Tag Archives: Inflation tax

Big Spending, Explosive Debt, and the Inflation Tax

07 Tuesday May 2024

Posted by in Deficits, Fiscal policy, Inflation

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The chart above makes a convincing case that we have a spending problem at the federal level. Really, we’ve had a spending problem for a long time. But at least tax revenue today remains reasonably well-aligned with its 50-year historical average as a share of GDP. Not spending. Even larger deficits opened up during the pandemic and they haven’t returned to pre-pandemic levels.

We’ve seen Joe Biden break spending records. His initiatives, often with questionable merit, have included the $1.8 trillion American Rescue Plan and the nearly $0.8 trillion Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, along with several other significant spending initiatives such as the Promise to Address Comprehensive Toxics Act and the subsidy-laden CHIPS Act. Meanwhile, emergency spending has become a regular occurrence on Biden’s watch. More recently, he’s made repeated efforts to forgive massive amounts of student loans despite the Supreme Court’s clear ruling that such gifts are unconstitutional.

Indeed, while Biden keeps pretty busy spinning tales of his days driving an 18-wheeler, cannibals devouring his Uncle Bosie Finnegan, his upbringing in black churches, synagogues, or in the Puerto Rican community, he still finds time to dream up ways for the government to spend money it doesn’t have. Or his kindly puppeteers do.

Biden’s New Budget

Eric Boehm expressed wonderment at Biden’s fiscal 2025 budget not long after its release in March. He was also mystified by the gall it took to produce a “fact sheet” in which the White House congratulated itself on fiscal responsibility. That’s how this Administration characterizes deficits projected at $16 trillion over the next ten years. No joke!

Furthermore, the Administration says the record spending will be “paid for”. Well, yes, with tax increases and lots of borrowing! There are a great many fabulist claims made by the White House about the budget. This link from the Office of Management and Budget includes a handy list of propaganda sheets they’ve managed to produce on the virtues of their proposal.

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects ten-year deficits under current law that are $3 trillion higher than Biden’s proposed budget. That’s the basis of the White House’s boast of fiscal restraint. But the difference is basically paid for with a couple of accounting tricks (see below). More charitably, one could say it’s paid for with higher taxes, aided by the assumption of slightly faster economic growth. The latter will be a good trick while undercutting incentives and wages with a big boost to the corporate tax rate.

The revenue projected by the While House from those taxes does not come anywhere close to eliminating the gap shown in the CBO’s chart above. Federal spending under Biden’s budget grows at about 4% annually, just a bit slower than nominal GDP. Thus, the federal share of GDP remains roughly constant and only slightly higher than the CBO’s current projection for 2034. Nevertheless, spending relative to GDP would continue at an historically high rate. Over the next decade, it would average more than 3% higher than its 50-year average. That would be about $1.3 trillion in 2034!

Meanwhile, the ratio of tax revenue to GDP under Biden’s proposal, as they project it, would average slightly higher than its 50-year average, reaching a full percentage point above by 2034 (and higher than the CBO baseline). That’s probably optimistic.

There is little real effort in this budget to reduce federal deficits, with Treasury borrowing rates now near 15-year highs. Interest expense has grown to an alarming share of spending. In fact, it’s expected to exceed spending on defense in 2024! Perhaps not coincidentally, the White House assumes a greater decline in interest rates than CBO over the next 10 years.

Treats or Tricks?

The situation is likely worse than the White House depicts, given that its budget incorporates assumptions that look generous to their claim of fiscal restraint. First, they frontload nondefense discretionary spending, allowing Biden to make extravagant promises for the near-term while pushing off steep declines in budget commitments to the out-years. The sharp reductions in this category of spending pares more than $2 trillion from the 10-year deficit. From the link above:

Biden also proposes to restore the expanded the child tax credit — for one year! How handy from a budget perspective: heroically call for an expanded credit (for a year) while avoiding, for the time being, the addition of a couple of trillion to the 10-year deficit.

Code Red

So where does this end? The ratio of federal debt to GDP will resume its ascent after a slight decline from the pandemic high. Here is the CBO’s projection:

The Biden budget shows a relatively stable debt to GDP ratio through 2034 due to the assumptions of slightly faster GDP growth, lower Treasury borrowing rates, and the aforementioned “fiscal restraint”. But don’t count on it!

The government’s growing dominance over real resources will have negative consequences for growth in the long-term. Purely as a fiscal matter, however, it must be paid for in one of three ways: revenue from explicit taxes, federal borrowing, or an implicit tax on the public more commonly known as the inflation tax. The last two are intimately related.

Bond investors always face at least a small measure of default risk even when lending to the U.S. Treasury. There is almost no chance the government would ever default outright by failing to pay interest or principal when due. However, investors hold an expectation that the value of their bonds will erode in real terms due to inflation. To compensate, they demand an “inflation premium” in the interest rate they earn on Treasury bonds. But an upside surprise to inflation would constitute a “soft default” on the real value of their bonds. This occurred during and after the pandemic, and it was triggered by a burgeoning federal deficit.

Brief Mechanics

John Cochrane has explained the mechanism by which acts of fiscal profligacy can be transmitted to the price of goods. The real value of outstanding federal debt cannot exceed the expected real value of future surpluses (a present value summed across positive and negative surpluses). If expected surpluses are reduced via some emergency or shock such that repayment in real terms is less likely, then the real value of government debt must fall. That means either interest rates or the price level must rise, or some combination of the two.

The Federal Reserve can prevent interest rates from rising (by purchasing bonds and increasing the money supply), but that leaves a higher price level as the only way the real value of debt can come into line. In other words, an unexpected increase in the path of federal deficits would be financed by money printing and an inflation tax. The incidence of this unexpected “implicit” tax falls not only to bondholders, but also on the public at large, who suffer an unexpected decline in the purchasing power of their nominal assets and incomes. This in turn tends to free-up real resources for government absorption.

Government Debt Is Risky

It appears that investors expect the future deficits now projected by the CBO (and the White House) to be paid down someday, to some extent, by future surpluses. That might seem preposterous, but markets apparently aren’t surprised by the projected deficits. After all, fiscal policy decisions can change tremendously over the course of a few years. But it still feels like excessive optimism. Whatever the case, Cochrane cautions that the next fiscal emergency, be it a new pandemic, a war, a recession, or some other crisis, is likely to create another huge expansion in debt and a substantial increase price level. Joe Biden doesn’t seem inclined to put us in a position to deal with that risk very effectively. Unfortunately, it’s not clear that Donald Trump will either. And neither seems inclined to seriously address the insolvencies of Social Security and Medicare. If unaddressed, those mandatory obligations will become real crises over the next decade.

Musings and Misgivings of a Likely Trump Voter

24 Thursday Aug 2023

Posted by in Politics

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Choosing between the lesser of evils is a bummer, but that’s often the reality for voters. That goes almost without saying… our choices are politicians! I’ll certainly be in that quandary if Donald Trump is the Republican nominee for president in 2024, which looks increasingly likely. I held my nose and voted for him — twice — primarily because the Big Government solutions promoted consistently by Democrats are so awful.

At this point I’m not fully on board with any GOP candidate. That could change, but not yet. Now, if you’re a Trump supporter and you think the rambling opinions below are too critical of your guy, cut me some slack. I’m not a “Never Trumper”. I’m a “Never Statist”. And while I’ve never had much faith that Trump is with me on that count, he will almost surely be the lesser of evils.

The Abused Politician

Trump has been subjected to despicable treatment by political opponents since well before his inauguration in 2016, and his abusers in and out of government never let up. Many of the charges and accusations against him have been pure fiction and at this point represent obvious election interference. So I’m somewhat sympathetic to him despite some of his positions and often disagreeable manner. Still, I credit him for being a fighter, and as an aside, I’ll add that I actually enjoy some of his rants. He has the style of a nasty stand-up comic, which gives me some occasional laughs.

I agree with Trump on certain policy matters. On others, including some fundamental points, I find it hard to trust him as a leader, and I said that long before he was elected in 2016. He claims not to be a politician, but he is a politician through and through. He’s also a populist. And while populism can serve as a valuable check on certain excesses of government, it often cuts the wrong way, favoring what I like to call “do-somethingism”. That usually means public intervention. Populism is a perfectly natural home for a “pick-and-choose” statist like Trump, however. Moreover, I’m not happy that he refused to debate his opponents, and that too was a purely political decision.

Malign Neglect

If you need proof of Trump’s base instincts as a politician, look no further than his refusal to engage on the subject of entitlement reform. It’s no secret that both Social Security (SS) and Medicare are technically insolvent. This is probably the most important fiscal issue the country will face in the foreseeable future.

Without reform, SS benefits will be cut 23% in 2034. That would bring certain outrage among seniors and anyone approaching retirement. Sure, it’s a decade down the road, but addressing it sooner would be far less painful. Does Trump favor a huge cut in benefits? Probably not. Does he think benefits can simply continue without additional funding or reform of some kind? Does he prefer a greater inflation tax, rather than reform? Does he secretly favor “just print the money” like the modern monetary theorists of the Left? There are much better alternatives, but where is his leadership on this issue?

His unwillingness to discuss entitlements, and indeed, his denigration of anyone who so much as mentions the need for serious reforms, is a disgrace. He knows the train wreck is coming, but his focus is squarely on short-term politics. Why are so many on the Right willing to fall for this? Maybe they too understand it’s an elephant in the room, but an elephant that must not be named. After all, it’s not as if the Democrats have done a thing to address the issue.

False Fealty to Workers

Trump is a protectionist, given to the mercantilist fallacy that only exports are good and imports are bad. We import heavily because we are a high-income nation. The other side of that coin is that the world craves our assets, including the U.S. dollar (which is in absolutely no danger of losing its dominance as the primary currency of international transactions).

Here’s a little truth from “Trade Flows 101”: U.S. imports of goods and services correspond to purchases of U.S. assets by the rest of the world. In other words, U.S. trade deficits present opportunities for foreign investors to supply us with capital. That helps foster greater U.S. productive capacity, greater worker productivity, and higher wages.

On the other hand, government intervention to discourage imports via quotas or tariffs increases domestic prices and erodes real wages in the U.S. Furthermore, to favor certain industries (exporters) over others (importers) is a grotesque application of corporatist industrial policy. Why does the Right tolerate Trump’s advocacy for this sort of government central planning? Part of the answer is national security, which I accept to a limited extent, but not when “critical industries” are extended favors by government that are redundant to already powerful market forces.

Protectionism owes some of its popularity to the appeal of nationalism, as distinct from patriotism. However, it promotes sclerosis among domestic producers by shielding them from competition, causing direct harm to U.S. consumers. There is nothing patriotic about protectionism.

Real Stuff

A fallacy closely related to protectionism, and one to which Trump subscribes, is that the U.S. must produce more “things” — more commodities and manufactured goods. That’s not the market’s judgement, but one that appeals to the instincts of interventionists. In any case, services are often more highly valued than physical goods. If your comparative advantage is in producing a highly-valued service, don’t beat yourself up over neglecting to produce hard goods at which you’re comparatively lousy. Specialization and trade are under-appreciated as true social and economic miracles.

That said, we certainly have an advantage in the production of fossil fuels and should continue to produce them without interference. I’m with Trump on that. One day, reliable sources of “clean” energy will be economic, but we’re not there yet.

Corporate State

Well before his presidential run, Trump had a history of leveraging government to achieve his private ends. Eminent domain actions were useful to his development projects and expanding his own property rights at the expense of others. Naturally, he claimed his projects were in the public interest. Ah, the mindset of a rent seeker: government exists to actively facilitate the acquisitive interests of private business, or at least the “winners”. That thinking is thoroughly contrary to the libertarian view of the state’s role in establishing a neutral social environment under the rule-of-law.

In other ways, as President, Trump sought to bring major corporations under his political sway. Trump’s protectionist leanings as president were a prime example of corporatism in action. And read this account of a public meeting (and watch it at the link) at which one CEO after another, under Trump’s furrowed gaze, took turns describing something great they were doing for the country and committing to do more. It was one big, weird suck-up session intended to make the puffed-up Trump look like a great leader. As the author at the link says:

“These are corporate executives doing the President’s bidding for fear or favour.”

I supported Trump’s tax cuts, though they were certainly designed to reduce taxes on corporate income. Was this corporatist largess? That might have been part of his motivation. However, as I’ve argued before, corporate income is largely double-taxed. Moreover, shareholders do not bear the full burden of corporate taxes. Workers bear a significant portion of the burden, so Trump’s corporate tax cuts encouraged growth in real wages, whether he understood it or not.

It’s Still So Big

Tax cuts paired with reduced spending would have been a welcome approach. Unfortunately, Trump was a fairly big spender during his term in office, even if you exclude Covid emergency spending. Growth in the government’s dominance over resources did not slow on his watch. Fiscally disciplined he’s not!

It’s true that his administration made efforts to curtail regulation, but in retrospect, those steps at best arrested the growth of regulation, rather than achieving reductions. The hope of seeing any real deconstruction of the administrative state under Trump was fleeting.

Migration

Immigration is a complicated issue when it comes to assessing Trump’s candidacy. I’m strongly in favor of greater legal immigration because it would improve our demographics and labor supply while shrinking our entitlements deficits. Legal migrants are often technically proficient and many come with sponsorships. On the whole, legal migrants tend to be ready and willing to work,

This position is often condemned by Trump’s most ardent cheerleaders, however. I’ve generally supported Trump’s position on illegal immigration as a matter of national security, to eliminate human trafficking, and to reduce burdens on public aid and support systems. Unfortunately, during Trump’s presidency, he did more to reduce legal immigration than illegal immigration. I have no qualms about “the Wall” except for its expense and the likelihood that cheaper and superior technologies could be deployed for border security. Trump might prefer the Wall’s symbolic value.

Rightly or wrongly, Trump’s messaging on immigration strikes many as nativist, providing an easy excuse for the Left to accuse him of racism. That certainly won’t help his election prospects.

Conclusion

Trump will almost surely be the GOP nominee, unless Democrats succeed in putting him behind bars by then. If the choice is Trump vs. almost any Democrat I can imagine, I’ll have to vote for him. For all his faults and wild card qualities, I still consider him a safer alternative than the devils we know on the Left. But I’d feel much better about him if he’d take a responsible position on Social Security and Medicare reform, abandon protectionism except in cases of critical national security needs (and without overkill), commit to spending reductions, and adopt a more productive approach to legal immigration.

Oh To Squeeze Fiscal Discipline From a Debt Limit Turnip

01 Wednesday Feb 2023

Posted by in Fiscal policy, Monetary Policy

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It’s as if people view the debt limit controversy as a political nuisance rather than the stopgap enforcement mechanism for fiscal sanity that it’s intended to be. That’s a lesson in how far we’ve gone toward an unhealthy acceptance of permanent federal deficits. Oh, most people seem to realize the the government’s spending is prodigious and beyond our capacity to collect taxes, but many don’t grasp the recklessness of the ongoing blowout. Federal deficits are expected to average $1.6 trillion per year over the next decade, versus less than $0.9 trillion and $1.25 trillion over the two previous decades, respectively. That $1.25 trillion includes the massive (and excessive) transfers that took place during the pandemic, which is why we’ve bumped up against the debt limit earlier than had been expected. The trend isn’t abating, despite the fact that the pandemic is behind us. And keep in mind that the Congressional Budget Office has been too optimistic for the past 20 years or so. Take a look at federal debt relative to GDP:

Unpleasant Arithmetic

With federal debt growing faster than GDP, the burden of servicing the debt mounts. This creates a strain in the coordination of fiscal and monetary policy, as described by David Andolfatto, who last year reviewed the implications of “Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic” for current policy. His title was taken from a seminal paper written by Thomas Sargent and Neil Wallace in 1981. Andolfatto says that:

“… attempting to monetize a smaller fraction of outstanding Treasury securities has the effect of increasing the rate of inflation. A tighter monetary policy ends up increasing the interest expense of debt issuance. And if the fiscal authority is unwilling to curtail the rate of debt issuance, the added interest expense must be monetized—at least if outright default is to be avoided.

Andolfatto wrote that last spring, before the Federal Reserve began its ongoing campaign to tighten monetary policy by raising short-term interest rates. But he went on to say:

“Deficit and debt levels are elevated relative to their historical norms, and the current administration seems poised to embark on an ambitious public spending program. … In the event that inflation rises and then remains intolerably above target, the Federal Reserve is expected to raise its policy rate. … if the fiscal authority is determined to pursue its deficit policy into the indefinite future, raising the policy rate may only keep a lid on inflation temporarily and possibly only at the expense of a recession. In the longer run, an aggressive interest rate policy may contribute to inflationary pressure—at least until the fiscal regime changes.”

So it is with a spendthrift government: escalating debt and interest expense must ultimately be dealt with via higher taxes or inflation, despite the best intentions of a monetary authority.

Fiscal Wrasslin’

Some people think the debt limit debate is all a big fake. Maybe … there are spendthrifts on both sides of the aisle. Still, the current debt limit impasse could serve a useful purpose if fiscal conservatives succeed in efforts to restrain spending. There is, however, an exaggerated uproar over the possibility of default, meaning a failure to make scheduled payments on Treasury securities. The capital markets aren’t especially worried because an outright default is very unlikely. Establishment Republicans may well resort to their usual cowardice and accept compromise without holding out for better controls on spending. Already, in a politically defensive gesture, House Speaker Kevin McCarthy has said the GOP wishes to strengthen certain entitlement programs. Let’s hope he really means restoring solvency to the Social Security and Medicare Trust Funds via fundamental reforms. And if the GOP rules out cuts to any program, let’s hope they don’t rule out cuts in the growth of these programs, or privatization. For their part, of course, Democrats would like to eliminate the debt ceiling entirely.

One of the demands made by Republicans is a transformation of the federal tax system. They would like to eliminate the income tax and substitute a tax on consumption. Economists have long favored the latter because it would eliminate incentives that penalize saving, which undermine economic growth. Unfortunately, this is almost dead in the water as a political matter, but the GOP further sabotaged their own proposal in their zeal to abolish the IRS. Their consumption tax would be implemented as a national sales tax applied at the point of sale, complete with a new Treasury agency to administer the tax. They’d have done better to propose a value added tax (VAT) or a tax on a simple base of income less saving (and other allowances).

Gimmicks and Measures

We’ve seen proposals for various accounting tricks to allow the government to avoid a technical default and buy time for an agreement to be reached on the debt limit. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen already has implemented “extraordinary measures” to stay under the debt limit until June, she estimates. The Treasury is drawing down cash, skipping additional investments in government retirement accounts (which can be made up later without any postponement of benefits), plus a few other creative accounting maneuvers.

Payment prioritization, whereby the Treasury makes payments on debt and critical programs such as Social Security and Medicare, but defers a variety of other payments, has also been considered. Those deferrals could include amounts owed to contractors or even government salaries. However, a deferral of payments owed to anyone represents a de facto default. Thus, payment prioritization is not a popular idea, but if push comes to shove, it might be viewed as the lesser of two evils. Missing payments on government bonds could precipitate a financial crisis, but no one believes it will come to that.

Two other ideas for avoiding a breach of the debt ceiling are rather audacious. One involves raising new cash via the sale of premium bonds by the Treasury, as described here by Josh Barro (and here by Matt Levine). The other idea is to mint a large denomination ($1 trillion) platinum, “commemorative” coin, which the Treasury would deposit at the Federal Reserve, enabling it to conduct business as usual until the debt limit impasse is resolved. I’ll briefly describe each of these ideas in more detail below.

Premium Bonds

Premium bonds would offer a solution to the debt limit controversy because the debt ceiling is defined in terms of the par value of Treasury debt outstanding, as opposed to the amount actually raised from selling bonds at auction. For example, a note that promises to pay $100 in one year has a par value of $100. If it also promises to pay $100 in interest, it will sell at a steep premium. Thus, the Treasury collects, say, $185 at auction, and it could use the proceeds to pay off $100 of maturing debt and fund $85 of federal spending. That would almost certainly require a “market test” by the Treasury on a limited scale, and the very idea might reveal any distaste the market might have for obviating the debt limit in this fashion. But distaste is probably too mild a word.

An extreme example of this idea is for the Treasury to sell perpetuities, which have a zero par value but pay interest forever, or at least until redeemed beyond some minimum (but lengthy) term. John Cochrane has made this suggestion, though mainly just “for fun”. The British government sold perpetuities called consols for many years. Such bonds would completely circumvent the debt limit, at least without legislation to redefine the limit, which really is long overdue.

The $1 Trillion Coin

Minting a trillion dollar coin is another thing entirely. Barro has a separate discussion of this option, as does Cochrane. The idea was originally proposed and rejected during an earlier debt-limit controversy in 2011. Keep in mind, in what follows, that the Fed does not follow Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).

Skeptics might be tempted to conclude that the “coin trick” is a ploy to engineer a huge increase the money supply to fund government expansion, but that’s not really the gist of this proposal. Instead, the Treasury would deposit the coin in its account at the Fed. The Fed would hold the coin and give the Treasury access to a like amount of cash. To raise that cash, the Fed would sell to the public $1 trillion out of its massive holdings of government securities. The Treasury would use that cash to meet its obligations without exceeding the debt ceiling. As Barro says, the Fed would essentially substitute sales of government bonds from its portfolio for bonds the Treasury is prohibited from selling under the debt limit. The effect on the supply of money is basically zero, and it is non-inflationary unless the approach has an unsettling impact on markets and inflation expectations (which of course is a distinct possibility).

When the debt ceiling is finally increased by Congress, the process is reversed. The Treasury can borrow again and redeem its coin from the Fed for $1 trillion, then “melt it down”, as Barro says. The Fed would repurchase from the public the government securities it had sold, adding them back to its portfolio (if that is consistent with its objectives at that time). Everything is a wash with respect to the “coin trick”, as long as the Treasury ultimately gets a higher debt limit.

Lust For the Coin

In fairness to skeptics, it’s easy to understand why the “coin trick” described above might be confused with another coin minting idea that arose from the collectivist vanguard during the pandemic. Representative Rashida Tlaib (D-MI) proposed minting coins to fund monthly relief payments of $1,000 – $2,000 for every American via electronic benefit cards. She was assisted in crafting this proposal by Rohan Grey, a prominent advocate of Modern Monetary Theory (MMT), the misguided idea that government can simply print money to pay for the resources it demands without inflationary consequences.

Tlaib’s plan would have required the Federal Reserve to accept the minted coins as deposits into the Treasury’s checking account. But then, rather than neutralizing the impact on the money supply by selling government bonds, the coin itself would be treated as base money. Cash balances would simply be made available in the Treasury’s checking account with the Fed. That’s money printing, pure and simple, but it’s not at all the mechanism under discussion with respect to short-term circumvention of the debt limit.

Fed Independence

The “coin trick” as a debt limit work-around is probably an impossibility, as Barro and others point out. First, the Fed would have to accept the coin as a deposit, and it is under no legal obligation to do so. Second, it obligates the Fed to closely coordinate monetary policy with the Treasury, effectively undermining its independence and its ability to pursue its legal mandates of high employment and low inflation. Depending on how badly markets react, it might even present the Fed with conflicting objectives.

Believe me, you might not like the Fed, but we certainly don’t want a Fed that is subservient to the Treasury… maintaining financial and economic stability in the presence of an irresponsible fiscal authority is bad enough without seating that authority at the table. As Barro says of the “coin trick”:

“These actions would politicize the Fed and undermine its independence. In order to stabilize expectations about inflation, the Fed would have to communicate very clearly about its intentions to coordinate its fiscal actions with Treasury — that is, it would have to tell the world that it’s going to act as Treasury’s surrogate in selling bonds when Treasury can’t. …

These actions would interfere with the Fed’s normal monetary operations. … the Fed is currently already reducing its holdings of bonds as part of its strategy to fight inflation. If economic conditions change (fairly likely, in the event of a near-default situation) that might change the Fed’s desired balance sheet strategy.”

On With The Show

Discussions about the debt limit continue between the White House and both parties in Congress. Kevin McCarthy met with President Biden today (2/1), but apparently nothing significant came it. Fiscal conservatives wonder whether McCarthy and other members of the GOP lack seriousness when it comes to fiscal restraint. But spending growth must slow to achieve deficit reduction, non-inflationary growth, and financial stability.

Meanwhile, even conservative media pundits seem to focus only on the negative politics of deficit reduction, ceding the advantage to Democrats and other fiscal expansionists. For those pundits, the economic reality pales in significance. That is a mistake. Market participants are increasingly skeptical that the federal government will ever pay down its debts out of future surpluses. This will undermine the real value of government debt, other nominal assets, incomes and buying power. That’s the inflation tax in action.

Unbridled growth of the government’s claims on resources at the expense of the private sector destroys the economy’s productive potential, to say nothing of growth. The same goes for government’s insatiable urge to regulate private activities and to direct patterns of private resource use. Unfortunately, so many policy areas are in need of reform that imposition of top-down controls on spending seems attractive as a stopgap. Concessions on the debt limit should only be granted in exchange for meaningful change: limits on spending growth, regulatory reforms, and tax simplification (perhaps replacing the income tax with a consumption tax) should all be priorities.

In the meantime, let’s avoid trillion dollar coins. As a debt limit work-around, premium bonds are more practical without requiring any compromise to the Fed’s independence. Other accounting gimmicks will be used to avoid missing payments, of course, but the fact that premium bonds and platinum coins are under discussion highlights the need to redefine the debt limit. When the eventual time of default draws near, fiscal conservatives must be prepared to stand up to their opponents’ convenient accusations of “brinksmanship”. The allegation is insincere and merely a cover for government expansionism.

A Fiscal Real-Bills Doctrine? No Such Thing As Painless Inflation Tax

14 Tuesday Jun 2022

Posted by in Fiscal policy, Inflation, Uncategorized

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A remarkable proposal made recently by Representative Ro Khanna (D -CA) would have the Biden Administration impose price controls, which would be bad enough. Khanna also would like the federal government to cover the inflation losses incurred by Americans by having it directly purchase certain goods and services and resell them “cheap” to consumers. In fairness, Khanna says the government should attempt to take advantage of dips in prices for oil, food commodities, and perhaps other necessities, which of course would limit or reverse downward price changes. When asked about Khanna’s proposal, Pete Buttigieg, Joe Biden’s Transportation Secretary, replied that there were great ideas coming out of Congress and the Administration should consider them. Anyway, the idea is so bad that it deserves a more thorough examination.

Central Planners Have No Clothes

First, such a program would represent a massive expansion in the scope of government. It would also present ample opportunities for graft and cronyism, as federal dollars filter through the administrative layers necessary to manage the purchases and distribution of goods. Furthermore, price and quantity would then be shaded by a heavy political component, often taking precedence over real demand and cost considerations. And that’s beyond the crippling “knowledge problem” that plagues all efforts at central planning.

One of the most destructive aspects of allowing government to absorb a greater share of total spending is that government is not invested with the same budgetary discipline as private buyers. Take no comfort in the notion that the government might prove expert at timing these purchases to leverage price dips. Remember that government always spends “other people’s money”, whether it comes from tax proceeds, lenders, or the printing press (and hence future consumers, who have absolutely no agency in the matter). Hence, price incentives take on less urgency, while political incentives gain prominence. The loss of price sensitivity means that government expenditures are likely to inflate more readily than private expenditures. This is all the more critical at a time when inflation is becoming embedded in expectations and pricing decisions. Khanna thus proposes an inflation “solution” that puts less price-sensitive bureaucrats in charge of actual purchases. That’s a prescription for failure.

If anyone in Biden’s White House is seriously considering a program of this kind, and let’s hope they’re not, they should at least be aware that direct subsidies for the purchase of key goods would be far more efficient. It’s also possible to hedge the risk of future price increases on commodities markets, perhaps simply distributing hedging gains to consumers when they pay off. However, having the federal government participate as a major player in commodities options and futures is probably not on the table at this point … and I shudder to think of it, but it might be more efficient than Khanna’s vision.

A Fiscal Real Bills Doctrine

Khanna’s program would almost surely cause inflation to accelerate. Inflation itself a form of taxation imposed by profligate governments, though it’s an inefficient tax since it creates greater uncertainty. Higher prices deflate the real value of most government debt (borrowed from the public), assets fixed in nominal value, and incomes. Read on, but this program would have the government pay your inflation tax for you by inflating some more. Does this sound like a vicious circle?

Khanna’s concept of inflation-relief is a fiscal reimagining of a long-discredited monetary theory called the “Real Bills Doctrine”. According to this doctrine, rising prices and costs necessitate additional money creation so that businesses have the liquidity to pay the bills associated with ongoing productive efforts. The “real” part is a reference to the link between business expenses and actual production, despite the fact that those bills are expressed in nominal terms. The result of this policy is a cycle of ever-higher inflation, as ever-more money is printed. This was the policy utilized by the Reichsbank in Weimar Germany during its hyperinflation of 1922-23. It’s really quite astonishing that anyone ever thought such a policy was helpful!

In Khanna’s version of the doctrine, the government spends to relieve cost pressure faced by consumers, so the rationale has nothing to do with productive effort.

Financing and the Central Bank Response

It’s reasonable to ask how these outlays would be financed. In all likelihood, the U.S. Treasury would borrow the funds at interest rates now at 10-15 year highs, which have risen in part to compensate investors for higher inflation.

My bet is that Khanna imagines the Fed would simply “print” money (i.e., buy the new government debt floated by the Treasury to pay for the program). This is the prescription of so-called Modern Monetary Theory, whose adherents have either forgotten or have never learned that money growth and inflation is a costly and regressive form of taxation.

Most economists would say the response of the Federal Reserve to this fiscal stimulus would bear on whether it really ignites additional inflationary pressure. Of course, rather than borrowing, Congress could always vote to levy higher taxes on the public in order to pay the public’s inflation tax burden! But then what’s the point? Well, taxing at least has the virtue of not fueling still higher inflation, and the Fed would not have a role to play.

But if the government simply borrows instead, it adds to the already bloated supply of government debt held by the public. This borrowing is likely to put more upward pressure on interest rates, and the federal government’s mounting interest expense requires more financing. What then might the Fed do?

The Fed is an independent, quasi-government entity, so it would not have to accommodate the additional spending by printing money (buying the new Treasury debt). Either way, investors are increasingly skeptical that the growing debt burden will ever be reversed via future surpluses. The fiscal theory of the price level holds that something must reduce the real value of government debt (in order to satisfy the long-term fiscal budget constraint). That “something” is a higher price level. This position is not universally accepted, and some would contend that if the Fed simply set a nominal GDP growth target and stuck to it, accelerating inflation would not have to follow from Khanna’s policy. The same if the Fed could stick to a symmetric average inflation target, but they certainly haven’t been up to that task. Hoping the Fed would fully assert its independence in a fiscal hurricane is probably wishful thinking.

Conclusion

There are no choke points in the supply chain for bad ideas on the left wing of the Democratic Party, and they are dominating party centrists in terms of messaging. The answer, it seems, is always more government. High inflation is very costly, but the best policy is to rein it in, and that requires budgetary and monetary discipline. Attempts to make high inflation “painless” are misguided in the first instance because they short-circuit consumer price responses and substitution, which help restrain prices. Second, the presumption that an inflation tax can be “painless” is an invitation to fiscal debauchery. Third, expansive government brings out hoards of rent seekers instigating corruption and waste. Finally, mounting public debt is unlikely to be offset by future surpluses, and that is the ultimate admission of Modern Monetary Theory. A fiscal real bills doctrine would be an additional expression of this lunacy. To suggest otherwise is either sheer stupidity or an exercise in gaslighting. You can’t inflate away the pain of an inflation tax.

The Fed’s Balance Sheet: What’s the Big Deal?

08 Sunday May 2022

Posted by in Government Failure, Inflation, Monetary Policy

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The Federal Reserve just announced tighter monetary policy in an attempt to reduce inflationary pressures. First, it raised its target range for the federal funds rate (on overnight loans between banks) by 0.5%. The new range is 0.75% – 1%. Second, on June 1, the Fed will begin taking steps to reduce the size of its $9 trillion portfolio of securities. These holdings were acquired during periods of so-called quantitative easing (QE) beginning in 2008, including dramatic expansions in 2020-21. A shorthand reference for this portfolio is simply the Fed’s “balance sheet”. It includes government debt the Fed has purchased as well as privately-issued mortgage-backed securities (MBS).

What Is This Balance Sheet You Speak Of?

Talk of the Fed’s balance sheet seems to mystify lots of people. During the 2008 financial crisis, the Fed began to inject liquidity into the economy by purchasing large amounts of assets to be held on its balance sheet. This was QE. It’s scope was unprecedented and a departure from the Fed’s pre-crisis reliance on interest rate targeting. QE had the effect of increasing bank reserves, which raised the possibility of excessive money supply growth. That’s when the Fed began to pay interest to banks on reserves, so they might be content to simply hold some of the reserves over and above what they are required to hold, rather than using all of that excess to support new loans and deposits (and thus money growth). However, that interest won’t stop banks from lending excess reserves if better opportunities present themselves.

The Fed has talked about reducing, “normalizing”, or “tapering” its balance sheet for some time, but it only recently stopped adding to it. With inflation raging and monetary policy widely viewed as too “dovish”, analysts expected the Fed to stop reinvesting proceeds from maturing securities, which amounts to about $95 billion per month. That would shrink or “taper” the balance sheet at a rate of about $1.1 trillion per year. Last week the Fed decided to cap the “runoff” at $47.5 billion per month for the first three months, deferring the $95 billion pace until September. Monetary policy “hawks” were disappointed by this announcement.

Monetizing Government

So, one might ask, what’s the big deal? Why must the Fed taper its securities holdings? Well, first, the rate of inflation is far above the Fed’s target range, and it’s far above the “average Joe’s” comfort range. Inflation imposes significant costs on the economy and acts as a regressive form of taxation, harming the poor disproportionately. To the extent that the Fed’s huge balance sheet (and the corresponding bank reserves) are supporting incremental money growth and fueling inflation, the balance sheet must be reduced.

In that connection, the Fed’s investment in government debt represents monetized federal debt. That means the Fed is essentially printing money to meet the Treasury’s financing needs. Together with profligate spending by the federal government, nothing could do more to convince investors that government debt will never be repaid via future budget surpluses. This dereliction of the government’s “full faith and credit”, and the open-armed acceptance of the inflation tax as a financing mechanism (à la Modern Monetary Theory), is the key driver of fiscal inflation. Reducing the balance sheet would represent de-monetization, which might help to restore faith in the Fed’s ability to push back against fiscal recklessness.

Buyer of First Resort

Perhaps just as critically, the Fed’s heavy investment in government debt and MBS represents an ongoing distortion to the pricing of financial assets and the allocation of capital. Some call this interference in the “price discovery process”. That’s because the Fed has represented a market-altering presence, a willing and inelastic buyer of government debt and MBS. Given that presence, it’s difficult for buyers and sellers to discern the true values of alternative uses of capital, or to care.

QE was, among other things, a welcome institutional development for the U.S. Treasury and for those who fancy that fresh money printing is an ever-valid form of government payment for scarce resources. The Fed’s involvement also means that other potential buyers of Treasury debt need not worry about interest rate risk, making public debt relatively more attractive than private debt. This is a dimension of the “crowding out” phenomenon, whereby the allocation of capital and flows of real resources between public and private uses are distorted.

The Fed’s presence as a buyer of MBS depresses mortgage rates and makes mortgage lending less risky for lenders and investors. As a result, it encourages an over-investment in housing and escalating home prices. This too distorts the allocation of capital and real resources, at the margin, toward housing and away from uses with greater underlying value.

Conclusion

The magnitude of the Fed’s balance sheet is an ongoing testament to an increasingly dominant role of central authorities in the economy. In this case, the Fed has served as a conduit for the inflation tax. In addition, it has unwittingly facilitated crowding out of private capital investment. The Fed’s purchases of MBS have distorted the incentives (and demand) for residential investment. These are subtle effects that the average citizen might not notice, just as one might not notice the early symptoms of a debilitating disease. The long-term consequences of the Fed’s QE activities, including the inflation tax and distorted allocations of capital, are all too typical of failures of government intervention and attempts at central planning. But don’t expect anyone at the Fed to admit it.

Fiscal Inflation Is Simple With This One Weird Trick

03 Thursday Feb 2022

Posted by in Fiscal policy, Inflation

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I’ll get to the weird trick right off the bat. Then you can read on if you want. The trick really is perverse if you believe in principles of sound credit and financial stability. To levy a fiscal inflation tax, all the government need do is spend like a drunken sailor and undermine its own credibility as a trustworthy borrower. One way to do that: adopt the policy prescriptions of Modern Monetary Theory (MMT).

A Theory of Deadbeat Government

That’s right! Run budget deficits and convince investors the debt you float will never be repaid with future real surpluses. That doesn’t mean the government would literally default (though that is never outside the realm of possibility). However, given such a loss of faith, something else must give, because the real value government debt outstanding will exceed the real value of expected future surpluses from which to pay that debt. The debt might be in the form of interest-bearing government bonds or printed money: it’s all government debt. Ultimately, under these circumstances, there will be a revised expectation that the value of that debt (bonds and dollars) will be eroded by an inflation tax.

This is a sketch of “The Fiscal Theory of the Price Level” (FTPL). The link goes to a draft of a paper by John Cochrane, which he intends as an introduction and summary of the theory. He has been discussing and refining this theory for many years. In fairness to him, it’s a draft. There are a few passages that could be written more clearly, but on the whole, FTPL is a useful way of thinking about fiscal issues that may give rise to inflation.

Fiscal Helicopters

Cochrane discusses the old allegory about how an economy responds to dollar bills dropped from a helicopter — free money floating into everyone’s yard! The result is the classic “too much money chasing too few goods” problem, so dollar prices of goods must rise. We tend to think of the helicopter drop as a monetary policy experiment, but as Cochrane asserts, it is fiscal policy.

We have experienced something very much like the classic helicopter drop in the past two years. The federal government has effectively given money away in a variety of pandemic relief efforts. Our central bank, the Federal Reserve, has monetized much of the debt the Treasury issued as it “loaded the helicopter”.

In effect, this wasn’t an act of monetary policy at all, because the Fed does not have the authority to simply issue new government debt. The Fed can buy other assets (like government bonds) by issuing dollars (as bank reserves). That’s how it engineers increases in the money supply. It can also “lend” to the U.S. Treasury, crediting the Treasury’s checking account. Presto! Stimulus payments are in the mail!

This is classic monetary seigniorage, or in more familiar language, an inflation tax. Here is Cochrane description of the recent helicopter drop:

“The Fed and Treasury together sent people about $6 trillion, financed by new Treasury debt and new reserves. This cumulative expansion was about 30% of GDP ($21,481) or 38% of outstanding debt ($16,924). If people do not expect that any of that new debt will be repaid, it suggests a 38% price-level rise. If people expect Treasury debt to be repaid by surpluses but not reserves, then we still expect $2,506 / $16,924 = 15% cumulative inflation.”

FTPL, May I Introduce You To MMT

Another trend in thought seems to have dovetailed with the helicopter drop , and it may have influenced investor sentiment regarding the government’s ever-weakening commitment to future surpluses: that would be the growing interest in MMT. This “theory” says, sure, go ahead! Print the money government “must” spend. The state simply fesses-up, right off the bat, that it has no intention of running future surpluses.

To be clear, and perhaps more fair, economists who subscribe to MMT believe that deficits financed with money printing are acceptable when inflation and interest rates are very low. However, expecting stability under those circumstances requires a certain level of investor confidence in the government fisc. Read this for Cochrane’s view of MMT.

Statists like Bernie Sanders, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, and seemingly Joe Biden are delighted to adopt a more general application of MMT as intellectual cover for their grandiose plans to remake the economy, fix the climate, and expand the welfare state. But generalizing MMT is a dangerous flirtation with inflation denialism and invites economic disaster.

If This Goes On…

Amid this lunacy we have Joe Biden and his party hoping to find avenues for “Build Back Better”. Fortunately, it’s looking dead at this point. The bill considered in the fall would have amounted to an additional $2 trillion of “infrastructure” spending, mostly not for physical infrastructure. Moreover, according to the Congressional Budget Office, that bill’s cost would have far exceeded $2 trillion by the time all was said and done. There are ongoing hopes for separate passage of free community college, an extended child tax credit for all families, a higher cap for state and local income tax deductions, and a host of other social and climate initiatives. The latter, relegated to a separate bill, is said to carry a price tag of over $550 billion. In addition, the Left would still love to see complete forgiveness of all student debt and institute some form of universal basic income. Hey, just print the money, right? Warm up the chopper! But rest easy, cause all this appears less likely by the day.

Are there possible non-inflationary outcomes from ongoing helicopter drops that are contingent on behavior? What if people save the fresh cash because it’s viewed as a one-time windfall (i.e., not a permanent increase in income)? If you sit on such a windfall it will erode as prices rise, and the change in expectations about government finance won’t be too comforting on that score.

There are many aspects of FTPL worth pondering, such as whether bond investors would be very troubled by yawning deficits with MMT noisemakers in Congress IF the Fed refused to go along with it. That is, no money printing or debt monetization. The burgeoning supply of debt would weigh heavily on the market, forcing rates up. Government keeps spending and interest costs balloon. It is here where Cochrane and critics of FTPL have a sharp disagreement. Does this engender inflation in the absence of debt monetization? Cochrane says yes if investors have faith in the unfaithfulness of fiscal policymakers. Excessive debt is then every bit as inflationary as printing money.

Real Shocks and FTPL

It’s natural to think supply disruptions are primarily responsible for the recent acceleration of inflation, rather than the helicopter drop. There’s no question about those price pressures in certain markets, much of it inflected by wayward policymakers, and some of those markets involve key inputs like energy and labor. Even the median component of the CPI has escalated sharply, though it has lagged broader measures a bit.

Broad price pressures cannot be sustained indefinitely without accommodating changes in the supply of money, which is the so-called “numeraire” in which all goods are priced. What does this have to do with FTPL or the government’s long-term budget constraint? The helicopter drop certainly led to additional money growth and spending, but again, FTPL would say that inflation follows from the expectation that government will not produce future surpluses needed for long-term budget balance. The creation of either new money or government debt, loaded the chopper as it were, is sufficient to accommodate broad price pressures over some duration.

Conclusion

Whether or not FTPL is a fully accurate description of fiscal and monetary phenomena, few would argue that a truly deadbeat government is a prescription for hyperinflation. That’s an extreme, but the motivation for FTPL is the potential abandonment of good and honest governing principles. Pledging an inflation tax is not exactly what anyone means by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government.

Deficits Are a Symptom of Statist Excess

12 Monday Feb 2018

Posted by in Big Government, Taxes

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One thing’s clear with respect to President Trump’s budget proposal and the ongoing debate over appropriations: federal spending will increase and add to future budget deficits. This follows the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) enacted late last year, which many expect to add upwards of $1 trillion to deficits over the next 10 years. I have offered mixed praise of some of the reforms and rate cuts in the TCJA, though it does not accomplish much in the way of tax simplification and it will almost certainly require a large increase in federal borrowing. Ultimately, however, dollar for dollar, a tax cut giving rise to a deficit inflicts lower (or even negative) costs on the private sector than an unfunded spending binge, which is costly in the most basic terms: resources devoured by government.

Cost of Spending

The cost of an extra dollar of government spending at the most basic level is the value of lost opportunities to which the resources absorbed by government otherwise could have been put. When the government spends an extra dollar, and if the government pays a competitive market price, the goods and services exchanged for that dollar by private party “A” would be valued at more than one dollar by other private parties who lost the opportunity to trade with “A” for those same goods and services.

There might be a strong case for incremental spending in any particular instance, of course. Can we benefit from more national defense? Infrastructure? Grants of foreign aid? Subsidies for this industry or that? This technology or that? This cultural program or that? Public aid? Primary research? Regulatory budgets? I’d favor very few of those as general spending priorities. However, there are many subcategories and so many special interests that it is difficult to control spending as long as compromise is needed to accomplish anything.

The Trump budget is a mix of cuts in non-defense spending and large increases in defense, infrastructure outlays, and border security. On balance, it would lead to substantially higher budget deficits over the next ten years. He won’t get all of what he wants, but it would be astonishing if larger deficits are not an outcome.

Unfortunately, government is typically inefficient in the execution of its tasks and it is less responsive to price incentives than private buyers, who are fully vested in “ownership” of the dollars they spend. Government agents, no matter how honorable, simply do not have the same kind of stake in the outcome as a private owner. Obviously, spending by federal agencies is influenced by the political process, which creates opportunities for side rewards for those who direct or influence spending and those who receive the payments. These side rewards are pure private rents arising from public largess. For a private party, the profitability of transacting with government may well exceed the normal return to capital or entrepreneurship. The efficiency of government spending is compromised by its political nature and the uneconomic behavior of government agents. I therefore have strong doubts about the cost-benefit comparison of almost any public initiative.

Un-Taxing

The government ultimately acquires its funds from taxes enforced via coercive power. After all, tax collection requires a considerable enforcement effort. A tax payment of one dollar requires the sacrifice of things that would have been acquired, now or in the future, in voluntary, private transactions valued more highly than one dollar by the taxpayer. That is the nature of gains from voluntary trade foregone. The result is that one dollar of taxation extracts more than one dollar of value from the private sector. Conversely, a reduced tax liability of one dollar means that private parties can engage in an extra dollar of voluntary trade and benefit from the surplus.

There are few forms of taxes that don’t distort incentives in the private market. Taxes may blunt incentives for work, saving, and deployment of capital in productive uses. To the extent that these private decisions are twisted by taxes in ways that differ from fully voluntary decisions, there is a further loss of value and resource waste. Eliminating these distortions is always a worthy goal.

Funding Deficits

Government has ways other than immediate taxation of paying for excess spending. One is to borrow from the public, domestic or foreign. Those who purchase the government’s debt, loaning their money to the government, do so voluntarily. That debt carries an interest obligation by the government, and it must repay the principle some day. That will require new taxes and their attendant distortions, even more borrowing, and/or some other method of extracting value from the private sector. A principle known as Ricardian equivalence holds that the effects of government outlays are the same whether financed by taxes or borrowing, because taxpayers know that future taxes will be owed to pay off government debt, and so they discount that liability into their behavioral calculus.

Additional borrowing can create an unstable financial environment if borrowing occurs at interest rates higher than the economy’s rate of growth. Borrowing might also “crowd out” private borrowers, absorbing saving that would otherwise be used to finance investment in the economy’s productive capacity. In other words, the resources acquired with that extra dollar of government spending will lead to less private investment and a sacrifice of future production.

Sneaky Inflation Tax

Another way that government can pay for spending is by imposing an inflation tax. This amounts to a devaluation of privately-held assets accomplished by inducing unexpected inflation. It allows government debt to be extinguished in the future with dollars having reduced purchasing power. Essentially, more currency (or its electronic equivalent) is placed into circulation: money printing, if you like. That sets up the “too-much-money-chasing-too-few-goods” inflation cycle. But like any other tax, the inflation tax is involuntary and creates waste by inducing the public to respond to distorted incentives.

Summary

An additional dollar of government spending absorbs a dollar of resources, and destroys more value than that given lost surplus to those who would otherwise have benefited from those resources. Moreover, the spending often fails to return a full dollar in benefits, often lining the pockets of elite grifters in the process. Ultimately, the funding for incremental spending must be commandeered from private parties via taxes or an inflationary taking of assets. Public borrowing might conceal the reality of taxes for a time, but it may crowd out productive investment that would otherwise enhance economic growth. So a case against incrementally larger government can be made in terms of resource costs as well as the distortionary effects of taxes and dissipation of future private growth.

By the same token, an ostensible reduction in taxes might be illusory, to the extent that future taxes or an inflationary taking will be necessary to cover the debt one day. On the other hand, there is no direct resource cost involved, and a tax reduction unbinds constraints and distortions on private incentives, which is unambiguously beneficial. And that’s true as long as the tax reductions aren’t targeted to benefit particular sectors, parties or technologies in any new misadventures in government central planning.

Deficits, in and of themselves, are either irrelevant or possibly damaging to long-term economic growth. You’ll get them with either tax cuts or spending hikes. But spending hikes absorb real resources, whereas tax cuts release resources by transforming a dead weight loss in private markets into proper gains from trade. If deficits are a problem, and if eliminating them requires costly tax distortions, then the real problem is the expanse of the state.

Do Not Rot Productive Capital

21 Saturday Feb 2015

Posted by in Taxes

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Dividend and capital gains income are taxed at lower rates than regular wage and salary income. That such income is taxed lightly strikes progressives as offensive, but the intent and effects of these lower rates is not to redistribute income to rentiers. Rather, relatively low dividend and capital gains tax rates are in place because they limit double-taxation, minimize taxation of inflationary “gains”, and reward successful risk-taking.

Dividends, and ultimately capital gains, derive from corporate earnings. Corporate income in the U.S. is taxed at the highest rate in the OECD, with a top federal rate of 38% (though the rate drops to 35% above a certain level of earnings). Dividends may or may not be paid to shareholders from corporate income, but if so, they are subsequently taxed again as personal income. If dividends were taxed as regular income to individuals, the combined federal taxes (corporate and individual) on that marginal income in upper brackets would be in excess of 75%. With state corporate and personal income taxes added on, the after-tax dividend received by an individual shareholder from each dollar of pre-tax corporate income could then be less than 10 cents in some states.

The top federal tax rate on dividends is 20%, versus 39.6% for regular income. One reason that dividend income is taxed at lower rates than wage and salary income is recognition of the confiscatory nature of double taxation, as illustrated above. Realized capital gains are taxed at the same rate as dividends for the same reason. A capital gain is the increase in the value of an asset over time. Such gains are taxed only when an asset is sold, when the gain is realized. The low tax rate on gains from the sale of corporate stock also limits double taxation (and even triple taxation).

Stock prices tend to rise along with the expected stream of future after-tax corporate earnings and dividends. A prospective buyer of shares knows they will incur taxes on future dividends, which limits the price they are willing to pay for the shares. So, higher future earnings will be taxed to the corporation when they occur, higher future dividends will be taxed to the buyer of shares when dividends are eventually paid, and the resulting gain in the share price received by the seller today is taxed as a capital gain to the seller. Triple (and anticipatory) taxation! A relatively low tax rate on capital gains at least helps to limit the damage from the awful incentives created by multiple taxation of the same income.

Another important reason for taxing capital gains more lightly than wages and salaries is that the tax, in the presence of inflation, diminishes the real value of an asset. As an example, compare the following situations in which the price level increases by 20% over five years: Worker Joe earns $10 an hour to start with and $12 an hour at the end of year 5; Saver Dev earns $1 dividends per share of the Prophet Corp (which he plans to hold indefinitely) to start with and $1.20 at the end of year 5; Retiree Cap buys one share of Gaines Corp worth $100 at the start and sells it for $120 at the end of year 5. On a pre-tax basis, these three individuals all keep pace with inflation. The real value of their pre-tax earnings, or the share value in Cap’s case, is unchanged after five years. Cap keeps pace by virtue of a $20 capital gain, so the real value of his share is unchanged.

If all three types of income are taxed at the same rate, Joe and Dev both keep pace with inflation on an after-tax basis as well. But what about Cap? After taxes, the proceeds of his stock sale are $115. Cap’s after-tax gain is only 15%, less than the inflation that occurred, so the real value of his investment was diminished by the combination of inflation and the capital gains tax. The same would be true for farmland, artwork, or any other kind of asset. It is one matter to tax flows of income that change with inflation. It is another to tax changes in property value that would otherwise keep pace with inflation. This is truly a form of wealth confiscation, and it provides a further rationale for taxing capital gains more lightly than wage and salary income, or not at all.

There are further complexities that influence the results. For one thing, all three individuals would suffer real losses if inflation pushed them into higher tax brackets. This is why bracket thresholds are indexed for inflation. Another wrinkle is the “stepped-up basis at death”, by which heirs incur taxable gains only on increases in value that occur after the death of their benefactor. This aspect of the tax code was recently discussed on Sacred Cow Chips here.

The third rationale for taxing capital gains more lightly than wage and salary income is an attempt to improve the risk-return tradeoff: larger rewards, ex ante and ex post, are typically available only with acceptance of higher risk of loss or complete failure. This is true for private actors and from a societal point of view. It is hoped that lighter taxes on contingent rewards will encourage savings and their deployment into promising ventures that may entail high risk.

This post was prompted by a article in The Freeman entitled “A Loophole For the Wealthy? Demystifying Capital Gains“, by Dr. Kim Henry. I was somewhat surprised to learn that Dr. Henry is a dentist. His theme is of interest from a public finance perspective, and he provides a good discussion of the advantages of maintaining a low tax rate on capital gains. My only complaint is with the first of these two points:

“[The capital gains tax rate] is lower for two important reasons:
1. Although the gain is realized in one year, it actually took place over more than one year. The wine did not increase in value just in the year it was sold. It took 30 years to achieve its higher price.
2. Capital gains are not indexed to inflation. …”

To be fair, Dr. Henry’s point relative to the time required to achieve a gain probably has more to do with the riskiness of an asset or venture’s returns, rather than the passage of time per se. If an asset’s value increases by 4% per year, the three points raised above (multiple taxation, taxing of inflationary gains, and rewarding successful risk-taking) would be just as valid after year 1 as they are after year 5.

Taxing income from capital is fraught with dangers to healthy investment incentives, which are primary drivers of employment and income growth. Double taxation of corporate income is not helpful. Capital gains taxes suffer from the same defect and others. But capital income is a ripe target for those who wish to score political points by inflaming envy. It’s a dark art.

Debt Don’t Have No Mercy In This Land

25 Tuesday Mar 2014

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Peter Schiff warns that the growth of debt will catch up with us. If it’s impossible to cut federal spending or tax more heavily, then the only remaining avenue is more debt issuance and ultimately an inflation tax. This scenario is all too realistic, and it may put the Federal Reserve into a bind of having no credible QE exit strategy. Will the Fed really allow rates to rise? Will it really stop printing?