Creative destruction takes place when inefficient producers are outcompeted by other firms, especially those brandishing new technologies. The concept, originally developed by Joseph Schumpeter in the 1940s, came to be accepted as a hallmark of market dynamics and capitalism. Successful market entrants rise to compete and eventually cripple incumbent producers who’ve grown stale in their offerings, inputs, or methods.
Creative destruction encourages long-term economic growth in several ways. First, it allows unproductive firms to fail, freeing resources to be absorbed by firms having solid growth opportunities. Second, creative destruction enables the diffusion of new technologies. Third, it motivates incumbents to improve their game, adapting to new realities in the marketplace. This is a continuous process. There are always firms that fail to keep pace with their competitors, whether old-line producers or failing risk-takers, but this is especially the case during periods of economic weakness.
Harmful Policy Menu
Attempting to prevent creative destruction via public policy is counter-productive, anti-competitive, and it impedes economic growth. Yet we constantly expend well-meaning energies to short circuit the process by attempting to promote uneconomic technologies, shield established firms from competition, and resuscitate dying firms. These efforts include industrial policies, barriers to foreign trade, excessive regulation of new technologies, selective taxation, certain bankruptcy reorganizations, and outright bailouts.
Creative destruction is a sign of flourishing competition, but it is subverted by industrial policies that subsidize politically-favored firms that otherwise would be uncompetitive. These policies create artificial advantages that waste public resources on what are often just bad ideas (see here and here).
Likewise, protectionism breeds weakness while shielding domestic producers from competition. And selective taxes, such as those on online sales, create an uneven playing field, blunting competitive forces.
Policies that encourage the survival of “zombie firms” also thwart creative destruction. These are companies with chronic losses that manage to hang on, sometimes for many years, with refinanced debt. Companies and their lenders can expend a great deal of internal effort forestalling bankruptcy. However, it’s not uncommon for zombie firms to languish for years but ultimately fail even after bankruptcy reorganizations, especially when the sole focus is on financial restructuring rather than business operations.
Government sometimes steps in to prolong the survival of struggling firms via subsidies, loan guarantees, and protracted efforts to keep interest rates low. Bailouts of various kinds have become all too common. Bailout activity creates perverse incentives with respect to risk. It also wastes resources by propping up inefficient operators, trapping resources in uses that return less to society than their opportunity costs.
Macro Maleficence
Ben Landau-Taylor makes a provocative but sensible claim in an article entitled “Industrial Greatness Requires Economic Depressions”. It’s about an unfortunate side effect of government policies intended to stabilize the economy: business failures occur with greater frequency during economic contractions, and that’s when policymakers are most apt to render aid via expansionary fiscal and monetary actions. No one likes economic downturns and unemployment, so “stimulative” policy is easy to sell politically, despite its all-too-typical failures in terms of timing and efficacy (see here and here). One intent is to support firms whose travails are revealed by a weak economy, including those relying on obsolete technologies. It might buy them survival time, but on the public dime. Ultimately, by forestalling creative destruction, these policies undermine economic growth.
Landau-Taylor emphasizes that creative destruction is not costless. Business failures and job losses are painful. And creative destruction brought on by dramatic advances can actually cause recessions or even depressions. Is that a rationale for delaying the inevitable failure of weak incumbents and impeding the broad adoption of new technologies? Our long-term well-being might dictate that we allow such transitions to take place by shunting aside interventionist temptations.
As a rationale for intervention, it’s sometimes said that we can’t regain the output lost during contractions. An appropriate riposte is that government efforts to counter recessionary forces are almost always futile. Furthermore, the lost output might be a pittance relative to the growth and permanent gains made possible by allowing creative destruction to run its course, liberating resources for better opportunities and growth.
On this point, Landau-Taylor says:
“If we want our descendants in 2125 to surpass our living standards the way we surpass our ancestors from 1925, then we will have to permit economic transformations at the scale that our ancestors did, including bankruptcies, job losses, and the cascading depressions that result. The individual pain of depressions does not have to be quite so severe as it once was. Because we are richer, we can and do spend vastly more on welfare, but this should be directed at individuals rather than at megacorporations. But there will always be some pain.“
Conclusion
Too often public policy creates obstacles to natural and healthy market processes, including creative destruction. This prevents the economy from reaching its true growth potential. Subsidies, bailouts, protectionism, and arguably macroeconomic stimulus, too often give safe harbor to struggling producers who manage to retain control over resources having more valued uses, including firms relying on obsolete and impractical technologies. Recessions typically expose firms with the weakest market prospects, but countercyclical fiscal and monetary policy may give them cover, forestalling their inevitable decline. Thus, we risk throwing good resources after bad, foregoing opportunities for growth and a more prosperous future.
A week ago I posted about electrification and particularly EV mandates, one strand of government industrial policy under which non-favored sectors of the economy must labor. This post examines a related industrial policy: manipulation of power generation by government policymakers in favor of renewable energy technologies, while fossil fuels are targeted for oblivion. These interventions are a reaction to an overwrought climate crisis narrative, but they present many obstacles, oversights and risks of their own. Chief among them is whether the power grid will be capable of meeting current and future demand for power while relying heavily on variable resources: wind and sunshine.
Like almost everything I write, this post is too long! Here is a guide to what follows. Scroll down to whatever sections might be of interest:
Malinvestment: Idle capital
Key Considerations to chew on
False Premises: zero CO2? Low cost?
Imposed Cost: what and how much?
Supporting Growth: with renewables?
Resource Constraints: they’re tight!
Technological Advance: patience!
The Presumed Elephant: CO2 costs
Conclusion
Malinvestment
The intermittency of wind and solar power creates a fundamental problem of physically idle capital, which leaves the economy short of its production possibilities. To clarify, capital invested in wind and solar facilities is often idle in two critical ways. First, wind and solar assets have relatively low rates of utilization because of their variability, or intermittency. Second, neither provides “dispatchable” power: it is not “on call” in any sense during those idle periods, which are not entirely predictable. Wind and solar assets therefore contribute less value to the electric grid than dispatchable sources of power having equivalent capacity and utilization.
Is “idle capital” a reasonable characterization? Consider the shipping concerns that are now experimenting with sails on cargo ships. What is the economic value of such a ship without back-up power? Can you imagine them drifting in the equatorial calms for days on end? Even light winds would slow the transport of goods significantly. Idle capital might be bad enough, but a degree of idleness allows flexibility and risk mitigation in many applications. Idle, non–dispatchable capital, however, is unproductive capital.
Likewise, solar-powered signage can underperform or fail over the course of several dark, wintry days, even with battery backup. The signage is more reliable and valuable when it is backed-up by another power source. Again, idle, non-dispatchable capital is unproductive capital.
The pursuit of net-zero carbon emissions via wind and solar power creates idle capital, which increasingly lacks adequate backup power. That should be a priority, but it’s not. This misguided effort is funded from both private investment and public subsidies, but the former is very much contingent on the latter. That’s because the flood of subsidies is what allows private investors to profit from idle capital. Rent-enabled investments like these crowd out genuinely productive capital formation, which is not limited to power plants that might otherwise use fossil fuels.
Creating idle or unemployed physical capital is malinvestment, and it diminishes future economic growth. The surge in this activity began in earnest during the era of negative real interest rates. Today, in an era of higher rates, taxpayers can expect an even greater burden, as can ratepayers whose power providers are guaranteed returns on their regulated rate bases.
Key Consideration
The forced transition to net zero will be futile, but especially if wind and solar energy are the primary focus. Keep the following in mind:
The demand for electricity is expected to soar, and soon! Policymakers have high hopes for EVs, and while adoption rates might fall well short of their goals, they’re doing their clumsy best to force EVs down our throats with mandates. But facilitating EV charging presents difficulties. Lionel Shriver states the obvious: “Going Electric Requires Electricity”. Reliable electricity!
Perhaps more impressive than prospects for EVs is the expected growth in power demand from data centers required by the explosion of artificial intelligence applications across many industries. It’s happening now! This will be magnified with the advent of artificial general intelligence (AGI).
Dispatchable power sources are needed to back-up unreliable wind and solar power to ensure service continuity. Maintaining backup power carries a huge “imposed cost” at the margin for wind and solar. At present, that would entail CO2 emissions, violating the net zero dictum.
Perhaps worse than the cost of backup power would be the cost borne by users under the complete elimination of certain dispatchable power sources. An imposed cost then takes the form of outages. Users are placed at risk of losing power at home, at the office and factories, at stores, in transit, and at hospitals at peak hours or under potentially dangerous circumstances like frigid or hot weather.
Historically, dispatchable power has allowed utilities to provide reliable electricity on-demand. Just flip the switch! This may become a thing of the past.
Wind and solar power are sometimes available when they’re not needed, in which case the power goes unused because we lack effective power storage technology.
Wind and solar power facilities operate at low rates of utilization, yet new facilities are always touted at their full nameplate capacity. Capacity factors for wind turbines averaged almost 36% in the U.S. in 2022, while solar facilities averaged only about 24%. This compared with nuclear power at almost 93%, natural gas (66%), and coal (48%). Obviously, the low capacity factors for wind and solar reflect their variable nature, rather than dispatchable responses to fluctuations in power demand.
Low utilization and variability are underemphasized or omitted by those promoting wind and solar plant in the media and often in discussions of public policy, and no wonder! We hear a great deal about “additions to capacity”, which overstate the actual power-generating potential by factors of three to four times. Here is a typical example.
Wind and solar power are far more heavily subsidized than fossil fuels. This is true in absolute terms and especially on the basis of actual power output, which reveals their overwhelmingly uneconomic nature. From the link above, here are Mitch Rolling and Isaac Orr on this point:
“In 2022, wind and solar generators received three and eighteen times more subsidies per MWh, respectively, than natural gas, coal, and nuclear generators combined. Solar is the clear leader, receiving anywhere from $50 to $80 per MWh over the last five years, whereas wind is a distant second at $8 to $10 per MWh …. Renewable energy sources like wind and solar are largely dependent on these subsidies, which have been ongoing for 30 years with no end in sight.”
The first-order burden of subsidies falls on taxpayers. The second-order burdens manifest in an unstable grid and higher power costs. But just to be clear, subsidies are paid by governments to producers or consumers to reduce the cost of activity favored by policymakers. However, the International Monetary Fund frequently cites “subsidy” figures that include staff estimates of unaddressed externalities. These are based on highly-simplified models and subject to great uncertainty, of course, especially when dollar values are assigned to categories like “climate change”. Despite what alarmists would have us believe, the extent and consequences of climate change are not settled scientific issues, let alone the dollar cost.
Wind and solar power are extremely land- and/or sea-intensive. For example, Casey Handmer estimates that a one-Gigawatt data center, if powered by solar panels, would need a footprint of 20,000 acres.
Solar installations are associated with a significant heat island effect: “We found temperatures over a PV plant were regularly 3–4 °C warmer than wildlands at night….”
In addition to the destruction of habitat both on- and offshore, turbine blades create noise, electromagnetism, and migration barriers. Wind farms have been associated with significant bird and bat fatalities. Collisions with moving blades are one thing, but changes to the winds and air pressure around turbines are also a danger to avian species.
Solar farms present dangers to waterfowl. These creatures are tricked into diving toward what they believe to be bodies of water, only to crash into the panels.
The production of wind and solar equipment requires the intensive use of scarce resources, including environmentally-sensitive materials. Extracting these materials often requires the excavation of massive amounts of rock subject to extensive processing. Mining and processing rely heavily on diesel fuel. Net zero? No.
Wind and solar facilities often present major threats of toxicity at disposal, or even sooner. A recent hail storm in Texas literally destroyed a solar farm, and the smashed panels have prompted concerns not only about solar “sustainability”, but also that harsh chemicals may be leaking into the local environment.
The transmission of power is costly, but that cost is magnified by the broad spatial distribution of wind and solar generating units. Transmission from offshore facilities is particularly complex. And high voltage lines run into tremendous local opposition and regulatory scrutiny.
When wind turbines and solar panels are idle, so are the transmission facilities needed to reach them. Thus, low utilization and the variability of those units drives up the capital needed for power and power transmission.
There is also an acute shortage of transformers, which presents a major bottleneck to grid development and stability.
While zero carbon is the ostensible goal, zero carbon nuclear power has been neglected by our industrial planners. That neglect plays off exaggerated fears about safety. Fortunately, there is a growing realization that nuclear power may be surest way to carbon reductions while meeting growth in power demand. In fact, new data centers will go off-grid with their own modular reactors.
At the Shriver link, he notes the smothering nature of power regulation, which obstructs the objective of providing reliable power and any hope of achieving net zero.
The Biden administration has resisted the substitution of low CO2 emitting power sources for high CO2 emitting sources. For example, natural gas is more energy efficient in a variety of applications than other fuel sources. Yet policymakers seem determined to discourage the production and use of natural gas.
False Premises
Wind and solar energy are touted by the federal government as zero carbon and low-cost technologies, but both claims are false. Extracting the needed resources, fabricating, installing, connecting, and ultimately disposing of these facilities is high in carbon emissions.
The claim that wind and solar have a cost advantage over traditional power sources is based on misleading comparisons. First, putting claims about the cost of carbon aside, it goes without saying that the cost of replacing already operational coal or natural gas generating capacity with new wind and solar facilities is greater than doing nothing.
The hope among net zero advocates is that existing fossil fuel generating plant can be decommissioned as more renewables come on-line. Again, this thinking ignores the variable nature of renewable power. Dispatchable backup power is required to reliably meet power demand. Otherwise, fluctuating power supplies undermine the economy’s productive capacity, leading to declines in output, income, health, and well being. That is costly, but so is maintaining and adding back-up capacity. Costs of wind and solar should account for this necessity. It implies that wind and solar generating units carry a high cost at the margin.
Imposed Costs
A “grid report card” from the Mackinac Center for Public Policy notes the conceptual flaw in comparing the levelized cost (à la Lazard) of a variable resource with one capable of steady and dispatchable performance. From the report, here is the crux of the imposed-cost problem:
“… the more renewable generation facilities you build, the more it costs the system to make up for their variability, and the less value they provide to electricity markets.”
A committment to variable wind and solar power along with back-up capacity also implies that some capital will be idle regardless of wind and solar conditions. This is part of the imposed cost of wind and solar built into the accounting below. But while back-up power facilities will have idle periods, it is dispatchable and serves an insurance function, so it has value even when idle in preserving the stability of the grid. For that matter, sole reliance on dispatchable power sources requires excess capacity to serve an insurance function of a similar kind.
The Mackinac report card uses estimates of imposed cost from an Institute for Energy Research to construct the following comparison (expand the view or try clicking the image for a better view):
The figures shown in this table are somewhat dated, but the Mackinac authors use updated costs for Michigan from the Center of the American Experiment. These are shown below in terms of average costs per MWh through 2050, but the labels require some additional explanation.
The two bars on the left show costs for existing coal ($33/MWh) and gas-powered ($22) plants. The third and fourth bars are for new wind ($180) and solar ($278) installations. The fifth and sixth bars are for new nuclear reactors (a light water reactor ($74) and a small modular reactor($185)). Finally, the last two bars are for a new coal plant ($106) and a natural gas plant ($64), both with carbon capture and storage (CCS). It’s no surprise that existing coal and gas facilities are the most cost effective. Natural gas is by far the least costly of the new installations, followed by the light water reactor and coal.
The Mackinac “report card” is instructive in several ways. It provides a detailed analysis of different types of power generation across five dimensions, including reliability, cost, cleanliness, and market feasibility (the latter because some types of power (hydro, geothermal) have geographic limits. Natural gas comes out the clear winner on the report card because it is plentiful, energy dense, dispatchable, clean burning, and low-cost.
Supporting Growth
Growth in the demand for power cannot be met with variable resources without dispatchable backup or intolerable service interruptions. Unreliable power would seriously undermine the case for EVs, which is already tenuous at best. Data centers and other large users will go off-grid before they stand for it. This would represent a flat-out market rejection of renewable investments, ESGs be damned!
Casey Handmer makes some interesting projections of the power requirements of data centers supporting not just AI, but AGI, which he discusses in “How To Feed the AIs”. Here is his darkly humorous closing paragraph, predicated on meeting power demands from AGI via solar:
“It seems that AGI will create an irresistibly strong economic forcing function to pave the entire world with solar panels – including the oceans. We should probably think about how we want this to play out. At current rates of progress, we have about 20 years before paving is complete.”
Resource Constraints
Efforts to force a transition to wind and solar power will lead to more dramatic cost disadvantages than shown in the Mackinac report. By “forcing” a transition, I mean aggressive policies of mandates and subsidies favoring these renewables. These policies would effectuate a gross misallocation of resources. Many of the commodities needed to fabricate the components of wind and solar installations are already quite scarce, particularly on the domestic U.S. front. Inflating the demand for these commodities will result in shortages and escalating costs, magnifying the disadvantages of wind and solar power in real economic terms.
To put a finer point on the infeasibility of the net zero effort, Simon P. Michaux produced a comparative analysis in 2022 of the existing power mix versus a hypothetical power mix of renewable energy sources performing an equal amount of work, but at net-zero carbon emissions (the link is a PowerPoint summary). In the renewable energy scenario, he calculated the total quantities of various resources needed to achieve the objective over one generation of the “new” grid (to last 20 -30 years). He then calculated the numbers of years of mining or extraction needed to produce those quantities based on 2019 rates of production. Take a look at the results in the right-most column:
Those are sobering numbers. Granted, they are based on 2019 wind and solar technology. However, it’s clear that phasing out fossil fuels using today’s wind and solar technology would be out of the question within the lifetime of anyone currently living on the planet. Michaux seems to have a talent for understatement:
“Current thinking has seriously underestimated the scale of the task ahead.”
He also emphasizes the upward price pressure we’re likely to witness in the years ahead across a range of commodities.
Technological Breakthroughs
Michaux’s analysis assumes static technology, but there may come a time in the not-too-distant future when advances in wind and solar power and battery storage allow them to compete with hydrocarbons and nuclear power on a true economic basis. The best way to enable real energy breakthroughs is through market-driven economic growth. Energy production and growth is hampered, however, when governments strong-arm taxpayers, electricity buyers, and traditional energy producers while rewarding renewable developers with subsidies.
We know that improvements will come across a range of technologies. We’ve already seen reductions in the costs of solar panels themselves. Battery technology has a long way to go, but it has improved and might some day be capable of substantial smoothing in the delivery of renewable power. Collection of solar power in space is another possibility, as the feasibility of beaming power to earth has been demonstrated. This solution might also have advantages in terms of transmission depending on the locations and dispersion of collection points on earth, and it would certainly be less land intensive than solar power is today. Carbon capture and carbon conversion are advancing technologies, making net zero a more feasible possibility for traditional sources of power. Nuclear power is zero carbon, but like almost everything else, constructing plants is not. Nevertheless, fission reactors have made great strides in terms of safety and efficiency. Nuclear fusion development is still in its infancy, but there have been notable advances of late.
Some or all of these technologies will experience breakthroughs that could lead to a true, zero-carbon energy future. The timeline is highly uncertain, but it’s likely to be faster than anything like the estimates in Michaux’s analysis. Who knows? Perhaps AI will help lead us to the answers.
A Presumed Elephant
This post and my previous post have emphasized two glaring instances of government failure on their own terms: a headlong plunge into unreliable renewable energy, and forced electrification done prematurely and wrong. Some would protest that I left the veritable “elephant in the room”: the presumed external or spillover costs associated with CO2 emissions from burning fossil fuels. Renewables and electrification are both intended to prevent those costs.
External costs were not ignored, of course. Externalities were discussed explicitly in several different contexts such as the mining of new materials, EV tire wear, the substitution of “cleaner” fuels for others, toxicity at disposal, and the exaggerated reductions in CO2 from EVs when the “long tailpipe” problem is ignored. However, I noted explicitly that estimates of unaddressed externalities are often highly speculative and uncertain, and especially the costs of CO2 emissions. They should not be included in comparisons of subsidies.
Therefore, the costs of various power generating technologies shown above do not account for estimates of externalities. If you’re inclined, other SCC posts on the CO2 “elephant” can be found here.
Conclusion
Power demand is expected to soar given the coming explosion in AI applications, and especially if the heavily-subsidized and mandated transition to EVs comes to pass. But that growth in demand will not and cannot be met by relying on renewable energy sources. Their variability implies substantial idle capacity, higher costs, and service interruptions. Such a massive deployment of idle capital would represents an enormous waste of resources, but the sad fact is it’s been underway for some time.
In the years ahead, the net-zero objective will prove representative of a bumbling effort at industrial planning. Costs will be driven higher, including the cost inflicted by outages and environmental damage. Ratepayers, taxpayers, and innocents will share these burdens. Travis Fisher is spot on when he says the grid is becoming a “dangerous liability” thanks to wounds inflicted by subsidies, regulations, and mandates.
“The National Electrical Grid is teetering on collapse. The shift away from full-time available power (like fossil fuels, LNG, etc.) to so-called ‘green’ sources has deeply impacted reliability.”
“Also, as more whale-killing off-shore wind farms are planned, the Biden administration forgot to plan for the thousands of miles of transmission lines that will be needed. And in a perfect example of leftist autophagy, there is considerable opposition from enviro-groups who will tie up the construction of wind farms and transmission lines in court for decades.”
Meanwhile, better alternatives to wind and solar have been routinely discouraged. The substantial reductions in carbon emissions achieved in the U.S. over the past 15 years were caused primarily by the substitution of natural gas for coal in power generation. Much more of that is possible. The Biden Administration, however, wishes to prevent that substitution in favor of greater reliance on high-cost, unreliable renewables. And the Administration wishes to do so without adequately backing up those variable power sources with dispatchable capacity. Likewise, nuclear power has been shunted aside, despite its safety, low risk, and dispatchability. However, there are signs of progress in attitudes toward bringing more nuclear power on-line.
Industrial policy usually meets with failure, and net zero via wind and solar power will be no exception. Like forced electrification, unreliable power fails on its own terms. Net zero ain’t gonna happen any time soon, and not even by 2050. That is, it won’t happen unless net zero is faked through mechanisms like fraudulent carbon credits (and there might not be adequate faking capacity for that!). Full-scale net-zero investment in wind and solar power, battery capacity, and incremental transmission facilities will drive the cost of power upward, undermining economic growth. Finally, wind and solar are not the environmental panacea so often promised. Quite the contrary: mining of the necessary minerals, component fabrication, installation, and even operation all have negative environmental impacts. Disposal at the end of their useful lives might be even worse. And the presumed environmental gains … reduced atmospheric carbon concentrations and lower temperatures, are more scare story than science.
Postscript: here’s where climate alarmism has left us, and this is from a candidate for the U.S. Senate (she deleted the tweet after an avalanche of well-deserved ridicule):
Industrial policy allows government planners to select favored and disfavored industries or sectors. It thereby bypasses and distorts impersonal market signals that would otherwise direct scarce resources to the uses most valued by market participants. Instead, various forms of aid and penalties are imposed on different sectors in order to accomplish the planners’ objectives, This includes interventions in foreign trade and attempts to steer technological development. Industrial policy often comes under the guise of enhanced national security. Of course, it can also be used to reward cronies. And it has a poor record of accomplishing its objectives and avoiding unintended consequences.
The Sausage Factory
The executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government are loaded with economic interventionists, regardless of party affiliation. In an age of (Chevron) judicial deference to “experts” within the administrative state, it is not uncommon for legislative language to give abundant leeway to those who implement policy within the executive branch (though a couple of upcoming Supreme Court decisions might change that balance). Increasingly, bills are stuffed so full of provisions that lawmakers find it all but impossible to read them in full, let alone make an accurate assessment of their virtues, drawbacks, and internal contradictions.
Even worse is the fact that bills are, in great part, written by relatively youthful legislative staffers with little real world experience in industry, and who harbor the naive belief that whatever is wished, government can make it so. But their work also proceeds under guidance from lawmakers, administration officials, consultants, and lobbyists who have their own agendas and axes to grind. This is how industrial policy is promulgated in the U.S., and it is through this ugly prism that we must view environmental policy.
The Left dictates environmental and energy policy in several states, especially California, where energy costs have soared under renewable energy initiatives. California households now pay almost triple the rate per kilowatt-hour paid in Washington, and more than double what’s paid in Oregon. Something similar may happen in New York, which has highly ambitious goals for renewable energy even as the costs of the state’s offshore wind projects are out of control. These and other state-level “laboratories” are demonstrating that a renewable energy agenda can carry very high costs to the populace. The same is true of the painful experience in Germany with its much-heralded Energiewende.
Net Zero
The Left is also pulling the strings within the federal bureaucracy and the Biden Administration. The objective is an industrial policy to achieve “net zero” CO2 emissions, a practical impossibility for at least several decades (unless it’s faked, of course). Nevertheless, that policy calls for phasing out the use of fossil fuels. Under this agenda, mandates and subsidies are bestowed upon the use of renewable electric power sources, while restrictions and penalties are imposed on the production and use of fossil fuels. A subsequent post on the subject of power generation will address this prototypical failure of central planning.
Electrification
Here, I discuss another key objective of our industrial planners: electrify whatever is not electrified in order to advance the net zero agenda. Of course, for some time to come, more than half of electric power will be generated using fossil fuels (currently about 60%, with another 18% nuclear), so the policy is largely a sham on its face, but we’ll return to that point below. The EV tailpipe is very long, as they say.
Electrification means, among other things, the forced adoption of electronic vehicles (EVs). President Biden’s EPA has issued rules on auto emissions that are expected to require, by 2032, that 60% or more of cars and light trucks sold will be EVs. The USA Today article at the link offers this rich aside:
“…the original proposal — which was always technology-neutral in theory, meaning automakers could sell any cars and light-duty trucks they wanted as long as they hit the fleetwide reductions….”
Technology neutral? Hahaha! We aren’t forcing you to choose technologies as long as you meet our technological requirements!
EV Doldrums
Anyway, the EPA’s targets are completely impractical, partly because the value for drivers is lacking. Not coincidentally, the market for EVs seems to have chilled of late. Hertz has soured on heavy use of EVs in its fleet, and Ford has announced reductions in EV production. The new UAW agreements will make it difficult for some domestic producers to turn a profit on EVs. Fisker is just about broke. Apple has cancelled development of its EV, and several other automakers have reduced their production plans. Toyota was the first producer to raise the red flag on the breakneck transition to EVs in favor of a measured reliance on hybrids. Of course, there are other prominent voices cautioning against rapid attempts at electrification in general.
To be fair, some EVs are marvelous machines, but they and their supporting infrastructure are not yet well-suited to the mass market.
A Tangled Web
Here are some drawbacks of EVs that have yet to be adequately addressed:
They are expensive, even with the rich-man’s subsidy to buyers paid by the government and carbon credit subsidies granted to producers.
Costly battery replacement is an eventuality that looms over the wallets of EV owners.
EVs have limited range given the state of battery technology, especially when the weather is cold.
There presently exist far too few charging stations to make EVs workable for many people. In any case, charging away from home can be extremely time consuming and the charges vary widely.
The purchase and installation of EV chargers at home is a separate matter, and can cost $4,000 or more if an upgrade to the service panel is necessary. Installed costs commonly range from $1,175 to $3,300, depending on the type of charger and the region.
EVs are much heavier than vehicles powered by internal combustion engines. As a result, EV tire wear can be a surprising cost causer and pollutant.
Battery fires in EVs are extremely difficult to extinguish, creating a new challenge for emergency responders.
Reliance on EVs for local emergency services would be dangerous without duplicative investment by local jurisdictions to offset the down-time required for charging.
For decades to come, the power grid will be unable to handle the load required for widespread adoption of EVs. A rapid conversion would be impossible without a great expansion in generating and transmission capacity, including transformer availability.
Domestically we lack the natural resources to produce the batteries required by EVs in a quantity that would satisfy the Administration’s goals. This forces dependence on China, our chief foreign adversary.
The mining of those resources is destructive to the environment. Much of it is done in China due to the country’s abundance of rare earth minerals, but wherever the mining occurs, it relies heavily on diesel power.
Joel Kotkin points out that China now hosts the world’s largest EV producer, BYD. Biden’s mandates might very well allow China to dominate the U.S. auto market, even as its own CO2 emissions are soaring,,
Producers of EVs earn carbon credits for each vehicle sold, which they can sell to other auto producers who fall short of their required mix of EVs in total production. Tesla, for example, earned revenue of $1.8 billion from carbon credit sales in 2022. But note again that these so-called zero-emission vehicles use electricity generated with an average of 60% fossil fuels. Thus, the scheme is largely a sham.
The push for EVs has been hampered by the botched rollout of (non-Tesla) charging stations under a huge Biden initiative in the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act. Progress has been bogged down by sheer complexity and expense, including the cost of bringing adequate power supplies to the chargers as well as the difficulty of meeting contracting requirements and operating standards. This is exemplary of the failures that usually await government efforts to engineer outcomes contrary to market forces.
Electric Everything?
Like EVs, electric stoves have drawbacks that limit their popularity, including price and the nature of the heat needed for quality food preparation. In addition to autos and stoves, wholesale electrification would require the replacement or costly reconfiguration of a huge stock of business and household capital that is now powered by fossil fuels, like gas furnaces, tractors, chain saws, and many other tools and appliances. This set of legacy investment choices was guided by market prices that reflect the scarcity and efficiency of the resources, yet government industrial planners propose to lay much of it to waste.
Central Planning: a False Conceit
John Mozena quotes Adam Smith on the social and economic hazards of rejecting the market mechanism and instead accepting governmental authority over the allocation of resources:
“All governments which thwart this natural course, which force things into another channel, or which endeavour to arrest the progress of society at a particular point, are unnatural, and to support themselves are obliged to be oppressive and tyrannical.”
“As Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek pointed out during the socialist calculation debate, central planners lack the information that is produced by markets. By over-riding market prices and substituting their own judgment, regulators incur the same loss of information.”
Advocates of EV industrial policy have failed to appreciate the large gaps between the technology they are determined to dictate and basic consumer requirements. These gaps are along such margins as range, charging time, tire and battery wear, and perhaps most importantly, affordability. The planners have failed to foresee the massive demands on the power grid of a forced replacement of the internal combustion auto stock with EVs. The planners elide the true nature of EV-driven emissions, which are never zero carbon but instead depend on the mix of power sources used to charge EV batteries. Finally, EV mandates show that the industrial planners are oblivious to other environmental burdens inherent in EVs, whatever their true carbon footprint might be.
Choosing between the lesser of evils is a bummer, but that’s often the reality for voters. That goes almost without saying… our choices are politicians! I’ll certainly be in that quandary if Donald Trump is the Republican nominee for president in 2024, which looks increasingly likely. I held my nose and voted for him — twice — primarily because the Big Government solutions promoted consistently by Democrats are so awful.
At this point I’m not fully on board with any GOP candidate. That could change, but not yet. Now, if you’re a Trump supporter and you think the rambling opinions below are too critical of your guy, cut me some slack. I’m not a “Never Trumper”. I’m a “Never Statist”. And while I’ve never had much faith that Trump is with me on that count, he will almost surely be the lesser of evils.
The Abused Politician
Trump has been subjected to despicable treatment by political opponents since well before his inauguration in 2016, and his abusers in and out of government never let up. Many of the charges and accusations against him have been pure fiction and at this point represent obvious election interference. So I’m somewhat sympathetic to him despite some of his positions and often disagreeable manner. Still, I credit him for being a fighter, and as an aside, I’ll add that I actually enjoy some of his rants. He has the style of a nasty stand-up comic, which gives me some occasional laughs.
I agree with Trump on certain policy matters. On others, including some fundamental points, I find it hard to trust him as a leader, and I said that long before he was elected in 2016. He claims not to be a politician, but he is a politician through and through. He’s also a populist. And while populism can serve as a valuable check on certain excesses of government, it often cuts the wrong way, favoring what I like to call “do-somethingism”. That usually means public intervention. Populism is a perfectly natural home for a “pick-and-choose” statist like Trump, however. Moreover, I’m not happy that he refused to debate his opponents, and that too was a purely political decision.
Malign Neglect
If you need proof of Trump’s base instincts as a politician, look no further than his refusal to engage on the subject of entitlement reform. It’s no secret that both Social Security (SS) and Medicare are technically insolvent. This is probably the most important fiscal issue the country will face in the foreseeable future.
Without reform, SS benefits will be cut 23% in 2034. That would bring certain outrage among seniors and anyone approaching retirement. Sure, it’s a decade down the road, but addressing it sooner would be far less painful. Does Trump favor a huge cut in benefits? Probably not. Does he think benefits can simply continue without additional funding or reform of some kind? Does he prefer a greater inflation tax, rather than reform? Does he secretly favor “just print the money” like the modern monetary theorists of the Left? There are much better alternatives, but where is his leadership on this issue?
His unwillingness to discuss entitlements, and indeed, his denigration of anyone who so much as mentions the need for serious reforms, is a disgrace. He knows the train wreck is coming, but his focus is squarely on short-term politics. Why are so many on the Right willing to fall for this? Maybe they too understand it’s an elephant in the room, but an elephant that must not be named. After all, it’s not as if the Democrats have done a thing to address the issue.
False Fealty to Workers
Trump is a protectionist, given to the mercantilist fallacy that only exports are good and imports are bad. We import heavily because we are a high-income nation. The other side of that coin is that the world craves our assets, including the U.S. dollar (which is in absolutely no danger of losing its dominance as the primary currency of international transactions).
Here’s a little truth from “Trade Flows 101”: U.S. imports of goods and services correspond to purchases of U.S. assets by the rest of the world. In other words, U.S. trade deficits present opportunities for foreign investors to supply us with capital. That helps foster greater U.S. productive capacity, greater worker productivity, and higher wages.
On the other hand, government intervention to discourage imports via quotas or tariffs increases domestic prices and erodes real wages in the U.S. Furthermore, to favor certain industries (exporters) over others (importers) is a grotesque application of corporatist industrial policy. Why does the Right tolerate Trump’s advocacy for this sort of government central planning? Part of the answer is national security, which I accept to a limited extent, but not when “critical industries” are extended favors by government that are redundant to already powerful market forces.
Protectionism owes some of its popularity to the appeal of nationalism, as distinct from patriotism. However, it promotes sclerosis among domestic producers by shielding them from competition, causing direct harm to U.S. consumers. There is nothing patriotic about protectionism.
Real Stuff
A fallacy closely related to protectionism, and one to which Trump subscribes, is that the U.S. must produce more “things” — more commodities and manufactured goods. That’s not the market’s judgement, but one that appeals to the instincts of interventionists. In any case, services are often more highly valued than physical goods. If your comparative advantage is in producing a highly-valued service, don’t beat yourself up over neglecting to produce hard goods at which you’re comparatively lousy. Specialization and trade are under-appreciated as true social and economic miracles.
That said, we certainly have an advantage in the production of fossil fuels and should continue to produce them without interference. I’m with Trump on that. One day, reliable sources of “clean” energy will be economic, but we’re not there yet.
Corporate State
Well before his presidential run, Trump had a history of leveraging government to achieve his private ends. Eminent domain actions were useful to his development projects and expanding his own property rights at the expense of others. Naturally, he claimed his projects were in the public interest. Ah, the mindset of a rent seeker: government exists to actively facilitate the acquisitive interests of private business, or at least the “winners”. That thinking is thoroughly contrary to the libertarian view of the state’s role in establishing a neutral social environment under the rule-of-law.
In other ways, as President, Trump sought to bring major corporations under his political sway. Trump’s protectionist leanings as president were a prime example of corporatism in action.And read this account of a public meeting (and watch it at the link) at which one CEO after another, under Trump’s furrowed gaze, took turns describing something great they were doing for the country and committing to do more. It was one big, weird suck-up session intended to make the puffed-up Trump look like a great leader. As the author at the link says:
“These are corporate executives doing the President’s bidding for fear or favour.”
I supported Trump’s tax cuts, though they were certainly designed to reduce taxes on corporate income. Was this corporatist largess? That might have been part of his motivation. However, as I’ve argued before, corporate income is largely double-taxed. Moreover, shareholders do not bear the full burden of corporate taxes. Workers bear a significant portion of the burden, so Trump’s corporate tax cuts encouraged growth in real wages, whether he understood it or not.
It’s Still So Big
Tax cuts paired with reduced spending would have been a welcome approach. Unfortunately, Trump was a fairly big spender during his term in office, even if you exclude Covid emergency spending. Growth in the government’s dominance over resources did not slow on his watch. Fiscally disciplined he’s not!
It’s true that his administration made efforts to curtail regulation, but in retrospect, those steps at best arrested the growth of regulation, rather than achieving reductions. The hope of seeing any real deconstruction of the administrative state under Trump was fleeting.
Migration
Immigration is a complicated issue when it comes to assessing Trump’s candidacy. I’m strongly in favor of greater legal immigration because it would improve our demographics and labor supply while shrinking our entitlements deficits. Legal migrants are often technically proficient and many come with sponsorships. On the whole, legal migrants tend to be ready and willing to work,
This position is often condemned by Trump’s most ardent cheerleaders, however. I’ve generally supported Trump’s position on illegal immigration as a matter of national security, to eliminate human trafficking, and to reduce burdens on public aid and support systems. Unfortunately, during Trump’s presidency, he did more to reduce legal immigration than illegal immigration. I have no qualms about “the Wall” except for its expense and the likelihood that cheaper and superior technologies could be deployed for border security. Trump might prefer the Wall’s symbolic value.
Rightly or wrongly, Trump’s messaging on immigration strikes many as nativist, providing an easy excuse for the Left to accuse him of racism. That certainly won’t help his election prospects.
Conclusion
Trump will almost surely be the GOP nominee, unless Democrats succeed in putting him behind bars by then. If the choice is Trump vs. almost any Democrat I can imagine, I’ll have to vote for him. For all his faults and wild card qualities, I still consider him a safer alternative than the devils we know on the Left. But I’d feel much better about him if he’d take a responsible position on Social Security and Medicare reform, abandon protectionism except in cases of critical national security needs (and without overkill), commit to spending reductions, and adopt a more productive approach to legal immigration.
Recent advances in artificial intelligence (AI) are giving hope to advocates of central economic planning. Perhaps, they think, the so-called “knowledge problem” (KP) can be overcome, making society’s reliance on decentralized market forces “unnecessary”. The KP is the barrier faced by planners in collecting and using information to direct resources to their most valued uses. KP is at the heart of the so-called “socialist calculation debate”, but it applies also to the failures of right-wing industrial policies and protectionism.
Apart from raw political motives, run-of-the-mill government incompetence, and poor incentives, the KP is an insurmountable obstacle to successful state planning, as emphasized by Friedrich Hayek and many others. In contrast, market forces are capable of spontaneously harnessing all sources of information on preferences, incentives, resources, as well as existing and emergent technologies in allocating resources efficiently. In addition, the positive sum nature of mutually beneficial exchange makes the market by far the greatest force for voluntary social cooperation known to mankind.
Nevertheless, the hope kindled by AI is that planners would be on an equal footing with markets and allow them to intervene in ways that would be “optimal” for society. This technocratic dream has been astir for years along with advances in computer technology and machine learning. I guess it’s nice that at least a few students of central planning understood the dilemma all along, but as explained below, their hopes for AI are terribly misplaced. AI will never allow planners to allocate resources in ways that exceed or even approximate the efficiency of the market mechanism’s “invisible hand”.
Michael Munger recently described the basic misunderstanding about the information or “data” that markets use to solve the KP. Markets do not rely on a given set of prices, quantities, and production relationships. They do not take any of those as givens with respect to the evolution of transactions, consumption, production, investment, or search activity. Instead, markets generate this data based on unobservable and co-evolving factors such as the shape of preferences across goods, services, and time; perceptions of risk and its cost; the full breadth of technologies; shifting resource availabilities; expectations; locations; perceived transaction costs; and entrepreneurial energy. Most of these factors are “tacit knowledge” that no central database will ever contain.
At each moment, dispersed forces are applied by individual actions in the marketplace. The market essentially solves for the optimal set of transactions subject to all of those factors. These continuously derived solutions are embodied in data on prices, quantities, and production relationships. Opportunity costs and incentives are both an outcome of market processes as well as driving forces, so that they shape the transactional footprint. And then those trades are complete. Attempts to impose the same set of data upon new transactions in some repeated fashion, freezing the observable components of incentives and other requirements, would prevent the market from responding to changing conditions.
Thus, the KP facing planners isn’t really about “calculating” anything. Rather, it’s the impossibility of matching or replicating the market’s capacity to generate these data and solutions. There will never be an AI with sufficient power to match the efficiency of the market mechanism because it’s not a matter of mere “calculation”. The necessary inputs are never fully unobservable and, in any case, are unknown until transactions actually take place such that prices and quantities can be recorded.
In my 2020post “Central Planning With AI Will Still Suck”, I reviewed a paper by Jesús Fernández-Villaverde (JFV), who was skeptical of AI’s powers to achieve better outcomes via planning than under market forces. His critique of the “planner position” anticipated the distinction highlighted by Munger between “market data” and the market’s continuous generation of transactions and their observable footprints.
JFV emphasized three reasons for the ultimate failure of AI-enabled planning: impossible data requirements; the endogeneity of expectations and behavior; and the knowledge problem. Again, the discovery and collection of “data” is a major obstacle to effective planning. If that were the only difficulty, then planners would have a mere “calculation” problem. This shouldn’t be conflated with the broader KP. That is, observable “data” is a narrow category relative the arrays of unobservables and the simultaneous generation of inputs and outcomes that takes place in markets. And these solutions are found by market processes subject to an array of largely unobservable constraints.
An interesting obstacle to AI planning cited by JFV is the endogeneity of expectations. It too can be considered part of the KP. From my 2020 post:
“Policy Change Often Makes the Past Irrelevant: Planning algorithms are subject to the so-called Lucas Critique, a well known principle in macroeconomics named after Nobel Prize winner Robert Lucas. The idea is that policy decisions based on observed behavior will change expectations, prompting responses that differ from the earlier observations under the former policy regime. … If [machine learning] is used to “plan” certain outcomes desired by some authority, based on past relationships and transactions, the Lucas Critique implies that things are unlikely to go as planned.”
Again, note that central planning and attempts at “calculation” are not solely in the province of socialist governance. They are also required by protectionist or industrial policies supported at times by either end of the political spectrum. Don Boudreaux offers this wisdom on the point:
“People on the political right typically assume that support for socialist interventions comes uniquely from people on the political left, but this assumption is mistaken. While conservative interventionists don’t call themselves “socialists,” many of their proposed interventions – for example, industrial policy – are indeed socialist interventions. These interventions are socialist because, in their attempts to improve the overall performance of the economy, proponents of these interventions advocate that market-directed allocations of resources be replaced with allocations carried out by government diktat.”
The hope that non-market planning can be made highly efficient via AI is a fantasy. In addition to substituting the arbitrary preferences of planners and politicians for those of private agents, the multiplicity of forces bearing on individual decisions will always be inaccessible to AIs. Many of these factors are deeply embedded within individual minds, and often in varying ways. That is why the knowledge problem emphasized by Hayek is much deeper than any sort of “calculation problem” fit for exploitation via computer power.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Note: The image at the top of this post is attributed by Bing to the CATO Institute-sponsored website Libertarianism.org and an article that appeared there in 2013, though that piece, by Jason Kuznicki, no longer seems to feature that image.
Much of what is labeled market failure is a consequence of government failure, or rather, failure caused by misguided public intervention, not just in individual markets but in the economy more generally. Misguided efforts to correct perceived excesses in pricing are often the problem, but there are myriad cases of regulatory overreach, ham-handed application of taxes and subsidies for various enterprises, and widespread cronyism. But it is often convenient for politicians to appear as if they are doing something, which makes activism and active blame of private enterprise a tempting path. The Biden Administration’s energy crisis offers a case in point. First, a digression on the efficiency of free markets. Skip the next two sections to get straight to Biden’s mess.
Behold the Bounty
I always spent part of the first class session teaching Principles of Economics on some incredible things that happen each and every day. Most college freshmen seem to take them for granted: the endless variety of goods that arrive on shelves each day; the ongoing flow of services, many appearing like magic at the flick of a switch; the high degree of coincidence between specific wants and all these fresh supplies; the variety and flow of raw materials and skills that are brought to bear; the fantastic array of sophisticated equipment deployed to assist in these efforts; and the massive social coordination necessary to accomplish all this. How does it all happen? Who collects all the information on what is wanted, and by whom? On the feasibility of actually producing and distributing various things? What miracle computer processes the vast set of information guiding these decisions and actions? Does some superior intelligence within an agency plan all this stuff?
The answer is simple. The seemingly infinite set of knowledge is marshaled, and all these tasks are performed, by the greatest institution of social cooperation to ever emerge: decentralized, free markets! Buying decisions are guided by individual needs and wants. Production and selling decisions are guided by resource availability and technology. And all sides react to evolving prices. Preferences, resources, and technology are in a constant state of flux, but prices react, signaling producers and consumers to make individual adjustments that correct larger imbalances. It is tempting to describe the process as the evolving solution to a gigantic set of dynamic equations.
The Impossible Conceit
No human planner or government agency is capable of solving this problem as seamlessly and efficiently as markets, nor can they hope to achieve the surplus welfare that redound to buyers and sellers in markets. Central planners or intervening authorities cannot possess the knowledge and coordinating power of the market mechanism. That doesn’t mean markets are “perfect”, of course. Things like external costs and benefits, dominant sellers, and asymmetric information can cause market outcomes to deviate from the competitive “ideal”. Inequities can arise from some of these imperfections as well.
What can be much worse is the damage to market performance caused by government policy. Usually the intent is to “correct” imperfections, and the rationale might be defensible. The knowledge to do it very well is often lacking, however. Taxes, subsidies, regulations, tariffs, quotas, capital controls, and manipulation of interest rates (and monetary and credit aggregates) are very general categories of distortion caused by the public sector. Then there is competition for resources via government procurement, which is frequently graft-ridden or price-insensitive.
Many public interventions create advantages for large sellers, leading to greater market concentration. This might best serve the private political power of the wealthy or might convey advantages to investments that happen to be in vogue among the political class. These are the true roots of fascism, which leverages coercive state power for the benefit of private interests.
Energy Vampires
Now we have the curious case of the Biden Administration and it’s purposeful disruption of energy markets in an effort to incentivize a hurried transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy. As I described in a recent post on stagflation,
“… Biden took several steps to hamstring the domestic fossil fuel industry at a time when the economy was still recovering from the pandemic. This included revoking permits for the Keystone pipeline, a ban on drilling on federal lands and federally-controlled waters in the Gulf, shutting down production on some private lands on the pretext of enforcing the Endangered Species Act, and capping methane emissions by oil and gas producers. And all that was apparently just a start.
As Mark Theisen notes, when you promise to destroy a particular industry, as Joe Biden has, by taxing and regulating it to death, who wants to invest in or even maintain production facilities? Some leftists with apparent influence on the administration are threatening penalties against the industry up to and including prosecution for ‘crimes against humanity’!”
In addition to killing Keystone, there remains a strong possibility that Biden will shut down the Line 5 pipeline in Michigan, and there are other pipelines currently under federal review. Biden’s EPA also conducted a purge of science advisors considered “too friendly” to oil and gas industry. This was intertwined with a “review” of new methane rules, which harm smaller, independent oil and gas drillers disproportionately.
Joe Biden’s “Build Back Better” (BBB) legislation, as clumsy in policy as it is in name, introduces a number of “Green New Deal” provisions that would further disadvantage the production and use of fossil fuels. Hart Energy provides descriptions of various tax changes that appeared in the Treasury’s so-called “Greenbook”, a collection of revenue proposals, many of which appear in the BBB legislation that recently passed in the House. These include rollbacks of various deductions for drilling costs, depletion allowances, and recovery rules, as well as hikes in certain excise taxes as well as taxes on foreign oil income. And all this while granting generous subsidies to intermittent and otherwise uneconomic technologies that happen to be in political favor. This is a fine payoff for cronies having invested significantly in these rent seeking opportunities. While the bill still faces an uphill fight in the Senate, apparently Biden has executive orders, held in abeyance, that would inflict more pain on consumers and producers of fossil fuels.
Biden’s energy policies are obviously intended to reduce supplies of oil, gas, and other fossil fuels. Prices have responded, as Green notes:
“Gas is up an average of 57% this year, with corresponding increases of 44% for diesel and a whopping 60% for fuel oil.”
The upward price pressure is not limited to petroleum: electricity rates are jumping as well. Consumers and shippers have noticed. In fact, while Biden crows about wanting “the rich” to pay for BBB, his energy policies are steeply regressive in their impact, as energy absorbs a much larger share of budgets among the poor than the rich. This is politically suicidal, but Biden’s advisors have chosen a most cynical tact as the reality has dawned on them.
Abusive Victim Blaming
Who to blame? After the predictable results of cramping domestic production and attacking fossil fuel producers, the Biden team naturally blames them for rising prices! “Price gouging” is a charge made by political opportunists and those who lack an understanding of how markets allocate scarce resources. More severe scarcity means that prices must rise to ration available quantities and to incentivize those capable of bringing forth additional product under difficult circumstances. That is how a market is supposed to function, and it mitigates scarcity!
But here comes the mendacious and Bumbling Buster Biden. He wants antitrust authorities at the FTC to investigate oil pricing. Again from Stephen Green:
There’s nothing quite like a threat to market participants to prevent the price mechanism from performing its proper social function. But a failure to price rationally is a prescription for more severe shortages.
Biden has also ordered the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) to release 50 million barrels of oil, a move that replaces a total of 2.75 days of monthly consumption in the U.S. The SPR is supposed to be drawn upon only in the case of emergencies like natural disasters, so this draw-down is as irresponsible as it is impotent. In fact, OPEC is prepared to offset the SPR release with a production cut. Biden has resorted to begging OPEC to increase production, which is pathetic because the U.S. was a net exporter of oil not long ago … until Biden took charge.
Conclusion
Properly stated, the challenge mounted against markets as an institution is not that they fall short of “perfection”. It is that some other system would lead to superior results in terms of efficiency and/or equity. Central planning, including the kind exercised by the Biden Administration in it’s hurried and foolish effort to tear down and remake the energy economy, is not even a serious candidate on either count.
Granted, there is a long history of subsidies to the oil and gas sector. I cannot defend those, but the development of the technology (even fracking) largely preceded the fruits of the industry’s rent seeking. At this point, green fuels receive far more subsidies (despite some claims to the contrary). Furthermore, the primacy of fossil fuels was not achieved by tearing down competing technologies and infrastructure. In contrast, the current round of central planning requires destruction of entire sectors of the economy that could otherwise produce efficiently for the foreseeable future, if left unmolested.
The Biden Administration has adopted the radical green agenda. Their playbook calls for a severe tilting of price incentives in favor uneconomic, renewable energy sources, despite the economy’s heretofore sensible reliance on plentiful fossil fuels. It’s no surprise that Biden’s policy is unpopular across the economic spectrum. His natural inclination is to blame a competitive industry victimized by his policy. It’s a futile attempt to avoid accountability, as if he thinks doubling down on the fascism will help convince the electorate that oil and gas producers dreamt up this new, nefarious strategy of overcharging customers. People aren’t that dumb, but it’s typical for the elitist Left presume otherwise.
Bill Gates’ considerable philanthropic efforts through the Gates Foundation are well known. Much of the foundation’s activity has focused on disease control and nutrition around the globe. Education reform has also been a priority. Many of these projects are laudable, though I’m repulsed by a few (see here and here). During the coronavirus pandemic, Gates has spoken approvingly of Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions (lockdown measures), which are both coercive and ineffective (and see here). He has earned the enmity of anti-vaxers, of course, though I’m not anti-vax as long as the jabs are voluntary. The Gates Foundation funded the World Health Organization’s effort to provide guidance on digital vaccine passports, which is a de facto endorsement of discrimination based on vaccination status. His priorities for addressing climate change also raise some troubling issues, a few of which I address below.
Squeezing Policy from a Definition
Gates put a special Malthusian twist on a TED Talk he did back in 2010 using an equation for carbon dioxide emissions, which he’s reprised over the years. It gained a lot of notice in 2016 when a few sticklers noticed that his claim to have “discovered” the equation was false. The equation is:
CO2 = P x S x E x C,
where P = People, S = Services per person, E = Energy per service, and C = CO2 per energy unit.
This equation first appeared as the so-called Kaya Identity in a scientific review in 2002. Such an equation can be helpful in organizing one’s thoughts, but it has no operational implications in and of itself. At one level it is superficial: we could write a similar identity for almost anything, like the quantity of alcohol consumed in a year, which must equal the population times the ounces of alcohol per drink times the number of drinks per person. At a deeper level, it can be tempting to build theories around such equations, and there is no question that any theory about CO2 must at least preserve the identity.
There’s an obvious temptation to treat an equation like this as something that can be manipulated by policy, despite the possibility of behavioral links across components that might lead to unintended consequences. This is where Gates gets into trouble.
Reality Checks
As David Solway writes, Gates’ jumped to the conclusion that population drives carbon emissions, reinforcing a likely perspective that the human population is unsustainable. His benevolent solution? A healthier population won’t breed as fast, so he prescribes more vaccinations (voluntary?) and improved health care. For good measure, he added a third prong: better “reproductive health services”. Let’s see… what share of the 0.9 -1.4 billion reduction in world population Gates prescribed in 2016 would have come from terminated pregnancies?
In fact, healthier people might or might not want more children, but lower child mortality in the developing world would reduce certain economic incentives for high fertility. Another reliable association is between income and child bearing: an increase in “services per person” is likely to lead to smaller families, but that wasn’t given any emphasis by Gates. Income growth is simply not part of the narrative! Yet income growth does something else: it allows us to more easily afford the research and investments required for advanced technologies, including cleaner energy. These things take time, however.
Solway points to other weaknesses in Gates’ interpretation of the Kaya Identity. For example, efforts to slow population growth are not reliably associated with “services per person”, fuel efficiency, or carbon efficiency. In other words, carbon emissions may be powerfully influenced by factors other than population. China is a case in point.
Centralized industrial and social planning is generally ill-suited to advancing human well being. It’s especially suspect if the sole objective is to reduce carbon emissions. But Gates knows that lowering emissions without a corresponding drop in real income requires continuing technological advances and/or more efficient decisions about which technologies to deploy. He is a big advocate of developing cheap hydrogen power, which is far from a reality. He is also excited about carbon capture technologies, which are still in their infancy.
Renewables like wind and solar power play a large part in Gates’ vision. Those technologies cannot deliver a reliable flow of power, however, without either adequate backup capacity or a dramatic advance in battery technology. Gates over-promotes wind and solar, but I give him credit for acknowledging their intermittency. He attempts to come to grips with it by advocating nuclear backup, but it’s just not clear that he has integrated the incremental cost of the necessary backup capacity with other direct costs of these renewables… not to mention the considerable environmental costs imposed by wind and solar (see the “back-to-nature” photo at the top for a cogent illustration). Power storage at scale is still a long way off, and its cost will be significant as well.
We could deploy existing energy technologies to greater advantage with respect to carbon efficiency. We’ve already reduced CO2 emissions in the U.S. by substituting natural gas for less carbon-efficient fuels, but the Biden Administration would rather discourage its use. Gates deserves credit for recognizing the huge role that nuclear energy can play in providing zero-carbon power. Despite that, he still can’t quite bring himself to admit the boneheadedness of heavy reliance on intermittent renewables.
Bill’s “Green Premium”
Gates seems to have deemphasized the Kaya Identity more recently. Instead, his focus has shifted to the so-called “green premium”, or the incremental cost of using zero-carbon technology relative to a traditional source. Needless to say, the premium is large for truly zero-carbon sources, but Gates emphasizes the importance of using the green premium to guide development even in the here and now.
That’s fine, but it’s not clear that he gives adequate consideration to cases in which emissions, while not eliminated, can be reduced at a negative incremental cost via appropriate substitution. That describes the transition to natural gas from other fuels. This is something that markets can do without the assistance of ham-handed interventionists. Gates prefers nuclear power and says natural gas is “not a real bridge technology” to a zero carbon future. That’s short-sighted and reflects an absolutist mindset that ignores both the economic and political environment. The thinking is that if it’s not zero emissions, it’s not worth doing.
Gates emphasizes the need to sharply reduce the range of green premia on various technologies to achieve net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. But the goal of net-zero emissions 2050 is based on the highly unlikely proposition that global catastrophe awaits failing net-zero. In fact, the predicted consequences of doing nothing are based on drastic and outdated carbon growth scenarios and rudimentary carbon-forcing models that have proven to be severely biased to the upside in terms of predicting global temperature trends.
The idea that 2050 is some kind of “deadline” is a wholly arbitrary determination. Furthermore, the absolutism with which such goals are stated belies a failure to properly assess the true costs and benefits of carbon-based energy. If we so much as accept the notion that fossil fuels have external costs, we are then expected to accept that zero carbon emissions is optimal. This is not “science”; it is doctrine propped-up by bizarre and false scare stories. It involves massive efforts to manipulate opinion and coerce behavior based upon shoddy forecasts produced by committee. Even carbon capture technology is considered “problematic” because it implies that someone, somewhere, will use a process that emits CO2. That’s a ridiculous bogeyman, of course, and even Gates supports development of carbon capture.
Conclusion
I’ve never felt any real antipathy for Bill Gates as a person. He built a fortune, and I used his company’s software for most of my career. In some ways I still prefer it to macOS. I believe Gates is sincere in his efforts to help humanity even if his efforts are misdirected. He seems to reside on the less crazy end of the spectrum of climate alarmists. He’s putting a great deal of his private resources toward development of technologies that, if successful, might actually lead to less coercion by those attempting to transform private energy decisions. Nevertheless, there is menace in some of the solutions to which Gates clings. They require concerted action on the part of central authorities that would commandeer private resources and abrogate liberty. His assertion that the world is over-populated is both dubious and dangerous. You can offer free health care, but a conviction that the population must be thinned can lead to far more radical and monstrous initiatives.
The “green premium” promoted by Gates is an indirect measure of how far we must go to achieve parity in the pricing of carbon and non-carbon energy sources, as if parity should be an objective of public policy. That proposition is based on bad economics, fraudulent analyses of trends in carbon concentrations and climate trends, and a purposely incomplete menu of technological alternatives. Yes, the green premium highlights various technological challenges, but it is also a direct measure of how much intervention via taxes or subsidies are necessary to achieve parity. Is that a temptation to policymakers? Or does it represent a daunting political barrier? It’s pretty clear that the “median voter” does not view climate change as the only priority.
Building a big government is thought to be a luxury that prosperous nations can afford, but such efforts have a systematically negative effect on their ability to generate income, much as eating the seed corn delivers a farmer to poverty. Daniel J. Mitchell puts it bluntly in a piece entitled “Rich Nations That Enact Big Government Don’t Remain Rich“. This is nowhere more obvious than in Argentina and Venezuela, two nations that were prosperous 50 years ago and are now economically feeble, or in Venezuela’s case, imploding. Government, in the final analysis, extracts resources from the private economy, often contributing negatively to productivity. Yet the idea that government is a tonic for economic growth persists, and it persists even in the face of weakness induced by excessive government.
Government statistics on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) exaggerate the contribution of government to income in at least a couple of ways. To understand why, it’s necessary to distinguish between spending aggregates and income aggregates, which add up to the same total GDP. The former include consumption, investment, and government spending. Income aggregates are the other side of the GDP “coin”: payments made to factors of production, which represent GDP as a measure of output value.
A dissociation between these alternative views of GDP with respect to government’s contribution is that government payments count as spending and income regardless of the recipient’s contribution to output. Even if nothing is accomplished, nothing is produced, it is measured as income and spending and it is an increment to GDP. Payments to dig holes and refill them contribute to GDP as long as the government does the “job”. By contrast, if a worker in the private sector is paid but produces nothing of value, the firm’s owners suffer a loss of income corresponding to the worker’s pay, and GDP is unchanged! So increased factor payments by government cause an implicit bias in the measurement of output.
A second government bias implicit in GDP statistics is that public spending and government labor payments are often not subjected to a “market test” of value. The activity is “mandated”, so there is no correspondence to a willingness to pay or real value. Public employee unions exaggerate these distortions. There are generally no competitors for government provision of services, few incentives for efficiency, and often little discipline in government procurement processes. So the pricing of government transactions tends to be inflated. And yet when the government gets ripped off by overcharges or cronyist kickbacks, the excess payments contribute positively to GDP. In contrast, when a private firm gets ripped off, its income is correspondingly reduced and the transaction generally will not contribute to GDP.
It takes taxes to fund government, either immediate or deferred, and the taxes are either explicit or implicit in the form of eroded purchasing power. This creates negative incentives that retard private investment incentives, work incentives, and thereby private economic growth. Redistributional efforts retard work incentives as well because welfare–state beneficiaries often face high marginal tax rates on earned income.
Does big government represent a good investment for the wealth of a prosperous nation? In view of the above, one can hardly trust official statistics in rendering a judgement on that question. But despite these distortions, big government and measured economic growth are still negatively correlated. Mitchell provides more detailed analysis of government and economic growth at Heritage, including a set of references to academic papers on the topic.
One important way that government may contribute to economic growth is through the provision of physical infrastructure, which theoretically improves efficiency in private production. However, public infrastructure spending is subject to the same upward cost pressures discussed above, it is often tied to bumbling industrial policy efforts, its utilization by the public is usually mis-priced, and governments are congenitally inept at operating facilities efficiently. It is not clear that private developers could be counted upon to fill the void without some form of partnership with government, however, which has its own pitfalls. There are certainly reforms that could make private and public infrastructure investment and operation more viable, such as eliminating regulatory roadblocks to the installation of new facilities.
Another area in which government may generate a positive economic return is public investment in education, but that return is far from guaranteed. The success of public education investment depends on a wide range of cultural, political, and economic factors. For example, Cuba has the third largest proportion of government education spending to GDP, but the country’s ability to profit from that investment is severely crimped by its totalitarian economic and political system. I have been a frequent critic of public education in general, and I am not persuaded that education is truly a public good, despite some degree of spillover benefit. And while education may be a worthwhile national priority in many circumstances, it is not clear that government should necessarily fund education, let alone “run” education. Public education spending certainly doesn’t automatically translate to effective education outcomes, and it does not guarantee economic growth.
There is great exaggeration regarding the success of certain nations that have allowed government to absorb a large share of resources. That includes many of the European states, for which average incomes are roughly comparable to the Mississippi Delta. Only Luxembourg, Norway and Switzerland have income levels that are respectable relative to the U.S., and Norway relies heavily on oil extraction. Attributing economic power to government in the Nordic countries is especially misleading because the strength of those economies has always stemmed from their fundamentally capitalist underpinnings. Sweden built its wealth on capitalism, but it has cannibalized that strength over several decades with a burgeoning welfare state and high taxes. It only recently has begun attempting to reverse course.
Economic progress is unlikely to be achieved by “investing” in a larger public sector. Instead, encouraging private activity via positive incentives and minimal regulatory interference is a better route to success. The measured economic benefits of government spending are illusory to a significant degree. Even those activities thought to be the most productive avenues for government involvement, like investment in infrastructure and education, are plagued by cost inflation and incompetent execution. Finally, cross-country empirical evidence confirms that a more dominant public sector is associated with lower income growth. And yet there will always be a faction subscribing to the infantile, “free-lunch” belief that big government can deliver growth, and deliver it in excess of the predictable damage it inflicts on the private economy.
The proposition that mankind is capable of creating a successful “planned” society is at least as old as the Bronze Age. Of course it’s been tried. The effort necessarily involves a realignment of the economic and political landscape and always requires a high degree of coercion. But putting that aside, such planning can never be successful relative to spontaneous order of the kind that dominates private affairs in a free society. The task of advancing human well-being given available resources has never been achieved under central planning. It always fails miserably in this regard, and it always will fail to match the success of decentralized decision-making and private markets.
There are various ways to explain this fact, but I recently came across an interesting take on the subject having to do with the notion of scalability. Francis Turner offers this note on the topic at the Liberty.me blog. To begin, he gives a lengthy quote from a software developer who relates the problems of social and economic planning to the complexity of managing a network. On the topic of scale, the developer notes that the number of relationships in a network increases with the square of the number of its “nodes”, or members:
“2 nodes have 1 potential relationship. 4 nodes (twice as many) has 6 potential relationships (6 times as many). 8 nodes (twice again) has 28 potential relationships. 100 nodes => [4,950] relationships; 1,000 nodes => 499,500 relationships—nearly half a million.“
Actually, the formula for the number of potential relationships or connections in a network is n*(n-1)/2, where n is the number of network nodes. The developer Turner quotes discusses this in the context of two competing network management structures: client-server and peer-to-peer. Under the former, the network is managed centrally by a server, which communicates with all nodes, makes various decisions, and routes communications traffic between nodes. In a peer-to-peer network, the work of network management is distributed — each computer manages its own relationships. The developer says, at first, “the idea of hooking together thousands of computers was science fiction.” But as larger networks were built-out in the 1990s, the client-server framework was more or less rejected by the industry because it required such massive resources to manage large networks. In fact, as new nodes are added to a peer-to-peer network, its capacity to manage itself actually increases! In other words, client-server networks are not as scalable as peer-to-peer networks:
“Even if it were perfectly designed and never broke down, there was some number of nodes that would crash the server. It was mathematically unavoidable. You HAVE TO distribute the management as close as possible to the nodes, or the system fails.
… in an instant, I realized that the same is true of governments. … And suddenly my coworker’s small government rantings weren’t crazy…”
This developer’s epiphany captures a few truths about the relative efficacy of decentralized decision-making. It’s not just for computer networks! But in fact, when it comes to network management, the task is comparatively simple: meet the computing and communication needs of users. A central server faces dynamic capacity demands and the need to route changing flows of traffic between nodes. Software requirements change as well, which may necessitate discrete alterations in capacity and rules from time-to-time.
But consider the management of a network of individual economic units. Let’s start with individuals who produce something… like widgets. There are likely to be real economies achieved when a few individual widgeteers band together to produce as a team. Some specialization into different functions can take place, like purchasing materials, fabrication, and distribution. Perhaps administrative tasks can be centralized for greater efficiency. Economies of scale may dictate an even larger organization, and at some point the firm might find additional economies in producing widget-complementary products and services. But eventually, if the decision-making is centralized and hierarchical, the sheer weight of organizational complexity will begin to take a toll, driving up costs and/or diminishing the firm’s ability to deal with changes in technology or the market environment. In other words, centralized control becomes difficult to scale in an efficient way, and there may be some “optimal” size for a firm beyond which it struggles.
Now consider individual consumers, each of whom faces an income constraint and has a set of tastes spanning innumerable goods. These tastes vary across time scales like hour-of-day, day-of-week, seasons, life-stage, and technology cycles. The volume of information is even more daunting when you consider that preferences vary across possible price vectors and potential income levels as well.
Can the interactions between all of these consumer and producer “nodes” be coordinated by a central economic authority so as to optimize their well-being dynamically, subject to resource constraints? As we’ve seen, the job requires massive amounts of information and a crushing number of continually evolving decisions. It is really impossible for any central authority or computer to “know” all of the information needed. Secondly, to the software developer’s point, the number of potential relationships increases with the square of the number of consumers and producers, as does the required volume of information and number of decisions. The scalability problem should be obvious.
This kind of planning is a task with which no central authority can keep up. Will the central authority always get milk, eggs and produce to the store when people need it, at a price they are willing to pay, and with minimal spoilage? Will fuel be available such that a light always turns on whenever they flip the switch? Will adequate supplies of medicines always be available for the sick? Will the central authority be able to guarantee a range of good-quality clothing from which to choose?
There has never been a central authority that successfully performed the job just described. Yet that job gets done every day in free, capitalistic societies, and we tend to take it for granted. The massive process of information transmission and coordination takes place spontaneously with spectacularly good results via private discovery and decision-making, secure property rights, markets, and a functioning price mechanism. Individual economic units are endowed with decision-making power and the authority to manage their own relationships. And the spontaneous order that takes shape remains effective even as networks of economic units expand. In other words, markets are highly scalable at solving the eternal problem of allocating scarce resources.
But thus far I’ve set up something of a straw man by presuming that the central authority must monitor all individual economic units to know and translate their demands and supplies of goods into the ongoing, myriad decisions about production, distribution and consumption. Suppose the central authority takes a less ambitious approach. For example, it might attempt to enforce a set of prices that its experts believe to be fair to both consumers and producers. This is a much simpler task of central management. What could go wrong?
These prices will be wrong immediately, to one degree or another, without tailoring them to detailed knowledge of the individual tastes, preferences, talents, productivities, price sensitivities, and resource endowments of individual economic units. It would be sheer luck to hit on the correct prices at the start, but even then they would not be correct for long. Conditions change continuously, and the new information is simply not available to the central authority. Various shortages and surpluses will appear without the corrective mechanism usually provided by markets. Queues will form here and inventories will accumulate there without any self-correcting mechanism. Consumers will be angry, producers will quit, goods will rot, and stocks of physical capital will sit idle and go to waste.
Other forms of planning attempt to set quantities of goods produced and are subject to errors similar to those arising from price controls. Even worse is an attempt to plan both price and quantity. Perhaps more subtle is the case of industrial policy, in which planners attempt to encourage the development of certain industries and discourage activity in those deemed “undesirable”. While often borne out of good intentions, these planners do not know enough about the future of technology, resource supplies, and consumer preferences to arrogate these kinds of decisions to themselves. They will invariably commit resources to inferior technologies, misjudge future conditions, and abridge the freedoms of those whose work or consumption is out-of-favor and those who are taxed to pay for the artificial incentives. To the extent that industrial policies become more pervasive, scalability will become an obstacle to the planners because they simply lack the information required to perform their jobs of steering investment wisely.
Here is Turner’s verdict on central planning:
“No central planner, or even a board of them, can accurately set prices across any nation larger than, maybe, Liechtenstein and quite likely even at the level of Liechtenstein it won’t work well. After all how can a central planner tell that Farmer X’s vegetables taste better and are less rotten than Farmer Y’s and that people therefore are prepared to pay more for a tomato from Farmer X than they are one from Farmer Y.”
I will go further than Turner: planning can only work well in small settings and only when the affected units do the planning. For example, the determination of contract terms between two parties requires planning, as does the coordination of activities within a firm. But then these plans are not really “central” and the planners are not “public”. These activities are actually parts of a larger market process. Otherwise, the paradigm of central planning is not merely unscalable, it is unworkable without negative consequences.
Finally, the notion of scalability applies broadly to governance, not merely economic planning. The following quote from Turner, for example, is a ringing endorsement for federalism:
“It is worth noting that almost all successful nations have different levels of government. You have the local town council, the state/province/county government, possibly a regional government and then finally the national one. Moreover richer countries tend to do better when they push more down to the lower levels. This is a classic way to solve a scalability problem – instead of having a single central power you devolve powers and responsibilities with some framework such that they follow the general desires of the higher levels of government but have freedom to implement their own solutions and adapt policies to local conditions.”
The stock market’s recent gains have at least three plausible explanations: corporate earnings growth, the prospect of tax reform, and deregulation. Tax reform and deregulation are stated priorities of the Trump Administration and have the potential to lift the economy and generate additional earnings. Investors obviously like that prospect, though regulation itself is a tool used subversively by crony capitalists to stifle competition in their markets. Conceivably, some of the large firms that dominate major stock indices could suffer from deregulation. And I have to wonder whether the economic threat of Trumpian trade protectionism is not taken seriously by the equity markets. Let’s hope they’re right.
It’s no mystery that high taxes and tax complexity can inhibit economic growth. Let’s face it: when it comes to productive effort, we can all think of better things to do than tax planning, crony capitalist or not. The same is true of regulation: the massive diversion of resources into non-productive compliance activities stifles innovation, growth, and even the stability of the status quo. Regulation creates obstacles to activities like new construction and the diffusion of telecommunications services. And it discourages the creation of new products and services like potentially life-saving drugs and slows their introduction to market. The sheer number of federal regulations is so spectacular that one wonders how anything productive ever gets done! Patrick McLaughlin of The Mercatus Center and several coauthors tell of “The Impossibility of Comprehending, or Even Reading, All Federal Regulations“.
Regulation is more than a mere economic burden. It is the product of an administrative apparatus that is not subject to the checks and balances that are at the very heart of our system of constitutional government. That is a threat to basic liberties. Barry Brownstein offers an instructive case study of “The Tyranny of Administrative Power” involving violations of property rights in New Hampshire. The case involves the administrative machinations surrounding an installation of high-power lines.
Governmental efforts to spur innovation ordinarily take the form of spending on research, subsidies for certain technologies or favored industries (e.g., alternative energy), and large government programs dedicated to the achievement of various technological goals (e.g., NASA, DARPA). Together with regulatory rules that influence the allocation of resources, these governmental efforts are called industrial policy. An unfortunate recent example is Trump’s decision to retain the renewable fuel standard (RFS), but on the whole, industrial policy does not seem central to Trump’s effort to stimulate innovation.
It’s clear that a deregulatory effort is well underway: the so-called “deconstruction of the administrative state” hailed by Steve Bannon not long after Trump took office. First came Trump’s 2-for 1 executive order (also see here) requiring the elimination (or modification) of two rules for every new rule. In the Wall Street Journal, Greg Ip writes about changes at the FDA and the FCC that could dramatically alter the pace of innovation in the pharmaceutical and telecom industries. (If the link is gated, you access the article on the WSJ’s Facebook page.) Speedier and less burdensome reviews of new drugs will greatly benefit consumers. An end to net neutrality rules will support greater investment in broadband infrastructure and access to innovative services. There is a new emphasis at the FCC on enabling innovative solutions to communications problems, such as Google’s effort to provide cell phone service in Puerto Rico by flying balloons over the island. The Trump Administration is also reining-in an aggressive EPA, the source of many questionable rules that weaken property rights and inhibit growth. (Again, the RFS is a disappointing exception.) Health care reform could offer much needed relief from overzealous insurance regulation and high compliance costs for physicians and other providers.
But deconstructing the administrative state is hard. Regulations just seem to metastasize, so deregulatory gains are offset by continued rule-making. This is partly from new legislation, but it is also a consequence of the incentives facing self-interested regulators. With that in mind, it’s impressive that regulation has not grown, on balance, thus far into Trump’s first year in office. According to Patrick McLaughlin, zero regulatory growth has been unusual going back at least to the Carter Administration. In quoting McLaughlin, The Weekly Standard says that Trump might well earn the mantle of “King of Deregulation“, but he has a long way to go. Brookings has this interactive tool to keep track of his deregulatory progress. One item on the Brookings list is the President’s intention to withdraw from the Paris Climate Accord. That represents a big save in terms of avoiding future regulatory burdens.
I can’t help but be wary of other avenues through which the Trump Administration might regulate activity and undermine economic growth. Chief among these is Trump’s negative attitude toward foreign trade. Government interference with our freedom to freely engage in transactions with the rest of the world is costly in terms of both foreign and domestic prices. With something of a history as a crony capitalist himself, Trump is not immune to pressure from private economic interests, as illustrated by his recent cow-tow to the ethanol lobby. Nevertheless, I’m mostly encouraged by the administration’s deregulatory efforts, and I hope they continue. The equity market apparently expects that to be the case.
In advanced civilizations the period loosely called Alexandrian is usually associated with flexible morals, perfunctory religion, populist standards and cosmopolitan tastes, feminism, exotic cults, and the rapid turnover of high and low fads---in short, a falling away (which is all that decadence means) from the strictness of traditional rules, embodied in character and inforced from within. -- Jacques Barzun
Sacred Cow Chips 