Category Archives: Pandemic

COVID Politics and Collateral Damage

26 Sunday Jul 2020

Posted by in Pandemic, Public Health

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Policymakers, public health experts, and the media responded to the coronavirus in ways that have often undermined public health and magnified the deadly consequences of the pandemic. Below I offer several examples of perverse politics and policy prescriptions, and a few really bad decisions by certain elected officials. Some of the collateral damage was intentional and motivated by an intent to inflict political damage on Donald Trump, and people of good faith should find that grotesque no matter their views on Trump’s presidency.

Politicized Treatment

The smug dismissal of hydroxychloraquine as Trumpian foolishness was a crime against humanity. We now know HCQ works as an early treatment and as a prophylactic against infection. It’s has been partly credited with stanching “hot spots” in India as well as contributing strongly to control of the contagion in Switzerland and in a number of other countries. According to epidemiologist Harvey Risch of the Yale School of Public Health, HCQ could save 75,000 to 100,000 lives if the drug is widely used. This is from Dr. Risch’s OpEd in Newsweek:

“On May 27, I published an article in the American Journal of Epidemiology (AJE) entitled, ‘Early Outpatient Treatment of Symptomatic, High-Risk COVID-19 Patients that Should be Ramped-Up Immediately as Key to the Pandemic Crisis.’ That article, published in the world’s leading epidemiology journal, analyzed five studies, demonstrating clear-cut and significant benefits to treated patients, plus other very large studies that showed the medication safety. …

Since [then], seven more studies have demonstrated similar benefit. In a lengthy follow-up letter, also published by AJE, I discuss these seven studies and renew my call for the immediate early use of hydroxychloroquine in high-risk patients.”

Risch is careful to couch his statements in forward-looking terms, but this also implies that tens of thousands of lives could have been saved, or patients might have recovered more readily and without lasting harm, had use of the drug not been restricted. The FDA revoked its Emergency Use Authorization for HCQ on June 15th, alleging that it is not safe and has little if any benefit. An important rationale cited in the FDA’s memo was an NIH study of late-stage C19 patients that found no benefit and potential risks to HCQ, but this is of questionable relevance because the benefit appears to be in early-stage treatment or prophylaxis. Poor research design also goes for this study and this study, while this study shared in some shortcomings (e.g., and no use of and/or controls for zinc) and a lack of statistical power. Left-wing outlets like Politico seemed almost gleeful, and blissfully ignorant, in calling those studies “nails in the coffin” for HCQ. Now, I ask: putting the outcomes of the research aside, was it really appropriate to root against a potential treatment for a serious disease, especially back in March and April when there were few treatment options, but even now?

Then we have the state governors who restricted the use of HCQ for treating C19, such as Gretchen Whitmer (MI) and Steve Sisolak (NV). Andrew Cuomo (NY) decided that HCQ could be dispensed only for hospital use, exactly the wrong approach for early stage treatment. And all of this resistance was a reaction to Donald Trump’s optimism about the promise of HCQ. Yes, there was alarm that lupus patients would be left without adequate supplies, but the medication is a very cheap, easy to produce drug, so that was never a real danger. Too much of the media and politicians have been complicit in denying a viable treatment to many thousands of C19 victims. If you were one of the snarky idiots putting it down on social media, you are either complicit or simply a poster child for banal evil.

Seeding the Nursing Homes

The governors of several states issued executive orders to force nursing homes to accept C19 patients, which was against CMS guidance issued in mid-March. The governors were Andrew Cuomo (NY), Gretchen Whitmer (MI), Gavin Newsom (CA), Tom Wolf (PA), and Phil Murphy (PA). This was a case of stupidity more than anything else. These institutions are home to the segment of the population most vulnerable to the virus, and they have accounted for about 40% of all C19 deaths. Nursing homes were ill-prepared to handle these patients, and the governors foolishly and callously ordered them to house patients who required a greater level of care and who represented an extreme hazard to other residents and staff.

Party & Protest On

Then of course we had the mayor of New York City, Bill De Blasio, who urged New Yorkers to get out on the town in early March. That was matched in its stupidity by the array of politicians and health experts who decided, having spent months proselytizing the need to “stay home”, that it was in their best interests to endorse participation in street protests that were often too crowded to maintain effective social distance. That’s not a condemnation of those who sought to protest peacefully against police brutality, but it was not a good or consistent recommendation in the domain of public health. Thankfully, the protests were outside!

Testing, Our Way Or the Highway

The FDA and CDC were guilty of regulatory overreach in preventing early testing for C19, and were responsible for many lives lost early in the pandemic. By the time the approved CDC tests revealed that the virus was ramping up drastically in March, the country was already behind in getting a handle on the spread of the virus, quarantining the infected, and tracing their contacts. There is no question that this cost lives.

Masks… Maybe, But Our Way Or the Highway

U.S. public health authorities were guilty of confused messaging on the efficacy of masks early in the pandemic. As Joel Zinberg notes in City Journal, Anthony Fauci admitted that his own minimization of the effectiveness of masks was motivated by a desire to prevent a shortage of PPE for health care workers:

“In discouraging mask use, Fauci—for decades, the nation’s foremost expert on viral infectious diseases—was not acting as a neutral interpreter of settled science but as a policymaker, concerned with maximizing the utility of the limited supply of a critical item. An economist could have told him that there was no need to misinform the public. Letting market mechanisms work and relaxing counterproductive regulations would ease shortages. Masks for health-care workers would be available if we were willing to pay higher prices; those higher prices, in turn, would elicit more mask production.”

Indeed, regulators made acquisition of adequate supplies of PPE more difficult than necessary via compliance requirements, “price gouging” rules, and import controls.

Bans on Elective Surgery

Another series of unnecessary deaths was caused by various bans on elective surgeries across the U.S. (also see here), and we’re now in danger of repeating that mistake. These bans were thought to be helpful in preserving hospital capacity, but hospitals were significantly underutilized for much of the pandemic. Add to that the fright inspired by official reaction to C19, which keeps emergency rooms empty, and you have a universe of diverse public health problems to grapple with. As I said on this blog a couple of months ago:

“… months of undiagnosed cardiac and stroke symptoms; no cancer screenings, putting patients months behind on the survival curve; deferred procedures of all kinds; run-of-the-mill infections gone untreated; palsy and other neurological symptoms anxiously discounted by victims at home; a hold on treatments for all sorts of other progressive diseases; and patients ordinarily requiring hospitalization sent home. And to start back up, new health problems must compete with all that deferred care. Do you dare tally the death and other worsened outcomes? Both are no doubt significant.”

Lockdowns

The lockdowns were unnecessary and ineffectual in their ability to control the spread of the virus. A study of 50 countries published by The Lancet last week found the following:

“Increasing COVID-19 caseloads were associated with countries with higher obesity … median population age … and longer time to border closures from the first reported case…. Increased mortality per million was significantly associated with higher obesity prevalence … and per capita gross domestic product (GDP) …. Reduced income dispersion reduced mortality … and the number of critical cases …. Rapid border closures, full lockdowns, and wide-spread testing were not associated with COVID-19 mortality per million people.”

That should have been obvious for a virus that holds little danger for prime working-age cohorts who are most impacted by economic lockdowns.

Like the moratoria on elective surgeries, lockdowns did more harm than good. Livelihoods disappeared, business were ruined, savings were destroyed, dreams were shattered, isolation set in, and it continues today. These kinds of problems are strongly associated with health troubles, family dysfunction, drug and alcohol abuse, and even suicide. It’s ironic that those charged with advising on matters pertaining to public health should focus exclusively on a single risk, recommending solutions that carry great risk themselves without a second thought. After all, the protocol in reviewing new treatments sets the first hurdle as patient safety, but apparently that didn’t apply in the case of shutdowns.

Even as efforts were made to reopen, faulty epidemiological models were used to predict calamitous outcomes. While case counts have risen in many states in the U.S. in June and July, deaths remain far below model predictions and far below deaths recorded during the spring in the northeast.

One last note: I almost titled this post “Attack of the Killer Morons”, but as a concession to what is surely a vain hope, I decided not to alienate certain readers right from the start.

 

 

Some Cheery COVID Research Tidbits

16 Thursday Jul 2020

Posted by in Pandemic, Public Health, Uncategorized

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Here’s a short list of new or newish research developments, some related to the quest to find COVID treatments. Most of it is good news; some of it is very exciting!

Long-lasting T-cell immunity: this paper in Nature shows that prior exposure to coronaviruses like severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and even the common cold prompt an immune reaction via so-called T-cells that have long memories and are reactive to certain proteins in COVID-19 (SARS-CoV-2). The T-cells were detected in both C19-infected and uninfected patients. This comes after discouraging reports that anti-body responses to C19 are short-lived, but T-cells are a different form of acquired immunity. Derek Lowe says the following:

“This makes one think, as many have been wondering, that T-cell driven immunity is perhaps the way to reconcile the apparent paradox between (1) antibody responses that seem to be dropping week by week in convalescent patients but (2) few (if any) reliable reports of actual re-infection. That would be good news indeed.”

The herd immunity threshold (HIT) is much lower than you think: I’ve written about the effect of heterogeneity on the HIT before, here and here. This new paper, by three Oxford zoologists, shows that the existence of a cohort having some form of prior immunity, innate or acquired, reduces the number of infections required to achieve the HIT. For example, if initial transmissibility (R0) is 2.5 and 40% of the population has prior immunity (both reasonable assumptions for many areas), the HIT is as low as 20%, according to the authors’ calculations. That’s when the contagion begins to recede, though the final infected share of the population would be higher. This might explain why new cases and deaths have already plunged in places like Italy, Sweden, and New York, and why protests in NYC did not lead to a new wave of infections, while those in the south appear to have done so.

Seasonal effects: viral loads might be decreasing. From the abstract:

“Severity of COVID-19 in Europe decreased significantly between March and May and the seasonality of COVID-19 is the most likely explanation. Mucosal barrier and mucociliary clearance can significantly decrease viral load and disease progression, and their inactivation by low relative humidity of indoor air might significantly contribute to severity of the disease.”

The BCG vaccine appears to be protective: this is the bacillus Calmette-Guérin tuberculosis vaccine administered in some countries, This finding is not based on clinical trials, so more work is needed.

Is there no margin in plasma? No subsidy? This is the only “bad news” item on my list. It’s widely agreed that blood plasma from recovered C19 patients can be incorporated into an immune globulin drug to inoculate people against the virus. It’s proven safe, but for various reasons no one seems interested. Not the government. Not private companies. Did Trump happen to mention it or something?

C19 doesn’t spread in schools: this German study demonstrates that there is little risk in reopening schools. One of the researchers says:

“Children act more as a brake on infection. Not every infection that reaches them is passed on…. This means that the degree of immunization in the group of study participants is well below 1 per cent and much lower then we expected. This suggests schools have not developed into hotspots.”

Also worth emphasis is that remote learning leaves much to be desired, as acknowledged by the National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine, which has recommended that schools reopen for younger children and those with special needs.

Can angiotensin drugs (ACE Inhibitors/ARBs) reduce mortality? This meta-analysis of nine studies finds that these drugs reduce C19 mortality among patients with hypertension. The drugs were also associated with a reduction in severity but not with statistical significance. These results run contrary to initial suspicions, because ACEI/ARB drugs actually “up-regulate” ACE-2 receptors, to which C19 binds. Researchers say the drugs might be working through some other protective channel. This is not a treatment per se, but this should be reassuring if you already take one of these medications.

Tricor appears to clear lung tissue of C19: this research focused on C19’s preference for an environment rich in cholesterol and other fatty acids:

“What they found is that the novel coronavirus prevents the routine burning of carbohydrates, which results in large amounts of fat accumulating inside lung cells – a condition the virus needs to reproduce.”

Tricor reduces those fats, and the researchers claim it is capable of clearing lung tissue of C19 in a matter of days. This was not a clinical trial, however, so more work is needed. Tricor is an FDA approved drug, so it is safe and could be administered “off label” immediately. Tricor is a fibrate; the news with respect to statins and C19 severity is pretty good too! These are not treatments per se, but this should be reassuring if you already take one of these medications.

Hydroxychloroquine works: despite months of carping from media and leftist know-it-all’s dismissing the mere possibility of HCQ as a potential C19 treatment, evidence is accumulating that it is effective in treating early-stage infections after all. The large study conducted by the Henry Ford Health System found that treatment with HCQ early after hospitalization, and with careful monitoring of heart function, cut the death rate in half relative to a control group. Here’s another: an Indian study found that four-plus maintenance doses of HCQ acted as a prophylactic against C19 infection among health care workers, reducing the odds of infection by more than half. An additional piece of evidence is provided by this analysis of a 14-day Swiss ban on the use of HCQ in late May and early June. The ban was associated with a huge leap in the C19 deaths after a lag of less than two weeks. Resumption of HCQ treatment brought C19 deaths down sharply after a similar lag.

Meanwhile, a study in Lancet purporting to show that HCQ was ineffective and posed significant risks to heart health was retracted based on the poor quality of the data.

Remdesivir also cuts death rate: by 62% in a smaller controlled study by the drug maker Gilead Sciences.

Pet ownership might confer some immunity: this one is a little off-beat, and perhaps the research is under-developed, but it is interesting nonetheless!

I owe Instapundit and Marginal Revolution hat tips for several of these items.

Case Fatality, Stale Ratios and Exaggerated Loss

14 Tuesday Jul 2020

Posted by in Analytics, Pandemic

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I hope someday I won’t feel compelled to write or worry about the coronavirus. However, as the pandemic wears on, it seems to take only a few days for issues to pile up, and I just can’t resist comment. Today I have a couple of beefs with uses of data and concomitant statements I’ve seen posted of late.

People are still quoting case fatality rates (CFRs) as if those cumulative numbers are relevant to the number of deaths we can expect going forward. They are not. Just as hair-brained are applications of cumulative hospitalization and ICU admittance rates to produce “rough and ready” estimates of what to expect going forward. Or, I’ve seen people express hospitalizations as ratios to CFR, as if those ratios will be the same going forward. Again, they are not. Let me try to explain.

The chart below shows the course of the U.S. CFR since the start of the pandemic. It’s taken from the interactive Covid Time Series site. My apologies if you have to click on the chart for decent viewing (or you can visit the site). The CFR at any date is the cumulative number of deaths to-date divided by the cumulative number of confirmed cases. It is a summary of past history, but it is not well-suited to making predictions about death rates in the future. The CFR began to taper a little before Memorial Day, and it is now at about 4% (as of July 13).

Out of curiosity, I also generated CFRs for AZ, CA, FL, GA, and TX, which now average about half of the national CFR. There’s an obvious lesson: if you must use CFRs, understand that they vary from place to place.

Again, CFRs are cumulative. Their changes over time can tell us something about recent trends, but even then they are flawed. For example, case counts have risen dramatically with more widespread testing. Those testing positive more recently are concentrated in younger age cohorts, for whom infections are much less severe. Treatment has improved dramatically as well, so there is little reason to expect the CFR’s of recently diagnosed cases to be as high as the latest CFRs shown above.

There is no easy way to calculate an unflawed “marginal” CFR for a recent period, though an effort to do so might improve the predictive value. Deaths lag behind case counts because the progression from early symptoms to death can take several weeks. Even more vexing for constructing a valid, recent fatality rate is that reporting of deaths is itself delayed, as I explained in my last post. Each day’s report of deaths captures deaths that may have occurred over a period of several weeks in the past, and sometimes many more.

Finally no CFR can capture the true mortality rate of the virus without ongoing, ubiquitous testing. As the state of testing stands, the true mortality rate must reflect undiagnosed cases in the denominator. The CDC’s latest “best” estimate of the true mortality rate is just 0.3%, and 0.05% for those aged 50 years or less. Those figures are based on serological tests for the presence of antibodies to C19 in more random samples of the population. Those findings reflect the extent of undiagnosed and/or asymptomatic cases.

The point is one shouldn’t be too blithe about throwing numbers around like 4% mortality based on the CFR, or even 1% mortality as a “nice, round number”, without heavy qualification. Those numbers are gross exaggerations of what we are likely to see going forward.

The same criticisms can be leveled at claims that hospitalizations will proceed at some fixed ratio relative to diagnosed cases, or some fixed ratio relative to deaths. Again, new cases tend to be less severe, so hospitalizations are likely to be a much lower ratio to cases than what is reflected in cumulative totals. Because of improved treatment, the ratio of deaths to hospitalizations will be much lower in the future as well.

CFRs are not a useful guide to future COVID deaths. The true mortality rate is a much better baseline, particularly for subsets of the population matching the current case load. Finally, and this is the only disclaimer I’ll bother to provide today, we all know that suffering is not confined to terminal cases, and it is not confined to the hospitalized subset. But don’t exaggerate the extent of your preferred interpretation of suffering by applying inappropriate cumulative calculations.

 

Reported and “Actual” COVID Deaths

13 Monday Jul 2020

Posted by in Pandemic, Political Bias

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I was updating my post from twelve days ago on the upward trend in new coronavirus cases when I came across a great tabular summary of a phenomenon that’s been underway since early April: significant delays in reporting deaths from COVID-19 (C19). Before I get to that, a quick word on what’s happened over the past 12 days. New coronavirus cases keep climbing in a number of states, and it’s been a grisly waiting game to see whether the severity and lethality of infections will follow the case counts upward. The following chart provides a very preliminary answer. It’s taken from Our World In Data, and it shows the seven-day moving average of C19 deaths in the U.S.

There has indeed been an upturn in reported deaths over the past week. Just prior to that, a temporary plateau in late June was caused by a set of “reclassifications” of earlier deaths in New Jersey (the “plateau effect is caused by seven-day averaging). These kinds of changes in reporting make it rather difficult to interpret trends accurately. Unfortunately, the reporting of deaths has been subject to continuing distortions that are even more difficult to discern than New Jersey’s spike.

Kyle Lamb provides the interesting table below, which might be difficult to read without either clicking on it or going to the link at Twitter. Here is another link to an annotated version of the table. The top row labeled “CTP Total” is the C19 death toll reported each week by the COVID Tracking Project. This is generally what the public sees. These reports show that deaths reached their highest levels during the weeks of April 11th through May 9th. However, the second column shows C19 deaths by their actual week of occurrence. This series shows a more distinct peak on April 18th with steady declines thereafter.

The weekly totals in the second column are not final, however. Take a look at the last reporting week in the far right column (July 11th). The CTP reported 4,286 deaths, an increase over the prior week consistent with the upturn in the first chart above. But the table shows that over half of that week’s reported deaths actually occurred in late April and early May! So the upturn in deaths is something of a mirage.

We won’t have a reasonable approximation of the death totals for the past several weeks (or how they compare) for at least several more weeks. In fact, one can argue that it might be a matter of months before we have a reasonable approximation of those deaths, but it’s worth noting that the vast bulk of “actual” C19 deaths tend to be reported within four weeks of the initial reporting week, and the additions or revisions to the two weeks in late April and early May in the last column were exceptionally large. Chances are we won’t see many more that big…. Or will we?

Aspects of this process hint at the ease with which the C19 death totals could be manipulated. The reported totals for all-cause mortality in the first column are incomplete; more recent weeks, especially, are not fully settled as to causes of death. Some of those fatalities are certain to be attributed to C19. Others might be reclassified as C19. And here is the scary part: the all-cause totals are certain to include a significant number of lockdown-related or COVID-phobic deaths: individuals who were unable or unwilling to seek medical care for urgent needs due to lockdowns or fears of rampant spread of C19 infections within hospital environments. To anyone with an interest in manipulating the C19 death toll, whether hospital officials seeking higher reimbursements, local or state officials seeking federal funds, or public officials at any level seeking to promote pandemic fears and/or political discord, these “extra” deaths might be tempting marks for reclassification.

I’m fairly confident that the uptrend of new cases will be far less severe than early in the pandemic. I believe much of the alarm I see on social and mainstream media is misplaced. More on that in a subsequent post, but for now I’ll simply note that those testing positive are concentrated in much lower ranges of the age distribution, and treatment has improved in a variety of ways. The table above shows that the downtrend in actual weekly C19 deaths is intact as of the admittedly incomplete July 11th reporting week. We won’t know the “actual” pattern of early-July C19 fatalities for another month or more. Even then, one might harbor suspicions that the totals are manipulated for economic or political reasons, but we can hope the reporting authorities are exercising the utmost objectivity in assigning cause of death.

Unfortunate COVID Follies

08 Wednesday Jul 2020

Posted by in Government Failure, Pandemic

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This post is devoted to a few coronavirus policies and positions that trouble me. 

Counting Deaths: People have the general impression that counting COVID-19 cases and deaths is straightforward. The facts are more reminiscent of the following exchange in the film Arsenic and Old Lace, when Jonathan Brewster angrily insists he has offed more souls than his sweet little aunties have poisoned with elderberry wine:

Dr. Einstein: You cannot count the one in South Bend. He died of pneumonia!
Jonathan Brewster: He wouldn’t have died of pneumonia if I hadn’t shot him! 

Here, Dr. Einstein wears the shoes of public health authorities who claim that C19 deaths are undercounted. But lives counted as lost from C19, in many cases, are individuals who also had the flu, pneumonia, stroke, kidney failure, and a variety of other co-morbidities. Yes, other causes of death might be induced by the coronavirus, but like Johnny’s victim in South Bend, many would not have died from C19 if they hadn’t had a prior health event. In addition, otherwise unexplained deaths are often attributed to C19 with little justification.

In fact, the C19 death toll has been distorted by a perverse federal hospital reimbursement policy that rewards hospitals for COVID patients. Death certificates seem to list C19 as the cause for almost anyone who dies in or out of a hospital during the pandemic, whether they’ve been tested or not. In fact, deaths have been attributed to C19 despite negative test results when officials decided, for one reason or another, that the test must have been unreliable!

Lockdowns: almost all of the “curve flattening” in late March and April was accomplished by voluntary action, which I’ve covered before here. The lockdowns imposed by state and local governments were highly arbitrary and tragic for many workers and business owners who could have continued to operate as safely as many so-called “essential” businesses. Lockdowns in certain areas were also blatant violations of religious rights. There is little to no evidence that lockdowns themselves led to any actual abatement of the virus. And of course, people are fed up! 

The Beach: Right now I’m at a wonderful beach condo in Florida for a week. There are other people on the beach, mostly families and a few groups of friends, but there is plenty of open space. You will not catch the coronavirus on a beach like this. And there is almost zero chance you’ll catch it on any beach. In fact, the chance you’ll catch it anywhere outside is minuscule unless you’re jammed so tightly among hundreds of protesters that you can’t even turn around. Yet government officials have closed beaches in many parts of the country while allowing the protests to go on. Oh sure, they think people will CROWD onto beaches as if they’re at a BLM protest… except they’re not. Ah, then it must be banned! That takes a special kind of dumbass.     

Waiting for Results: How could we have spent trillions of dollars as a nation on economic stimulus, much of it skimmed off by grifters, but we can’t seem to get sufficient resources to make calls to those awaiting test results? This is a case of misplaced priorities. Even now, people are waiting more than a week for their results, and many are wandering around in the community without knowing their status. Wouldn’t you think we’d get that done? We can conduct well over a half million tests a day, but can’t we find a few bucks to deliver results via phone, email, or text within 24 hours of processing results. This is truly absurd. 

Vaccine Candidates: A similar point can be made about vaccine development: We are spending $5 billion on Operation Warp Speed to build capacity in advance for five promising vaccine candidates. These will be identified over the next few months, and it looks as if all five will come from established pharmaceutical majors. There are many more vaccine candidates, however, some being developed by smaller players using inventive new techniques. The OWS expenditure looks pretty meager when you compare it to the trillions in funds the federal government is spending on economic stimulus, especially when finding an effective vaccine would obviate much of the stimulus. 

Treatment: Hydroxycloroquine has been found to lower the death rate from COVID-19 in a large controlled trial. Congratulations, morons, for trashing HCQ as a potential treatment, solely because Trump mentioned it. Way to go, dumbasses, for banning the use of a potential treatment that could have saved many thousands of lives. 

Air Conditioning: I’m shocked that public health experts haven’t been more vocal about the potentially dangerous effects of running air conditioners at high levels in public buildings. The virus is known to thrive in cool, dry environments, which is exactly what AC creates, yet this seems to have been almost completely ignored.   

Vitamin D: Likewise, I think public health experts have been far too reticent about the connection between Vitamin D deficiencies and the severity of C19 (also see here and here). The accumulating evidence about this association offers an explanation for the disturbingly high severity of cases among Black, Asian and Minority Ethnics (BAME), not to mention a possible role in C19 deaths among the generally D-deficient nursing home population. For the love of God, get the word out to the community that Vitamin D supplements might help, and they won’t hurt, and otherwise, tell people to get some sun!

Masks: I’m not in favor of strict mask mandates, but I have trouble understanding the aversion to masks among certain friends. Of course, there’s been way too much mixed messaging on the benefits of masks, and it didn’t all come from politicians! Scientists, the CDC, and the World Health Organization seemingly did everything possible to squander their credibility on this and other issues. However, a consensus now seems to have developed that masks protect others from the wearer and seem to protect the wearer from others as well. It should be obvious that masks offer a middle ground on which the economy can be restarted while mitigating the risks of further contagion. But even if you don’t believe masks protect the wearer, but only protect others from an infected wearer, donning a mask inside buildings, and when social distancing is impossible, still qualifies as a mannerly thing to do.  

 

Cases Climb, Most Patients Faring Better

30 Tuesday Jun 2020

Posted by in Pandemic, Public Health

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There’s been much speculation about whether recent increases in confirmed cases of COVID-19 (first chart above) will lead to a dramatic increase in fatalities (second chart). More generally, there is curiosity or perhaps hope as to whether the virus is not as dangerous to these new patients as it was early in the pandemic. I have discussed this point in several posts, most recently here. Based on the national data (above), we’re at the point at which an upturn in deaths might be expected. Based on the experience of many individual states, however, deaths should have trended upward by now, but they haven’t done so. Cases are generally less severe and are resolving more quickly.

Of course, more testing produces more cases (though there has been a mild uptick in test positivity over the past two weeks), but that doesn’t really explain the entire increase in cases over the past few weeks. In particular, why are so many new cases in the south? After all, there is evidence that the virus doesn’t survive well in warm, humid climates with more direct sunlight.

As I have mentioned several times, heavy use of air-conditioning in the south may have contributed to the increase. Nate Silver speculates that this is the case. The weather warmed up in late May and especially June, and many southerners retreated indoors where the air is cool, dry, and the virus thrives. Managers of public buildings should avoid blasting the AC, and you might do well to heed the same advice if you live with others in a busy household. In fact, nearly all transmission is likely occurring indoors, as has been the case throughout the pandemic. At the same time, however, with the early reopening of many southern states, younger people flocked to gyms, bars and other venues, largely abandoning any pretense of social distancing. So it’s possible that these effects have combined to produce the spike in new cases.

Some contend that the protests following George Floyd’s murder precipitated the jump in confirmed cases. Perhaps they played a role, but I’m somewhat skeptical. Yes, these could have become so-called super-spreader events; there are certain cities in which the jump in cases lagged the protests by a few weeks, such as Austin, Houston, and Miami, and where some cases were confirmed to be among those who protested. But if the protests contributed much to the jump, why hasn’t New York City seen a corresponding increase? Not only that, but the protests were outside, and the protests dissuaded many others from going out at all!

The trend in coronavirus fatalities remains more favorable, despite the increase in daily confirmed cases. One exception is New Jersey, which decided to reclassify 1,800 deaths as “probable” COVID deaths about six days ago. You can see the spike caused by that decision in the second chart above. Reclassifications like that arouse my suspicion, especially when federal hospital reimbursements are tied to COVID cases, and in view of this description from Bloomberg (my emphasis):

“… those whose negative test results were considered unreliable; who were linked to known outbreaks and showed symptoms; or whose death certificates strongly suggested a coronavirus link.”

Deaths necessarily lag new cases by anywhere from a few days to several weeks, depending on the stage at the time of diagnosis and delays in test results. The lag between diagnosis and death seems to center on about 12 – 14 days. Thus far, there doesn’t appear to be an upward shift in the trend of fatal cases, but the big updraft in cases nationally only started about two weeks ago. More on that below.

Importantly, a larger share of new cases is now among a younger age cohort, for whom the virus is much less threatening. The most vulnerable people are probably taking more precautions than early in the pandemic, and shocking as might seem, there is probably some buildup in immunity in the surviving nursing home population at this point. We are also better at treatment, and there is generally plenty of hospital capacity. And to the extent that the surge in new cases is concentrated in the south, fewer patients are likely to have Vitamin D deficiencies, which is increasingly mentioned as a contributor to the severity of coronavirus infections.

I decided to make some casual comparisons of new cases versus COVID deaths on a state-by-state basis, but I got a little carried away. Using the COVID Time Series web site, I started by checking some of the southern states with recent large increases in case counts. I ended up looking at 15 states in the south and west, and I added Missouri and Minnesota as well. I passed over a few others because their trends were basically flat. The 17 states all had upward trends in new cases over the past one to two months, or they had an increase in new cases more recently. However, only four of those states experienced any discernible increase in daily deaths over the corresponding time frames. These are Arizona, Arkansas, Tennessee, and Texas, and their increases are so modest they might be statistical noise.

Again, deaths tend to lag new cases by a couple of weeks, so the timing of the increase in case counts matters. Five of the states were trending upward beginning in May or even earlier, and 13 of the states saw an acceleration or a shift to an upward trend in new cases after Memorial Day, in late May or June. Of those 13, the changes in trend occurred between one and five weeks ago. Six states, including Texas, had a shift within the past two weeks. It’s probably too early to draw conclusions for those six states, but in general there is little to suggest that fatal cases will soar like they did early in the pandemic. Case fatality rates are likely to remain at much lower levels.

We’ll know much more within a week or two. It’s very encouraging that the upward trend in new cases hasn’t resulted in more deaths thus far, especially at the state level, as many states have had case counts drift upward for over a month. If it’s going to occur, it should be well underway within a week or so. Much also depends on whether new cases continue to climb in July, in which case we’ll be waiting in trepidation for whether more deaths transpire.

Coronavirus Framing #7: Second Wave Uncertainty

19 Friday Jun 2020

Posted by in Pandemic

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We’re now said to be on the cusp of a “second wave” of coronavirus infections. It’s become a new focus of media attention in the past week or so. Increased infections have been reported across a number of states, especially in the south, but I’m not especially alarmed at this point for reasons explained below. Either way, the public policy response will certainly be different this time, at least in most areas. We’ve learned that a more targeted approach to managing coronavirus risk is far less costly, which means eschewing general lockdowns in favor of focusing resources on protecting the most vulnerable. That approach is supported by research weighing the costs and benefits of the alternatives (also see here and here).

The targeted approach I’ve advocated does not call for any less caution on the part of individuals. That means avoiding prolonged, close contact with others, especially indoors. I don’t mind wearing a mask when inside stores or public buildings, but I believe it should be voluntary. I do my best to stay out of close proximity to most others in public places anyway, masked or otherwise. This is voluntary social distancing. I also believe public health authorities should be more active in disseminating information on known correlates of coronavirus severity, such as Vitamin D deficiency, high LDL cholesterol, and the “reverse seasonal effect” caused by low humidity in air-conditioned spaces. I would also strongly agree that the effort to identify and mass produce vaccine candidates, known as Operation Warp Speed, should be ramped up considerably, with heavier funding and more than five vaccine candidates.

We’ve seen a continuing increase in coronavirus testing since my last “framing” post about a month ago. Testing has increased to a daily average of almost 500,000 over the past two weeks. At present we appear to have an excess supply of testing capacity in many areas, as Rich Lowry notes:

“The problem with testing nationally is becoming less a shortfall of availability of the tests and more a shortfall of people showing up to get tested. An insider in the diagnostics industry says that laboratories are reporting that they are ‘sample starved’ — i.e., they aren’t getting enough specimens. He notes, ‘We have all seen stories about sample-collection sites in some regions not seeing that many patients.’

An HHS official says that in May there was the capacity to do twice as many tests as were actually performed, calling it a function of ‘allocation and efficiency, but more just demand.’ Says Giroir, ‘We really see areas in the country now that there’s more tests available than people who want to get tested or the need for testing.'”

Before turning to some charts, a word about the data in the charts I’ve been using throughout the pandemic. Some of the nationwide information was directly from the CDC or the Johns Hopkins dashboard. In other cases, I’ve reported state level data and some nationwide data published by The COVID Tracking Project (CTP) and the COVID Time Series (CTS) dashboard, which uses state data from CTP. I first noticed a few discrepancies in the national totals in April, which have become larger with growth in the counts of cases and deaths. Here is a key part of CTP’s explanation:

“For many states, the CDC publishes higher testing numbers than the states themselves report, which raises questions about the structure and integrity of both state and federal data reporting. … Another point of contrast between the CDC’s new reporting and the official state data compiled by The COVID Tracking Project is that the CDC has not released historical, state-level testing data for the first three months of the outbreak.”

Thus, the CDC currently reports almost 120,000 U.S. deaths, while CTP reports about 112,000. Nevertheless, I will continue to report numbers from both sources for the sake of continuity, and I will try to remember to note the source in each case.

The first chart below shows the number of daily tests from CTP; the second chart shows the number of daily confirmed cases (CTP). Since mid-May, daily testing has increased by more than 50%, calculated on a moving average basis, and is now approaching half a million per day or more than 3 million per week. Pooled testing is coming, which will ultimately increase testing capacity several-fold. Daily confirmed cases have been hovered just above 20,000 since around Memorial Day, with a recent turn upward to around 24,000.

Early in the pandemic, I made the mistake of focusing too heavily on case numbers. Yes, I adjusted for population size and was aware that the initial shortage of tests was restraining diagnoses. Still, I did not foresee the great expansion in testing we’ve witnessed, the great transmissibility of the virus in some regions, nor the large number of asymptomatic cases that would ultimately be diagnosed.

The daily percentage of positive tests (CTP), which is smoothed in the chart below using a seven-day moving average to eliminate within-week variability, has declined gradually since early April to about 4% before the uptick in the last few days. Still, that’s a drop of about 75% from the peak when tests were in very short supply. Those were days when even heavily symptomatic individuals were having trouble getting tested.

We’d hope to see a resumption in the decline of the positive percentage as testing continues to grow, but even with a relatively constant positivity rate, the number of daily confirmed cases must grow as testing expands. There may be several reasons the positivity rate has remained stubbornly near 5% over the past few weeks. One is the obvious reversal in social distancing as states have opened up. People became less fearful about the virus in general, and protesters jammed the streets after the George Floyd murder in Minneapolis. Another reason is that there are new areas of focus for testing that might be picking up cases. For example, hospitals in some states are now testing all admissions for COVID-19. This will tend to pick up more infections to the extent that individuals with co-morbidities are hospitalized at higher rates in general and are also more susceptible to the coronavirus. Finally, testing more broadly is likely to pick up a larger share of asymptomatic cases even as the “true rate” of infection declines.

The daily death toll (CTP) attributed to coronavirus has continued to decline. See below. It is now running at about a third of the peak level it reached in mid-April. There are several reasons for the decline. One is the lower number of active cases, changes in which lead deaths by a few weeks. Awareness and testing capacity have undoubtedly led to earlier diagnosis of the most severe cases. There is also the strong possibility that the virus, having felled some of the most susceptible individuals, is now up against more hosts with effective immune responses. An ongoing degree of social distancing, more humid weather, and more direct sunlight have probably reduced initial viral loads from those experienced early-on, when the case load was escalating. Finally, treatment has improved in multiple ways, and there are now a few medications that have shown promise in shortening the duration and severity of infection.

The course of the pandemic has varied greatly across countries and across regions of the U.S. The New York City area was especially hard hit along with several other large cities, as well as Louisiana. CTS shows that states with the highest cumulative number of coronavirus deaths (New York (blue line), New Jersey (green), Massachusetts, Illinois, and Pennsylvania in the charts below) have experienced downward trends in positive cases per day (the first chart below), leading daily deaths downward in May and early June (the second chart — NY’s downtrend began earlier). I apologize if the charts below are difficult to read, but they have resisted my efforts at resizing. Note: I’m mainly focused on trends here, and I have not shown these series on a per capita basis.

More recently, almost two dozen states have begun to see higher daily case diagnoses. Several of these had more favorable outcomes in the early months of the pandemic and were in more advanced stages of reopening. The charts below (CTS) show results for Arizona, Florida, Georgia, and Texas. The new “hot spots” in these states are mostly urban centers. It’s not clear that the reopenings are to blame, however. The protests after George Floyd’s murder may have contributed in cities like Houston, though no increase in New York is apparent as yet. The states in the chart are all in the south or southwest, so the increases have occurred despite sunny, warm conditions. It’s possible that hot weather has prompted more intensive use of air conditioning, which dries indoor environments and can promote the spread of the virus. These southern states have not yet experienced a corresponding increase in deaths, though that would occur with a lag. 

Missouri has seen an slow upward trend in its daily positive test count over the past four weeks, even though the state’s positive rate has trended down slowly since early May. I show MO’s confirmed cases per day below (in green) together with Illinois’ (because my hometown is on the border and the two states are a nice contrast). IL is much larger and has had a much higher case load, but the downward trend in new cases in IL is impressive. Coronavirus deaths per day are shown in the second chart below, with seven-day averages superimposed. Deaths have also trended down in both states, though MO has experienced a few bad days very recently, and MO’s case fatality rate is slightly higher than in IL.

We’ll know fairly soon whether we’re really headed for a second major wave. However, the case count, in and of itself, is not too informative. Testing has increased markedly, so we would expect to see more cases diagnosed. The percent of tests that are positive is a better indicator, and it has flattened at a still uncomfortable 5% for about a month, with a slight uptick in the past few days. Even more telling will be the future path of coronavirus deaths. My expectation is that more recent infections are likely to be less deadly, if only because of the lessons learned about protecting the care-bound elderly. I also believe we’re not too far from what I have called effective herd immunity. 

The pandemic has taken a heavy toll, especially among the aged. In fact, total deaths in the U.S. have now exceeded both the Hong Kong flu of the late 1960s and the Asian flu of the late 1950s. Unfortunately, risks will remain elevated for some time. However, any reasonable estimate of the life-years lost is considerably less than in those earlier pandemics due to the differing age profiles of the victims. In any case, the coronavirus pandemic has not been the kind of apocalyptic event that was originally feared and erroneously predicted by several prominent epidemiological models. It can be tackled effectively and at much lower cost by focusing resources on protecting vulnerable segments of the population. 

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Trump Hates/Loves Lockdowns, Dumps on Swedes

07 Sunday Jun 2020

Posted by in Health Care, Pandemic

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President Trump was in a festive mood last Friday, pleased with the May employment report, as he should be. But in his Rose Garden word jam, he made some questionable and unnecessary claims about coronavirus policies in the U.S. and the Swedish experience. I credit Trump for pushing to end the lockdowns as it became clear that they were both unhealthy and unsustainable. However, he’s now way too eager to cover his earlier tracks. That is, he is now defensive about the precautions he advocated on the advice of his medical experts in March and early April.

In the Rose Garden, Trump said that lockdowns were necessary to stop the spread of the virus. But to assert that lockdowns “stopped” or even slowed the spread of the virus is speculation at best, and they had deadly effects of their own. Most of the social distancing was achieved through voluntary action, as I have argued previously. Lockdown advocacy lacked any semblance of geographic nuance, as if uniform application makes sense regardless of population density.

Trump went on to say that Sweden was in “bad shape” because it did not impose a lockdown during the pandemic. This is not a new position for the president, but the facts are anything but clear-cut. Again, there is mixed evidence on whether mandatory lockdowns have a real impact on the spread or mortality of the coronavirus (also see here). That’s not to say that social distancing doesn’t work, but much of the benefit comes from private decisions to mitigate risk via distancing. Of course, that also depends on whether people have good information to act on. And to be fair, Sweden did take certain measures such as banning gatherings of more than 50 people, closing schools, and limiting incoming travel.

While the full tale has not been told, and Sweden’s death rate is high on a per capita basis, several other Western European countries that imposed lockdowns have had even higher death rates. The following chart is from the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IMHE). It is expressed in terms of coronavirus deaths per 100,000 of population. The orange line is Sweden, the purple line is Belgium, and the light blue line is the UK. Actuals are reported through June 4th. While Sweden’s death toll has a somewhat steeper gradient, the level remains well below both Belgium and the UK. It is also lower than the death rates for Italy and Spain, and it is about the same as France’s death rate. Yes, a number of other countries have lower death rates, including the U.S., but the evidence is hardly consistent with Trump’s characterization.

Sweden’s big mistake was not it’s decision to rely on voluntary social distancing, but in failing to adequately protect highly vulnerable populations. The country’s elderly skew older than most countries by several years. Residents of nursing homes have accounted for about half of Sweden’s coronavirus deaths, an international outlier. Inadequate preparedness in elder care has been a particular problem, including a lack of personal protective equipment for workers. There was also a poorly implemented volunteer program, intended to fill-out staffing needs, that appears to have aggravated transmission of the virus.

Sweden has also experienced a concentration of cases and deaths among its large immigrant population. It has the largest immigrant population among the Nordic countries, with large numbers of low income migrants from Syria, Iraq, Iran, Somalia and parts of Eastern Europe. Earlier in the pandemic, according to one estimate, 40% of coronavirus fatalities in Stockholm were in the Somali population. These immigrants tend to live in dense conditions, often in multigenerational households. Many residents with health problems tend to go untreated. Conditions like Vitamin D deficiency and high cholesterol, apparent risk factors for coronavirus severity, likely go untreated in these communities. In addition, language barriers and traditional trust relationships may diminish the effectiveness of communications from public health authorities. In fact, some say the style of Swedish public health messaging was too culturally idiosyncratic to be of much use to immigrants. And one more thing: immigrants are a disproportionately high 28% of nursing home staff in Sweden, implying an intimacy between two vulnerable populations that almost surely acts as a risk multiplier in both.

It might be too harsh to suggest that that Sweden could have prevented the outsized impact of the virus on immigrants. However, Sweden’s coronavirus testing has not been as intensive as other Nordic countries. More testing might have helped alleviate the spread of the virus in nursing homes and in immigrant communities. But the vulnerabilities of the immigrant population might be more a matter of inadequate health care than anything else, both on the demand and supply sides.

Contrary to Trump’s characterization, Sweden’s herd immunity strategy is not the reason for it’s relatively high death rate from the virus. Several countries that imposed lockdowns have had higher death rates. And Sweden’s death rate has been heavily concentrated among the aged in nursing homes and its large immigrant population. It’s possible that Sweden’s approach led to a cavalier attitude with respect identifying vulnerable groups and taking measures that could have protected them, including more intensive testing. Nevertheless, it’s inaccurate and unfair to scapegoat Sweden for not imposing a mandatory lockdown. The choice is not merely whether to impose lockdowns, but how to protect vulnerable populations at least cost. In that sense, general lockdowns are a poor choice.

 

Trump and Coronavirus

26 Tuesday May 2020

Posted by in Pandemic, Public Health, Risk Management, Stimulus, Trump Administration

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It’s a bit early to fully evaluate President Trump’s performance in dealing with the coronavirus pandemic, but there are a number of criteria on which I might assign marks. I’ll address some of those below, but in so doing I’m reminded of Jerry Garcia’s quip that he was “shopping around for something no one will like.” That might be how this goes. Of course, many of the sub-topics are worthy of lengthier treatment. The focus here is on the pandemic and not more general aspects of his performance in office, though there is some unavoidable overlap.

General “Readiness”

Many have criticized the Trump Administration for not being “ready” for a pandemic. I assign no grade on that basis because absolutely no one was ready, at least not in the West, so there is no sound premise for judgement. I also view the very general charge that Trump did not provide “leadership” as code for either “I don’t like him”, or “he refused to impose more authoritarian measures”, like a full-scale nationwide lockdown. Such is the over-prescriptive instinct of the Left.

Equally misleading is the allegation that Trump had “disbanded” the White House pandemic response team, and I have addressed that here. First, while the NSC would play a coordinating role, pandemic response is supposed to be the CDC’s job, when it isn’t too busy with diseases of social injustice to get it done. Second, it was John Bolton who executed a reorganization at the NSC. There were two high profile departures from the team in question at the time, and one one was a resignation. Most of the team’s staff remained with the NSC with the same duties as before the reirganization.

Finally, there was the matter of a distracting impeachment on false charges. This effort lasted through the first three years of Trump’s administration, finally culminating in January 2020. Perhaps the Administration would have had more time to focus on what was happening in China without the histrionics from the opposition party. So whatever else I might say below, these factors weigh toward leniency in my appraisal of Trump’s handing of the virus.

Messaging: C

As usual, Trump’s messaging during the pandemic was often boorish and inarticulate. His appearances at coronavirus briefings were no exception, often cringeworthy and sometimes featuring misinterpretations of what his team of experts was saying. He was inconsistent in signaling optimism and pessimism, as were many others such as New York Governor Andrew Cuomo and New York City Mayor Bill De Blasio. It shifted from “the virus is about like the flu” in February to a more sober assessment by mid-March. This was, however, quite consistent with the messaging from Dr. Anthony Fauci over the same time frame, as well as the World Health Organization (WHO). Again, no one really knew what to expect, so it’s understandable. A great deal of that can be ascribed to “the fog of war”.

Delegation and Deference: B

Trump cannot be accused of ignoring expert advice through the episode. He was obviously on-board with Fauci, Dr. Deborah Birx, Dr. Robert Redfield, and other health care advisors on the “15 Days to Slow the Spread” guidelines issued on March 16. His messaging wavered during those 15 days, expressing a desire to fully reopen the nation by Easter, which Vice President Michael Pence later described as “aspirational”. Before the end of March, however, Trump went along with a 30-day extension of the guidelines. Finally, by mid-April, the White House released guidelines for “Opening Up America Again“, which was a collaboration between Trump’s health care experts and the economic team. Trump agreed that the timeline for reopening should be governed by “the data”. There is no question, however, that Trump was chomping at the bit for reopening at several stages of this process. I see value in that positioning, as it conveys an intent to reopen asap and that people should have confidence in progress toward that goal.  

International Travel Bans: A

If anyone wonders why the world was so thoroughly blindsided by the coronavirus, look no further than China’s failure to deliver a proper warning as 2019 drew to a close. Wuhan, China was ground zero; the virus spread to the rest of the world with travelers out of Wuhan and other Chinese cities. The White House announced severe restrictions on flights from China on January 31, including a two-week quarantine for returning U.S. citizens. In retrospect, it wasn’t a minute too soon, yet for that precaution, Trump was attacked as a racist by the Left. In early February, WHO actually said travel bans were unnecessary, among other missteps. Other bans were instituted on entry from Iran and Brazil, as well as entry from Europe in early March, as countries around the globe closed their borders. Trump’s actions on incoming travelers were prescient, so I’ll score this one for Trump. Some of these travel restrictions can and should be eased now, and certainly that is expected in coming months, so we’ll see how well that process is managed.

Deference to States: A-

As a federalist, I was pleased that Trump and his team left most of the specifics on closures and bans on public gatherings up to state and local governments. That allowed more targeted mitigation efforts as dictated by local conditions and, to some extent, public opinion. This is a classic case of “laboratory federalism” whereby the most effective policies can be identified, though as we’ve seen, there’s no guarantee less successful states will emulate them. I grade Trump well on this one.

On reopening, too, Trump has been a consistent advocate of allowing flexility where local conditions permit, though he wrongly claimed he had “total authority” over ending social distancing rules. It’s hard to square that remark with his general stand on the issue of autonomy except as a tactic to strong-arm certain governors on other points.   

CDC/FDA Snafus: D

I applaud the Administration for its emphasis on the salutary effects of deregulation, but Trump went along with some major pieces of “expert advice” that were not only poor from regulatory perspective, but an affront to federalism. One was a directive issued by the CDC to delay “all elective surgeries, non-essential medical, surgical, and dental procedures during the 2019 Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak“. (See my post “Suspending Medical Care in the Name of Public Health“.)

This is exactly the kind of “one size fits all” regulatory policy that has proven so costly, sacrificing not just economic activity but lives and care for the sick, creating avoidable illnesses and complications. The idea was to assure that adequate health care resources were available to treat an onslaught of coronavirus patients, but that was unneeded in most jurisdictions. And while the contagion was in it’s early “exponential” phase at the time, a more nuanced approach could have been adopted to allow different geographic areas and facilities more discretion, especially for different kinds of patients, or perhaps something less than a complete suspension of care. In any case, the extensions into May were excessive. I must grade Trump poorly for allowing this to happen, despite what must have been extreme pressure to follow “expert advice” on the point and the others discussed earlier.

That’s not the only point on which I blame Trump for caving to the CDC. In a case of massive regulatory failure, the CDC and FDA put the U.S. well over a month behind on testing when the first signs of the virus appeared here. Not only did they prohibit private labs and universities from getting testing underway, insisting on exclusive use of the CDC’s own tests, they also distributed faulty tests in early February that took over a month to replace. The FDA also enforced barriers to imported N95-type masks during the pandemic. Trump tends to have a visceral understanding of the calcifying dangers of regulation, but he let the so-called “experts” call the shots here. Big mistake, and Trump shares the blame with these agencies.  

Health Resources: B-

Managing the emergency distribution of PPE and ventilators to states did not go as smoothly as might have been hoped. The shortage itself left FEMA with the unenviable task of allocating quantities that could never satisfy all demands. A few states were thought to have especially acute needs, but there was also an obligation to hold stockpiles against potential requests from other states. In fact, a situation of this kind creates an incentive for states to overstate their real needs, and there are indications that such was the case. Trump sparred with a few governors over these allocations. There is certainly blame to be shared, but I won’t grade Trump down for this.

Vaccines and Treatments: C+

 

The push to develop vaccines might not achieve success soon, if ever, but a huge effort is underway. Trump gets some of the credit for that, as well as the investment in capacity now to produce future vaccine candidates in large quantities. As for treatments, he was very excited about the promise of hydroxychloraquine, going so far as to take it himself with zinc, a combination for which no fully randomized trial results have been reported (the recent study appearing in the Lancet on HCQ taken by itself has been called into question). Trump also committed an unfortunate gaffe when the DHS announced the results of a study showing that sunlight kills coronavirus in a matter of minutes, as do bleach and other disinfectants. Trump mused that perhaps sunlight or some form of disinfectant could be used as a treatment for coronavirus patients. He might have been thinking about an old and controversial practice whereby blood is exposed to UV light and then returned to the body. Later, he said he used the term “disinfectant” sarcastically, but he probably meant to say “euphemistically” …. I’m not sure he knows the difference. In any case, his habit of speculating on such matters is often unhelpful, and he loses points for that.

Fiscal Policy: B

The several phases of the economic stimulus program were a collaboration between the Trump Administration and Congress. A reasonably good summary appears here. The major parts were the $2.3 trillion CARES Act in late March and a nearly $500 billion supplemental package in late April. These packages were unprecedented in size. Major provisions were direct cash payments and the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), which provides loans and grants to small businesses. The execution of both was a bit clunky, especially PPP, which placed a burden on private banks to extend the loans but was sketchy in terms of qualifications. The extension of unemployment compensation left some workers with more benefits than they earned in their former jobs, which could be an impediment to reopening. There were a number of other reasonable measures in these packages and the two smaller bills that preceded them in March. A number of these measures were well-targeted and inventive, such as waiving early withdrawal penalties from IRA and 401(k) balances. The Trump Administration deserves credit for helping to shape these efforts as well as others taken independently by the executive branch. 

Trump’s proposal to suspend payroll taxes did not fly, at least not yet. The idea is to reduce the cost of hiring and increase the return to work, if only temporarily. This is not a particularly appealing idea because so much of the benefits would flow to those who haven’t lost their jobs. It could be improved if targeted at new hires and rehires, however.

Trump’s proposal to grant liability waivers to reopened private businesses is extremely contentious, but one I support. Lockdowns are being eased under the weight of often heavy public and private regulation of conduct. As John Cochrane says in “Get Ready for the Careful Economy“: 

“One worry on regulation is that it will provide a recipe for a wave of lawsuits. That may have been a reason the Administration tried to hold back CDC guidance. A long, expensive, and impractical list of things you must do to reopen is catnip when someone gets sick and wants to blame a business. Show us the records that you wiped down the bathrooms every half hour. A legal system that can sue over talcum powder is not above this.”

Indeed, potential liability might represent a staggering cost to many businesses, one that might not be insurable. Accusations of negligence, true or false, can carry significant legal costs. Customers and employees, not just businesses, must accept some of the burden of risks of doing business. I give Trump good marks for this one, but we’ll see if it goes anywhere.

Some of the proposals for new stimulus legislation from democrats are much worse, including diversity initiatives, massive subsidies for “green” technologies, and bailouts for state and local government for unfunded pension liabilities. None of these has anything to do with the virus. The burden of pension shortfalls in some states should not fall on taxpayers nationwide, but on the states that incurred them. The Trump Administration and congressional Republicans should continue resisting these opportunistic proposals.

The Grade

Without assigning weights to the sub-topics covered above, I’d put the overall grade for Trump and his Administration’s handling of matters during the pandemic at about a B-, thus far. When it comes to politics, it’s often unfair to credit or blame one side for the promulgation of an overall set of policies. Nevertheless, I think it’s fair to say that Trump, could have done much better and could have done much worse. We will learn more with the passage of time, the continued evolution of the virus, the development of treatments or vaccines, and the course of the economy.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Suspending Medical Care In the Name of Public Health

23 Saturday May 2020

Posted by in Health Care, Pandemic

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Step back in time six months and ask any health care professional about the consequences of suspending delivery of most medical care for a period of months. Forget about the coronavirus for a moment and just think about that “hypothetical”. These experts would have answered, uniformly, that it would be cataclysmic: months of undiagnosed cardiac and stroke symptoms; no cancer screenings, putting patients months behind on the survival curve; deferred procedures of all kinds; run-of-the-mill infections gone untreated; palsy and other neurological symptoms anxiously discounted by victims at home; a hold on treatments for all sorts of other progressive diseases; and patients ordinarily requiring hospitalization sent home. And to start back up, new health problems must compete with all that deferred care. Do you dare tally the death and other worsened outcomes? Both are no doubt significant.

What you just read has been a reality for more than two months due to federal and state orders to halt non-emergency medical procedures in the U.S. The intent was to conserve hospital capacity for a potential rush of coronavirus patients and to prevent others from exposure to the virus. That might have made sense in hot spots like New York, but even there the provision of temporary capacity went almost completely unused. Otherwise, clearing hospitals of non-Covid patients, who could have been segregated, was largely unnecessary. The fears prompted by these orders impacted delivery of care in emergency facilities: people have assiduously avoided emergency room visits. Even most regular office visits were placed on hold. And as for the reboot, there are health care facilities that will not survive the financial blow, leaving communities without local sources of care.

A lack of access to health care is one source of human misery, but let’s ask our health care professional about another “hypothetical”: the public health consequences of an economic depression. She would no doubt predict that the stresses of joblessness and business ruin would be acute. It’s reasonable to think of mental health issues first. Indeed, in the past two months, suicide hotlines have seen calls spike by multiples of normal levels (also see here and here). But the stresses of economic disaster often manifest in failing physical health as well. Common associations include hypertension, heart disease, migraines, inflammatory responses, immune deficiency, and other kinds of organ failure.

The loss of economic output during a shutdown can never be recovered. Goods don’t magically reappear on the shelves by government mandate. Running the printing press in order to make government benefit payments cannot make us whole. The output loss will permanently reduce the standard of living, and it will reduce our future ability to deal with pandemics and other crises by eroding the resources available to invest in public health, safety, and disaster relief.

What would our representative health care professional say about the health effects of a mass quarantine, stretching over months? What are the odds that it might compound the effects of the suspension in care? Confinement and isolation add to stress. In an idle state of boredom and dejection, many are unmotivated and have difficulty getting enough exercise. There may be a tendency to eat and drink excessively. And misguided exhortations to “stay inside” certainly would never help anyone with a Vitamin D deficiency, which bears a striking association with the severity of coronavirus infections.

But to be fair, was all this worthwhile in the presence of the coronavirus pandemic? What did health care professionals and public health officials know at the outset, in early to mid-March? There was lots of alarming talk of exponential growth and virus doubling times. There were anecdotal stories of younger people felled by the virus. Health care professionals were no doubt influenced by the dire conditions under which colleagues who cared for virus victims were working.

Nevertheless, a great deal was known in early March about the truly vulnerable segments of the population, even if you discount Chinese reporting. Mortality rates in South Korea and Italy were heavily skewed toward the aged and those with other risk factors. One can reasonably argue that health care professionals and policy experts should have known even then how best to mitigate the risks of the virus. That would have involved targeting high-risk segments of the population for quarantine, and treatment for the larger population in-line with the lower risks it actually faced. Vulnerable groups require protection, but death rates from coronavirus across the full age distribution closely mimic mortality from other causes, as the chart at the top of this chart shows.

The current global death toll is still quite small relative to major pandemics of the past (Spanish Flu, 1918-19: ~45 million; Asian Flu, 1957-58: 1.1 million; Hong Kong flu, 1969: 1 million; Covid-19 as of May 22: 333,000). But by mid-March, people were distressed by one particular epidemiological model (Neil Ferguson’s Imperial College Model, subsequently exposed as slipshod), predicting 2.2 million deaths in the U.S. (We are not yet at 100,000 deaths). Most people were willing to accept temporary non-prescription measures to “slow the spread“. But unreasonable fear and alarm, eagerly promoted by the media, drove the extension of lockdowns across the U.S. by up to two extra months in some states, and perhaps beyond.

The public health and policy establishment did not properly weigh the health care and economic costs of extended lockdowns against the real risks of the coronavirus. I believe many health care workers were goaded into supporting ongoing lockdowns in the same way as the public. They had to know that the suspension of medical care was a dire cost to pay, but they fell in line when the “experts” insisted that extensions of the lockdowns were worthwhile. Some knew better, and much of the public has learned better.