The sharp reductions in this category of spending pares more than $2 trillion from the 10-year deficit. From the link above:

Biden also proposes to restore the expanded the child tax credit — for one year! How handy from a budget perspective: heroically call for an expanded credit (for a year) while avoiding, for the time being, the addition of a couple of trillion to the 10-year deficit.

Code Red

So where does this end? The ratio of federal debt to GDP will resume its ascent after a slight decline from the pandemic high. Here is the CBO’s projection:

The Biden budget shows a relatively stable debt to GDP ratio through 2034 due to the assumptions of slightly faster GDP growth, lower Treasury borrowing rates, and the aforementioned “fiscal restraint”. But don’t count on it!

The government’s growing dominance over real resources will have negative consequences for growth in the long-term. Purely as a fiscal matter, however, it must be paid for in one of three ways: revenue from explicit taxes, federal borrowing, or an implicit tax on the public more commonly known as the inflation tax. The last two are intimately related.

Bond investors always face at least a small measure of default risk even when lending to the U.S. Treasury. There is almost no chance the government would ever default outright by failing to pay interest or principal when due. However, investors hold an expectation that the value of their bonds will erode in real terms due to inflation. To compensate, they demand an “inflation premium” in the interest rate they earn on Treasury bonds. But an upside surprise to inflation would constitute a “soft default” on the real value of their bonds. This occurred during and after the pandemic, and it was triggered by a burgeoning federal deficit.

Brief Mechanics

John Cochrane has explained the mechanism by which acts of fiscal profligacy can be transmitted to the price of goods. The real value of outstanding federal debt cannot exceed the expected real value of future surpluses (a present value summed across positive and negative surpluses). If expected surpluses are reduced via some emergency or shock such that repayment in real terms is less likely, then the real value of government debt must fall. That means either interest rates or the price level must rise, or some combination of the two.

The Federal Reserve can prevent interest rates from rising (by purchasing bonds and increasing the money supply), but that leaves a higher price level as the only way the real value of debt can come into line. In other words, an unexpected increase in the path of federal deficits would be financed by money printing and an inflation tax. The incidence of this unexpected “implicit” tax falls not only to bondholders, but also on the public at large, who suffer an unexpected decline in the purchasing power of their nominal assets and incomes. This in turn tends to free-up real resources for government absorption.

Government Debt Is Risky

It appears that investors expect the future deficits now projected by the CBO (and the White House) to be paid down someday, to some extent, by future surpluses. That might seem preposterous, but markets apparently aren’t surprised by the projected deficits. After all, fiscal policy decisions can change tremendously over the course of a few years. But it still feels like excessive optimism. Whatever the case, Cochrane cautions that the next fiscal emergency, be it a new pandemic, a war, a recession, or some other crisis, is likely to create another huge expansion in debt and a substantial increase price level. Joe Biden doesn’t seem inclined to put us in a position to deal with that risk very effectively. Unfortunately, it’s not clear that Donald Trump will either. And neither seems inclined to seriously address the insolvencies of Social Security and Medicare. If unaddressed, those mandatory obligations will become real crises over the next decade.

No Radar, No Rudder: Fiscal & Monetary Destabilization

31 Wednesday May 2023

Posted by Nuetzel in Fiscal policy, Monetary Policy

≈ 1 Comment

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budget deficits, Credible Committments, crowding out, David Beckworth, David Henderson, Discretionary Spending, economic stimulus, Federal Reserve, Great Depression, Housing Bubble, Inflation Reduction Act, Long and Variable Lags, Lucas Critique, Mortgage Crisis, Pandemic Relief, Rational Expectations, Robert Lucas, Shovel-Ready Projects, Spending Multipliers, Stabilization policy, Tyler Cowen

Policy activists have long maintained that manipulating government policy can stabilize the economy. In other words, big spending initiatives, tax cuts, and money growth can lift the economy out of recessions, or budget cuts and monetary contraction can prevent overheating and inflation. However, this activist mirage burned away under the light of experience. It’s not that fiscal and monetary policy are powerless. It’s a matter of practical limitations that often cause these tools to be either impotent or destabilizing to the economy, rather than smoothing fluctuations in the business cycle.

The macroeconomics classes seem like yesterday: Keynesian professors lauded the promise of wise government stabilization efforts: policymakers could, at least in principle, counter economic shocks, particularly on the demand side. That optimistic narrative didn’t end after my grad school days. I endured many client meetings sponsored by macro forecasters touting the fine-tuning of fiscal and monetary policy actions. Some of those economists were working with (and collecting revenue from) government policymakers, who are always eager to validate their pretensions as planners (and saviors). However, seldom if ever do forecasters conduct ex post reviews of their model-spun policy scenarios. In fairness, that might be hard to do because all sorts of things change from initial conditions, but it definitely would not be in their interests to emphasize the record.

In this post I attempt to explain why you should be skeptical of government stabilization efforts. It’s sort of a lengthy post, so I’ve listed section headings below in case readers wish to scroll to points of most interest. Pick and choose, if necessary, though some context might get lost in the process.

Expectations Change the World
Fiscal Extravagance
Multipliers In the Real World
Delays
Crowding Out
Other Peoples’ Money
Tax Policy
Monetary Policy
Boom and Bust
Inflation Targeting
Via Rate Targeting
Policy Coordination
Who Calls the Tune?
Stable Policy, Stable Economy

Expectations Change the World

There were always some realists in the economics community. In May we saw the passing of one such individual: Robert Lucas was a giant intellect within the economics community, and one from whom I had the pleasure of taking a class as a graduate student. He was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Science in 1995 for his applications of rational expectations theory and completely transforming macro research. As Tyler Cowen notes, Keynesians were often hostile to Lucas’ ideas. I remember a smug classmate, in class, telling the esteemed Lucas that an important assumption was “fatuous”. Lucas fired back, “You bastard!”, but proceeded to explain the underlying logic. Cowen uses the word “charming” to describe the way Lucas disarmed his critics, but he could react strongly to rude ignorance.

Lucas gained professional fame in the 1970s for identifying a significant vulnerability of activist macro policy. David Henderson explains the famous “Lucas Critique” in the Wall Street Journal:

“… because these models were from periods when people had one set of expectations, the models would be useless for later periods when expectations had changed. While this might sound disheartening for policy makers, there was a silver lining. It meant, as Lucas’s colleague Thomas Sargent pointed out, that if a government could credibly commit to cutting inflation, it could do so without a large increase in unemployment. Why? Because people would quickly adjust their expectations to match the promised lower inflation rate. To be sure, the key is government credibility, often in short supply.”

Non-credibility is a major pitfall of activist macro stabilization policies that renders them unreliable and frequently counterproductive. And there are a number of elements that go toward establishing non-credibility. We’ll distinguish here between fiscal and monetary policy, focusing on the fiscal side in the next several sections.

Fiscal Extravagance

We’ve seen federal spending and budget deficits balloon in recent years. Chronic and growing budget deficits make it difficult to deliver meaningful stimulus, both practically and politically.

The next chart is from the most recent Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report. It shows the growing contribution of interest payments to deficit spending. Ever-larger deficits mean ever-larger amounts of debt on which interest is owed, putting an ever-greater squeeze on government finances going forward. This is particularly onerous when interest rates rise, as they have over the past few years. Both new debt is issued and existing debt is rolled over at higher cost.

Relief payments made a large contribution to the deficits during the pandemic, but more recent legislation (like the deceitfully-named Inflation Reduction Act) piled-on billions of new subsidies for private investments of questionable value, not to mention outright handouts. These expenditures had nothing to do with economic stabilization and no prayer of reducing inflation. Pissing away money and resources only hastens the debt and interest-cost squeeze that is ultimately unsustainable without massive inflation.

Hardly anyone with future political ambitions wants to address the growing entitlements deficit … but it will catch up with them. Social Security and Medicare are projected to exhaust their respective trust funds in the early- to mid-2030s, which will lead to mandatory benefit cuts in the absence of reform.

If it still isn’t obvious, the real problem driving the budget imbalance is spending, not revenue, as the next CBO chart demonstrates. The “emergency” pandemic measures helped precipitate our current stabilization dilemma. David Beckworth tweets that the relief measures “spurred a rapid recovery”, though I’d hasten to add that a wave of private and public rejection of extreme precautions in some regions helped as well. And after all, the pandemic downturn was exaggerated by misdirected policies including closures and lockdowns that constrained both the demand and supply sides. Beckworth acknowledges the relief measures “propelled inflation”, but the pandemic also seemed to leave us on a permanently higher spending path. Again, see the first chart below.

The second chart below shows that non-discretionary spending (largely entitlements) and interest outlays are how we got on that path. The only avenue for countercyclical spending is discretionary expenditures, which constitute an ever-smaller share of the overall budget.

We’ve had chronic deficits for years, but we’ve shifted to a much larger and continuing imbalance. With more deficits come higher interest costs, especially when interest rates follow a typical upward cyclical pattern. This creates a potentially explosive situation that is best avoided via fiscal restraint.

Putting other doubts about fiscal efficacy aside, it’s all but impossible to stimulate real economic activity when you’ve already tapped yourself out and overshot in the midst of a post-pandemic economic expansion.

Multipliers In the Real World

So-called spending multipliers are deeply beloved by Keynesians and pork-barrel spenders. These multipliers tell us that every dollar of extra spending ultimately raises income by some multiple of that dollar. This assumes that a portion of every dollar spent by government is re-spent by the recipient, and a portion of that is re-spent again by another recipient. But spending multipliers are never what they’re cracked up to be for a variety of reasons. (I covered these in “Multipliers Are For Politicians”, and also see this post.) There are leakages out of the re-spending process (income taxes, saving, imports), which trim the ultimate impact of new spending on income. When supply constraints bind on economic activity, fiscal stimulus will be of limited power in real terms.

If stimulus is truly expected to be counter-cyclical and transitory, as is generally claimed, then much of each dollar of extra government spending will be saved rather than spent. This is the lesson of the permanent income hypothesis. It means greater leakages from the re-spending stream and a lower multiplier. We saw this with the bulge in personal savings in the aftermath of pandemic relief payments.

Another side of this coin, however, is that cutting checks might be the government’s single-most efficient activity in execution, but it can create massive incentive problems. Some recipients are happy to forego labor market participation as long as the government keeps sending them checks, but at least they spend some of the income.

Delays

Another unappreciated and destabilizing downside of fiscal stimulus is that it often comes too late, just when the economy doesn’t need stimulus. That’s because a variety of delays are inherent in many spending initiatives: legislative, regulatory, legal challenges, planning and design, distribution to various spending authorities, and final disbursement. As I noted here:

“Even government infrastructure projects, heralded as great enhancers of American productivity, are often subject to lengthy delays and cost overruns due to regulatory and environmental rules. Is there any such thing as a federal ‘shovel-ready’ infrastructure project?”

Crowding Out

The supply of savings is limited, but when government borrows to fund deficits, it directly competes with private industry for those savings. Thus, funds that might otherwise pay for new plant, equipment, and even R&D are diverted to uses that should qualify as government consumption rather than long-term investment. Government competition for funds “crowds-out” private activity and impedes growth in the economy’s productive capacity. Thus, the effort to stimulate economic activity is self-defeating in some respects.

Other Peoples’ Money

Government doesn’t respond to price signals the way self-interested private actors do. This indifference leads to mis-allocated resources and waste. It extends to the creation of opportunities for graft and corruption, typically involving diversion of resources into uses that are of questionable productivity (corn ethanol, solar and wind subsidies).

Consider one other type of policy action perceived as counter-cyclical: federal bailouts of failing financial institutions or other troubled businesses. These rescues prop up unproductive enterprises rather than allowing waste to be flushed from the system, which should be viewed as a beneficial aspect of recession. The upshot is that too many efforts at economic stabilization are misdirected, wasteful, ill-timed, and pro-cyclical in impact.

Tax Policy

Like stabilization efforts on the spending side, tax changes may be badly timed. Tax legislation is often complex and can take time for consumers and businesses to adjust. In terms of traditional multiplier analysis, the initial impact of a tax change on spending is smaller than for expenditures, so tax multipliers are smaller. And to the extent that a tax change is perceived as temporary, it is made less effective. Thus, while changes in tax policy can have powerful real effects, they suffer from some of the same practical shortcomings for stabilization as changes in spending.

However, stimulative tax cuts, if well crafted, can boost disposable incomes and improve investment and work incentives. As temporary measures, that might mean an acceleration of certain kinds of activity. Tax increases reduce disposable incomes and may blunt incentives, or prompt delays in planned activities. Thus, tax policy may bear on the demand side as well as the timing of shifts in the economy’s productive potential or supply side.

Monetary Policy

Monetary policy is subject to problems of its own. Again, I refer to practical issues that are seemingly impossible for policy activists to overcome. Monetary policy is conducted by the nation’s central bank, the Federal Reserve (aka, the Fed). It is theoretically independent of the federal government, but the Fed operates under a dual mandate established by Congress to maintain price stability and full employment. Therein lies a basic problem: trying to achieve two goals that are often in conflict with a single policy tool.

Make no mistake: variations in money supply growth can have powerful effects. Nevertheless, they are difficult to calibrate due to “long and variable lags” as well as changes in money “velocity” (or turnover) often prompted by interest rate movements. Excessively loose money can lead to economic excesses and an overshooting of capacity constraints, malinvestment, and inflation. Swinging to a tight policy stance in order to correct excesses often leads to “hard landings”, or recession.

Boom and Bust

The Fed fumbled its way into engineering the Great Depression via excessively tight monetary policy. “Stop and go” policies in the 1970s led to recurring economic instability. Loose policy contributed to the housing bubble in the 2000s, and subsequent maladjustments led to a mortgage crisis (also see here). Don’t look now, but the inflationary consequences of the Fed’s profligacy during the pandemic prompted it to raise short-term interest rates in the spring of 2022. It then acted with unprecedented speed in raising rates over the past year. While raising rates is not always synonymous with tightening monetary conditions, money growth has slowed sharply. These changes might well lead to recession. Thus, the Fed seems given to a pathology of policy shifts that lead to unintentional booms and busts.

Inflation Targeting

The Fed claims to follow a so-called flexible inflation targeting policy. In reality, it has reacted asymmetrically to departures from its inflation targets. It took way too long for the Fed to react to the post-pandemic surge in inflation, dithering for months over whether the surge was “transitory”. It wasn’t, but the Fed was reluctant to raise its target rates in response to supply disruptions. At the same time, the Fed’s own policy actions contributed massively to demand-side price pressures. Also neglected is the reality that higher inflation expectations propel inflation on the demand side, even when it originates on the supply side.

Via Rate Targeting

At a more nuts and bolts level, today the Fed’s operating approach is to control money growth by setting target levels for several key short-term interest rates (eschewing a more direct approach to the problem). This relies on price controls (short-term interest rates being the price of liquidity) rather than allowing market participants to determine the rates at which available liquidity is allocated. Thus, in the short run, the Fed puts itself into the position of supplying whatever liquidity is demanded at the rates it targets. The Fed makes periodic adjustments to these rate targets in an effort to loosen or tighten money, but it can be misdirected in a world of high debt ratios in which rates themselves drive the growth of government borrowing. For example, if higher rates are intended to reduce money growth and inflation, but also force greater debt issuance by the Treasury, the approach might backfire.

Policy Coordination

While nominally independent, the Fed knows that a particular monetary policy stance is more likely to achieve its objectives if fiscal policy is not working at cross purposes. For example, tight monetary policy is more likely to succeed in slowing inflation if the federal government avoids adding to budget deficits. Bond investors know that explosive increases in federal debt are unlikely to be repaid out of future surpluses, so some other mechanism must come into play to achieve real long-term balance in the valuation of debt with debt payments. Only inflation can bring the real value of outstanding Treasury debt into line. Continuing to pile on new debt simply makes the Fed’s mandate for price stability harder to achieve.

Who Calls the Tune?

The Fed has often succumbed to pressure to monetize federal deficits in order to keep interest rates from rising. This obviously undermines perceptions of Fed independence. A willingness to purchase large amounts of Treasury bills and bonds from the public while fiscal deficits run rampant gives every appearance that the Fed simply serves as the Treasury’s printing press, monetizing government deficits. A central bank that is a slave to the spending proclivities of politicians cannot make credible inflation commitments, and cannot effectively conduct counter-cyclical policy.

Stable Policy, Stable Economy

Activist policies for economic stabilization are often perversely destabilizing for a variety of reasons. Good timing requires good forecasts, but economic forecasting is notoriously difficult. The magnitude and timing of fiscal initiatives are usually wrong, and this is compounded by wasteful planning, allocative dysfunction, and a general absence of restraint among political leaders as well as the federal bureaucracy..

Predicting the effects of monetary policy is equally difficult and, more often than not, leads to episodes of over- and under-adjustment. In addition, the wrong targets, the wrong operating approach, and occasional displays of subservience to fiscal pressure undermine successful stabilization. All of these issues lead to doubts about the credibility of policy commitments. Stated intentions are looked upon with doubt, increasing uncertainty and setting in motion behaviors that lead to undesirable economic consequences.

The best policies are those that can be relied upon by private actors, both as a matter of fulfilling expectations and avoiding destabilization. Federal budget policy should promote stability, but that’s not achievable institutions unable to constrain growth in spending and deficits. Budget balance would promote stability and should be the norm over business cycles, or perhaps over periods as long as typical 10-year budget horizons. Stimulus and restraint on the fiscal side should be limited to the effects of so-called automatic stabilizers, such as tax rates and unemployment compensation. On the monetary side, the Fed would do more to stabilize the economy by adopting formal rules, whether a constant rate of money growth or symmetric targeting of nominal GDP.

Oh To Squeeze Fiscal Discipline From a Debt Limit Turnip

01 Wednesday Feb 2023

Posted by Nuetzel in Fiscal policy, Monetary Policy

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Brinksmanship, British Consols, Congressional Budget Office, consumption tax, David Andolfatto, Debt Limit, Debt to GDP, Entitlement Trust Funds, Extraordinary Measures, Fed Independence, Federal Debt, Federal Default, Federal Reserve, Fiscal Restraint, Income Tax, Inflation tax, IRS, Janet Yellen, Joe Biden, John Cochrane, Josh Barro, Kevin McCarthy, Matt Levine, Modern Monetary Theory, Monetarist Arithmetic, Neil Wallace, Pandemic Benefits, Payment Prioritization, Perpetuities, Platinum Coin, Premium Bonds, Privatization, Rashida Tlaib, Rohan Grey, Saving Incentives, Thomas Sargent, Treasury Debt, Trillion Dollar Coin, Value Added Tax

It’s as if people view the debt limit controversy as a political nuisance rather than the stopgap enforcement mechanism for fiscal sanity that it’s intended to be. That’s a lesson in how far we’ve gone toward an unhealthy acceptance of permanent federal deficits. Oh, most people seem to realize the the government’s spending is prodigious and beyond our capacity to collect taxes, but many don’t grasp the recklessness of the ongoing blowout. Federal deficits are expected to average $1.6 trillion per year over the next decade, versus less than $0.9 trillion and $1.25 trillion over the two previous decades, respectively. That $1.25 trillion includes the massive (and excessive) transfers that took place during the pandemic, which is why we’ve bumped up against the debt limit earlier than had been expected. The trend isn’t abating, despite the fact that the pandemic is behind us. And keep in mind that the Congressional Budget Office has been too optimistic for the past 20 years or so. Take a look at federal debt relative to GDP:

Unpleasant Arithmetic

With federal debt growing faster than GDP, the burden of servicing the debt mounts. This creates a strain in the coordination of fiscal and monetary policy, as described by David Andolfatto, who last year reviewed the implications of “Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic” for current policy. His title was taken from a seminal paper written by Thomas Sargent and Neil Wallace in 1981. Andolfatto says that:

“… attempting to monetize a smaller fraction of outstanding Treasury securities has the effect of increasing the rate of inflation. A tighter monetary policy ends up increasing the interest expense of debt issuance. And if the fiscal authority is unwilling to curtail the rate of debt issuance, the added interest expense must be monetized—at least if outright default is to be avoided.

Andolfatto wrote that last spring, before the Federal Reserve began its ongoing campaign to tighten monetary policy by raising short-term interest rates. But he went on to say:

“Deficit and debt levels are elevated relative to their historical norms, and the current administration seems poised to embark on an ambitious public spending program. … In the event that inflation rises and then remains intolerably above target, the Federal Reserve is expected to raise its policy rate. … if the fiscal authority is determined to pursue its deficit policy into the indefinite future, raising the policy rate may only keep a lid on inflation temporarily and possibly only at the expense of a recession. In the longer run, an aggressive interest rate policy may contribute to inflationary pressure—at least until the fiscal regime changes.”

So it is with a spendthrift government: escalating debt and interest expense must ultimately be dealt with via higher taxes or inflation, despite the best intentions of a monetary authority.

Fiscal Wrasslin’

Some people think the debt limit debate is all a big fake. Maybe … there are spendthrifts on both sides of the aisle. Still, the current debt limit impasse could serve a useful purpose if fiscal conservatives succeed in efforts to restrain spending. There is, however, an exaggerated uproar over the possibility of default, meaning a failure to make scheduled payments on Treasury securities. The capital markets aren’t especially worried because an outright default is very unlikely. Establishment Republicans may well resort to their usual cowardice and accept compromise without holding out for better controls on spending. Already, in a politically defensive gesture, House Speaker Kevin McCarthy has said the GOP wishes to strengthen certain entitlement programs. Let’s hope he really means restoring solvency to the Social Security and Medicare Trust Funds via fundamental reforms. And if the GOP rules out cuts to any program, let’s hope they don’t rule out cuts in the growth of these programs, or privatization. For their part, of course, Democrats would like to eliminate the debt ceiling entirely.

One of the demands made by Republicans is a transformation of the federal tax system. They would like to eliminate the income tax and substitute a tax on consumption. Economists have long favored the latter because it would eliminate incentives that penalize saving, which undermine economic growth. Unfortunately, this is almost dead in the water as a political matter, but the GOP further sabotaged their own proposal in their zeal to abolish the IRS. Their consumption tax would be implemented as a national sales tax applied at the point of sale, complete with a new Treasury agency to administer the tax. They’d have done better to propose a value added tax (VAT) or a tax on a simple base of income less saving (and other allowances).

Gimmicks and Measures

We’ve seen proposals for various accounting tricks to allow the government to avoid a technical default and buy time for an agreement to be reached on the debt limit. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen already has implemented “extraordinary measures” to stay under the debt limit until June, she estimates. The Treasury is drawing down cash, skipping additional investments in government retirement accounts (which can be made up later without any postponement of benefits), plus a few other creative accounting maneuvers.

Payment prioritization, whereby the Treasury makes payments on debt and critical programs such as Social Security and Medicare, but defers a variety of other payments, has also been considered. Those deferrals could include amounts owed to contractors or even government salaries. However, a deferral of payments owed to anyone represents a de facto default. Thus, payment prioritization is not a popular idea, but if push comes to shove, it might be viewed as the lesser of two evils. Missing payments on government bonds could precipitate a financial crisis, but no one believes it will come to that.

Two other ideas for avoiding a breach of the debt ceiling are rather audacious. One involves raising new cash via the sale of premium bonds by the Treasury, as described here by Josh Barro (and here by Matt Levine). The other idea is to mint a large denomination ($1 trillion) platinum, “commemorative” coin, which the Treasury would deposit at the Federal Reserve, enabling it to conduct business as usual until the debt limit impasse is resolved. I’ll briefly describe each of these ideas in more detail below.

Premium Bonds

Premium bonds would offer a solution to the debt limit controversy because the debt ceiling is defined in terms of the par value of Treasury debt outstanding, as opposed to the amount actually raised from selling bonds at auction. For example, a note that promises to pay $100 in one year has a par value of $100. If it also promises to pay $100 in interest, it will sell at a steep premium. Thus, the Treasury collects, say, $185 at auction, and it could use the proceeds to pay off $100 of maturing debt and fund $85 of federal spending. That would almost certainly require a “market test” by the Treasury on a limited scale, and the very idea might reveal any distaste the market might have for obviating the debt limit in this fashion. But distaste is probably too mild a word.

An extreme example of this idea is for the Treasury to sell perpetuities, which have a zero par value but pay interest forever, or at least until redeemed beyond some minimum (but lengthy) term. John Cochrane has made this suggestion, though mainly just “for fun”. The British government sold perpetuities called consols for many years. Such bonds would completely circumvent the debt limit, at least without legislation to redefine the limit, which really is long overdue.

The $1 Trillion Coin

Minting a trillion dollar coin is another thing entirely. Barro has a separate discussion of this option, as does Cochrane. The idea was originally proposed and rejected during an earlier debt-limit controversy in 2011. Keep in mind, in what follows, that the Fed does not follow Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).

Skeptics might be tempted to conclude that the “coin trick” is a ploy to engineer a huge increase the money supply to fund government expansion, but that’s not really the gist of this proposal. Instead, the Treasury would deposit the coin in its account at the Fed. The Fed would hold the coin and give the Treasury access to a like amount of cash. To raise that cash, the Fed would sell to the public $1 trillion out of its massive holdings of government securities. The Treasury would use that cash to meet its obligations without exceeding the debt ceiling. As Barro says, the Fed would essentially substitute sales of government bonds from its portfolio for bonds the Treasury is prohibited from selling under the debt limit. The effect on the supply of money is basically zero, and it is non-inflationary unless the approach has an unsettling impact on markets and inflation expectations (which of course is a distinct possibility).

When the debt ceiling is finally increased by Congress, the process is reversed. The Treasury can borrow again and redeem its coin from the Fed for $1 trillion, then “melt it down”, as Barro says. The Fed would repurchase from the public the government securities it had sold, adding them back to its portfolio (if that is consistent with its objectives at that time). Everything is a wash with respect to the “coin trick”, as long as the Treasury ultimately gets a higher debt limit.

Lust For the Coin

In fairness to skeptics, it’s easy to understand why the “coin trick” described above might be confused with another coin minting idea that arose from the collectivist vanguard during the pandemic. Representative Rashida Tlaib (D-MI) proposed minting coins to fund monthly relief payments of $1,000 – $2,000 for every American via electronic benefit cards. She was assisted in crafting this proposal by Rohan Grey, a prominent advocate of Modern Monetary Theory (MMT), the misguided idea that government can simply print money to pay for the resources it demands without inflationary consequences.

Tlaib’s plan would have required the Federal Reserve to accept the minted coins as deposits into the Treasury’s checking account. But then, rather than neutralizing the impact on the money supply by selling government bonds, the coin itself would be treated as base money. Cash balances would simply be made available in the Treasury’s checking account with the Fed. That’s money printing, pure and simple, but it’s not at all the mechanism under discussion with respect to short-term circumvention of the debt limit.

Fed Independence

The “coin trick” as a debt limit work-around is probably an impossibility, as Barro and others point out. First, the Fed would have to accept the coin as a deposit, and it is under no legal obligation to do so. Second, it obligates the Fed to closely coordinate monetary policy with the Treasury, effectively undermining its independence and its ability to pursue its legal mandates of high employment and low inflation. Depending on how badly markets react, it might even present the Fed with conflicting objectives.

Believe me, you might not like the Fed, but we certainly don’t want a Fed that is subservient to the Treasury… maintaining financial and economic stability in the presence of an irresponsible fiscal authority is bad enough without seating that authority at the table. As Barro says of the “coin trick”:

“These actions would politicize the Fed and undermine its independence. In order to stabilize expectations about inflation, the Fed would have to communicate very clearly about its intentions to coordinate its fiscal actions with Treasury — that is, it would have to tell the world that it’s going to act as Treasury’s surrogate in selling bonds when Treasury can’t. …

These actions would interfere with the Fed’s normal monetary operations. … the Fed is currently already reducing its holdings of bonds as part of its strategy to fight inflation. If economic conditions change (fairly likely, in the event of a near-default situation) that might change the Fed’s desired balance sheet strategy.”

On With The Show

Discussions about the debt limit continue between the White House and both parties in Congress. Kevin McCarthy met with President Biden today (2/1), but apparently nothing significant came it. Fiscal conservatives wonder whether McCarthy and other members of the GOP lack seriousness when it comes to fiscal restraint. But spending growth must slow to achieve deficit reduction, non-inflationary growth, and financial stability.

Meanwhile, even conservative media pundits seem to focus only on the negative politics of deficit reduction, ceding the advantage to Democrats and other fiscal expansionists. For those pundits, the economic reality pales in significance. That is a mistake. Market participants are increasingly skeptical that the federal government will ever pay down its debts out of future surpluses. This will undermine the real value of government debt, other nominal assets, incomes and buying power. That’s the inflation tax in action.

Unbridled growth of the government’s claims on resources at the expense of the private sector destroys the economy’s productive potential, to say nothing of growth. The same goes for government’s insatiable urge to regulate private activities and to direct patterns of private resource use. Unfortunately, so many policy areas are in need of reform that imposition of top-down controls on spending seems attractive as a stopgap. Concessions on the debt limit should only be granted in exchange for meaningful change: limits on spending growth, regulatory reforms, and tax simplification (perhaps replacing the income tax with a consumption tax) should all be priorities.

In the meantime, let’s avoid trillion dollar coins. As a debt limit work-around, premium bonds are more practical without requiring any compromise to the Fed’s independence. Other accounting gimmicks will be used to avoid missing payments, of course, but the fact that premium bonds and platinum coins are under discussion highlights the need to redefine the debt limit. When the eventual time of default draws near, fiscal conservatives must be prepared to stand up to their opponents’ convenient accusations of “brinksmanship”. The allegation is insincere and merely a cover for government expansionism.

Fiscal Foolishness a Costly Salve For Midterm Jitters

05 Friday Aug 2022

Posted by Nuetzel in Fiscal policy, Inflation

≈ 2 Comments

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Alternative Minimum Corporate Tax, Brad Polumbo, Carried Interest, Chuck Schumer, CMS, Drug Price Controls, Eric Boehm, Fossil fuels, Green Energy, Inflation Reduction Act, IRS, Joe Biden, Joe Manchin, Kyrsten Sinema, Lois Lerner, Medicare Part D, Obamacare Subsidies, Private equity, Stock Buybacks, Sweat Equity, Tax Burden, Tax Enforcement, Tax Incidence, Wharton Economics, William C. Randolf

The “Inflation Reduction Act” (IRA) is about as fatuous a name for pork-barrel spending and taxes as its proponents could have dreamt up! But that’s the preposterous appellation given to the reconciliation bill congressional Democrats hope to approve. Are we to believe that Congress suddenly recognizes the inflationary effects of governments deficits? Well, the trouble is the projected revenue enhancements (taxes) and cost savings are heavily backloaded. It’s mostly spending up front, which is exactly how we got to this point. There are a number of provisions intended to increase domestic energy production in the hope of easing cost-push, supply-side price pressures. However, provisions relating to fossil fuel production are dependent on green energy projects in the same locales. So, even if we get more oil, we’ll still be pissing away resources on wind and solar technologies that will never be reliable sources of power. Even worse, the tax provisions in the bill will have burdens falling heavily on wage earners, despite the Administration’s pretensions of taxing only rich corporations and their shareholders.

The Numbers

The IRA (itself an irritating acronym) would add $433 billion of new federal outlays through 2031 (*investments*, because seemingly every federal outlay is an “investment” these days). At least that’s the deal that Chuck Schumer and Joe Manchin agreed to. As the table below shows, these outlays are mostly for climate initiatives, but the figure includes almost $70 billion of extended Obamacare subsidies. There is almost $740 billion of revenue enhancements, which are weighted toward the latter half of the ten-year budget window.

The deal reduces the federal budget deficit by about $300 billion over ten years, but that takes a while… somewhat larger deficits are projected through 2026. I should note that the Congressional Budget Office has issued a new score this week that puts the savings at a much lower $102 billion. However, that “new” score does not reflect the changes demanded by Kyrsten Sinema (R-AZ).

Spending

Budget projections are usually dependent on assumptions about the duration of various measures, among many other things like economic growth. For example, the increased Obamacare subsidies are an extension, and the scoring assumes they end in 2026. It’s hard to believe they won’t be extended again when the time comes. Over ten years, that would cut the deficit reduction roughly in half.

The bill is laden with green energy subsidies intended to reduce CO2 emissions. They will accomplish little in that respect, but what the subsidies will do is enrich well-healed cronies while reducing the stability of the electric grid. Tax credits for electric vehicles will be utilized primarily by wealthier individuals, though there are tax credits for energy-efficient appliances and the like, which might benefit a broader slice of the population. And while there are a few provisions that might address supplies of fossil fuels and investment in nuclear energy, these are but a sop to Joe Manchin and misdirection against critics of Joe Biden’s disastrous energy policies.

Revenue

Should we be impressed that the Democrats have proposed a bill that raises revenue more than spending? For their part, the Democrats insist that the bill will impose no new taxes on those with taxable incomes less than $400,000. That’s unlikely, as explained below. As a matter of macroeconomic stability, with the economy teetering on the edge of recession, it’s probably not a great time to raise taxes on anyone. However, Keynesians could say the same thing about my preferred approach to deficit reduction: cutting spending! So I won’t press that point too much. However, the tax provisions in the IRA are damaging not so much because they depress demand, but because they distort economic incentives. Let’s consider the three major tax components:

1. IRS enforcement: this would provide about $80 billion in extra IRS funding over 10 years. It is expected to result in a substantial number of additional IRS tax audits (placed as high as 1.2 million). Democrats assert that it will raise an additional $400 billion, but the CBO says it’s likely to be much lower($124 billion). This will certainly ensnare a large number of taxpayers earning less than $400,000 and impose substantial compliance costs on individuals and businesses. A simplified tax code would obviate much of this wasteful activity, but our elected representatives can’t seem to find their way to that obvious solution. In any case, pardon my suspicions that this increase in funding to enforce a Byzantine tax code might be used to weaponize the IRS against parties harboring disfavored political positions. Shades of Lois Lerner!

2. Carried Interest: Oops! Apparently the Democrat leadership just bought off Kyrsten Sinema by eliminating this provision and replacing it with another awful tax…. See #3 below. The next paragraph briefly discusses what the tax change for carried interest would have entailed:

The original bill sought to end the favorable tax treatment of “carried interest”, which is earned by private equity managers but is akin to the “sweat equity” earned by anyone making a contribution to the value of an investment without actually contributing a proportionate amount of capital. I’ve written about this before here. Carried interest income is taxed at the long-term capital gains tax rate, which is usually lower than tax rates on ordinary income. This treatment is really the same as for any partnership that allocates gains to partners, but populist rhetoric has it that it is used exclusively by nasty private equity managers. Changing this treatment for private equity firms would represent gross discrimination against firms that make a valuable contribution to the market for the ownership control of business enterprises, which helps to discipline the management of resources in the private sector.

3. Tax on Corporate Stock Buy-Backs: it’s not uncommon for firms to use cash they’ve generated from operations to repurchase shares of stock issued in past. Unaccountably, Democrats regard this as a “wasteful” activity designed to unfairly enrich shareholders. However, it is a perfectly legitimate way for firms to return capital to owners. The tax would create an incentive for managers to choose less efficient alternatives for the use of excess funds. In any case, the unrestricted freedom of owners to empower managers to repurchase shares is a fundamental property right.

A tax on corporate stock buybacks can result in the triple taxation of corporate profits. Profits are taxed at the firm level, and if the firm uses after-tax profits to repurchases shares, then the profits are taxed again, and further, any gain to shareholders would be subject to capital gains tax. This is one more violation of the old principle that income should be taxed once and only once.

The proposed excise tax on buy-backs now added to the IRA is *expected* to raise more revenue than the carried interest revision would have, but adjustments to behavior have a way of stymying expectations. Research has demonstrated that firms who buy back their shares often outperform their peers. But again, there are always politicians who wish to create more frictions in capital markets because firms and investors are easy political marks, and because these politocos do not understand the key role of capital markets in allocating resources efficiently between uses and across time.

4. Corporate taxes: Imposing a minimum tax rate of 15% on corporate book income above $1 billion is a highly controversial part of the IRA. While supporters contend that the burden would fall only on wealthy shareholders, in fact the burden would be heavily distributed across lower income ranges. First, a great many working people are corporate shareholders through their individual or employer-sponsored savings plans. Second, corporate employees shoulder a large percentage of the burden of corporate taxes via reduced wages and benefits. Here’s Brad Polumbo on the incidence of the corporate tax burden:

“William C. Randolph of the Congressional Budget Office found that for every dollar raised by the corporate tax, approximately 70 cents comes out of workers’ wages. Further confirming this finding, research from the Kansas City Federal Reserve concluded that a 10% increase in corporate taxes reduces wages by 7%.”

This again demonstrates the dishonesty of claims that no one with an income below $400,000 will be taxed under the IRA. In addition, almost 50% of the revenue from this minimum tax will come from the manufacturing sector:

As Eric Boehm states at the last link, “So much for improving American manufacturers’ competitiveness!” Incidentally, it’s estimated that the bill would cause differential increases in the effective corporate tax on investments in equipment, structures, and inventories. This is not exactly a prescription for deepening the stock of capital or for insulating the American economy from supply shocks!

5. Medicare Drug Prices: A final source of deficit reduction is the de facto imposition of price controls on certain prescription drugs under Medicare Part D. A small amount of savings to the government are claimed to begin in 2023. However, the rules under which this will be administered probably won’t be established for some time, so the savings may well be exaggerated. It’s unclear when the so-called “negotiations” with drug companies will begin, but they will take place under the threat of massive fines for failing to agree to CMS’s terms. And as with any price control, it’s likely to impinge on supply — the availability of drugs to seniors, and it is questionable whether seniors will reap any savings on drugs that will remain available.

Do Words Have No Meaning?

The IRA’s vaunted anti-inflationary effects are a pipe dream. A Wharton Study found that the reduction in inflation would be minuscule:

“We estimate that the Inflation Reduction Act will produce a very small increase in inflation for the first few years, up to 0.05 percent points in 2024. We estimate a 0.25 percentage point fall in the PCE price index by the late 2020s. These point estimates, however, are not statistically different than zero, thereby indicating a very low level of confidence that the legislation will have any impact on inflation.”

Over 230 economists have weighed in on the poor prospects that the IRA will achieve what its name suggests. And let’s face it: not even the general public has any confidence that the IRA will actually reduce inflation:

Conclusion

The Inflation Reduction Act is a destructive piece of legislation and rather galling in its many pretenses. I’m all for deficit reduction, but the key to doing so is to cut the growth in spending! Reducing the government’s coerced absorption of resources relative to the size of the economy prevents “crowding out” of private, voluntary, market-tested activity. It also prevents the need for greater tax distortions that undermine economic performance.

The federal government has played host to huge pandemic relief bills over the past two years. Then we have Joe Biden’s move to forgive student debt, a benefit flowing largely to higher income individuals having accumulated debt while in graduate programs. And then, Congress passed a bill to subsidize chip manufacturers who were already investing heavily in domestic production facilities. All the while, the Biden Administration was doing everything in its power to destroy the fossil fuel industry. So now, Democrats hope to follow-up on all that with a bill stuffed with rewards for cronies in the form of renewable energy subsidies, financed largely on the backs of the same individuals who they’ve sworn they won’t tax! The dishonesty is breathtaking! This crowd is so eager to do anything before the midterm elections that they’ll shoot for the nation’s feet!

A Fiscal Real-Bills Doctrine? No Such Thing As Painless Inflation Tax

14 Tuesday Jun 2022

Posted by Nuetzel in Fiscal policy, Inflation, Uncategorized

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Biden Administration, Cronyism, Federal Debt, Fiscal Inflation, Fiscal policy, Friedrich Hayek, Hyperinflation, Inflation tax, Knowledge Problem, Modern Monetary Theory, Monetary policy, Money Printing, Nominal GDP Targeting, Pete Buttigieg, Real Bills Doctrine, Reichsbank, rent seeking, Ro Khanna

A remarkable proposal made recently by Representative Ro Khanna (D -CA) would have the Biden Administration impose price controls, which would be bad enough. Khanna also would like the federal government to cover the inflation losses incurred by Americans by having it directly purchase certain goods and services and resell them “cheap” to consumers. In fairness, Khanna says the government should attempt to take advantage of dips in prices for oil, food commodities, and perhaps other necessities, which of course would limit or reverse downward price changes. When asked about Khanna’s proposal, Pete Buttigieg, Joe Biden’s Transportation Secretary, replied that there were great ideas coming out of Congress and the Administration should consider them. Anyway, the idea is so bad that it deserves a more thorough examination.

Central Planners Have No Clothes

First, such a program would represent a massive expansion in the scope of government. It would also present ample opportunities for graft and cronyism, as federal dollars filter through the administrative layers necessary to manage the purchases and distribution of goods. Furthermore, price and quantity would then be shaded by a heavy political component, often taking precedence over real demand and cost considerations. And that’s beyond the crippling “knowledge problem” that plagues all efforts at central planning.

One of the most destructive aspects of allowing government to absorb a greater share of total spending is that government is not invested with the same budgetary discipline as private buyers. Take no comfort in the notion that the government might prove expert at timing these purchases to leverage price dips. Remember that government always spends “other people’s money”, whether it comes from tax proceeds, lenders, or the printing press (and hence future consumers, who have absolutely no agency in the matter). Hence, price incentives take on less urgency, while political incentives gain prominence. The loss of price sensitivity means that government expenditures are likely to inflate more readily than private expenditures. This is all the more critical at a time when inflation is becoming embedded in expectations and pricing decisions. Khanna thus proposes an inflation “solution” that puts less price-sensitive bureaucrats in charge of actual purchases. That’s a prescription for failure.

If anyone in Biden’s White House is seriously considering a program of this kind, and let’s hope they’re not, they should at least be aware that direct subsidies for the purchase of key goods would be far more efficient. It’s also possible to hedge the risk of future price increases on commodities markets, perhaps simply distributing hedging gains to consumers when they pay off. However, having the federal government participate as a major player in commodities options and futures is probably not on the table at this point … and I shudder to think of it, but it might be more efficient than Khanna’s vision.

A Fiscal Real Bills Doctrine

Khanna’s program would almost surely cause inflation to accelerate. Inflation itself a form of taxation imposed by profligate governments, though it’s an inefficient tax since it creates greater uncertainty. Higher prices deflate the real value of most government debt (borrowed from the public), assets fixed in nominal value, and incomes. Read on, but this program would have the government pay your inflation tax for you by inflating some more. Does this sound like a vicious circle?

Khanna’s concept of inflation-relief is a fiscal reimagining of a long-discredited monetary theory called the “Real Bills Doctrine”. According to this doctrine, rising prices and costs necessitate additional money creation so that businesses have the liquidity to pay the bills associated with ongoing productive efforts. The “real” part is a reference to the link between business expenses and actual production, despite the fact that those bills are expressed in nominal terms. The result of this policy is a cycle of ever-higher inflation, as ever-more money is printed. This was the policy utilized by the Reichsbank in Weimar Germany during its hyperinflation of 1922-23. It’s really quite astonishing that anyone ever thought such a policy was helpful!

In Khanna’s version of the doctrine, the government spends to relieve cost pressure faced by consumers, so the rationale has nothing to do with productive effort.

Financing and the Central Bank Response

It’s reasonable to ask how these outlays would be financed. In all likelihood, the U.S. Treasury would borrow the funds at interest rates now at 10-15 year highs, which have risen in part to compensate investors for higher inflation.

My bet is that Khanna imagines the Fed would simply “print” money (i.e., buy the new government debt floated by the Treasury to pay for the program). This is the prescription of so-called Modern Monetary Theory, whose adherents have either forgotten or have never learned that money growth and inflation is a costly and regressive form of taxation.

Most economists would say the response of the Federal Reserve to this fiscal stimulus would bear on whether it really ignites additional inflationary pressure. Of course, rather than borrowing, Congress could always vote to levy higher taxes on the public in order to pay the public’s inflation tax burden! But then what’s the point? Well, taxing at least has the virtue of not fueling still higher inflation, and the Fed would not have a role to play.

But if the government simply borrows instead, it adds to the already bloated supply of government debt held by the public. This borrowing is likely to put more upward pressure on interest rates, and the federal government’s mounting interest expense requires more financing. What then might the Fed do?

The Fed is an independent, quasi-government entity, so it would not have to accommodate the additional spending by printing money (buying the new Treasury debt). Either way, investors are increasingly skeptical that the growing debt burden will ever be reversed via future surpluses. The fiscal theory of the price level holds that something must reduce the real value of government debt (in order to satisfy the long-term fiscal budget constraint). That “something” is a higher price level. This position is not universally accepted, and some would contend that if the Fed simply set a nominal GDP growth target and stuck to it, accelerating inflation would not have to follow from Khanna’s policy. The same if the Fed could stick to a symmetric average inflation target, but they certainly haven’t been up to that task. Hoping the Fed would fully assert its independence in a fiscal hurricane is probably wishful thinking.

Conclusion

There are no choke points in the supply chain for bad ideas on the left wing of the Democratic Party, and they are dominating party centrists in terms of messaging. The answer, it seems, is always more government. High inflation is very costly, but the best policy is to rein it in, and that requires budgetary and monetary discipline. Attempts to make high inflation “painless” are misguided in the first instance because they short-circuit consumer price responses and substitution, which help restrain prices. Second, the presumption that an inflation tax can be “painless” is an invitation to fiscal debauchery. Third, expansive government brings out hoards of rent seekers instigating corruption and waste. Finally, mounting public debt is unlikely to be offset by future surpluses, and that is the ultimate admission of Modern Monetary Theory. A fiscal real bills doctrine would be an additional expression of this lunacy. To suggest otherwise is either sheer stupidity or an exercise in gaslighting. You can’t inflate away the pain of an inflation tax.

Fiscal Inflation Is Simple With This One Weird Trick

03 Thursday Feb 2022

Posted by Nuetzel in Fiscal policy, Inflation

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Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Bernie Sanders, Build Back Better, Child Tax Credit, Congressional Budget Office, Deficits, Federal Reserve, Fiscal policy, Fiscal Theory of the Price Level, Helicopter Drop, Inflation tax, infrastructure, Joe Biden, John Cochrane, Median CPI, Modern Monetary Theory, Monetary policy, Pandemic Relief, Seigniorage, Stimulus Payments, Student Loans, Surpluses, Trimmed CPI, Universal Basic Income

I’ll get to the weird trick right off the bat. Then you can read on if you want. The trick really is perverse if you believe in principles of sound credit and financial stability. To levy a fiscal inflation tax, all the government need do is spend like a drunken sailor and undermine its own credibility as a trustworthy borrower. One way to do that: adopt the policy prescriptions of Modern Monetary Theory (MMT).

A Theory of Deadbeat Government

That’s right! Run budget deficits and convince investors the debt you float will never be repaid with future real surpluses. That doesn’t mean the government would literally default (though that is never outside the realm of possibility). However, given such a loss of faith, something else must give, because the real value government debt outstanding will exceed the real value of expected future surpluses from which to pay that debt. The debt might be in the form of interest-bearing government bonds or printed money: it’s all government debt. Ultimately, under these circumstances, there will be a revised expectation that the value of that debt (bonds and dollars) will be eroded by an inflation tax.

This is a sketch of “The Fiscal Theory of the Price Level” (FTPL). The link goes to a draft of a paper by John Cochrane, which he intends as an introduction and summary of the theory. He has been discussing and refining this theory for many years. In fairness to him, it’s a draft. There are a few passages that could be written more clearly, but on the whole, FTPL is a useful way of thinking about fiscal issues that may give rise to inflation.

Fiscal Helicopters

Cochrane discusses the old allegory about how an economy responds to dollar bills dropped from a helicopter — free money floating into everyone’s yard! The result is the classic “too much money chasing too few goods” problem, so dollar prices of goods must rise. We tend to think of the helicopter drop as a monetary policy experiment, but as Cochrane asserts, it is fiscal policy.

We have experienced something very much like the classic helicopter drop in the past two years. The federal government has effectively given money away in a variety of pandemic relief efforts. Our central bank, the Federal Reserve, has monetized much of the debt the Treasury issued as it “loaded the helicopter”.

In effect, this wasn’t an act of monetary policy at all, because the Fed does not have the authority to simply issue new government debt. The Fed can buy other assets (like government bonds) by issuing dollars (as bank reserves). That’s how it engineers increases in the money supply. It can also “lend” to the U.S. Treasury, crediting the Treasury’s checking account. Presto! Stimulus payments are in the mail!

This is classic monetary seigniorage, or in more familiar language, an inflation tax. Here is Cochrane description of the recent helicopter drop:

“The Fed and Treasury together sent people about $6 trillion, financed by new Treasury debt and new reserves. This cumulative expansion was about 30% of GDP ($21,481) or 38% of outstanding debt ($16,924). If people do not expect that any of that new debt will be repaid, it suggests a 38% price-level rise. If people expect Treasury debt to be repaid by surpluses but not reserves, then we still expect $2,506 / $16,924 = 15% cumulative inflation.”

FTPL, May I Introduce You To MMT

Another trend in thought seems to have dovetailed with the helicopter drop , and it may have influenced investor sentiment regarding the government’s ever-weakening commitment to future surpluses: that would be the growing interest in MMT. This “theory” says, sure, go ahead! Print the money government “must” spend. The state simply fesses-up, right off the bat, that it has no intention of running future surpluses.

To be clear, and perhaps more fair, economists who subscribe to MMT believe that deficits financed with money printing are acceptable when inflation and interest rates are very low. However, expecting stability under those circumstances requires a certain level of investor confidence in the government fisc. Read this for Cochrane’s view of MMT.

Statists like Bernie Sanders, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, and seemingly Joe Biden are delighted to adopt a more general application of MMT as intellectual cover for their grandiose plans to remake the economy, fix the climate, and expand the welfare state. But generalizing MMT is a dangerous flirtation with inflation denialism and invites economic disaster.

If This Goes On…

Amid this lunacy we have Joe Biden and his party hoping to find avenues for “Build Back Better”. Fortunately, it’s looking dead at this point. The bill considered in the fall would have amounted to an additional $2 trillion of “infrastructure” spending, mostly not for physical infrastructure. Moreover, according to the Congressional Budget Office, that bill’s cost would have far exceeded $2 trillion by the time all was said and done. There are ongoing hopes for separate passage of free community college, an extended child tax credit for all families, a higher cap for state and local income tax deductions, and a host of other social and climate initiatives. The latter, relegated to a separate bill, is said to carry a price tag of over $550 billion. In addition, the Left would still love to see complete forgiveness of all student debt and institute some form of universal basic income. Hey, just print the money, right? Warm up the chopper! But rest easy, cause all this appears less likely by the day.

Are there possible non-inflationary outcomes from ongoing helicopter drops that are contingent on behavior? What if people save the fresh cash because it’s viewed as a one-time windfall (i.e., not a permanent increase in income)? If you sit on such a windfall it will erode as prices rise, and the change in expectations about government finance won’t be too comforting on that score.

There are many aspects of FTPL worth pondering, such as whether bond investors would be very troubled by yawning deficits with MMT noisemakers in Congress IF the Fed refused to go along with it. That is, no money printing or debt monetization. The burgeoning supply of debt would weigh heavily on the market, forcing rates up. Government keeps spending and interest costs balloon. It is here where Cochrane and critics of FTPL have a sharp disagreement. Does this engender inflation in the absence of debt monetization? Cochrane says yes if investors have faith in the unfaithfulness of fiscal policymakers. Excessive debt is then every bit as inflationary as printing money.

Real Shocks and FTPL

It’s natural to think supply disruptions are primarily responsible for the recent acceleration of inflation, rather than the helicopter drop. There’s no question about those price pressures in certain markets, much of it inflected by wayward policymakers, and some of those markets involve key inputs like energy and labor. Even the median component of the CPI has escalated sharply, though it has lagged broader measures a bit.

Broad price pressures cannot be sustained indefinitely without accommodating changes in the supply of money, which is the so-called “numeraire” in which all goods are priced. What does this have to do with FTPL or the government’s long-term budget constraint? The helicopter drop certainly led to additional money growth and spending, but again, FTPL would say that inflation follows from the expectation that government will not produce future surpluses needed for long-term budget balance. The creation of either new money or government debt, loaded the chopper as it were, is sufficient to accommodate broad price pressures over some duration.

Conclusion

Whether or not FTPL is a fully accurate description of fiscal and monetary phenomena, few would argue that a truly deadbeat government is a prescription for hyperinflation. That’s an extreme, but the motivation for FTPL is the potential abandonment of good and honest governing principles. Pledging an inflation tax is not exactly what anyone means by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government.

Joe Biden’s Fat Cooked-Goose Tax Plan

03 Saturday Apr 2021

Posted by Nuetzel in Fiscal policy, Taxes

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Biden Administration, CARES Act, corporate taxes, Double Taxation, infrastructure, Justin Wolfers, Loopholes, OECD, Offshoring, Pandemic, Pass-Through Income, Phil Kerpen, Renewable Energy Credits, Research and DEvelopment, Statutory Rates, Tax Foundation

I recently wrote on this blog about the damaging impact of corporate taxes on workers, consumers, and U.S. competitiveness. Phil Kerpen tweeted the chart above showing the dramatic reduction in the distribution of corporate tax rates across the world from 1980 through 2020. Yes, yes, Joe Biden’s posture as a fair and sensible leader aside, most countries place great emphasis on their treatment of business income and their standing relative to trading partners.

Kerpen’s tweet was a response to this tweet by economist Justin Wolfers:

Apparently, Wolfers wishes to emphasize that Biden’s plan, which raises the statutory corporate rate from 21% to 28%, does not take the rate up to the level of the pre-Trump era. Fair enough, but compare Wolfers’ chart with Kerpen’s (from the Tax Foundation) and note that it would still put the U.S. in the upper part of the international distribution without even considering the increment from state corporate tax rates. Also note that the U.S. was near the top of the distribution in 1980, 2000, and 2010. In fact, the U.S. had the fourth highest corporate tax rate in the world in 2017, before Trump’s tax package took effect. Perhaps Biden’s proposed rate won’t be the fourth highest in the world, but it will certainly worsen incentives for domestic U.S. investment, the outlook for wage growth, and consumer prices.

And in the same thread, Wolfers said this:

That’s certainly true, but let’s talk about those “loopholes”. First, much of U.S. corporate income is “passed though” to the returns of individual owners, so corporate taxes understate the true rate of tax paid on corporate income. Let’s also remember that the corporate tax represents a double taxation of income, and as a matter of tax efficiency it would be beneficial to consolidate these taxes on individual returns.

Beyond those consideration, the repeal of any corporate tax deduction or credit would have its own set of pros and cons. As long as there is a separate tax on corporate income, there is an economic rationale for most so-called “loopholes”. Does Wolfers refer to research and development tax credits? Maybe he means deductions on certain forms of compensation, though it’s hard to rationalize treating any form of employee compensation as income taxable to the business. Then there are the massive tax subsidies extended for investments in renewable energy. Well, good for Wolfers if that last one is his gripe! The CARES Act of 2020 allowed publicly-traded companies to use losses in 2020( presumably induced by the pandemic) to offset income in prior years, rather than carrying them forward. Did Wolfers believe that to be inappropriate? I might object to that too, to the extent that the measure allows declining firms to use COVID to cloak inefficiencies. Does he mean the offshoring of income to avoid U.S. corporate taxes? Might that be related to relative tax rates?

In any case, Wolfers can’t possibly imagine that the U.S. is the only country allowing a variety of expenses to be deducted against corporate income, or credits against tax bills for various activities. So, a comparison of statutory tax rates is probably a good place to start in assessing the competitive thrust of tax policy. But effective tax rates can reveal much more about the full impact of tax policy. In 2011, a study showed that the U.S. had the second highest effective corporate tax rate in the world. Today, among developed countries, the OECD puts the U.S. roughly in the middle of the pack, close to Germany but higher than Canada, Mexico and Japan, and lower than the UK. This article from 2019 reaches the same conclusion, though the rankings and rates differ from the OECD’s calculations. So it’s not as if the U.S. is the only country to offer tax incentives, or “loopholes” in Wolfers’ preferred terminology.

The corporate tax hikes proposed by the Biden Administration are intended to fund the massive outlays in the so-called infrastucture bill, which of course has very little to do with real infrastructure. Both the tax and spending proposals are bad policy. So far, however, passage of the bill is not a given. Let’s hope all of the Republicans and at least one Democrat senator have the sense to vote it down, but I’m not optimistic. The best hope for resistance among Democrats is Joe Manchin of West Virginia, but even he has signaled his support. Biden’s appointment of Gayle Manchin to a key administration post couldn’t have hurt.

The Dirt On the Corporate Income Tax

23 Tuesday Mar 2021

Posted by Nuetzel in Fiscal policy, Tax Incidence

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Alan D. Viard, Biden Administration, Compliance Costs, corporate income tax, Edward Lane, Investment Incentives, Joseph Sullivan, L. Randall Wray, Milton Friedman, Off-Shoring, Peggy Musgrave, Physical Capital, Pricing Power, Regressive Tax, Richard Musgrave, Shifting the Burden, Tax Avoidance, Tax Foundation, Transfer Pricing, Transparency

The Biden Administration is proposing a substantial increase in the corporate income tax rate from 21% to 28%. This is another case of a self-destructive policy that serves as a virtue signal to the progressive Left. See? We’re taxing the rich and their powerful corporations! What none of them realize is that the tax on corporate income is actually a regressive tax on consumers and workers; it is a disincentive to the formation of productive capital; and it is a highly wasteful tax due to compliance costs and the impact of avoidance. And the Biden proposal would make the U.S. less competitive internationally, as the chart above from Joseph Sullivan demonstrates. Maybe some of the proponents realize it, but they still like it because it sounds so good to their base!

It’s not as if all these unhealthy characteristics of the corporate tax are new findings. Milton Friedman explained some of the basics in 1971 when he said:

“The elementary fact is that ‘business’ does not and cannot pay taxes. Only people can pay taxes. Corporate officials may sign the check, but the money that they forward to Internal Revenue comes from the corporation’s employees, customers or stockholders. A corporation is a pure intermediary through which its employees, customers and stockholders cooperate for their mutual benefit.”

In 1984, two giants of public finance economics, Richard and Peggy Musgrave, investigated how the corporate tax was shifted to households. Here’s a description of their findings from a recent paper by Edward Lane and L. Randall Wray:

“… the bottom quintile pays 4.6–5.5 percent of its income toward the corporate profits tax, the top decile pays 2.5–3.7 percent of its income, and the ninth decile pays 2.4–2.9 percent of its income. They conclude that the corporate profits tax is largely regressive while the federal personal income tax is progressive.”

The incidence of the corporate tax rate falls primarily on workers in the form of lower wages and lost jobs, and on consumers in the form of higher prices. Lane and Wray cite several influential studies over the years showing a substantial negative association between corporate taxes and wages. As the authors note, major corporations often have pricing power in both product and labor markets, at least relative to their power in capital markets where they must raise capital. Capital markets are highly competitive, so they don’t provide much opportunity for shifting the burden of the tax to owners of equity and debt. There are limits on a firm’s ability to pass the tax along to customers and workers as well, of course, but shareholders are relatively well-insulated from the burden of the tax.

There are still other reasons to avoid increasing the corporate income tax rate. It currently raises about $200 billion annually for the U.S. Treasury, or about 7% of estimated federal tax revenue for the 2021 fiscal year. It also has extremely high compliance costs. Lane and Wray quote a 2016 Tax Foundation estimate that U.S. businesses face tax compliance costs on the order of $193 billion a year. Not all of that figure applies to corporations, and not all of it is for federal tax compliance, but a great deal of it is. There are also a number of ways the tax can be avoided, such as off-shoring operations and using overstated transfer prices of inputs obtained from units overseas. This is not an economically efficient way to generate tax revenue.

Moreover, the corporate income tax creates perverse incentives. When new investment in productive, physical capital is penalized at the margin, you can expect less capital investment, lower wages, and fewer jobs. Alan D. Viard explains that the dynamics of this mechanism take time to play out, but the longer-run decay in the capital stock is perhaps the most damaging aspect of a high corporate tax rate. And indeed, while there are probably short-run effects, the reduction in the incentive to invest is the real mechanism linking a higher corporate tax to reduced wages and higher prices, not to mention reduced economic growth.

Finally, there is a pernicious political-economic aspect of the corporate income tax owing to the difficulty for the general public in identifying its true incidence. This was also discussed by Milton Friedman:

“… Indirect effects make it difficult to know who ‘really’ pays any tax. But this difficulty is greatest for taxes levied on business. That fact is at one and the same time the chief political appeal of the corporation income tax, and its chief political defect. The politician can levy taxes, as it appears, on no one, yet obtain revenue. The result is political irresponsibility. Levying most taxes directly on individuals would make it far clearer who pays for government programs.

If the government intends to tax the owners of corporate wealth (a significant share of which is held in retirement savings accounts), it should be honest about doing so. That would mean taxing capital income in a more consolidated way, as Lane and Wray put it, at the individual level. That kind of transparency might be too much to hope for because the politics of doing so are much less favorable.

Meanwhile, the Biden Administration wants to have it all: higher corporate taxes and higher taxes on relatively high-earning individuals. But a significant burden of the corporate tax increase ultimately is shifted to individual workers and consumers. It is a regressive tax, and it is an inefficient tax with outrageously high compliance costs. It is a destructive tax because it undermines the economy’s growth in productive capacity. And it offers tax revenue to politicians who have little budgetary resolve, and with little political consequence.

Trump’s Payroll Tax Ploy

15 Tuesday Sep 2020

Posted by Nuetzel in Fiscal policy, Taxes

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and Wells Fargo, Coronavirus, Coyote Blog, CVS, Donald Trump, economic stimulus, Election Politics, Employer’s Share, FICA, Hiring Incentives, Home Depot, JP Morgan Chase, payroll taxes, Permanent Income, Social Security, Steve Mnuchin, Tax Deferral, UPS, Warren Meyer

President Trump’s memorandum to Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin on payroll tax deferral is bad economic policy, but it might ultimately prove useful as a political weapon. The memo, released in August, instructed the Treasury to allow employers to suspend withholding of the employee’s share of FICA taxes (6.2%) until the end of the year, but it does not forgive the taxes. Only Congress (with the President’s signature) can eliminate the tax obligation. There are several reasons I don’t like it:

Assuming the tax obligation is forgiven, it would provide some relief to those who are already employed (and earning less than $4,000 every two weeks), but not to the unemployed. Thus, as relief from coronavirus-induced job losses, this doesn’t cut it.
It does not reduce the cost of hiring, as would a permanent reduction in the employer’s share, so it does not improve hiring incentives.
The deferral creates uncertainty: will the tax bill be forgiven? If not, will the employee be on the hook? Or the employer? What if an employee leaves the company having received a deferral?
The measure will not be an effective stimulus to spending. It is not an addition to workers’ permanent income since it is a temporary “holiday”. Income perceived as temporary adds little to consumer spending. And it doesn’t constitute a temporary tax break unless employers participate (see below), and even then only if Trump is re-elected and if Congress agrees to forgive the tax.
Trump suggested that the tax will be forgiven if he is re-elected. It’s a rather unsavory proposition: create an immediate tax benefit paired with a matching future obligation with forgiveness contingent upon re-election!
Long-term funding of Social Security is already problematic. Adding a payroll tax holiday on top of that, assuming the taxes are forgiven, only aggravates the situation. Yes, I can imagine various “long-game” reform proposals that might attempt to leverage such a break, but I consider that highly unlikely.

It’s no surprise that a number of large employers are not participating in the tax deferral. such as CVS, JP Morgan Chase, UPS, Home Depot, and Wells Fargo.

Small employers have an even bigger problem to the extent that they lack sophisticated accounting systems to handle such deferrals. Here’s Warren Meyers’ take on the payroll tax suspension:

“We have 400 employees today, but since we are a summer seasonal business we will have fewer than 100 in January. If there is a catch-up repayment in January (meaning Congress chooses not to forgive the taxes altogether), most of my employees who would need to repay the tax will be gone. Do you think the government is just going to say, ‘oh well, I guess we lost that money’? Hah! You don’t know how the government works with tax liens. My guess is that for every employee no longer on the payroll for whom back employment taxes need to be collected, the government is going to say our company is responsible for those payments instead. We could be out hundreds of thousands of extra dollars. President Biden will just say, ‘well I guess you should not have participated in a Trump program.’

So this is the vise we are in: Either we participate in the program, and risk paying a fortune in extra taxes at some future date, or we don’t participate, and have every employee screaming at us for deducting payroll taxes when President Trump told them they did not have to pay it anymore. And what happens if Congress does come along later and forgive the taxes, what kind of jerk am I for not allowing my employees to benefit from the tax break?

A payroll tax rollback was considered for the Republican stimulus packages that failed in Congress this summer, but that provision was said to be “negotiable”. In any case, nothing passed. Surely Trump’s economic advisors know that the economics of the payroll tax memo are lousy, even if Trump doesn’t get it.

I can’t decide whether the whole thing is Machiavellian or just a goof. Perhaps Trump is so eager to be seen as a tax cutter that he is willing to gloss over the distinction between a tax cut and a deferral. If the taxes owed are not forgiven, it won’t be on his watch. And Trump might believe he can weaponize the payroll tax deferral against obstinate Democrats in Congress as well as Joe Biden. Maybe he can.

Sacred Cow Chips

Category Archives: Fiscal policy

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Joe Biden’s Fat Cooked-Goose Tax Plan

The Dirt On the Corporate Income Tax