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Sweden’s Pandemic Policy: Arguably Best Practice

14 Monday Nov 2022

Posted by in Health Care, Pandemic

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When Covid-19 began its awful worldwide spread in early 2020, the Swedes made an early decision that ultimately proved to be as protective of human life as anything chosen from the policy menu elsewhere. Sweden decided to focus on approaches for which there was evidence of efficacy in containing respiratory pandemics, not mere assertions by public health authorities (or anyone else) that stringent non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) were necessary or superior.

The Swedish Rationale

The following appeared in an article in Stuff in late April, 2020,

“Professor Johan Giesecke, who first recruited [Sweden’s State epidemiologist Anders] Tegnell during his own time as state epidemiologist, used a rare interview last week to argue that the Swedish people would respond better to more sensible measures. He blasted the sort of lockdowns imposed in Britain and Australia and warned a second wave would be inevitable once the measures are eased. ‘… when you start looking around at the measures being taken by different countries, you find very few of them have a shred of evidence-base,’ he said.

Giesecke, who has served as the first Chief Scientist of the European Centre for Disease Control and has been advising the Swedish Government during the pandemic, told the UnHerd website there was “almost no science” behind border closures and school closures and social distancing and said he looked forward to reviewing the course of the disease in a year’s time.”

Giesecke was of the opinion that there would ultimately be little difference in Covid mortality across countries with different pandemic policies. Therefore, the least disruptive approach was to be preferred. That meant allowing people to go about their business, disseminating information to the public regarding symptoms and hygiene, and attempting to protect the most vulnerable segments of the population. Giesecke said:

“I don’t think you can stop it. It’s spreading. It will roll over Europe no matter what you do.”

He was right. Sweden had a large number of early Covid deaths primarily due to its large elderly population as well as its difficulty in crafting effective health messages for foreign-speaking immigrants residing in crowded enclaves. Nevertheless, two years later, Sweden has posted extremely good results in terms of excess deaths during the pandemic.

Excess Deaths

Excess deaths, or deaths relative to projections based on historical averages, are a better metric than Covid deaths (per million) for cross-country or jurisdictional comparisons. Among other reasons, the latter are subject to significant variations in methods of determining cause of death. Moreover, there was a huge disparity between excess deaths and Covid deaths during the pandemic, and the gap is still growing:

Excess deaths varied widely across countries, as illustrated by the left-hand side of the following chart:

Interestingly, most of the lowest excess death percentages were in Nordic countries, but especially Sweden and Norway. That might be surprising in terms of high Nordic latitudes, which may have created something of a disadvantage in terms of sun exposure and potentially low vitamin D levels. Norway enacted more stringent public policies during the pandemic than Sweden. Globally, however, lockdown measures showed no systematic advantage in terms of excess deaths. Notably, the U.S. did quite poorly in terms of excess deaths at 8X the Swedish rate,

Covid Deaths

The right-hand side of the chart above shows that Sweden experienced a significant number of Covid deaths per million residents. The figure still compares reasonably well internationally, despite the country’s fairly advanced age demographics. Most Covid deaths occurred in the elderly and especially in care settings. Like other places, that is where the bulk of Sweden’s Covid deaths occurred. Note that U.S. Covid deaths per million were more than 50% higher than in Sweden.

NPIs Are Often Deadly

Perhaps a more important reason to emphasize excess deaths over Covid deaths is that public policy itself had disastrous consequences in many countries. In particular, strict NPIs like lockdowns, including school and business closures, can undermine public health in significant ways. That includes the inevitably poor consequences of deferred health care, the more rapid spread of Covid within home environments, the physical and psychological stress from loss of livelihood, and the toll of isolation, including increased use of alcohol and drugs, less exercise, and binge eating. Isolation is particularly hard on the elderly and led to an increase in “deaths of despair” during the pandemic. These were the kinds of maladjustments caused by lockdowns that led to greater excess deaths. Sweden avoided much of that by eschewing stringent NPIs, and Iceland is sometimes cited as a similar case.

Oxford Stringency Index

I should note here, and this is a digression, that the most commonly used summary measure of policy “stringency” is not especially trustworthy. That measure is an index produced by Oxford University that is available on the Our World In Data web site. Joakim Book documented troubling issues with this index in late 2020, after changes in the index’s weightings dramatically altered its levels for Nordic countries. As Book said at that time:

“Until sometime recently, Sweden, which most media coverage couldn’t get enough of reporting, was the least stringent of all the Nordics. Life was freer, pandemic restrictions were less invasive, and policy responses less strong; this aligned with Nordic people’s experience on the ground.”

Again, Sweden relied on voluntary action to limit the spread of the virus, including encouragement of hygiene, social distancing, and avoiding public transportation when possible. Book was careful to note that “Sweden did not ‘do nothing’”, but it’s policies were less stringent than its Nordic neighbors in several ways. While Sweden had the same restrictions on arrivals from outside the European Economic Area as the rest of the EU, it did not impose quarantines, testing requirements, or other restrictions on travelers or on internal movements. Sweden’s school closures were short-lived, and its masking policies were liberal. The late-2020 changes in the Oxford Stringency Index, Book said, simply did not “pass the most rudimentary sniff test”.

Economic Stability

Sweden’s economy performed relatively well during the pandemic. The growth path of real GDP was smoother than most countries that succumbed to the excessive precautions of lockdowns. However, Norway’s economy appears to have been the most stable of those shown on the chart, at least in terms of real output, though it did suffer a spike in unemployment.

The Bottom Line

The big lesson is that Sweden’s “light touch” during the pandemic proved to be at least as effective, if not more so, than comparatively stringent policies imposed elsewhere. Covid deaths were sure to occur, but widespread non-Covid excess deaths were unanticipated by many countries practicing stringent intervention. That lack of foresight is best understood as a consequence of blind panic among public health “experts” and other policymakers, who too often are rewarded for misguided demonstrations that they have “done something”. Those actions failed to stop the spread in any systematic sense, but they managed to do great damage to other aspects of public health. Furthermore, they undermined economic well being and the cause of freedom. Johan Giesecke was right to be skeptical of those claiming they could contain the virus through NPIs, though he never anticipated the full extent to which aggressive interventions would prove deadly.

Scary New Variant or Omicrommon Cold?

08 Wednesday Dec 2021

Posted by in Coronavirus, Pandemic, Uncategorized

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The political motives behind the naming of the Covid Omicron variant might prove to be a huge irony. The Greek letter Xi was skipped by the World Health Organization (WHO), undoubtedly to avoid any symbolic association between Covid and the Chinese dictator Xi Jinping. After all, he’s probably determined to bury discussion of the leak at the Wuhan lab that was the probable cause of this whole mess. The WHO was happy to provide cover. The irony is that the Omicron variant might well bring on a more gentle phase of the pandemic if early indications can be trusted. But in that case, my guess is Chairman Xi wouldn’t have appreciated the twist even if WHO had called it the Xi variant.

The Omicron variant was identified in the Gauteng Province of South Africa and announced by national health authorities on November 24th. The earliest known sample was taken on November 9th. The variant was subsequently diagnosed in a number of other countries, including the U.S. It has a large number of mutations, and initial reports indicated that the variant was spreading extremely fast, having suddenly outcompeted other variants to account for the majority of new cases in South Africa. It is apparently highly contagious. Moreover, Omicron has been diagnosed among the vaccinated as well as those having immunity from prior infections, which is usually more effective and durable than vaccination. Thus, it is said to have “immune escape” properties. Scary indeed!

However, Omicron seems to have been around much longer than suggested by its initial diagnosis in late November (and see this link for an extreme view). Cases in a number of countries show that it is already global; the lags involved in diagnosis as well as earlier contacts with spreaders suggest that Omicron’s origin could have been as early as late September. That means the spread has not been quite as fast as the first alarming reports suggested.

The reported symptoms of the Omicron variant have been quite mild, with fatigue being the most noteworthy. Omicron appears to have taken one mutation from the common cold, which, like Covid-19, is a type of coronavirus. And while there has been a surge in hospitalized cases in South Africa, most of these are said to be “incidental”. That is, these patients were admitted for other problems but happened to test positive for the Omicron variant. As we’ve seen throughout the pandemic, the data is not always reliable.

It’s too early to draw definite conclusions, and this variant might prove to be more dangerous with time. In fact, some say that South Africa’s experience might not be representative because of its young population and high natural immunity. It also happens to be early summer there, when higher vitamin D levels help to boost immunity. So, there is a great deal of uncertainty about Omicron (and see here). Nevertheless, I’ll risk a jinx by momentarily contemplating an outcome that’s not terribly far-fetched.

Viruses mutate in ways that help ensure their survival: they must not kill too many of their hosts, which means the usual progression is toward less lethal variants. They may become more contagious, and new variants must be contagious enough to outcompete their ancestors. Viral interference can sometimes prevent multiple viruses from having a broad coexistence. That’s the likely phenomenon we witnessed when the Covid pandemic coincided with the virtual disappearance of the flu and other respiratory viruses. More to the point, it’s the same phenomenon that occurred when the Spanish Flu was eventually outcompeted by less deadly variants.

So it’s possible that a mild Omicron will put the pandemic behind us. If it proves to be as contagious and as mild as it appears thus far, it would likely displace Delta and other variants as the first phase of a new, endemic malady. That might even cut into the severity of the current seasonal wave. The Ethical Skeptic tweets thusly:

“So was Omicron an ultra fast-mutating magic terminator variant? A gift from God, or aliens…? … Or natural virility/genetic profile derived from a previous variant conferring immunity …”

That would be a wonderful outcome, but Omicron’s arrival in the northern hemisphere just as winter gets underway contributes to the uncertainty. It’s severity during the northern winter could be far worse than what we’ve seen in South Africa. We can hope this variant isn’t one truly deserving of Chairman Xi’s name.

CDC Makes a Bum Lead Steer: Alternate Reality vs. The Herd

16 Sunday May 2021

Posted by in Herd Immunity, Pandemic

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Jordan Schachtel enjoyed some schadenfreude last week when he tweeted:

“I am thoroughly enjoying the White House declaring COVID over and seeing the confused cultists having a nervous breakdown and demanding the continuation of COVID Mania.”

It’s quite an exaggeration to say the Biden Administration is “declaring COVID over”, however. They’re backpedaling, and while last week’s CDC announcement on masking is somewhat welcome, it reveals more idiotic thinking about almost everything COVID: the grotesquely excessive application of the precautionary principle (typical of the regulatory mindset) and the mentality of “zero COVID”. And just listen to Joe Biden’s tyrannical bluster following the CDC announcement:

“The rule is now simple: get vaccinated or wear a mask until you do.

The choice is yours.”

Is anyone really listening to this buffoon?Unfortunately, yes. But there’s no federal “rule”, unless your on federal property; it constitutes “guidance” everywhere else. I’m thankful our federalist system still receives a modicum of respect in the whole matter, and some states have chosen their own approaches (“Hooray for Florida”). Meanwhile, the state of the pandemic looks like this, courtesy of Andy Slavitt:

False Assertions

The CDC still operates under the misapprehension that kids need to wear masks, despite mountains of evidence showing children are at negligible risk and tend not to be spreaders. Here’s some evidence shared by Phil Kerpen on the risk to children:

The chart shows the fatality risk by age (deaths per 100,000), and then under the assumption of a 97% reduction in that risk due to vaccination, which is quite conservative. Given that kind of improvement, an unvaccinated 9 year-old child has about the same risk as a fully vaccinated 30 year-old!

The CDC still believes the unvaccinated must wear masks outdoors, but unless you’re packed in a tight crowd, catching the virus outdoors has about the same odds as a piano falling on your head. And the CDC insists that two shots of mRNA vaccine (Pfizer or Moderna) are necessary before going maskless, but only one shot of the Johnson and Johnson vaccine, even though J&J’s is less effective than a single mRNA jab!

Other details in the CDC announcement are worthy of ridicule, but for me the most aggravating are the agency’s implicit position that herd immunity can only be achieved through vaccination, and its “guidance” that the unvaccinated should be dealt with coercively, even if they have naturally-acquired immunity from an infection!

Tallying Immunity

Vaccination is only one of several routes to herd immunity, as I’ve noted in the past. For starters, consider that a significant share of the population has a degree of pre-existing immunity brought on by previous exposure to coronaviruses, including the common cold. That doesn’t mean they won’t catch the virus, but it does mean they’re unlikely to suffer severe symptoms or transmit a high viral load to anyone else. Others, while not strictly immune, are nevertheless unlikely to be sickened due to protections afforded by healthy vitamin D levels or because they are not obese. Children, of course, tend to be fairly impervious. Anyone who’s had a bout with the virus and survived is likely to have gained strong and long-lasting immunity, even if they were asymptomatic. And finally, there are those who’ve been vaccinated. All of these groups have little or no susceptibility to the virus for some time to come.

It’s not necessary to vaccinate everyone to achieve herd immunity, nor is it necessary to reach something like an 85% vax rate, as the fumbling Dr. Fauci has claimed. Today, almost 47% of the U.S. population has received at least one dose, or about 155 million adults. Here’s Kerpen’s vax update for May 14.

Another 33 million people have had positive diagnoses and survived, and estimates of seroprevalence would add perhaps another 30 million survivors. Some of those individuals have been vaccinated unnecessarily, however, and to avoid double counting, let’s say a total of 50 million people have survived the virus. Some 35 million children in the U.S. are under age 12. Therefore, even if we ignore pre-existing immunity, there are probably about 240 million effectively immune individuals without counting the remaining non-susceptibles. At the low end, based on a population of 330 million, U.S. immunity is now greater than 70%, and probably closer to 80%. That is more than sufficient for herd immunity, as traditionally understood.

The Herd Immunity Threshold

Here and in the following section I take a slightly deeper dive into herd immunity concepts.

Herd immunity was one of my favorite topics last year. I’m still drawn to it because it’s so misunderstood, even by public health officials with pretensions of expertise in the matter. My claim, about which I’m not alone, is that it’s unnecessary for a large majority of the population to be infected (or vaccinated) to limit the spread of a virus. That’s primarily because there is great variety in individuals’ degree of susceptibility, social connections, aerosol production, and viral load if exposed: call it heterogeneity or diversity if you like. Variation across individuals naturally limits a contagion relative to a homogeneous population.

Less than 1% of those who caught the virus died, while the others recovered and acquired immunity. The remaining subset of individuals most vulnerable to severe illness was thus reduced over time via acquired immunity or death. This is the natural dynamic that causes contagions to slow and ultimately peter out. In technical jargon, the virus reproduction rate “R” falls below a value of one. The point at which that happens is called the “herd immunity threshold” (HIT).

A population with lots of variation in susceptibility will have a lower HIT. Some have estimated a HIT in the U.S. as low as 15% -25%. Ultimately, total exposure will go much higher than the HIT, perhaps well more than doubling exposure, but the contagion recedes once the HIT is reached. So again, it’s unnecessary for anywhere near the full population to be immune to achieve herd immunity.

One wrinkle is that CIVID is now likely to have become endemic. Increased numbers of cases will re-emerge seasonally in still-susceptible individuals. That doesn’t contradict the discussion above regarding the HIT rate: subsequent waves will be quite mild by comparison with the past 14 months. But if the effectiveness of vaccines or acquired immunity wanes over time, or as healthy people age and become unhealthy, re-emergence becomes a greater risk.

Sub-Herd Immunity

A further qualification relates to so-called sub-herds. People are clustered by geographical, social, and cultural circles, so we should think of society not as a singular “herd”, but as a collection of sub-herds having limited cross-connectivity. The following charts are representations of different kinds of human networks, from Nathan D. Grawe’s review of “The Rules of Contagion, by Adam Kucharski:

Sub-herd members tend to have more degrees of separation from individuals in other sub-herds than within their own sub-herd. The most extreme example is the “broken network” (where contagions could not spread across sub-herds), but there are identifiable sub-herds in all of the examples shown above. Less average connectedness across sub-herds implies barriers to transmission and more isolated sub-herd contagions.

We’ve seen isolated spikes in cases in different geographies, and there have been spikes within geographies among sub-herds of individuals sharing commonalities such as race, religious affiliation, industry affiliation, school, or other cultural affiliation. Furthermore, transmission of COVID has been dominated by “super-spreader” events, which tend to occur within sub-herds. In fact, sub-herds are likely to be more homogeneous than the whole of society, and that means their HIT will be higher than we might naively calculate based on higher levels of aggregation.

We have seen local, state, or regional contagions peak and turn down when estimates of total incidence of infections reach the range of 15 – 25%. That appears to have been enough to reach the HIT in those geographically isolated cases. However, if those geographical contagions were also concentrated within social sub-herds, those sub-herds might have experienced much higher than 25% incidence by the time new infections peaked. Again, the HIT for sub-herds is likely to be greater than the aggregate population estimates implied, The upshot is that some sub-herds might have achieved herd immunity last year but others did not, which explains the spikes in new geographic areas and even the recurrence of spikes within geographic areas.

Conclusion

It’s unnecessary for 100% of the population to be vaccinated or to have pre-existing immunity. Likewise, herd immunity does not imply that no one catches the virus or that no one dies from the virus. There will be seasonal waves, though muted by the large immune share of the population. This is not something that government should try to stanch, as that would require the kind of coercion and scare tactics we’ve already seen overplayed during the pandemic. People face risks in almost everything they do, and they usually feel competent to evaluate those risks themselves. That is, until a large segment of the population allows themselves to be infantalized by public health authorities.

On COVID, NPIs, and “Human” Data Points

24 Tuesday Nov 2020

Posted by in Lockdowns, Pandemic, Public Health

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The other day a friend told me “your data points always seem to miss the people points.” He imagines a failure on my part to appreciate the human cost of the coronavirus. Evidently, he feels that I treat data on cases, hospitalizations, and deaths as mere accounting issues, all while emphasizing the negative aspects of government interventions.

This fellow reads my posts very selectively, hampered in part by his own mood affiliation. Indeed, he seems to lack an appreciation for the nuance and zeitgeist of my body of blogging on the topic… my oeuvre! This despite his past comments on the very things he claims I haven’t mentioned. His responses usually rely on anecdotes relayed to him by nurses or doctors he knows. Anecdotes can be important, of course. But I know nurses and doctors too, and they are not of the same mind as his nurses and doctors. Anecdotes! We’re talking about the determination of optimal policy here, and you know what Dr. Fauci says about relying on anecdotes!

Incremental Costs and Benefits

My friend must first understand that my views are based on an economic argument, one emphasizing the benefits and costs of particular actions, including human costs. COVID is dangerous, but primarily to the elderly, and no approach to managing the virus is free. Here are two rather disparate choices:

  1. Mandated minimization of economic and social interactions throughout society over some time interval in the hope of reducing the spread of the virus;
  2. Laissez faire for the general population while minimizing dangers to high-risk individuals, subject to free choice for mentally competent, high-risk individuals.

To be clear, #2 entails all voluntary actions taken by individuals to mitigate risks. Therefore, #1 implies a set of incremental binding restrictions on behavior beyond those voluntary actions. However, I also include in #1 the behavioral effects of scare mongering by public officials, who regularly issue pronouncements having no empirical basis.

The first option above entails so-called non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) by government. These are the elements of so-called lockdowns, such as quarantines and other restrictions on mobility, business and consumer activity, social activities, health care activities, school closures, and mask mandates. NPIs carry costs that are increasing in the severity of constraints they impose on society.

And before I proceed, remember this: tallying all fatal COVID cases is really irrelevant to the policy exercise. Nothing we do, or could have done, would save all those lives. We should compare what lives can be saved from COVID via lockdowns, if any, with the cost of those lockdowns in terms of human life and human misery, including economic costs.

Economic Losses

NPIs involve a loss of economic output that can never be recovered… it is gone forever, and a loss is likely to continue for some time to come. That sounds so very anodyne, despite the tremendous magnitude of the loss involved. But let’s stay with it for just a second. The loss of U.S. output in 2020 due to COVID has been estimated at $2.5 trillion. As Don Boudreaux and Tyler Cowen have noted, what we normally spend on safety and precautionary measures (willingness-to-pay), together with the probabilities of losses, implies that we value our lives at less than $4 million on average. Let’s say the COVID death toll reaches 300,000 by year-end (that’s incremental in this case— but it might be a bit high). That equates to a total loss of $1.2 trillion in life-value if we ignore distinctions in life-years lost. Now ask this: if our $2.5 trillion output loss could have saved every one of those 300,000 lives, would it have been worth it? Not even close, and the truth is that the sacrifice will not have saved even a small fraction of those lives. I grant, however, that the economic losses are partly attributable to voluntary decisions, but goaded to a great extent by the alarmist commentary of public health officials.

The full depth of losses is far worse than the dollars and cents comparison above might sound. Output losses are always matched by (and, in value, are exactly the same as) income losses. That involves lost jobs, lost hours, failed businesses, and destroyed careers. Ah, now we’re getting a bit more “human”, aren’t we! It’s nothing short of callous to discount these costs. Unfortunately, the burden falls disproportionately on low-income workers. Our elites can mostly stay home and do their jobs remotely, and earn handsome incomes. The working poor spend their time in line at food banks.

Yes, government checks can help those with a loss of income compete with elites for the available supply of goods, but of course that doesn’t replace the lost supply of goods! Government aid of this kind is a palliative measure; it doesn’t offset the real losses during a suspension of economic activity.

Decimated Public Health

The strain of the losses has been massive in the U.S. and nearly everywhere in the world. People are struggling financially, making do with less on the table, depleting their savings, and seeking forbearance on debts. The emotional strains are no less real. Anxiety is rampant, drug overdoses have increased, calls to suicide hotlines have exploded, and the permanence of the economic losses may add to suicide rates for some time to come. Dr. Robert Redfield of the CDC says more teenagers will commit suicide this year than will die from COVID (also see here). There’s also been a terrifying escalation in domestic abuse during the pandemic, including domestic homicide. The despair caused by economic losses is all too real and should be viewed as a multiplier on the total cost of severe NPIs.

More on human costs: a health care disaster has befallen locked-down populations, including avoidance of care on account of panic fomented by so-called public health experts, the media, and government. Some of the consequences are listed here. But to name just a few, we have huge numbers of delayed cancer diagnoses, which sharply decrease survival time; mass avoidance of emergency room visits, including undiagnosed heart attacks and strokes; and unacceptable delays in cardiac treatments. Moreover, lockdowns worldwide have severely damaged efforts to deal with scourges like HIV, tuberculosis, and malaria.

The CDC reports that excess mortality among 25-44 year-olds this year was up more than 26%, and the vast bulk of these were non-COVID deaths. A Lancet study indicates that a measles outbreak is likely in 2021 due to skipped vaccinations caused by lockdowns. The WHO estimates that 130,000,000 people are starving worldwide due to lockdowns. That is roughly the population of the U.S. east coast. Again, the callousness with which people willfully ignore these repercussions is stunning, selfish and inhumane, or just stupid.

Excess Deaths

Can we quantify all this? Yes we can, as a matter of fact. I’ve offered estimates in the past, and I already mentioned that excess deaths, COVID and non-COVID, are reported on the CDC’s web site. The Ethical Skeptic (TES) does a good job of summarizing these statistics, though the last full set of estimates was from October 31. Here is the graphic from the TES Twitter feed:

Note particularly the huge number of excess deaths attributable to SAAAD (Suicide, Addiction Abandonment, Abuse and Despair): over 50,000! The estimate of life-years lost due to non-COVID excess deaths is almost double that of COVID deaths because of the difference in the age distributions of those deaths.

Here are a few supporting charts on selected categories of excess deaths, though they are a week behind the counts from above. The first is all non-COVID, natural-cause excess deaths (the vertical gap between the two lines), followed by excess deaths from Alzheimer’s and dementia, other respiratory diseases, and malignant neoplasms (cancer):

The clearest visual gap in these charts is the excess Alzheimer’s and dementia deaths. Note the increase corresponding to the start of the pandemic, when these patients were suddenly shut off from loved ones and the company of other patients. I also believe some of these deaths were (and are) due to overwhelmed staff at care homes struck by COVID, but even discounting this category of excess deaths leaves us with a huge number of non-COVD deaths that could have been avoided without lockdowns. This represents a human cost over and above those tied to the economic losses discussed earlier.

Degraded Education and Health

Lockdowns have also been destructive to the education of children. The United Nations has estimated that 24 million children may drop out of school permanently as a result of lockdowns and school closures. This a burden that falls disproportionately on impoverished children. This article in the Journal of the American Medical Association Network notes the destructive impact of primary school closures on educational attainment. Its conclusions should make advocates of school closures reconsider their position, but it won’t:

“… missed instruction during 2020 could be associated with an estimated 5.53 million years of life lost. This loss in life expectancy was likely to be greater than would have been observed if leaving primary schools open had led to an expansion of the first wave of the pandemic.“

Lockdown Inefficacy

Lockdowns just don’t work. There was never any scientific evidence that they did. For one thing, they are difficult to enforce and compliance is not a given. Of course, Sweden offers a prime example that draconian lockdowns are unnecessary, and deaths remain low there. This Lancet study, published in July, found no association between lockdowns and country mortality, though early border closures were associated with lower COVID caseloads. A French research paper concludes that public decisions had no impact on COVID mortality across 188 countries, U.S. states, and Chinese states. A paper by a group of Irish physicians and scientists stated the following:

“Lockdown has not previously been employed as a strategy in pandemic management, in fact it was ruled out in 2019 WHO and Irish pandemic guidelines, and as expected, it has proven a poor mitigator of morbidity and mortality.”

One of the chief arguments in favor of lockdowns is the fear that asymptomatic individuals circulating in the community (and there are many) would spread the virus. However, there is no evidence that they do. In part, that’s because the window during which an individual with the virus is infectious is narrow, but tests may detect tiny fragments of the virus over a much longer span of time. And there is even some evidence that lockdown measures may increase the spread of the virus!

Lockdown decisions are invariably arbitrary in their impact as well. The crackdown on gyms is one noteworthy example, but gyms are safe. Restaurants don’t turn up in many contact traces either, and yet restaurants have been repeatedly implicated as danger zones. And think of the many small retailers shut down by government, while giant competitors like Wal-Mart continue to operate with little restriction. This is manifest corporatism!

Then there is the matter of mask mandates. As readers of this blog know, I think masks probably help reduce transmission from droplets issued by a carrier, that is, at close range. However, this recent Danish study in the Annals of Internal Medicine found that cloth masks are ineffective in protecting the wearer. They do not stop aerosols, which seem to be the primary source of transmission. They might reduce viral loads, at least if worn properly and either cleaned often or replaced. Those are big “ifs”.

To the extent that masks offer any protection, I’m happy to wear them within indoor public accommodations, at least for the time being. To the extent that people are “scared”, I’m happy to observe the courtesy of wearing a mask, but not outside in uncrowded conditions. To the extent that masks are required under private “house rules”, of course I comply. Public mask mandates outside of government buildings are over the line, however. The evidence that those mandates work is too tenuous and our liberties are too precious too allow that kind of coercion. And private facilities should be subject to private rules only.

QED

So my poor friend is quite correct that COVID is especially deadly to certain cohorts and challenging for the health care community. But he must come to grips with a few realities:

  • The virus won’t be defeated with NPIs; they don’t work!
  • NPIs inflict massive harm to human well-being.
  • Lockdowns or NPIs are little or no gain, high-pain propositions.

The rejection of NPI’s, or lockdowns, is based on compelling “human” data points. As Don Boudreaux says:

“The lockdowns and other restrictions on economic and social activities are astronomically costly – in a direct economic sense, in an emotional and spiritual sense, and in a ‘what-the-hell-do-these-arbitrary-diktats-portend-for-our-freedom?’ sense.” 

This doctor has a message for the those denizens of social media with an honest wish to dispense helpful public health advice:

“Americans have admitted that they will meet for Thanksgiving. Scolding and shaming them for wanting this is unlikely to slow the spread of SARS-CoV-2, though it may earn you likes and retweets. Starting with compassion, and thinking of ways they can meet, but as safely as possible, is the task of real public health. Now is the time to save public health from social media.”

And take some Vitamin D!

Predicted November COVID Deaths

08 Sunday Nov 2020

Posted by in Pandemic, Public Health

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Reported COVID deaths do not reflect deaths that actually occurred in the reporting day or week, as I’ve noted several times. Here is a nice chart from @tlowdon on Twitter showing the difference between reported deaths and actual deaths for corresponding weeks. The blue bars are weekly deaths reported by the COVID Tracking Project. The solid orange bars are the CDC’s “provisional” deaths by actual week of death, which is less than complete for recent weeks because of lags in reporting. Still, it’s easy to see that reported deaths have overstated actual deaths each week since late August.

I should note that the orange bars represent deaths that involved COVID-19, though a COVID infection might not have actually killed them. This CDC report, updated on November 4th, shows the importance of co-morbidities, which in many cases are the actual cause of death according to pre-COVID, CDC guidance on death certificates.

Leading Indicators

Researchers have studied several measures in an effort to find leading indicators of COVID deaths. The list includes new cases diagnosed (PCR positivity) and the percentage of emergency room visits presenting symptoms of COVID-like illness (%CLI). These indicators are usually evaluated after shifting them in time by a few weeks in order to observe correlations with COVID deaths a few weeks later. Interestingly, @tlowdon reports that the best single predictor of actual COVID deaths over the course of a few weeks is the sum of the %CLI and the percentage of ER patients presenting symptoms of influenza-like illness (%ILI). Perhaps adding %ILI to %CLI strengthens the correlation because the symptoms of the flu and COVID are often mistaken for one another.

The chart below reproduces the orange bars from above representing deaths at actual dates of death. Also plotted are the %Positivity from COVID tests (shifted forward 2 weeks), %CLI (3 weeks), the %ILI (3 weeks), and the sum of %CLI and %ILI (3 weeks, the solid blue line). My guess is that %ILI contributes to the correlation with deaths mainly because %ILI’s early peak (which occurred in March) led the peak in deaths in April. Otherwise, there is very little variation in %ILI. That might change with the current onset of the flu season, but as I noted in my last post, the flu has been very subdued since last winter.

What About November?

So where does that leave us? The chart above ends with our leading indicator, CLI + ILI, brought forward from the first half of October. What’s happened to CLI + ILI since then? And what does that tell us to expect in November? The chart below is from the CDC’s web site. The red line is %CLI and the yellow line is %ILI. The sum of the two isn’t shown. However, there is no denying the upward trend in CLI, though the slope of CLI + ILI would be more moderate.

As of 10/31, CLI + ILI has increased by almost 40% since it’s low in early October. If the previous relationship holds up, that implies an increase of almost 40% in actual weekly COVID deaths from about 4,000 per week to about 5,500 per week by November 21 (a little less than 800 per day).

FiveThirtyEight has a compilation of 13 different forecast models with projections of deaths by the end of November. The estimate of 5,500 per week by November 21, or perhaps slightly less per week over the full month of November, would put total COVID deaths at the top of the range of the MIT, UCLA, Iowa State, and University of Texas models, but below or near the low end of ranges for eight other models. However, those models are based on reported deaths, so the comparison is not strictly valid. Reported deaths are still likely to exceed actual deaths by the end of November, and the actual death prediction would be squarely in the range of multiple reported death predictions. That reinforces the expectation an upward trend in actual deaths.

Third Wave States

States in the upper Midwest and upper Mountain regions have had the largest increases in cases per capita over the past few weeks. Using state abbreviations, the top ten are ND, SD, WI, IA, MT, NE, WY, UT, IL, and MN, with ID at #11 (according to the CDC’s COVID Data Tracker). One factor that might mediate the increase in cases, and ultimately deaths, is the possibility of early herd immunity: in the earlier COVID waves, the increase in infections abated once seroprevalence (the share of the population with antibodies from exposure) reached a level of 15% to 25%.

Unfortunately, estimates of seroprevalence by state are very imprecise. Thus far, reliable samples have been limited to states and metro areas that had heavy infections in the first and second waves. One rule of thumb, however, is that seroprevalence is probably less than 10x the cumulative share of a population having tested positive. To be very conservative, let’s assume a seroprevalence of four times cumulative cases. On that basis, half the states in the “top ten” listed above would already have seroprevalence above 15%. Those states are ND, SD, WI, IA, and NE. The others are mostly in a range of 12% to 15%, with MI coming in the lowest at about 9%.

This gives some cause for optimism that the wave in these states and others will abate fairly soon, but there are a number of uncertainties: first, the estimates of seroprevalence above, while conservative, are very imprecise, as noted above; second, the point at which herd immunity might cause the increase in new cases to begin declining is real guesswork (though we might have confirmation in a few states before long); third, we are now well into the fall season, with lower temperatures, lower humidity, less direct sunlight, and diminishing vitamin D levels. We do not have experience with COVID at this time of year, so we don’t know whether the patterns observed earlier in the year will be repeated. If so, new cases might begin to abate in some areas in November, but that probably wouldn’t be reflected in deaths until sometime in December. And if the flu comes back with a corresponding increase in CLI + ILI, then we’d expect further increases in actual deaths attributed to COVID. That is only a possibility given the weakness in flu numbers in 2020, however.

Closing Thoughts

I was excessively optimistic about the course of the pandemic in the U.S. in the spring. While this post has been moderately pessimistic, I believe there are reasons to expect fewer deaths than previous relationships would predict. We are far better at treating COVID now, and the vulnerable are taking precautions that have reduced their incidence of infections relative to younger and healthier cohorts. So if anything, I think the forecasts above will err on the high side.

Fall Coronavirus Season

16 Friday Oct 2020

Posted by in Coronavirus, Pandemic, Uncategorized

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We’ve known for some times that COVID-19 (C19) follows seasonal patterns typical of the flu, though without the flu’s frequent antigenic drift. Now that we’re moving well into autumn, we’ve seen a surge in new C19 case counts in Europe and in a number of U.S. states, especially along the northern tier of the country.

The new case surge began in early to mid-September, depending on the state, and it’s been coincident with another surge in tests. From late July through early October, we had a near doubling in the number of tests per positive in the U.S. An increase in tests also accompanied the previous surge during the summer, which claimed far fewer lives than the initial wave in the early spring. In the summer, infections were much more prevalent among younger people than in the spring. Vitamin D levels were almost certainly higher during the summer months, our ability to treat the virus had also improved, and immunities imparted by prior infections left fewer susceptible individuals in the population. We have many of those advantages now, but D levels will fade as the fall progresses.

As for the new surge in cases, another qualification is that false positives are still a major testing problem; they inflate both case counts and C19-attributed deaths. In the absence of any improvement in test specificity, of which there is no evidence, the exaggeration caused by false positives grows larger as testing increases and positivity rates fall. So take all the numbers with that as a caveat.

How deadly will the virus be this fall? So far in Europe, the trends look very promising. Kyle Lamb provided the following charts from WHO on Twitter yesterday. (We should all be grateful that Twitter hasn’t censored Kyle yet, because he’s been a force in exposing alarmism in the mainstream media and among the public health establishment.) Take a look at these charts, and note particularly the lag between the first wave of infections and deaths, as well as the low counts of deaths now:

If the lag between diagnosis and death is similar now to the spring, Europe should have seen a strong upward trend in deaths by now, yet it’s hardly discernible in most of those countries. The fatality rates are low as well:

As Lamb notes, the IFRs in the last column look about like the flu, though again, the reporting of deaths and their causes are often subject to lags.

What about the U.S.? Nationwide, C19 cases and attributed death reports declined after July. See the chart below. More recently, reported deaths have stabilized at under 700 per day. Note again the relatively short lags between turns in cases and deaths in both the spring and summer waves.

Clearly, there has been no acceleration in C19 deaths corresponding to the recent trend in new cases. Northeastern states that had elevated death rates in the spring saw no resurgence in the summer; southern states that experienced a surge in the summer have now enjoyed taperings of both cases and deaths. But with each season, the virus seems to roll to regions that have been relatively unscathed to that point. Now, cases are surging in the upper Midwest and upper mountain states, though some of these states are lightly populated and their data are thin.

A few state charts are shown below, but trends in deaths are very difficult to tease out in some cases. First, here are new cases and reported deaths in Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota. There is a clear uptrend in cases in these states along with a very slight rise in deaths, but reported deaths are very low.

Next are Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, and South Dakota. A slight uptrend in cases began as early as August. Idaho and Montana have had few deaths, so they are not plotted in the second chart. The Dakotas have had days with higher reported deaths, and while the data are thin and volatile, the visual impression is definitely of an uptrend in deaths.

The following states are somewhat more central in latitude: Colorado, Illinois, and Ohio. There is a slight upward trend in new cases, but not deaths. Illinois is experiencing its own second wave in cases.

Out of curiosity, I also plotted Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey, all of which suffered in the first wave during the spring. They are now experiencing uptrends in cases, especially Massachusetts, but deaths have been restrained thus far.

The upshot is that states having little previous exposure to the virus are seeing an uptrend in deaths this fall. The same does not seem to be happening in states with significant prior exposure, at least not yet.

There are major questions about the reasons for the lingering death counts in the U.S.. But consider the following: first, the infection fatality rate (IFR) keeps falling, despite the stubborn level of daily reported deaths. Second, deaths reported have increasingly been pulled forward from deaths that actually occurred in the more distant past. This sort of “laundering” lends the appearance of greater persistence in deaths than is real. Third, again, false positives exaggerate not just cases, but also C19 deaths. Hospitals test everyone admitted, and patients who test positive for C19 are reimbursed at higher rates under the CARES Act; Medicare reimburses at a higher rates for C19 patients as well.

We’re definitely seeing a seasonal upswing in C19 infections in the US., now going on five weeks. In Europe, the surge in cases began slightly earlier. However, in both Europe and the U.S., these new cases have not yet been associated with a meaningful surge in deaths. The exceptions in the U.S. are the low-density upper mountain states, which have had little prior exposure to the virus. The lag between cases and deaths in the spring and summer was just two to three weeks, and while it’s too early to draw conclusions, the absence of a surge in deaths thus far bodes well for the IFR going forward. If we’re so fortunate, we can thank a combination of factors: a younger set of infecteds, earlier detection, better treatment and therapeutics, lower viral loads, and a subset of individuals who have already gained immunity.

Trump Hates/Loves Lockdowns, Dumps on Swedes

07 Sunday Jun 2020

Posted by in Health Care, Pandemic

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President Trump was in a festive mood last Friday, pleased with the May employment report, as he should be. But in his Rose Garden word jam, he made some questionable and unnecessary claims about coronavirus policies in the U.S. and the Swedish experience. I credit Trump for pushing to end the lockdowns as it became clear that they were both unhealthy and unsustainable. However, he’s now way too eager to cover his earlier tracks. That is, he is now defensive about the precautions he advocated on the advice of his medical experts in March and early April.

In the Rose Garden, Trump said that lockdowns were necessary to stop the spread of the virus. But to assert that lockdowns “stopped” or even slowed the spread of the virus is speculation at best, and they had deadly effects of their own. Most of the social distancing was achieved through voluntary action, as I have argued previously. Lockdown advocacy lacked any semblance of geographic nuance, as if uniform application makes sense regardless of population density.

Trump went on to say that Sweden was in “bad shape” because it did not impose a lockdown during the pandemic. This is not a new position for the president, but the facts are anything but clear-cut. Again, there is mixed evidence on whether mandatory lockdowns have a real impact on the spread or mortality of the coronavirus (also see here). That’s not to say that social distancing doesn’t work, but much of the benefit comes from private decisions to mitigate risk via distancing. Of course, that also depends on whether people have good information to act on. And to be fair, Sweden did take certain measures such as banning gatherings of more than 50 people, closing schools, and limiting incoming travel.

While the full tale has not been told, and Sweden’s death rate is high on a per capita basis, several other Western European countries that imposed lockdowns have had even higher death rates. The following chart is from the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IMHE). It is expressed in terms of coronavirus deaths per 100,000 of population. The orange line is Sweden, the purple line is Belgium, and the light blue line is the UK. Actuals are reported through June 4th. While Sweden’s death toll has a somewhat steeper gradient, the level remains well below both Belgium and the UK. It is also lower than the death rates for Italy and Spain, and it is about the same as France’s death rate. Yes, a number of other countries have lower death rates, including the U.S., but the evidence is hardly consistent with Trump’s characterization.

Sweden’s big mistake was not it’s decision to rely on voluntary social distancing, but in failing to adequately protect highly vulnerable populations. The country’s elderly skew older than most countries by several years. Residents of nursing homes have accounted for about half of Sweden’s coronavirus deaths, an international outlier. Inadequate preparedness in elder care has been a particular problem, including a lack of personal protective equipment for workers. There was also a poorly implemented volunteer program, intended to fill-out staffing needs, that appears to have aggravated transmission of the virus.

Sweden has also experienced a concentration of cases and deaths among its large immigrant population. It has the largest immigrant population among the Nordic countries, with large numbers of low income migrants from Syria, Iraq, Iran, Somalia and parts of Eastern Europe. Earlier in the pandemic, according to one estimate, 40% of coronavirus fatalities in Stockholm were in the Somali population. These immigrants tend to live in dense conditions, often in multigenerational households. Many residents with health problems tend to go untreated. Conditions like Vitamin D deficiency and high cholesterol, apparent risk factors for coronavirus severity, likely go untreated in these communities. In addition, language barriers and traditional trust relationships may diminish the effectiveness of communications from public health authorities. In fact, some say the style of Swedish public health messaging was too culturally idiosyncratic to be of much use to immigrants. And one more thing: immigrants are a disproportionately high 28% of nursing home staff in Sweden, implying an intimacy between two vulnerable populations that almost surely acts as a risk multiplier in both.

It might be too harsh to suggest that that Sweden could have prevented the outsized impact of the virus on immigrants. However, Sweden’s coronavirus testing has not been as intensive as other Nordic countries. More testing might have helped alleviate the spread of the virus in nursing homes and in immigrant communities. But the vulnerabilities of the immigrant population might be more a matter of inadequate health care than anything else, both on the demand and supply sides.

Contrary to Trump’s characterization, Sweden’s herd immunity strategy is not the reason for it’s relatively high death rate from the virus. Several countries that imposed lockdowns have had higher death rates. And Sweden’s death rate has been heavily concentrated among the aged in nursing homes and its large immigrant population. It’s possible that Sweden’s approach led to a cavalier attitude with respect identifying vulnerable groups and taking measures that could have protected them, including more intensive testing. Nevertheless, it’s inaccurate and unfair to scapegoat Sweden for not imposing a mandatory lockdown. The choice is not merely whether to impose lockdowns, but how to protect vulnerable populations at least cost. In that sense, general lockdowns are a poor choice.

 

Private Social Distancing, Private Reversal

04 Monday May 2020

Posted by in Liberty, Pandemic, Uncategorized

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My original post on the dominance of voluntary social distancing over the mandated variety appears below. That dominance is qualified by the greater difficulty of engaging in certain activities when they are outlawed by government, or when the natural locations of activities are declared off-limits. Nevertheless, as with almost all regulation, people make certain “adjustments” to suit themselves (sometimes involving kickbacks to authorities, because regulation does nothing so well as creating opportunities for graft). Those “adjustments” often lead to much less desirable outcomes than the original, unregulated state. In the case of a pandemic, however, it’s tempting to view such unavoidable actions as a matter of compromise.

I say this now because the voluntary social distancing preceding most government lockdown orders in March (discussed in the post below) is subject to a degree of self-reversal. Apple Mobility Data suggests that something like that was happening throughout much of April, as shown in the chart at the top of this post. Now, in early May, the trend is likely to continue as some of the government lockdown mandates are being lifted, or at least loosened.

An earlier version of the chart above appeared in a Forbes article entitled, “Apple Data Shows Shelter-In-Place Is Ending, Whether Governments Want It To Or Not“. The author, John Koetsier, noted the Apple data are taken from map searches, so they may not be reliable indicators of actual movement. But he also featured some charts from Foursquare, which showed actual visits to various kinds of destinations, and some of theoe demonstrate the upward trend in activity.

In the original post below, I used SafeGraph charts lifted from a paper I described there. The four charts below are available on the SafeGraph website, which offered the services of the friendly little robot in the lower right-hand corner, but I demurred. You’ll probably need to click on the image to read the detail. They show more granular information by industry, brand, region, and restaurant categories. The upward trends are evident in quite a few of the series.

I should qualify my interpretation of the charts above and those in my original post: First, nine states did not have stay-at-home orders, though a few of those had varying restrictions on individuals and on the operation of “non-essential” businesses. The five having no orders of any kind (that I can tell) are lightly-populated, very low-density states, so the vast majority of the U.S. population was subject to some sort of lockdown measure. Second, eight states began to ease or lift orders in the last few days of April, Georgia and Colorado being the largest. Therefore, at the tail end, a small part of the increase in activity could be related to those liberalizations. Then again, it might have happened anyway.

The authoritarian impulse to shut everything down was largely unnecessary, and it did not accomplish much that voluntary distancing hadn’t accomplished already (again, see below). Healthy people need to stop cowering and take action. That includes the non-elderly and those free of underlying health conditions. Sure, take precautions, keep your distance, but get out of your home if you can. Get some sunny Vitamin D.

Committing yourself to the existence of a shut-in is not healthy, not wise, and it might destroy whatever wealth you possess if you are a working person. The data above show that people are recognizing that fact. As much as the Left wishes it were so, government seldom “knows better”. It is least effective when it uses force to suppress voluntary behavior; it is most effective when it follows consensus, and especially when it protects the rights of individuals to make their own choices where no consensus exists.

Last week’s post follows:

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

How much did state and local governments accomplish when they decided to issue stay-at-home orders? Perhaps not much. That’s the implication of data presented by the authors of “Internal and external effects of social distancing in a pandemic” (starts on page 22 in the linked PDF). Social distancing began in the U.S. in a series of voluntary, private actions. Government orders merely followed and, at best, reinforced those actions, but often in ham-handed ways.

The paper has a broader purpose than the finding that social distancing is often a matter of private initiative. I’ll say a bit more about it, but you can probably skip the rest of this paragraph without loss of continuity. The paper explores theoretical relationships between key parameters (including a social distancing construct) and the dynamics of a pandemic over time in a social welfare context. The authors study several alternatives: a baseline in which behavior doesn’t change in any way; a “laissez faire” path in which actions are all voluntary; and a “socially optimal” path imposed by a benevolent and all-knowing central authority (say what???). I’d offer more details, but I’ll await the coming extension promised by the authors to a world in which susceptible populations are heterogenous (e.g., like Covid-19, where children are virtually unaffected, healthy working age adults are roughly as at-risk as they are to the flu, and a population of the elderly and health-compromised individuals for which the virus is much more dangerous than the flu). In general, the paper seems to support a more liberalized approach to dealing with the pandemic, but that’s a matter of interpretation. Tyler Cowen, who deserves a hat-tip, believes that reading is correct “at the margin”.

Let’s look at some of the charts the authors present early in the paper. The data on social distancing behavior comes from Safegraph, a vendor of mobility data taken from cell phone location information. This data can be used to construct various proxies for aggregate social activity. The first chart below shows traffic at “points of interest” (POI) in the U.S. from March 8 to April 12, 2020. That’s the blue line. The red line is the percentage of the U.S. population subject to lockdown orders on each date. The authors explain the details in the notes below the chart:

Clearly POI visits were declining sharply before any governments imposed their own orders. The next two charts show similar declines in the percent of mobile devices that leave “home” each day (“home” being the device’s dominant location during nighttime hours) and the duration over which devices were away from “home”, on average.

So all of these measures of social activity began declining well ahead of the government orders. The authors say private social distancing preceded government action in all 50 states. POI traffic was down almost 40% by the time 10% of the U.S. population was subject to government orders, and those early declines accounted for the bulk of the total decline through April 12. The early drops in the two away-from-home measures were 15-20%, again accounting for well over half of the total decline.

The additional declines beyond that time, to the extent they can be discerned, could be either trends that would have continued even in the absence of government orders or reinforcing effects the orders themselves. This does not imply that lockdown orders have no effects on specific activities. Rather, it means that those orders have minor incremental effects on measures of aggregate social activity than the voluntary actions already taken. In other words, the government lockdowns are largely a matter of rearranging the deck chairs, or, that is to say, their distribution.

Many private individuals and institutions acted early in response to information about the virus, motivated by concerns about their own safety and the safety of family and friends. The public sector in the U.S. was not especially effective in providing information, with such politicos as President Donald Trump, Nancy Pelosi, Andrew Cuomo, Bill De Blasio, and the mayor of New Orleans minimizing the dangers into the month of March, and some among them encouraging people to get out and celebrate at public events. Even Anthony Fauci minimized the danger in late February (not to mention the World Health Organization). In fact, “the scientists” were as negligent in their guidance as anyone in the early stages of the pandemic.

When lockdown orders were issued, they were often arbitrary and nonsensical. Grocery stores, liquor stores, and Wal Mart were allowed to remain open, but department stores and gun shops were not. Beaches and parks were ordered closed, though there is little if any chance of infection outdoors. Lawn care services, another outdoor activity, were classified as non-essential in some jurisdictions and therefore prohibited. And certain personal services seem to be available to public officials, but not to private citizens. The lists of things one can and can’t buy truly defies logic.

In March, John W. Whitehead wrote:

“We’re talking about lockdown powers (at both the federal and state level): the ability to suspend the Constitution, indefinitely detain American citizens, bypass the courts, quarantine whole communities or segments of the population, override the First Amendment by outlawing religious gatherings and assemblies of more than a few people, shut down entire industries and manipulate the economy, muzzle dissidents, ‘stop and seize any plane, train or automobile to stymie the spread of contagious disease,’…”

That is fearsome indeed, and individuals can accomplish distancing without it. If you are extremely risk averse, you can distance yourself or take other precautions to remain protected. You can either take action to isolate yourself or you can decide to be in proximity to others. The more risk averse among us will internalize most of the cost of voluntary social distancing. The less risk averse will avoid that cost but face greater exposure to the virus. Of course, this raises questions of public support for vulnerable segments of the population for whom risk aversion will be quite rational. That would certainly be a more enlightened form of intervention than lockdowns, though support should be offered only to those highly at-risk individuals who can’t support themselves.

Christopher Phelan writes of three rationales for the lockdowns: buying time for development of a vaccine or treatments; reducing the number of infected individuals; and to avoid overwhelming the health care system. Phelan thinks all three are of questionable validity at this point. A vaccine might never arrive, and Phelan is pessimistic about treatments (I have more hope in that regard). Ultimately a large share of the population will be infected, lockdowns or not. And of course the health care system is not overwhelmed at this point. Yes, those caring for Covid patients are under a great stress, but the health care system as a whole, and patients with other maladies, are currently suffering from massive under-utilization.

If you wish to be socially distant, you are free to do so on your very own. Individuals are quite capable of voluntary risk mitigation without authoritarian fiat, as the charts above show. While private actors might not internalize all of the external costs of their activities, government is seldom capable of making the appropriate corrections. Coercion to enforce the kinds of crazy rules that have been imposed during this pandemic is the kind of abuse of power the nation’s founders intended to prevent. Reversing those orders can be difficult, and the precedent itself becomes a threat to future liberty. Nevertheless, we see mounting efforts to resist by those who are harmed by these orders, and by those who recognize the short-sighted nature of the orders. Private incentives for risk reduction, and private evaluation of the benefits of social and economic activity, offer superior governance to the draconian realities of lockdowns.

Don’t Be Cowed: Shelter, But Get Outside

29 Sunday Mar 2020

Posted by in Pandemic, Uncategorized

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As the coronavirus ordeal continues, it’s astonishing to hear the refrain from government officials, celebrities, talking heads, and social media scolds to “stay inside“. President Trump did it again today at his press conference. WTF? In northern England a man was arrested for “unauthorized walking”. Orders to “shelter in place” are often interpreted to mean “don’t go outside your home” except when necessary, as if active shooters are marauding through neighborhoods. In fairness, I don’t think anyone in the U.S. has yet been arrested for taking a walk, except for this incident, which is bad enough. Still, the misplaced emphasis of such rhetoric is confusing to people. The threat to civil liberties is one thing, but the suggestion that we should all stay inside is itself a threat to public health.

If you can get out of your home without coming face-to-face with others, you SHOULD get outside whenever you can! Get out in the sun and out of the forced-air, dehumidified environment that is your dwelling unit. Get some vitamin D and breath some fresh, humid air.

Here’s a personal anecdote: My yard backs-up to an extensive wooded area of a huge corporate campus. It was built years ago, and ever since, the company has welcomed residents of our neighborhood to walk the grounds. The company even maintains an access road that connects our street to a route that is often more convenient than our main entrance. A very good neighbor. I was out walking along one of the roads through the campus yesterday. Employees have not reported to work there for three weeks due to an employee’s diagnosis with the virus, so it was very quiet. A security guard drove by and stopped to tell me that I could no longer walk the campus due to the coronavirus. “That’s corporate policy now with this thing…”, he trailed off. As if my solitary stroll through the campus would contribute to the spread of the virus! Again, WTF? Of course, it is private property and they are entitled to make their own rules. I’m okay with that, but the virus is nonsensical as a rationale.

Public parks are closed in many areas. I understand the wisdom of discouraging people from mingling and preventing the virus’s spread via surfaces like park benches and playground equipment. Nevertheless, I believe parks should remain open to individuals or families for walking, running or resting. Just keep your distance.

You are highly unlikely to catch the virus outside unless you are in close proximity to an individual with the virus. Even then it’s unlikely. Yes, it can survive in air for about three hours, carried along in fine, exhaled aerosols. That is of much greater concern indoors, where the air is still and its volume limited. It is quickly dispersed outdoors into the vast atmosphere. And again, the virus is likely to degrade quickly in warm temperatures (> 54 degrees), direct sunlight, and high absolute humidity. All three are covered in this report. So enjoy your yard, your porch, your street, or at least open your windows when you can.

Covid-19: Killing It With Sunshine, Fresh Air

14 Saturday Mar 2020

Posted by in Health Care, Pandemic

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Update: also see “Don’t Be Cowed: Shelter, But Get Outside”

Patients with viral and bacterial infections seem to respond better if exposed to sunshine and fresh air. In fact, anyone hoping to keep infections at bay would do well to get outside in the sun for a while every day. A friend’s post alerted me to this fascinating article in Medium.com: “Coronavirus and the Sun: a Lesson from the 1918 Influenza Pandemic“, by Richard Hobday. It is well-sourced, though the references aren’t hyperlinked. Here’s the main point:

“... records from the 1918 pandemic suggest one technique for dealing with influenza — little-known today — was effective. … Put simply, medics found that severely ill flu patients nursed outdoors recovered better than those treated indoors. A combination of fresh air and sunlight seems to have prevented deaths among patients; and infections among medical staff. There is scientific support for this. Research shows that outdoor air is a natural disinfectant. Fresh air can kill the flu virus and other harmful germs. Equally, sunlight is germicidal and there is now evidence it can kill the flu virus.

On the last assertion, see here. Viruses always ebb as the weather warms in the spring. Light conditions improve, which might be more important than temperature: UV light is thought to kill germs of many kinds. Moreover, Vitamin D is generally protective against infections, and a deficiency is thought to increase Covid-19 risk.

Hobday goes on to describe the Open Air Factor, which probably is related to the presence of ozone, but maybe other curatives:

“Doctors who had first-hand experience of open-air therapy at the hospital in Boston were convinced the regimen was effective. It was adopted elsewhere. If one report is correct, it reduced deaths among hospital patients from 40 per cent to about 13 per cent. …

Patients treated outdoors were less likely to be exposed to the infectious germs that are often present in conventional hospital wards. They were breathing clean air in what must have been a largely sterile environment. We know this because, in the 1960s, Ministry of Defence scientists proved that fresh air is a natural disinfectant. Something in it, which they called the Open Air Factor, is far more harmful to airborne bacteria — and the influenza virus — than indoor air. They couldn’t identify exactly what the Open Air Factor is. But they found it was effective both at night and during the daytime. 

I’m not sure they were able to control for the relative absence of germs in fresh air, as opposed to the presence of something beneficial, but it’s certainly intriguing.

So whether you’re still on the “office team” or otherwise on the job, try to get outside! Whether you’re in a Covid-19 self-quarantine or worried about catching it, get outside if you can. Get some sun and fresh air, especially after a thunderstorm, when the air is rich with ozone. But drink plenty of fluids and don’t get burned! I’ll be hanging out in my back yard.